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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The Puzzle 
 
 
“The Americans have given us their best shot…that will address our 
security needs…being one that does not provide security guarantees, no 
hard promises on NATO but a complex of programs and assistance 
wherein the hope is that the whole will appear to exceed the sum of the 
parts and convey the impression of security.”1  
 
Words of the former Latvian ambassador to the U.S. Ojans Kalnins are very illustrative and 
exemplify an intense struggle of motives, factors and considerations of those countries that 
decided to embark on the road of NATO – membership. The message became even more 
vivid, as Georgia became an enthusiastic aspirant to join the Alliance, and the events of the 
brief Russo - Georgian war in August 2008 once again heated up the debate about the role the 
Alliance could play for potential candidate countries internally and strategially. But it also 
questioned the effectiveness of defence reforms performed in Georgia under the NATO – 
mentorship, since neither the mode of action of the Georgian leadership nor the quality of 
combat performance of Georgian units against invading Russian force were regarded in the 
West as satisfactory.
2
 Armenia did not have to go through the similar events full of violence, 
yet its relations to the West proved to be not less turbulent. It refused to sign the well – 
advanced Assosiation Agreement with the European Union (EU) at Vilnius Summit (28 - 29 
November 2013) and joind the Russian designed Customs Union in September  short before 
the EU – Summit.3 However, against all expectations, it did not abandon any existing 
mechanisms of cooperation with NATO. In contrary, despite its membership in the Russian 
                                                 
1
 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 162. 
2
 For extensive picture of events surrounding the Russo – Georgian war see : Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War 
That Shool the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (Macmillan, 2010); Svante E Cornell and S. 
Frederick Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia (Routledge, 2014); Mikhail Barabanov, 
Vyacheslav Tseluiko, and Anton Lavrov, Tanks of August, Ruslan Pukhov (Ed.) (Moscow: Centre for Analysis 
of Strategies and Technologies, 2010), available at http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=386; Heidi Tagliavini, 
―Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,‖ September 2009, 
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf. 
3
 Vladimir Socor, ―European Union‘s Eastern Partnership Unwanted by Armenia, Inadequate to Azerbaijan,‖ 
Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, December 9, 2013, available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41737&no_cache=1#.VcYN0fmqqko. 
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led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) it continued to expand its ties to the 
Alliance and to its prominent members bilaterally. In both cases, the way countries designed 
and executed their policies towards the Alliance generated a generic question of NATO – 
relevance, which naturally asked for the motives of national behavior and the effectiveness of 
existing cooperation mechanisms, i.e. benefits expected and gained.   
 
The strategic importance of NATO for neighboring countries has never been doubted. 
However, only after the radical change of the strategic environment in the early 1990s, did it 
truly assume its global importance, open the debate over the enlargement process and thus, 
become able to influence or define the policy objectives of countries embarked on close 
cooperation with the Alliance. Not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union all South 
Caucasus (SC) republics adopted a cooperative framework with the Alliance, with Armenia 
joining the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) in 2005 as the last.
1
 Georgia was 
among the first nations to join the Partnership For Peace framework (PFP) in 1994, switched 
then to IPAP in 2004 and managed to receive the Intensified Dialogue (ID) in 2006.
2
 Despite 
the failure to obtain the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at Bucharest Summit in 2008, 
Georgia has been the only country after Baltic States systematically pursuing its declared 
objective to become a full member of the alliance and adopted the Annual National Program 
(ANP) in 2008.
3
 The intensity and density of the relationship between NATO and the defence 
institutions in Armenia and Georgia led to the creation of a complex set of similar issue - 
areas, where the national/domestic constituencies had been exposed to various modes of 
external institutional influence, and processes of integrative adaptation unfolded. Hence, the 
overview of the period stretching back to early millennium (from 2004 - to 2012) inevitably 
invites us to investigate the motives and benefits of national cooperative policy approaches, 
and formulate the basic question of, whether the results produced within the established 
defence cooperation frameworks indeed can be translated as effects of NATO‘s 
transformative (enforcing) power.  
 
                                                 
1
 Alexander Iskanderyan, ―NATO and Armenia: A Long Game of Complementarism,‖ Caucasus Analytical 
Digest, no. 5 (April 2009): 17; Nigel Chamberlain and Ian Davis, ―NATO and the South Caucasus: Closer to 
War than Peace?,‖ Briefing Paper (NATO Watch, September 11, 2012), 3, available at 
http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/briefing_paper_no.25_-_nato_in_the_south_caucasus.pdf. 
2
 Jim Nichol, ―Georgia (Republic) and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications,‖ CRS Report for Congress, 
RS22829 (Washington D.C., March 7, 2008), 1–2, available at 
 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103692.pdf. 
3
 Archil Gegeshidze, ―Post-War Georgia: Resetting Euro-Atlantic Aspirations?,‖ Caucasus Analytical Digest, 
no. 5 (April 16, 2009): 7. 
5 
 
There is little doubt about NATO‘s ability to exert global influence, without which the 
international security architecture would be hard to imagine. Its capacity to influence ranges 
from the very material dimension of military power, to the elusive and intangible effects of 
functional professionalization. Its unifying power was recognized long before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, motivating Karl Deutsch to assign to it the quality of the Community in the 
North-Atlantic area
1
. The paradigm of the Cold War heavily influenced the way academic 
scholarship reviewed the Alliance. Despite numerous and valuable attempts, the majority of 
academic contributions remained policy - driven. The discussion was subsumed by broader 
regional security studies and international relations (IR) that repeatedly raised the question of 
the Alliance‘s organizational purpose and durability, leaving other not less relevant questions 
unattended
2
. In this study we attempt to alleviate the existing scholarly deficit by focusing on 
a particular aspect of the NATO-analysis - the Alliance‘s capacity to influence its partner 
countries‘ policy-making (formulation and implementation) in the defence area and, by doing 
so, to ensure compliance with NATO‘s commonly agreed norms and standards. The cases of 
Georgia and Armenia serve here as the best examples of countries that share the general 
context of strong historical and societal similarity, are exposed to NATO-cooperation 
processes, yet starkly differ in political orientations, strategic actions and policy outcomes.  
 
1.2 The Scholarly Debate and Existing Cleavages   
 
NATO scholarship had been largely dominated by the classical divide between the realist and 
constructivist stands. Various theoretical approaches have been adopted to test the validity of 
NATO - related claims from both mainstream perspectives (Realist: Hyde-Price 2007; 
Running, 2005; Ratti, 2006; Duffield, 1995 and Constructivist: Schimmelfennig, 1998, 2003, 
2005; Gheciu, 2005, Ciuta, 2002).
3
 The key element of realist thought, the struggle for power 
and dominance as the rationale for state survival, had been seriously challenged after the 
collapse of the major communist foe – the Soviet Union. Realist authors regarded the 
                                                 
1
 Karl W. et al. Deutsch, ―Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,‖ in The European Union, Readings 
on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Third ed. by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb 
(Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1957). 
2
 Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price, ―Theorizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,‖ in Joint Sessions 
of Workshops (Lisbon, 2009), 1. 
3
 Mark Webber, ―Theorizing NATO - More than a Defence Alliance?‖ (NATO at 60: Reflecting on the Past – 
Anticipating the Future Wednesday, Copenhagen, 2009), available at 
http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Events/2009/M._Webber_NATO_at_60_DIIS.pdf; Webber and Hyde-Price, 
―Theorizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.‖ 
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government‘s action as a rational choice in the strategic environment of international politics.1 
Thus they questioned the durability and the very purpose of the preservation of key western 
military alliance - NATO, based on the assumption of diverging interests of the member-
states in post Cold War era.
2
 Joseph Grieco offered the amended prisoners’ dilemma as the 
alternative view with a more penetrating analysis of the limitations of international 
cooperation while preserving the realist underpinning of state-behavior. He accurately depicts 
the complex relationship between the rank ordering of relative pay offs (gains) and the 
defined set of sensitivity factors, which leads him to conclude that states will refuse, limit or 
abandon cooperative commitments if they expect their relative gains to be disproportionately 
low.
3
 Gradually the sociological foundation of global power politics and cooperation, so 
vehemently rejected before, found its cautious recognition within rationalist authors‘ claims. 
Though the principle of interest-based behavior remained unchanged, it appeared to be fully 
plausible now that while forming alliances, great powers would seek likeminded partners 
regardless their relative power, or cooperate and advance shared interests based on internal 
regime similarity.
4
  
 
The proponents of another rationalist school that of neoliberal institutionalism, stressed the 
huge relevance of domestic constituencies, incentives and cost calculations while deciding for 
the particular mode of international behavior: compliance or defection. Correctly labeled by 
Michael McFaul as the ―forgotten dimension‖, the international factors of domestic change 
became essential to establish causal linkages between domestic actors and external agents.
5
 
However, the focus on effects caused domestically by an external actor 
(institution/organization) and, conversely, the domestic sources of international behavior, 
enjoyed less attention in liberal scholarship, once applied to international security institutions 
and NATO in particular. The realm of economic cooperation had been intensively studied by 
neo-liberal scholars and generated brilliant analysis on conditionality and compliance on 
                                                 
1
 Robert G. Kaufman, Review of ‗Statecraft, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Making: The El Chamizal 
Dispute‘ by Alan C. Lamborn and Stephen P. Mumme,‖ The Journal of Politics 51, no. 3 (August 1989): 791. 
2
 Mearsheimer 1990, Waltz 1993, Walt 1999, Kagan 2002. See more  in Erik Voeten, ―Resisting the Lonely 
Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to U.S. Dominance,‖ The Journal of Politics 66, no. 3 
(August 2004): 733. 
3
 Joseph M. Grieco, ―Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma Model,‖ The Journal of Politics 50, no. 3 (August 1988): 601–603. 
4
 Kevin Sweeney and Paul Fritz, ―Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power 
Alliances,‖ The Journal of Politics 66, no. 2 (May 2004): 429–440. 
5
 Michael McFaul, Amichai Magen, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ―Evaluating International Influences on 
Democratic Transitions: Concept Paper‖ (Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford 
University., 2007), 6,7, available at http://www.bangalured.net/world/Evaluating_International_Influences_-
_Transitions_-_Concept_Paper.pdf. 
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examples of state cooperation within the GATT, WTO, and the EU. They rendered 
exceptionally good general propositions worthy of application in other functional areas. For 
instance, Andrew Moravcsik holds national governments exposed to the influence of domestic 
interest - groups and committed to respond to their demands via various mechanisms of 
representation (democratic, social etc.).
1
 This aspect, among others, is also provided by 
Robert Putnam in his more developed system of the international political interplay 
(negotiations - two levels game), in which national executives are intensively involved to 
reach an international agreement. Born within this model, the conflict between internal and 
external (international) agendas poses a serious issue of political concern, deserving much 
more attention both theoretically and practically.  
 
Unfortunately, literature on NATO and other security organizations lacks such devotion and 
the same degree of interest to domestic sources of state - behavior, largely keeping the main 
focus on the problems of intra - institutional coordination, institutional adaptation, and the 
durability of the Alliance.
2
 Still, we are able to discern a common approach of institutionalist 
scholarship to security and military alliances. They are designed in a purposeful way ―in part 
to regulate internal political dynamics‖, but most importantly, they represent and serve as 
regimes, reflecting behavioral norms and expectations.
3
  The neoliberal view encompassed by 
Robert Keohane (1984, 1988) and Oran Young (1986) regards nation-states as purposeful 
actors aimed at utility maximization that enter shared commitments to benefit in the long-term 
(incentive based).
4
 The institutional approach became a valuable source of analysis due to the 
complexity of research questions that prerequisite the multidimensional nature of the 
research.
5
 Indeed, we need the valuable insights of different scholarly mainstreams to 
discover perhaps, single arguments, categories or some analytical concepts that once applied 
in a coherent manner would result in a convincing explanation of a particular social and 
political phenomenon. To do so, we need to identify additional areas of the academic 
                                                 
1
 Andrew Moravcsik, ―Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,‖ International 
Organization 51, no. 04 (1997): 518. 
2
 Celeste A. Wallander, ―Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,‖ International 
Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–35; Imperfcet Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, Helga 
Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); 
Alexander Siedschlag, NATO Meets the Post-Strategic Condition: Political Vicissitudes and Theoretical Puzzles 
in the Alliance’s First Wave of Adaptation, 1990-1997 (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998). 
3
 Andrew G. Long, Timothy Nordstrom, and Baek Kyeonghi, ―Allying for Peace: Treaty Obligations and 
Conflict between Allies,‖ The Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 103–104. 
4
 The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Powel W. Walter and Paul J. DiMaggio (Eds.) (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 6–7, available at 
www.stanford.edu/~woodyp/papers/dimaggioandpowell_intro.pdf. 
5
 Ibid., 27. 
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literature, where a major correlation of similar factors (external influence and effects on 
national policy formation/implementation) can be observed, and valuable findings can be 
borrowed.   
 
1.3 NATO – Enlargement: Identifying Linkages to 
Democratization Literature  
 
The notion of domestic constituencies, local interests and incentives as well as the very 
theoretical notion of ―relative gains‖ (pay - offs) so familiar to neoliberal and rationalist 
mainstreams represent pretty much the core of the discussion in the democratization literature. 
The international dimension of cooperation is another pillar of the mentioned scholarship. As 
Robert Putnam aptly puts it, international commitments require domestic ratification, and this 
may be limited due to the democratic nature of the country and the need of the governments to 
secure electoral support.
1
 In other words, as he continues, if international commitments and 
promises have been given without the proper consideration of preferences shared by domestic 
players, a significant backlash can be expected in a country enjoying the sufficient freedom of 
democracy.  As clearly manifested here, a strong link between the notion of conditionality and 
compliance is the pivotal element of democratization studies, in particular in the EU-
enlargement context. We don‘t intend to list the universe of authors and their contributions to 
the topic. Yet we will briefly sketch out the general results of their studies relevant to defence 
and security sector to enhance the common understanding of processes that are integral to the 
policy of conditionality and to the focus of our study.  
 
As the collapse of Soviet Union radically diminished the threat of a direct military 
confrontation with major foe, the importance of defence transformation and of the 
consolidation of other government institutions became a key precondition within the 
enlargement policy of the Alliance. The debate over enlarging the Alliance had from its very 
beginning the basic assumptions that new members could join the ―club‖ and that a new 
conceptual foundation needed to be adopted.
2
 The latter was desperately needed to justify the 
former and had covered many aspects of the Alliance‘s performance: from the global ability 
to project and provide security and democratic stability to the narrow questions of military 
                                                 
1
 Robert D. Putnam, ―Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,‖ International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 36–37. 
2
 Enlarging NATO: The National Debates, Mattox A. Gale and Arthur R. Rachwald (eds.) (Boulder Colorado, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 1. 
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effectiveness and combat interoperability with future member-state forces. Symptomatically, 
the low importance of military considerations behind the enlargement decision and the 
dominant role of the building a democratic community as the key mission among several 
driving rationales of enlargement gained growing momentum.
1
 The concept would be based 
on a simple principle of basic reciprocity:  on one hand NATO promises to take new members 
on board contingent on the implementation of reforms that would be relatively easy to verify 
via various inspections.
2
 These arguments are very much in line with institutionalists‘ claim 
that international organizations in particular can be effective in spreading (democratic) norms 
and changing national preferences. The Perry Principles developed in 1995 by the U.S. 
administration epitomize the essence of the consensus reached already by the early nineties 
among allied nations, highlighting the critical importance of the civilian control of defence 
and security sectors as means to encourage candidate nation to democratic reforms.
3
 A strong 
affinity to the claims of the democratic peace concept can‘t be overseen here. Furthermore, 
the supposed benefits of democratization turned to become an important ―public justification 
of NATO enlargement‖.4 An impressive number of authors advocated the principles of 
protecting democracies as the major justification for the NATO - expansion.
5
  For that reason, 
interlocking extended cooperation processes to various democratization mechanisms became 
the key pillar of policy development towards potential members. Given this tendency, three 
basic ―Goods‖ formulated by the German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier in his 
Spiegel article (April 2, 2009) to determine the membership chance (good for candidate, good 
for the alliance and good for pan-European security) were often less relevant in light of the 
new role of NATO as the promoter of democratic values with the ―the stringiest criteria‖ for 
membership, and democratic and military reform in particular.
6
  
 
Apart from the heavy democratic pillar of the alliance, the transformation process of the 
country itself represents a unique framework for the theoretical analysis as well as for 
practical testing in terms of compliance with NATO requirements. The literature provides two 
                                                 
1
 Sean Key, ―NATO Enlargement: Policy, Process, and Implications,‖ in America’s New Allies: Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, Andrew A. Michta (ed.) (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1999), 153. 
2
 Dan Reiter, ―Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,‖ International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 
2001): 52. 
3
 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, 147. 
4
 Ibid., 44. 
5
 See the complete list in  Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and 
Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
6
 Geoffrey Wright, ―Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during Unresolved 
Conflict,‖ Meditteranean Quarterly 20, no. 3 (2009): 22, doi:10.1215/10474552-2009-012. 
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general directions of the debate on democratic transformation: the first is occupied with basic 
characteristics of democracy in transitional states, and the second with the question of 
practical arrangements that have been met in order to meet the set requirements. A brief 
familiarization with this subject leads to the observation that despite great efforts spent in 
defining factors key to transitioning to effective democracy, few findings are provided for the 
greater insight on the mechanisms of compliance, implicit to the notion of the democratic 
transition. A wide range of structural factors has been analyzed by Jurgen Moeller and Svend 
- Erik Skaaning to formulate the thickness and thinness of democracy.
1
 Final charts 
containing the modernization indicators (BTI components), though very illustrative, proved to 
be less informative in terms of quality of democratic accomplishments.
2
 A non-standard view 
on the prospects of the democratic change in post-communist countries had been presented by 
Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, in which the O‘Donnel - Schmitter‘ idea of the 
pact-based democracy is rejected due to the low chance of producing stabile democratic 
regimes through revolutionary changes.
3
 The volume avoids going into depth in the realm of 
institution building and the mechanisms of compliance to democratic requirements. However, 
it renders very illustrative findings that underscore the key importance of the generic will to 
implement the democratic agenda by the dominant political force during the democratic 
transition.
4
 
 
The democratization literature often tries to attribute failures and successes in different 
countries to various structural or political factors. Some authors required more flexibility 
(credible threats of removal) while pointing at deficits of the argument that: 
 
During Cold War democratic reform aid was not effective because the donors could 
not credibly commit to withdrawing their aid from strategically important recipients 
even when reform was not forthcoming.
5
  
 
Some authors reinforce this claim by bringing in the notion of competitive authoritarianism 
responsible for limitations in existing leverage-mechanisms.
6
 Similarly, Joel Lazarus claims 
                                                 
1
 Jurgen Moeller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement and 
Explanation, Democratization Studies (New York: Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2011), 104–105. 
2
 Ibid., 136. 
3
 After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition, McFaul Michael and Kathryn Stoner-
Weiss (Eds.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1. 
4
 Ibid., 77. 
5
 Moeller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement and Explanation, 10. 
6
 For more description of the concept see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: 
Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 2010). 
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that western support actually reinforced the authoritarian system and increased political 
instability, for instance, in Georgia.
1
 This country being a top receipient of foreign funding 
and assistance (second in the US assistance in the wider Europe) always managed in a 
miraculous way to secure its democratic credibility in the eyes of western donors despite the 
frequent government changes.
2
 The ruling regimes were always trusted in the West and never 
had to perform the announced reforms fully, since the true reform-implementation would 
endanger their own chances of political power and survival.
3
 An additional impetus to the 
mentioned tendency has been often provided by the ―subjective logic‖ of organizations‘ 
policy that like the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) continued 
justifying greater spending and lacked proper messaging to identify critical deficiencies and 
priority measures.
4
 
 
1.4 What do We Miss in the Relevant Literature   
 
All aspects mentioned above are relevant insofar as they link the issue of defence 
transformation in Armenia and Georgia to the overall process of the democratic transition and 
prerequisite a high political dependence of the NATO‘s influence on domestic political 
developments. There is a common tendency that the expectations and measuring bar for 
Georgia are higher and the margins of errors smaller than in Armenia.
5
 Available studies of 
both countries did not use any specific language on details of national compliance, to say 
nothing of concrete issues in the realm of defence and security.
6
 In light of the growing 
expectations from the democratic transformation of both countries a clear description of 
                                                 
1
 Joel Lazarus, ―Neo-Liberal State Building and Western ‗Democracy Promotion‘: The Case of Georgia,‖ SGIR 
7th Pan-European Conference (Stockholm: St. Anthony‘s College University of Oxford, September 9, 2010), 1, 
available at 
 http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Neo-
liberal%20state%20building%20and%20democracy%20promotion%20in%20Georgia.pdf. 
2
 ―Georgia‘s Security Challenges and Policy Recommendations,‖ Policy Brief N1, US-Georgia Forum 
(Washington D.C.: CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), July 2012), 1; Lazarus, ―Neo-Liberal 
State Building and Western ‗Democracy Promotion,‘‖ 6. 
3
 Lazarus, ―Neo-Liberal State Building and Western ‗Democracy Promotion,‘‖ 6. 
4
 Ibid., 7. 
5
 Anthony Bowyer C., Democratization in the Caucasus: Elections in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Helsinki Commission, 2012), 
available at 
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id=526&Content
Type=H,B&ContentRecordType=B. 
6
 ―Part 3: Case Studies of Local Democracy in the South Caucasus,‖ in Democracy at the Local Level - a Guide 
for the South Caucasus (Yerevan: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003), 36. 
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mechanisms of achieving the expected results in particular areas must be provided.
1
  
Otherwise, as is often the case, the debate is limited to attempts of a general assessment of the 
government‘s capacity or the vague explanations of failure of institutional reforms due to 
limited checks and data available on executive authority.
2
  
 
As stipulated in NATO Strategic Concept 1991, a transition to full fledged democracy implies 
the need to foster ―the growth of democratic institutions‖.3 Its nurturing effect implied a 
process of intensive contacts with traditional western democracies that would bring about the 
desired change.  However, the existing literature is less able to explain key factors of domestic 
compliance that presumably are more specific, even subtle and cannot be roughly attributed to 
the general notion of democratic transition nor to the formal terms of good governance. Since 
our focus is narrowed down to the process of the defence transformation, the quest gets even 
more complicated due to the widespread tradition of its nominal reduction to the issue of 
civilian control over military that, obviously, is highly unsatisfying. Introducing the principles 
of democratic governance is a long and difficult process. But understanding and adopting the 
particular mechanisms of democratic governance in defence, that additionally ensure the 
national compliance to commitments made externally, proves to be a serious challenge and 
remains beyond the scope of academic debate on Armenia and Georgia.
4
  
 
Reforming defence and security sectors was considered as one of pivotal objectives in post-
communist countries and an integral part of the democratic transformation.
5
 There is no 
understanding of security without the military dimension, which necessitates the effective 
governance in defence if the successful democratic transformation is needed. Conversely, a 
developed democracy whose security forces are dysfunctional runs the risk of 
―dedemocratisation‖.6 The vast amount of the literature on Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
provides a pretty developed explanation of defence reform objectives, though predominantly 
distributed under the subjects of parliamentary control and the civilian supremacy over 
military in political decision-making. Yet the specifics of the defence sector require a separate 
                                                 
1
 Lazarus, ―Neo-Liberal State Building and Western ‗Democracy Promotion,‘‖ 1–3. 
2
 Michael D. Mihalka and Mark R. Wilcox, ―Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance in the 
South Caucasus,‖ Joint Force Quarterly, 2nd quarter 2010, 26. 
3
 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1998), 164. 
4
 ―Part 3: Case Studies of Local Democracy in the South Caucasus,‖ 48. 
5
 ―Security Sector Governance and Reform,‖ DCAF Backgrounder (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF), May 2009), available at http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-
Governance-and-Reform. 
6
 Ibid., 5. 
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and coherent approach to the topic of defence transformation with explicit objective of 
highlighting its critical features.  Thus the need of clear and sound codification measures for 
defence transformation and its practical achievements remains high on demand. The Geneva 
Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) continues to play a lead role in 
defining the multiplicity of defence related problem-factors. Yet in light of the scale of 
transformative effectiveness the measurement indicators still pose an important area, where 
significant deficits can be identified. The deficits can‘t be permanently enlarged by 
introducing the variety of contextual criteria such as political, normative, psychological etc. 
(seven in total) as offered by Nicole Ball.
1
 Nor it can be fully covered by the in - depth 
analysis of the parliamentary oversight functions, as provided by a hundred page strong 
DCAF-volume issued in 2003, in which resource and budgetary aspects of accountability are 
reviewed.
2
 Ultimately, we arrive at the point, where we share Ursula C. Schroeder‘s 
conclusion that ―…there are no specific indexes that measure the accountability regimes and 
civilian control of security sectors around the world‖ and more general indicators are 
frequently very confusing.
3
 
 
Translating the whole debate into the South Caucasus - reality the academic literature is less 
able to bring up the question on the generic objectives of defence reforms pursued in Armenia 
and Georgia and the causes of varying approaches and outcomes within the respective 
cooperation processes with NATO. This is as much relevant, as it correlates the strategic 
interests of a particular country with internal institutional objectives and the imperatives of the 
domestic political agenda. Without having a well defined strategic relevance for NATO as a 
whole region, the importance of each country had to be determined out of the cooperation 
process itself. Georgia got kind of a missionary assignment, serving as a success story of 
democratic transition worth emulating by neighboring countries.
4
 As for Armenia, the Russian 
trails of the country‘s moderate stance towards NATO can‘t be overseen. Despite the obvious 
                                                 
1
 Nicole Ball, ―Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform: Response to Security Sector Reform in Developing and 
Transitional Countries‖‖ (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, August 2004), 4, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue2_ball.pdf. 
2
 Philipp Fluri, Hans Born, and Anders B. Johnsson, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, 
Mechanisms and Practices, Philipp Fluri and Anders B. Johnsson (Eds.) (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, 2003), available at 
 http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Parliamentary-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector. 
3
 Ursula C. Schroeder, Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators, Occasional 
Paper 20 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), 28, available at 
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Measuring-Security-Sector-
Governancehttp://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Measuring-Security-Sector-Governance. 
4
 ―Georgia‘s Security Challenges and Policy Recommendations,‖ 1. 
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differences, the demand to both countries to pursue the course of democratic, institutional and 
military reforms has not been lessened at all.
1
 This additionally strengthens the common 
argument in the literature that rejects any other factor than the state of democracy under which 
the regional or a particular national policy toward NATO can be considered.
2
 Georgia‘s 
objective envisages an ultimate accession in the Alliance. However, it is not evident and 
remains questionable that the democratic transformation and defence reforms in particular 
would have been ever conducted without the NATO accession prospects.
3 
Here we agree to 
Dan Reiter‘s claim, that problems with measuring those reforms and validating practical 
achievements in defence render the validity of any general assessment quite questionable.
4
  
 
NATO as well as the pool of U.S. - official documents provide a relatively good indication on 
the area - spectrum, where defence transformation processes can be evaluated.
5
 The area - and 
result based measurement toolset seems to be a promising approach able to provide much 
clarity on principles, why some nations succeed in their defence transformation and some are 
close to failure or make hasty superficial reforms without public debate and proper 
understanding of the final outcome.
6
 Clearly, the identification of particular assessment tools 
is of critical importance in order to produce the objective assessment of NATO‘s capacity to 
influence and the national motives to comply.  In some cases the application of specific 
criteria will be unavoidable. For instance the military decision-making process is on its own 
already an issue of huge relevance for the practical outcomes of various defence policies 
implemented. It requires its own portion of analysis, spread among various functional areas, 
where its effects could be best studied and the general puzzle of driving factors for defence 
transformation best illuminated. Further, the ineffective command structures, illicit personal 
communication lines or the political purpose of ministerial appointments, all these factors 
could greatly contribute to the illustration of causal lines of success or failure from the local 
contextual angle.
7
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A clear identification of NATO‘s objectives towards the SC - region and countries in 
particular should be also noted due to its policy implications on the strategic and local 
(domestic) levels and the high risk of miscommunication and failures caused by the 
divergence of interests. Thus, knowing the clarity and the degree of convergence of strategic 
agendas between NATO and Armenia and Georgia turns out to be an important element to be 
studied thoroughly. The current academic debate lacks the mentioned aspect, albeit the clarity 
of strategic messaging greatly benefits the logic of national policy-making and minimizes the 
chances of the different interpretation of policy results and expectations. It should be also 
noted that whatever cooperation format a country accepts towards NATO, the notion of 
common standards immediately becomes omnipresent and relates to both dimensions of 
cooperation: political and military. Adopting those standards should by no means collide with 
conflicting domestic objectives or the ―hidden‖ agenda, according to Geoffrey Wright.  This 
brings up the issue of the purpose of applying NATO - standards and of credibility (honesty) 
of the national commitments to achieve the declared objectives by a partner - country.  
 
 
 
1.5 Basic Research Questions 
 
Summarizing the review of the relevant literature we can identify a distinct deficit and the 
inability of the existing scholarship to provide a clear assessment toolset of the national 
compliance in the defence area while undergoing a transformation process under the auspices 
of the NATO - cooperation framework. Additionally, no efforts had been made to link the 
strategic interest of a country cooperating with NATO with the internal (domestic) objectives 
that would illustrate the balance or imbalance of external and internal agenda imperatives. 
Understandably, it can be attributed to the specific scope and the nominal ownership by the 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) with its basics heavily rooted in the analysis of a country‘s 
political structure. Nonetheless, once the academic deficits are recognized and correlated to 
the dynamics of political processes between NATO and our case - countries, the following 
major research questions can be formulated to be investigated in our study: 
 
 To what degree NATO can utilize its policy of conditionality to enforce policy change 
of respective defence institutions? 
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 How are national state - and institutional policies towards the Alliance shaped and 
what factors were deceisive for policy - formation and implementation, in particular? 
 
 How do internal mechanisms of NATO institutional cooperation support the process 
of adopting common policies, norms and standards by national authorities? 
 
By responding to the formulated questions we attempt to provide valuable insights of the 
processes of interplay between two key players of international relations – the state via its 
defence institution and the multilateral/international organization (MO/IO). Our case selection 
is justified by number of key arguments. Although many cases have been empirically 
reviewed, no coherent picture has been provided so far that would analyse and put two 
countries (Armenia and Georgia) into a serious comparison. Though Azerbaijan as a third 
country in the region, which similarly to Armenia and Georgia shares a common historico - 
political context, would be a logical addition to our study, the scope of research (countries 
with opposing political intentions) and significant limitations of open sources on Azerbaijan, 
led us at this stage to exclude it from the range of cases. Furthermore, the selected case - 
countries provide unique conditions to analyze the varying abilities of the Alliance to exert 
influence as an Institution, and to deepen the understanding of state - institution 
interdependence mechanisms, by providing powerful explanations of particular policies in 
Armenia and Georgia adopted towards NATO, and different outcomes, for which no coherent 
account has been taken so far. In particular, it evaluates whether the effects of such interplay 
can contribute both to IO‘s efficacy as a transformative and enforcing power, as well as to 
participating country‘s sectoral policy improvement in the framework of defence 
transformation. The time - span (2004 -2012) to review is sufficient to disregard the risk of 
early or premature statements that would be symptomatic to early stages of cooperation.  
 
We designed our project in a way as to allow ourselves to narrow down the research theme to 
the critical issue of institutional influence in a certain period of time and within a strictly 
defined geographic area. Our goal was not to review the phenomenon of the NATO influence 
on all partner - countries to increase the degree of representativeness, as some would argue, 
but rather to specify and problematize particular aspects of the institutional interplay, i.e. the 
degree of national compliance at different levels of cross - country analysis, in order to 
provide valid answers to central questions of the research. As we tend to keep a certain degree 
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of the theoretical flexibility, the expected findings seem to be promising in elucidating the 
variety of issues relevant specifically to the neo - liberal institutionalist theory as well as other 
theoretical concepts embedded in democratization literature. Furthermore, we expect our 
study to highlight relevant aspects of the realist research agenda in relation to key 
determinants of state performance while transforming defence. Throughout the analysis we 
hope to discern major findings that would clarify the particular mode of the state‘s decision-
making (rationalist strategic calculation vs. social context dependent) chosen to engage the 
institutional framework of the Alliance.  
 
 
1.6 Structure of Paper 
 
Facing the fate of a quite challenging theoretical and empirical investigation we hope to 
respond to requirements of scientific rigor and of intellectual creativity, by developing the 
structure and form of the study in a way as to reflect best possible its key messages and 
findings. We also intend to enhance the research originality by designing and offering 
different perspectives of empirical cases, for which no coherent account has been taken so far. 
The study will first elucidate the depth of applicability of some theoretical mainstreams and 
offer an analytical concept, which largely predetermines the methodology and the 
methodological toolset to be applied. Then we will operationalize the concept of NATO-
influence, i.e. conditionality and compliance and distinguish indicators relevant for evaluating 
(―measuring‖) the effects of NATO-influence in particular areas of defence. The case-
countries will be scrutinized and evaluated in accordance with the conceptual structure 
developed before and, consequently, put in comparison across defence related sectors to 
localize outcome - disparities, similarities or the tendency-convergence. This way we will be 
able to sort out carefully the effects of conditionality (positive, partial or non-compliance) 
generated by NATO – cooperation frameworks from those potentially to be attributed to 
conflicting domestic interests and calculations. The findings will be ultimately summarized in 
the concluding chapter and put in respective formulations in an attempt to provide plausible 
answers to the research questions set in this chapter.  
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework 
 
  
2.1 Introduction  
 
Understanding the essence of institutions and their organizational patterns is the critical point 
of departure for our analytical undertaking. As clearly stated before, the major units of 
analysis are defence ministries and the armed forces of South Caucasus countries, and the 
contextual grid (cooperation) is provided by another institution – NATO. Whether successes 
or failures of institutional integration can be attributed to the mechanisms a country or 
defence ministry is exposed to within the institution, has still to be clarified. However, the fact 
is that we face an intensive interplay of institutions, effects of which are directly reflected in 
policy change, policy adoption or even at the very stage of policy initiation. Approving the 
institutional lens of inquiry is a logical necessity to meet the requirements of the theoretical 
rigor and to operationalize the respective analytical concept. We regard Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalism as the most promising avenue for the theoretical elucidation of our project. At 
this stage, however, we would suggest first to follow the logical sequence of theoretical 
contemplation and to look at epistemological basics of social science that are anchored in 
institutionalist theories. Thus we will look at the variety of definitions applied to institutional 
frameworks. Then we will tackle the functional weight assigned to institutions through 
different epistemological stands and the impact of the theoretical rivalry on understanding 
international institution as a cooperation enabler and independent agent. Finally, we will 
attempt to articulate the apparent benefits of theoretical complementarism, revealed through 
the adoption of the Neo-Liberal prism of institutionalism, and provide our vision of analytical 
model. It will allow us to apply a cross dimensional comparison throughout the study and 
generate deep insights of relevant factors critical to the major questions we have formulated 
before.  
 
2.2 Institutional Prism of Analysis – Point of Departure for the 
Analytical Inquiry 
 
By providing institutional patterns, within which ―many burning issues can be explained‖, 
institutions increasingly became a valuable source of analysis in political science and IR 
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respectively.
1
 Recognizing the merits of this approach, we are inevitably captured by the 
necessity to frame what the notion of institution implies. Scholars are featured by the 
inexhaustible capacity of providing the plentitude of relevant explanations, and, conversely, in 
their inability to stick to the most plausible and agreed definition. As Walter Powel and Paul 
DiMaggio convincingly state, the ambiguity is common characteristics while defining 
institution that leads scholars to agree rather what institution is not, than what it is about.
2
 The 
range of definitional attempts goes so far as to attach to every social act (action and activity) 
the meaning of institution that ranges ―from handshakes to marriages to strategic-planning 
departments‖.3 From this sociological perspective, institutions are nearly everywhere. For the 
sake of common definitional utility we will apply the version offered by March and Olsen, 
who defined institution as a ―relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining 
appropriate behavior for a specific group of actors in specific situations‖.4 This interpretation 
is fairly short and simple to keep in mind and to agree upon, yet it is still broad enough to 
allow further theoretical elaboration depending on the contextual underpinning.  
 
It must be noted that the revival of the new institutional approach, different from the static and 
old purist-burocratic understanding of institutionalism, unfolded as a reaction to the 
behavioral revolution in late 1950s and developed two distinct epistemological standpoints to 
explain the role institutions play in forming various aspects of social and political life, that of 
Rational Choice (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI).
5
 Institutions seemed to be very 
instrumental to offer explanations of various phenomena of contrasting nature and scale. 
Whether at micro or macro level, Rational Choice scholars applied institutional insights to 
solve the aggregation problem.
6
 The principle of activity routinization, i.e. repeated actions 
between actors to solve collective dilemmas constitutes the core of rationalist standpoint.  The 
need for collective goods and action also provided frameworks for the cooperative mode of 
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interactions.
1
 Since state is largely regarded as one of the major analytical units, the new 
institutionalism logically turned to the problem of state policy formation and policy effects by 
highlighting the significance of institutional forces at various junctures of decision making. 
According to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, actors operating within the institution have 
well defined and hierarchical set of preferences and act based on strategic calculations to 
increase the expected benefits.
2
 Utility maximization, the exogenous nature of the preferences 
that cannot be modified by the membership in institution and the strategic mode of interaction 
constitute basic original pillars of rationalist approach.
3
 In fact, this makes us assume that in 
narrow sense the institutional framework, though capable of changing actors (state) behavior 
via incentives and sanctions, cannot prevent him from breaking rules and even from 
abandoning the cooperation. The empirical investigation of numerous institutional 
frameworks revealed, similarly, some apparent limitations of the rationalist theory utility 
related to the problem of bounded rationality and free riding.  Consequently, rationalist 
scholars were increasingly preoccupied with broadening the narrow scope of the concept 
towards increased priority of collective goals and benefits, as in case of George Tsebelis 
(1990) and Jack Knight (1992), as well as by recognizing the relevance of the context, within 
which the political behavior is channeled and ultimately unfolds, as in case of Kenneth 
Shepsle.
4
 Institutions were no longer regarded as exogenously given and the rules of the game 
provided by players themselves mirrored the common desire to follow a particular pattern of 
behavior, i.e. the norms and procedures. The notion of rationalism was reduced to the mode of 
behavior still largely based on strategic calculation and conditioned by ―the expectations of 
how others react‖.5 
 
Not surprisingly, rationalist assumptions have been swiftly adopted by realist, neo-realist and 
to larger extent by neo-liberal mainstream authors focusing predominantly on functional 
explanations of institutional design and purpose, in which power relations and asymmetries 
defined the rules and mechanism of interaction. The distinction, benefits and the deficits of 
each theoretical school will be elaborated more nuanced way in the chapter to follow. 
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Nonetheless, the closer familiarization with seemingly conflicting epistemological positions 
(positivist vs. constructivist) will reveal the roots of our theoretical choice, its justification and 
the need for the limited theoretical complementarism. Not least, the ideas we disclose here 
will have a significant impact on the structure and objectives of our analytical concept, as well 
as influence the way of empirical data evaluation.  
 
2.2.1 Rational Choice vs. Sociological Institutionalism 
 
Despite the notable transformation of RCI, it has been intensively criticized because of its 
internal drawbacks related to the concept of bounded rationality and the external ignorance to 
sociological context.
1
 Constructivist approach established a new mode of social inquiry and 
posited itself as the major challenger to dominant positivist views. Works of Karl Deutsch 
(1953), Bruce Russet (1963) and Richard Merrit (1966) accomplished within the initiated 
research agenda, indicated the advent of the sociological dimension in international relations, 
where the cognitive elements such as identity formation, believes and social communications 
formed the central core of argumentation.
2
  
 
Applying sociological insights to institutional research agenda, scholars contributed to the 
birth of sociological institutionalism. Here institutions are assigned different meaning and are 
given much more significance in terms of influence and policy shaping capacity of its 
members. The cooperative tendencies are explained by the virtues of script legitimacy, 
through which states acquire the meaning of interactions and their identity.
3
 According to the 
very constructivist logic, which conforms pretty much to the institutional essence of nearly 
every social act, the huge importance of the cultural context and moral templates should not 
be underestimated and, in contrary, must be put forth. Forerunners of sociological 
institutionalism John Meyer and Brian Rowan would readily go further and argue that even 
simple bureaucratic practices have to be explained from this perspective.
4
 The logic of policy 
formation and influence within the institution would therefore imply, that the process of 
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internalization of norms, rules and standards ultimately leads to the creation of a commonly 
shared cognitive platform. Thus, naturally, the very structure of actor‘s preferences and its 
identity could not remain unaffected
1
.   
 
Driving force of successful cooperation within the institutional framework is, clearly, the 
readiness of actor, i.e. state to accept common procedures and policies that might well be 
constructed outside the institution yet constitute the logic of appropriateness related to the 
individual behavior. For instance, in the field of democratization studies the principle of 
adherence to democratic standards and norms is given huge importance. The process of 
democratic transition that involves an institution, which is still infected by rules conflicting 
with the new requirements, often results in a continuous adaptation to context and learning 
mechanisms, through which better results can be achieved.
2
 Being paradigmatic, but 
somehow less explicit, the cultural aspect of institutional influence has been further 
elaborated. As Walter Powel and Paul DiMaggio put it, the institutional integration is a basic 
social phenomenon that is largely based on the structure of common values and cultural 
patterns ―with the internalized need disposition structure of constituent personality.‖3 Similar 
to Powel and DiMaggio, who regard the success of institutional integration largely in terms of 
the conformity with common value system, Kathleen Thelen, though taking a historical 
approach to Katzenstein‘s findings, arrives to the same conclusions on the issue of Japan‘s 
security policy evolution.
4
 Paradoxically, the very concept of rationality was identified by 
Richard Scott as a cultural system providing guidelines for the social behavior and templates 
for designing the organization‘s structure. Yet he also admits that rationality models play a 
causal role in creation of formal institutions.
5
  
 
Having briefly reviewed two distinct approaches to the role institutions play in affecting 
actor‘s behavior, we are increasingly struggling with the inherent limitations of each 
standpoint, that are incapable of covering the vast complexity of institutional phenomenon. 
Scholars swiftly identified gray zones of the epistemological differences and pointed out the 
consequences of theoretical purity. Peter Katzenstein in his well dveloped sociological 
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contribution to international relations (IR) cautiously argues to not overestimate the cultural 
aspects of political decision-making.
1
 Powell and DiMaggio share the same concern and 
conclude that cognitive elements should not ―eclipse the strategic elements‖ and the settings 
of the action.
2
 If the behavior of an actor is constituted by the context created within the 
institution and, in turn, each individual action contributes to reconstructing social 
understanding, the ultimate result resembles a process, in which causal effects and linkages 
are very hard to recognize.   
 
Not surprisingly, both rationalist as well as constructivist scholars realized that the loyalty to 
theoretical parsimony would often not overweigh the expected benefits of applying valuable 
insights of the rival school. The tendency within the sociological mainstream is to 
acknowledge the arguments of RC - account and agree that often subjects to institutional 
influence instead of passive compliance, can choose other strategic ways of response  that 
include, avoidance, defiance, manipulation or compromise.
3
 States as unitary actors 
seemingly monopolized by the rationalist scholarship program found more recognition by 
constructivist authors, who continued attaching key role to the commitment to norms and 
shared understanding, yet from the altered sociological perspective of community of states.
4
 
Conversely, rationalist literature showed more flexibility by reflecting growing importance of 
institutions, among others in terms of shaping individual preferences. To certain degree 
institutions acquired a kind of sociological face-lifting being capable of affecting individual 
preferences even before formal accession. Rationalist understanding of institutions and 
international ones, in particular, is featured by their inherent capacity to promote information 
exchange and manage uncertainty. Richard Scott strengthens this argument by highlighting 
the stabilizing effects of institutions comprised of ―cognitive-cultural‖, normative and 
regulative elements.
5
 Rationalist model of Public Choice found a significant degree of 
commonalities within liberal IR - arguments on domestic origins of state preferences 
represented internationally. In this sense individuals and private groups moved into the focus 
of analysis and proved to be influential in affecting national decisions.
6
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A universe of authors could have been added to the list of references we have used to 
exemplify the institutional dimension and the range of topical priorities within the mentioned 
academic research programs. Yet we would be better served, if instead of quantifying the 
descriptive evidence of institutions, we devote our attention to more relevant aspect of 
international cooperation, where International Institutions (II) play key role in enabling 
cooperation among states and other institutions. Narrowing down the focus of the theoretical 
analysis is a logical necessity, to avoid the perennial risk of conceptual stretching, which 
would inevitably undermine the cohesion of our argumentation - line from the very beginning. 
The ability to cover more by saying less, as pointed out by Giovanni Sartori, is not the mode 
we favor.
1
  In contrary, we intentionally place the question of institutional influence of the 
North Atlantic Alliance within the international dimension of institutional analysis, where 
national policies generated under domestic factors are exposed to various sources of influence 
within the II.   
  
2.2.2 Defining Institutional Patterns of International Organizations 
 
International institutionalism reveals somehow more ontological affinity to international 
relations than to the mainstream schools of institutionalist theory. Nevertheless, it is 
preoccupied with similar questions of individual and collective actions, as well as with the 
core issue of interdependence between domestic and international politics.
2
 It is strongly 
associated with international regime studies that tackles the problems of international 
cooperation and reviews the tasks / functions of international institutions that traditionally 
have been regarded as the nation - state domain. The terms organization and institution are 
frequently used here interchangeably. The wide spread tradition of definitional blurriness did 
not spare the international dimension of institutions, and as in case of Oran Young generated a 
very broad definition of II, which encompassed various forms of organizational arrangements, 
so called, governing ―social practices‖ consisting of  roles and conventions. The most 
important element of the provided definition is that institutional analyses are not exclusively 
focused on formal international organizations.
3
  We, however, are much more interested in 
international institutions as formal and structured entities that in even more narrow formal 
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sense, possesses a well-organized bureaucratic body, offices and financial resources. To put it 
in a March and Olsen‘s manner, international institution is the collection of routinized 
behavior comprised of shared values, norms, and standards that: 
 
(…) constitute and legitimize political actors and provide them with consistent 
behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and 
endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action.
1
 
 
In a very rationalist manner the design of an institution was regarded as the key indicator for 
means and incentives available for participants to pursue their strategies. Stephen Krassner 
developed the consensual definition of an international regime as ―principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area‖ that is broadly shared among scholars, however is open for various interpretations.2 The 
crucial factor for understanding regimes is the functional nature of cooperation incentives in a 
given area, in which the frequent interaction lead to the setting rules and norms, through 
which the individual behavior can be assessed. Obviously there is no essential discrepancy to 
observe between Krassner‘s regime and March and Olsen‘s definition of the institution. 
Regimes are Institutions and may vary both in terms of organizational rigidity as well as the 
mode a state can follow the procedures and norms defined by the regime, despite the low 
chance of sanctions. The low probability of sanctioning members is logical, since Krassner‘s 
formulation of regimes leaves little space for holding institution as independent units capable 
of norm-enforcement.  
 
It is critical to our study to follow key aspects of cooperation process in institutional theory 
literature to discern major mechanisms responsible for political outcome, i.e. the particular 
state – behavior, internationally or on domestic scene. As already mentioned, neither Krassner 
in 1983 nor Keohane in 1984 while setting the groundwork of the international regime theory 
paid sufficient attention to formal international organizations, in order to explain institutional 
arrangements that affect international politics
3
. We regard formal, i.e. structured II as the 
constituent element of IR - theory encompassing the wide variety of institutional systems. 
Furthermore, when referring to II we explicitly base our contemplation on formal 
organizations and by large disregard informal regimes or agreements. Rationalist scholars 
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acknowledged the relevance of structured institutions that persisted over the long period of 
time and devoted their lion‘s share of analysis to the field of regime studies.1  
 
Cooperation among states lays at core of IR - theory and the anarchic perception of the world 
system is essentially rejected. Originated by the application of insights from economics and 
game theories, and heavily influenced by Mancur Olson‘s seminal work on public choice and 
collective action, it draws on the beneficial nature of cooperation by providing common 
incentives for cooperation.
2
  Benefits can be regarded as incentives and interests – in either 
broad or narrow sense, as security, social stability, economic development etc. Robert 
Keohane, arguably the most prominent liberal institutionalist solidified the neo - liberal view 
of international regimes by highlighting the invaluable role of regimes as best plattforms to 
reduce transaction costs and the information uncertainty, thus facilitating to negotiations and 
agreements among states.
3
 Definitional margins were further broadened by adding social-
cognitive dimension, in which international organization played a role of the community 
representation of group of states that pursue community - policy by accepting and 
implementing common norms and principles, down to very procedural regulations in various 
fields of activities.
4
 In this sense an international institution as a social construction was 
indeed able to shape actor‘s behavior in a particular policy - sector.5 We do not see much of 
value in continuing the elaboration of the debate on the utility of international regimes 
(institutions) between the various schools of international relation. The brief summary of 
competing arguments of realist and the neo-liberal scholars on the function and the utility of 
international institutions will be offered in the next chapter, and mainly dwells on advantages 
of neoliberal institutionalism as the cornerstone of our response to the need of theoretical 
complementarism. In this part of paper, however, some constructivist contributions to the 
regime theory seem to be indispensible. As Katzenstein amply puts it:  
 
Conflict and cooperation thus emerge from a never-ending process of redefining 
social and political identities that generate consensually shared and contextually 
appropriate norms that provide standards for action. In international society these 
standards are called regimes.
6
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Clearly the definition used above rests on the broad understanding of institutions that possess 
the action shaping function. Yet the crucial difference, we see, is the explicit notion of 
identity formation and the use of standards for actions that ultimately make up a regime. The 
compliance to norms and standards is also an attribute derived from the broader concept of 
legitimacy, and can have mutually reinforcing effect as recognized by some liberal authors.
1
 
The sociological view regards the internal institutional dynamics as a very inter - subjective 
process of identity formation leading to the creation of the shared understanding of an issue-
area and therefore influencing the individual preference - formation. John Ruggie extends 
even further the cognitive dimension of the regime and defines it as ―sets of mutual 
expectations and rules…energies‖ accepted by a group of states.2 The cooperation efforts of 
states in this sense are constrained by the social environment of an institution, and the policy 
formation, to put it bluntly, is not the result of objectively derived interests but a mere 
reaction on situations based on perceptions and expectations. This conclusion made by 
Kenneth Abbot in his attempt to reconcile rationalist approach with constructivist views, 
reflected a strong signal towards the necessity of finding theoretical convergences.
3
 
Developed as a reaction to the needs of explaining economic phenomena and by emphasizing 
the notion of transaction costs in international politics, the regime theory made significant 
shift towards its sociological dimension, increasingly recognizing its relevance in terms of 
establishing contractual patterns, member socialization and common legitimation of action. 
Even the core elements of liberal argumentation such as promotion of democratic values 
(Pevehouse, 2002), legal liability and reputational concerns (Duffield, 1992), the transparency 
and reciprocity, as well as negotiation patterns (Keohane, 1994) conform fairly well to basics 
of the constructivist view.
4
  
 
 
2.2.3 Organizational Facelift of International Institutions  
 
Reducing the theoretical divide have been made possible through the increased attention paid 
to internal mechanisms, incl. bureaucratic leverage institutions apply to exercise their 
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influence over members. It must be noted that this was not always the case. Neglecting the 
organizational aspect of international institutions was one of the featuring elements of the 
regime theory. International institutions (organizations) have been largely disregarded by 
organization theory, and conversely the study of international relations made little reference if 
any to organizational theory. Scholars realized very soon the existing gap, which contributed 
to the development of the study-area, in which convergent theoretical insights could have 
been identified. Whereas the neo - liberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane attach 
international secretariats the function of unbiased information - sharing and transparency to 
manage uncertainty concerns, the constructivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore (1993) 
and Michael Barnett (1999) underline the crucial role of II‘s bureaucracy in defining agenda 
that might be well divergent from member-state‘s interest.1 The role of neutral bureaucracy of 
II and its ability to influence the local elites and power groups inside the states is additionally 
strengthened by Ernst Haas (1989, 1990) and Jeffrey Checkel (1999), who are joined by 
Frank Schimmelfenning (2003) in his powerful exemplification of international institutions as 
Community Organizations that exercise the policy of conditionality via internalization of 
community norms and standards by aspirant countries before the actual accession.
2
  
 
Recognizing the merits of each epistemological approach, the organizational theory could not 
escape from the ―rationalist vs. constructivist debate‖ around the question of institutional 
identity and ability to act as autonomous agent. The apple of discord was rightly identified 
within the issues of the purpose, architecture and mechanisms of the institution. As 
Christopher Balding and Daniel Wehrenfennig put it in a truly rationalist way, the 
organizational design is a rational choice of the form in the ―pursuit of specific objectives‖ 
that will either enhance or decrease the mode of compliance among members, and provide 
toolset for carrying out the missions originally assigned.
3
 In fact, the existing mechanisms 
reveal the implied objectives and preconditions for the effectiveness of an institution, whether 
related to policy implementation and norm diffusion or to the formation of shared identity. 
Rooted within the notion of legal rationality in its Weberian understanding, it questions the 
sociological approach, according to which power depends on reputation and networks and 
decision are made collectively by calculus of consent, rather than by adhering to regularities 
and legal precedents.
4
 To sum up, rationalist arguments rest on the basic assumption that 
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institutions can do what they are objectively designed for, and not what they subjectively 
ought to do. States, therefore, looking for international institutional framework might abandon 
the existing one once they have proved to be ineffective to provide services desired.  
 
Originally, regarded as a very functional in its core, and stressing the primacy of state 
willingness to cooperate in certain issue-areas, the regime theory went much beyond the 
original theoretical frontiers. Though highly controversial, regimes were still regarded as the 
representation of functional ministries and not of the state-governments.
1
  Nowadays it 
encompasses various aspects of international professionalization, by which professional 
communities can be created and acquired the function of enforcing common norms and 
standards.
2
 In this sense, the disaggregation of a state is a standard tool to highlight the trans-
governmental nature of interactions. Furthermore, the interplay of governmental officials, 
ministries and agencies is regarded as independent from the state while creating professional 
networks and socialization mechanisms that ultimately lead to significant political effects, that 
of norm implementation.
3
 We particularly stress the importance of said developments within 
the IR theory, for it drew the focus of institutional analysis to the role of international 
organization able to act as independent agent. This principal - agent model holds that 
principals (i.e. states) delegate certain functions to an international institution (agent). 
However, the dynamics of institutional interplay allows after while the agent to pursue its own 
interests rather than those of principals.
4
  
 
Some rationalist authors distinguish formal international organizations in their ability to 
produce and enforce the norm - compliance among member - states, i.e by their degree of 
centralization and independence.
5
 The first property of institutional organization refers, 
naturally, to the structure and bureaucratic apparatus, whereas the latter to the capacity of 
independent managerial activity and that of agenda - setting. Both inherently support the 
creation of neutral forums where negotiations can unfold, common policy can be crafted and 
monitored, and information can be disseminated. The neutrality is a crucial element in 
bringing states with conflicting agendas to the discussion table. Combined with a high level of 
institutional autonomy it allows to perform such activities that ―…might be unacceptable in 
their original state – to - state form…‖ yet become ―…acceptable when run through an 
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independent or seemingly independent IO.‖1 The sociological wing of organizational theory, 
similar to rationalist claims, devotes significant attention to the content of II. However, it 
strengthens immensely the relevance of the bureaucratic apparatus in creating the institutional 
identity and spreading knowledge. Sungjoon Cho calls it ―the theoretical emancipation‖ of 
institutions from their creators (states).
2
  Institutions can exceed the limits of design set up by 
their creators and modify their original goal in changing environment in order to survive, thus 
becoming the ends themselves.
3
 Assuming organization‘s strong bureaucratic structure and a 
high degree of independence inherently supports the adoption of a different ontological 
foundation for international institution as corporations possessing agency. Since the field of 
international relations holds international institutions largely being controlled by states, and in 
contrary institutions often act in the way diverging from the members‘ interests, the attempts 
to explain the effects of institutional influence on state - policy and behavior turned to be very 
difficult and often ineffective. As a result, some authors advocated for accepting the said 
ontological basis that would eliminate the epistemological divide and create significant space 
for the analytical freedom and the methodological flexibility.
4
 This approach seems fairly 
reasonable for the purpose of integrating various modes of analysis, able to illustrate different 
aspects and dimensions of international institutions. In practical terms, it would require the 
major shift of analysis from the states (principal) towards the institution (agency), with more 
attention devoted to the agency‘s capacity of professional socialization as well as its ability to 
disseminate and enforce the standardized practices.  
 
Despite valuable efforts that scholars devoted to international institutions as formal and 
structured organizations, they are still defined by many as muddled concept lost somewhere 
between the realm of ―institutional order of international system‖ and the reference to 
―organizations, or agencies that operate cross - nationally‖.5 Our brief familiarization with 
theoretical origins of institutional patterns revealed the similar picture. Acknowledging the 
said weaknesses, admittedly to be attributed to the increased complexity and intensity of 
institutional dynamics, we nevertheless are prone to detect key concepts that are of crucial 
importance to our study and significantly determine not only the theoretical perspective we 
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adopt, but not least the structure of our analytical concept, a key factor for the coherence and 
plausibility of our argumentation. It is the rational and strategic nature of state behavior 
within and towards the institution that must be analyzed first. Whenever states decide to 
engage NATO as an institution or to be engaged by other states and institutions within the 
NATO, the question of the role and the primacy of state interests (preferences) for the 
formation of the modes of behavior becomes very important.  Second, we have to turn to the 
concept of agency and organizational autonomy, to determine the ability of the Alliance in 
creating and spreading the institutional identity, norms and standards based on shared values. 
Examining institutional design as well as the degree of autonomy as key properties of the 
institutional framework leads to the better understanding of the phenomenon of compliance, 
as well as the relevance of power-relationship the NATO supposedly is exposed to. Whether 
internal bureaucratic politics is of any relevance, or the preference - based state performance 
becomes limited once exposed to institutional influence of NATO, has yet to be verified. 
Nonetheless, the key theoretical elements distilled so far suggest that determinants of policy -
formation and political outcome should not be analysed within a single, narrow theoretical 
perspective, but rather include valuable findings lying in other theoretical domains.  
 
 
 
2.3 The Centrality of Neo - Liberal Institutionalism to the 
Concept of Study 
 
We do not engage questions that deal with a deep theoretical treatment of institutional 
formation or the organizational persistence that in fact, reveal marginal relevance to the object 
of our study. Our approach is featured by the selective mode applied to the large variety of 
questions asked by students of international institutions and for the most part responding to 
the need of explanation of institutional effects on a state behavior. Largely regarded as 
institutionalists‘ response to the realist agenda, it reviews the process of influence by 
addressing various mechanisms of institutional interdependence that shape particular political 
decisions.
1
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2.3.1 Theoretical Cleavages and the Need for theoretical Complementarism  
 
As already touched upon in previous chapter, the neo-liberal view holds that international 
institutions perform the function of negotiation platforms, where transaction costs and 
uncertainty are reduced and the costs of illegitimate actions, in contrary, are high. 
Interestingly, however, the international regime theory did not exclude bargaining as one of 
the interaction forms, thus allowing the realist school to capitalize on it. Power and power - 
relationship as major attributes of international politics, has been utilized by realist scholars to 
explain the processes relevant to international institutions and to state‘s external policy 
formation. Originated from the Kindleberger‘s study of Great Depression (1973), in which the 
key role of a dominant actor for the purpose of global economic stability is highlighted, power 
distribution has been further elaborated by Stephen Krasner (1976, 1982) and Robert Gilpin 
(1975) as an important framework of causal explanation.
1
 The neo - liberal approach to 
regime theory and international institutions, that centers its focus on the utility of institutional 
frameworks for enhancing international cooperation, is the major frontline of realist critique. 
Joseph Grieco emphasizes the inherent difficulty of states to accept structurally caused 
relative losses and therefore, evaluate very carefully the benefits international institution can 
provide.
2
 The famous article bluntly titled as ―The False Promise of International Institutions‖ 
drafted by John Mearsheimer, explicitly formulates the major realist argument that tolerates 
the existence of international institutions, however, as a mere reflection of state interests and 
power, without any constraining capacity.
3
 Despite the rationalist foundation (purposeful 
ontology of action) shared both by neo - liberal and realist students, their underlying 
assumptions differ to the point that the notion of power takes central place in realist literature, 
and the preferences are assigned the critical importance in the liberal institutionalist theory.  
 
We take both statements as tentatively valid ones and consider the sociological contribution to 
institutional theory as an additional concept that should be paid its share of attention. Though 
not central to our analysis and pretty muddled in the way it explains international regimes as 
―deep variety of authority relations‖, constructivist insights are still important to keep in mind 
while taking on the analysis of socialization mechanisms within the institution.
4
 Standard 
accusations of theoretical limitations bear the risk of oversimplifying the key messages and of 
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missing the valuable nuances of each theoretical school. Constructivist claims cannot dismiss 
the influence states exert over institutions by various policy – mechanisms in funding and 
personnel assignment. Similarly, realist would hardly deny that the legitimacy of a state action 
and the chance of compliance would significantly increase, once regarded as legitimate and 
supported by other members of an institution.
1
 Even more importantly, the perception of 
states as unitary actors purposefully operating to meet their predefined interests is an absolute 
valid and strong analytical assumption. However, it should not preclude us from attempts to 
investigate the domestic determinants of international politics largely disregarded in realist 
views.
2
  
 
Here we arrive at the point, where the need for theoretical pluralism is clearly recognized. We 
join the growing number of respected scholars who advocate for accepting more flexibility 
with regard to theoretical rigor, and apply theoretical complementarims as a valuable 
approach to encompass the huge complexity of social phenomena. The benefits of such 
approach are expected to be multidimensional. However, we cautiously argue that the 
application of the theoretical flexibility must be limited and should not bear a resemblance to 
the theoretical mosaic - building. The acknowledgment of this risk was an additional 
motivation to look carefully at the theoretical consistency of the literature and to identify the 
neo - niberal institutionalism as the framework flexible enough to respond to various 
analytical challenges as well as to meet key requirements of the theoretical rigor. The 
brilliance of the sharp exchange of arguments performed by realist (John Mearsheimer) and 
neo - liberal (Robert Keohane, Martin Lisa)  authors  is being revealed through the paradox 
that the radical divergence of analytical angles, does not prevent us from sharing one or 
another line of argumentation, depending on the context discussed. In fact, Robert Keohane 
stresses the strong affinity of the liberal approach to realist roots via realities of power and 
interests.
3
 As our interest is to construct a solid theoretical foundation for the systematic 
analysis of empirical material, the partial convergence of issues would become apparent. As 
Kathleen Thelen graciously puts it, the synthesis or the ―creative borrowing‖ would foster the 
strength of particular school, and points at rationalist scholars (Forejohn 1991, Bates et al. 
1998, Levi 1997, 1998), who increasingly realize the relevance of norms and identities in 
explaining political actions.
4
  Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal also admit that the rationalist 
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approach to regime theory would benefit from constructivist findings and be more complete.
1
 
Conversely, we can find more elements in constructivist literature (Finnemore and Sikknik, 
1998) that reveal the convergent dynamics with rationalist views, assigning a purposive actor 
the central role in pursuing his objectives in a strategic manner.
2
 Hence, drawing a clear 
distinction line between the regulating function of incentives and constrains (rational choice) 
and the constitutive role of the normative standards (sociological institutionalism) is often 
difficult to do, since all seem to lead to the formation of similar behavioral patterns. The 
distinction is not that much, if any.  
 
By concluding the stabilizing role NATO as a security regime had played internally via 
adherence of member - states to common norms and standards, John Duffield obviously 
leaves it up to privilege of a subjective assessment to attribute stabilizing effects of the 
Alliance either to rational choice or to sociological causes.
3
 Various versions of 
institutionalism can be used as distinct lenses to illuminate particular aspects of political life.
4
 
It is not a surprise that two corrective arguments interact producing the need for broader 
perspective and the tendency for abandoning one - way deterministic arguments, as Richard 
Scott concludes.
5
 Despite existing division lines, that have much to do with differing angles of 
contextual and theoretical analysis, there is more converging dynamics, than usually assumed. 
Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor suggest taking the said interchange of approaches as far as 
possible, while showing for instance, that none of sociological accounts claim that individuals 
are not rational or purposive, and in contrary, that actor‘s behavior can be well explained via 
reference to moral and normative templates.
6
 What we observe is, basically, the attempt to 
reconcile two different narratives of the same phenomena, allowing the use of both analytical 
tools when appropriate. Paying tribute to theoretical parsimony often results in the blunt 
rejection of the valuable insights of the rival theory. Although institutional models are 
difficult to import within the context different from those in which originated, the need for 
multidimensional theory cannot be simply dismissed.
7
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On the example of Frank Schimmelfennig‘s study (1998, 2001, and 2005) of accession 
process of East - European countries, in which he argues that the EU and NATO - 
membership was achieved predominantly by strategic use of normative arguments, we 
identify another significant challenge, that is maintaining analytical virtues of the distinct 
perspective. Whether the accession success had to be attributed merely to the inconsistencies 
between the rhetoric and entry - criteria, and not to the strategic bargaining and calculus of 
both sides, is highly controversial.
1
 The question why those countries succeeded in joining the 
EU can certainly not be explained by mere reference to the technical aspect of procedural 
effectiveness (showing the opponents‘ inconsistency). Mark Pollack for instance argues that 
on the EU - level, the socialization of elites showed little role in determining preferences as 
compared with the socialization on domestic level.
2
 Thus, the adjustment of causal relations to 
the benefit of theoretical parsimony may pose a serious danger.  Not surprisingly, rational 
choice scholars doubt the ability of constructivist authors to measure based on their inter-
subjective understanding of processes they ought to observe and analyze in a most objectively 
neutral way. Bringing domestic factors of politics into the reality of international institutions 
makes the analytical undertaking even more challenging by broadening the dimensions of 
inquiry. To sum up, ―rationalism, encompassing liberal argument of voluntary agreement and 
realists' claim of power and coercion, as well as constructivism provide today the major 
platform of contestation‖ for IR scholarship.3 Bearing in mind negative consequences of both 
the blind loyalty to theoretical purity as well as of conceptual stretching, we recognize the neo 
- liberal institutionalism as best framework capable of addressing issues in a way, other 
theoretical mainstreams are powerless to do. In the following chapter we provide the rationale 
of our theoretical choice, the strengths of the approach and the designed analytical concept, 
and the benefits it can bring to the results of our study.   
 
2.3.2 Neo - Liberal Institutionalism – the Source of Analytical Design  
 
Infinite number of questions could be easily identified that touch upon the impact of 
institutional effects. Yet the most critical to us is, to what extent state behavior is influenced 
by international institution, and accordingly, what theoretical pillars can be preferred to 
solidify our analytical construct. The separation of domestic and external factors still poses a 
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serious problem significantly hampering the elucidation of causal relationships. Correctly 
labeled by Michael McFaul as the ―forgotten dimension‖, the international factors of domestic 
change are essential to establish causal linkages between domestic actors and external agents.
1
 
It must be noted, that states are increasingly reviewed by realists students as a structure 
represented by the government. Yet realists fail to address the interrelation of domestic 
political factors and effects produced by international institutions in a way Robert Putnam‘s 
Two-Level Game does by stressing multilevel structure (constituency) of the state in 
international policy - making.
2
 Alongside with Robert Putnam, Robert Keohane (1982, 1995, 
1998) and Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1997) are key authors significantly contributing to the 
accomplishments of neo - liberal institutional theory and contribute to the solid body of 
arguments, our study heavily draws on. The theoretical mainstream we‘ve adopted is largely 
rooted within the liberal theory of IR, and we believe is best to account for critical theoretical 
claims related to the role of international institutions in policy – formation and implmentation.  
 
We will first devote our attention to major findings of the mentioned scholars, whom we 
regard critical to our study, and then complement the gained understanding by adding 
valuable insights generated within the studies of other students of neoliberal - rationalist 
fashion. As briefly alluded in previous sections, and explicitly to be mentioned here, the 
crucial advantage of the liberal institutionalist theory is the focus on political (incl. domestic) 
origins of national preferences. In Andrew Moravcsik‘s view the national governments are 
exposed to the influence of domestic interest - groups and respond to their demands via 
various mechanisms of representation (democratic, social etc.).
3
 His model draws on the 
causal importance of state - society relations rooted within the well developed Public Choice 
theory that defines the political behavior via intensive interplay of political transactions and 
preferences. Stressing the paradigmatic significance of societal group - preferences in 
defining state behavior, he elaborates variations (three) of liberal theory. Though his attempts 
to separate liberal theory from its institutional wing (represented by Robert Keohane) sound 
very unconvincing, the insights developed in relation to social contexts the states are 
embedded internationally and domestically, serve great deal in explaining the political 
behavior in world politics. According to Andrew Moravcsik, the fundamental actors in 
international politics are individual and private groups that may cause state to act in a unitary 
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or disaggregated way.
1
 States and other political institutions represent various configurations 
of domestic society, i.e. social coalitions, interests of which are translated into state 
preferences pursued by state officials in a purposeful manner, which in turn may lead to 
different configuration or compatibility modes of states‘ preferences (compatible or 
conflictual).
2
 Moravcsik‘s concept is perfectly applicable to international reality by showing 
the wide range of factors (social structures) relevant to the decision - making process 
performed by national representations (officials, agencies). Conversely, an international 
institution could refer to domestic constituencies to seek more support and legitimacy for 
policies and norms to be introduced.
3
  This aspect among others is also provided by Robert 
Putnam in his more developed system of political interplay - negotiations, in which national 
executives are involved in to reach international agreements. The conceptual understanding of 
how domestic policy and diplomacy interact is visualized by two levels of political 
deliberation national executive officials are engaged in (see Figure 1).
4
 
 
Figure 1.  The Logic of Two - Level Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the example of Bonn Economic Summit in 1978, where political leaders were forced to 
play on two game boards (international and domestic) to adopt the coordinated program of 
global reflation, he shows the limitations of analytical interpretation from purely domestic 
angle of causes and international effects (second image), or in contrary, from the standpoint of 
international causes and the domestic effects (second image reversed).
5
 While national 
executives are engaged with counterparts internationally to reach an agreement, domestically 
they seek approval from various interest groups, legislators and political constituencies, who 
in turn decide whether to support or not.  The concept of ratification presented by Robert 
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Putnam in his insightful article sheds light on two key factors that determine the political 
outcome:
1
 
 
1. National representatives, while negotiating, seek such solutions that will be 
most attractive to their constituents.  
2. Possible actions that appear rational for one player at one level may be less 
acceptable for the same player at the other level.  
 
It is noteworthy that within the complexity of multiple level negotiations, author attaches a 
great deal to the expectation effects, that heavily affect not only the proper phase of 
interaction leading to abortion, pause and other results, but cause also prior consultations with 
different constituents or even formal voting
2. We share author‘s particular interest for the said 
factor, not only because of its huge practical implications and intrinsic relevance to the overall 
political outcome, but not least due to its ability to correspond to key neo - realist ideas, nicely 
encompassed by Joseph Grieco under the concept of relative gains of state preferences.
3
  Two 
- level game model is a key concept we take as a starting platform for our own analysis. It will 
be further refined, by considering particular issues, relevant to our object of study, and by 
adding other elements derived from the literature of other liberal scholars.  
 
The critical contribution of the model is that it links the structure and procedures of 
international negotiations to the realm of domestic political interactions. By doing this, it 
reveals two general effects on the political outcome likely to unfold: first – exposed to the 
dual pressure, national officials‘ strategy is to modify the ―the scope of negotiations or the 
negotiated text to ensure approval at home‖; and second – national officials may use both 
domestic concerns to strengthen their position during international negotiations, or, 
conversely apply international constrains to overcome domestic resistance.
4
 We will push the 
theoretical horizon a bit further to illuminate the process of implementation, once an 
agreement has been signed and approved by national authorities. It invites scholars to the 
realm, what could be titled as domestic obstruction of legitimized implementation, in which 
international agreements serve the mere purpose of formal legitimation, however, are hardly 
implemented because of their incompatibility with domestic interests of much higher 
importance. The conflict of internal and external (international) agendas poses a serious 
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concern - issue, theoretically born within the Putnam‘s model and deserving more attention. 
International commitments and promises have to be debated domestically and wayed against 
domestic preferences, otherwise they might be seriously put under the risk of obstruction. 
Conversely, if no reaction is to observe, or no implementation of the agreement has followed, 
the process of democratic deliberation in the country can be seriously questioned. Here we see 
a clear affinity to key concepts of democratic theory (representative and deliberative 
democracies), as well as to the principal - agent model that deals with the strategies of 
executive officials (agents) who pursue their own interests, different from those of their 
constituents (principals).  
 
2.3.3 Neoliberal View of Institutions – The most compatible Framework  
 
We have briefly mentioned Andrew Moravcsik‘s vague attempt to place Robert Keohane 
outside of liberal theoretical mainstream. Understanding his strong internal drive for crafting 
the theoretical distinctiveness of the liberal concept, we are much less convinced by his 
arguments dismissing the institutionalist theory as not - compatible with core messages of the 
liberal theory. Instead we regard Robert Keohane as one of the key contributors to the liberal 
theory of international relations by enriching it with fascinating insights generated from 
international regime and institutional studies. Labeling him as ―sympathetic to liberalism‖ 
does not make Robert Keohane less liberal
1
. In contrary, both authors assertion of the 
importance of international institutions as well as of the purposive mode of state behavior in 
pursuit of its interests (preferences) constitute the major unifying framework of liberal 
thought when applied to international politics. Institutions in Keohane‘s view generally play 
positive role of supporting cooperation incentives in a given policy area and reduce initial 
uncertainty via increased distribution of information.
2
 However, they are not always 
successful and the degree of successfulness of an institution as a measurement for general 
plausibility of institutionalists‘ claim is being openly rejected by neoliberal authors 
themselves.
3
 Since bargaining and preference configurations somehow can be regarded as 
conceptual outlets for realists‘ argument of power and dominance relationship, the neo - 
liberal concept of international institutionalism seem to be well suited to respond both to 
claims of rival theories, as well as to the dynamics of real - world events. As Robert Keohane 
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and Martin Lisa argue, it does not deny the validity of realist approach to issues of power, 
security and interest, and by mitigating fears of cheating (positive distributional effect) it 
directly supports the logic of utility maximization of actors.
1
 At this point, the immense 
significance of information to security considerations is clearly recognized, and creates 
additional incentive of cooperation, once information - sharing mechanisms (e.g. on defence 
costs or force planning) are on place. Defining his arguments as functional response to the 
hegemonic stability concept, Keohane argues that the existence of a hegemon is not a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of cooperation, and if present, the hegemons would 
even benefit from the cooperation to enforce the rules.
2
  
 
Known for his propensity to focus predominantly on internal institutional structures, he also 
illustrates the institutional capacity to initiate domestic changes. In this sense, multinational 
institutions are given the ability to enhance the quality of ―national democratic processes‖ and 
to guide institutional changes domestically.
3
  He is joined by other liberal scholars, who 
highlight the broad variety of mechanisms of multilateral institutions that enhance national 
deliberation processes and decision - making, and range from platforms of negotiations and 
debate to the effective tools of expertise provision and professional networking. Illustrative 
are the words of James Madison in Federalist Papers that refer to the importance of objective 
assessment of third party for national political decision - making: 
  
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government (…) 
that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by 
some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the 
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.
4
 
 
Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik apply this logic when reviewing the impact international 
institutions can cause in new democracies. They particularly stress the multiplying effect of 
such influence once national political leadership agrees to reinforce domestic efforts via 
international commitments that imply sanctions in case of policy revision.
5
 International 
institutions perform a function of political assistance, when supporting states in advancing 
certain objectives domestically that initially originated somewhere else. This process of 
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interdependence can be run in two - way direction. In one case national systemic flaws can be 
corrected by serious involvement of an internation organization (IO); conversely national 
institutions usually impose tight control over IO by various mechanisms of accountability 
(information, financial) and the modes of decision - making procedures.
1
  
 
The liberal view of the role states play in international institutions implies a high degree of 
governmental accountability towards its domestic constituents that can either support officials 
or punish them for their decisions made internationally. Allen Buchannan terms the said effect 
of the state - IO interdependence as reciprocal legitimation, which implies the mutual 
reinforcement of the ―right to rule‖, i.e. the justification to act in response of the requirements 
of moral duties.
2
 Though mostly applied in the context of democratic nature of international 
institution (II), legitimacy enhancing mechanisms are crucial elements of II‘s domestic 
influence and the general concept of the compliance. The prospects of diminishing legitimacy 
can produce a great deal of concern and prevent a state from actions that undermine its 
objectives publicly declared. Domestic policies can be shaped by a wide application of 
international standards, or IIs can be allowed to operate in domestic affairs in order to 
increase policy effectiveness.
3
 The inherent openness of the said concept to multidimensional 
approach of the analysis resulted in a logical interest of scholars for the democratic effects of 
IIs influence. Whether picking on the topics of improved democratic governance, or the 
accountability of state officials (agents), the debate on the impact of international institutions 
encompassed various aspects of democratic theories and promised to improve the information 
asymmetry as well as the quality of monitoring state behavior.
4
  
 
Two aspects here should be given attention to review the multidimensional effects of 
institutions in their conceptual totality. The role of national elites and interest groups in 
conjunction with the linkages established towards the bureaucracies of international 
institutions should not be underestimated. Though the general principle of coherent state 
preferences remains valid, the coordinating effects of bureaucracies on the final political 
outcome as a result of policy readjustment between different interest groups have to be 
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thoroughly scrutinized.
1
 Another challenge is to bring to the fore the risk of the policies being 
―hijacked‖ by certain groups or even by political elitist circles. Hence, the historical play - 
back of political socialization processes between the representatives of national authorities 
and the officials of international organizations becomes indispensible tool to capture the 
moments, in which complex, costly but ultimately balanced institutional environment 
decisively contributed to the formation of likeminded political elites.
2
   
 
Neo - liberal approach to the issue of institutions‘ relevance in international relations is 
marked by its ability to encompass various aspects of power and interest - relations, structural 
dynamics and organizational influence that are shared by scholars of opposing theoretical 
mainstreams. The common epistemological foundation of neo - liberals and realists, that is the 
rational model of actor‘s behavior which is assumed to have fixed set of preferences, allows 
to speak about a high degree of theoretical convergence.
3
 Once the relevance of institution has 
been recognized, the neoliberal view can essentially subsume the realist claims and promise to 
provide more nuanced explanation of political processes. Despite the growing tendency of 
state disaggregation as a meaningful tool for understanding preference - formation, states still 
remain the main object of analysis, and as Mark Pollack argues, the creation of institutions 
―did not cause the transfer of authority from state to new center‖.4 The centrality of states in 
international relations is largely acknowledged by realist and neo - liberal institutionalist 
scholars, although the tendency ―…to multinationalize, transgovernmentalize, bureaucratize 
and transnationalize the state led to its literal extinction as analytical construct.‖5  
 
While highlighting the growing importance of inter-sectoral, functional and horizontal 
interdependence in world politics, we might sometimes use definitions such as 
Intergovernmentalism, International/Multilateral Institutionalims and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism interchangeably. We also share Robert Keohane and others‘ claim that states 
still represent the major link connecting individuals with outer world.
6
 Mark Pollack carefully 
puts together all major postulates of neo - liberal institutionalists in a very coherent way. 
Referring to state as the unit of analysis he concludes, that though consisting of various 
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interest groups, states ultimately aggregate the preferences and advance them in a strategic 
way by rationally choosing the institution that are designed best to maximize their utility.
1
 
Therefore, current institutional scholarship may simply vary depending on the empirical 
emphasis chosen (intergovernmental vs. very functional bureaucratic institution). Preferences 
play also key role in determining the autonomy of the organization. The principal - agent 
model becomes herewith a function of the state preferences that reveal themselves in the 
variety and relevance of issues. Principals (states) basically, very much define the level of 
autonomy of the agent (institution).
2
  
 
Theoretical debates are of critical importance, yet they should not lead to a blind dismissal of 
opposing arguments as unacceptable, rejecting the benefits the successful ―borrowings‖ can 
provide. No doubt, common standards of scientific research must be maintained. However, 
since the establishing of a causal relationship between the international action, the form of 
government and the domestic effects (politics) is our major goal and requires an analytical 
lens capable of providing the multidimensional (political, functional and ideational) picture, 
we adopt neo - liberal institutionalist approach as best framework for verifying the empirical 
evidence still to be gathered. We also admit that our theoretical choice does not preclude us 
from identifying other approaches as most applicable to certain issues, in overall, contributing 
to the better elucidation of causal linkages. Neo - liberal institutionalists‘ interpretation of 
international institution, though rationalist, is very helpful in illustrating the domestic -
international linkages, and in particular, is powerful in providing explanations in a 
―disaggregated manner‖. The concepts it applies are multifunctional and increasingly able to 
incorporate other dimensions such as time, space and social (cultural) context. Consequently, 
we are able to pinpoint the key elements that will further determine the design of our analysis 
and the structure of our study. These are: 
 
 Policy making and preference compatibility on two levels of game 
 Factor of mutually enhanced legitimation 
 Institutions as effective forums of communication and impartial management 
 Domestic constituents of the state  
 
Knowing the limits of comparative case - study approach, we restrain ourselves from the 
ambition of strong generalization of the findings. Yet the elements listed above, if carefully 
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applied, would immensely contribute to the illustration of existing political landscape and 
deepen the understanding of state - institution interdependence mechanisms, by providing 
powerful explanations of particular national policies adopted towards NATO and affected by 
NATO. This has not been done so far. 
 
2.4 Analytical Design and Hypotheses   
 
Defining causal relationship is the key objective of reasoning in general science.
1
 Theoretical 
foundations of the study, among others, pursue the objective to assist students in their attempt 
to construct a model, capable of producing hypotheses that are empirically valid and can be 
verified or falsified. The idea that the essence of science must be seen as the production of 
clear concepts is not new and can be traced back to Max Weber.
2
 Consequently, the concepts 
created must help us disaggregate our general hypothesis into a set of competing (alternative) 
hypotheses translatable into indicators for the sake of objective evaluation and measurement. 
Since social science research often does not perform best in focusing on processes that are 
observable, designing solid concepts and models turns to be a major precondition for 
improving quality of data collection.
3
 The rationalist coinage of institutional analysis, 
according to Andrew Moravcsik and Robert Putnam, is generally very suitable for 
constructing various interdependence models of domestic and international politics.
4
  We are 
in particular very interested in the ability of NATO to influence the preferences of actors 
(Armenia and Georgia) and cause political outcome or change at domestic level. This capacity 
is often called as transformative engagement of institution.
5
 Knowing well the methodological 
difficulties to test various causal lines used by institution (NATO) to influence the national 
behavior (defence dransformation) the task of defining criteria for the testability of causal 
argument is even more challenging.   
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2.4.1 Understanding analytical Design  
 
As Robert Keohane and Martin Lisa put it ―research designed to isolate the impact of 
institutions‖ from the underlying force is difficult to design and execute.1 However, we 
believe that, even more, the efforts aiming at analyzing cases, where these factors are 
interrelated, must be appreciated. We are aware of the perennial need to check and control the 
degree in which a research design responds to key questions formulated within it. In this 
constant way of conceptual self - control, we‘ll be able to combine theory with observations 
―in such a way as to demonstrate a causal effect.‖2 To respond to said challenges and to meet 
theoretical requirements of the study we designed a model (see below, Figure 2) that will 
guide us throughout the analysis. Bearing in mind the critical importance of domestic factors 
that may be the cause of state preference - formation we proceed in a rationalist manner by 
disaggregating complex international processes in single elements that in course of analysis 
can ultimately be aggregated in a ―multi - causal explanation.‖3  
 
Figure 2. Analytical Concept 
 
Domestic   State     Institutional   Transformative Effect -  
Factors   Policy Formation   Framework   State Policy Implemented 
 
1   2   Readjustment 3    4  
 
 
Security 
 
Gov.Elite 
 
Interest  
Groups  
      
 
Readjustment 
 
According to our model, the whole process of state - institution interplay is virtually divided 
in four phases, within which different forces (variables) come together and affect the ultimate 
political outcome. As Kenneth Abbott argues, the greatest impact comes through domestic 
politics allowing democratic leaders to ―commit themselves publicly to reform.‖4 The first 
phase of our model highlights the diverse nature of interest groups and other domestic factors 
involved in the process of preference - generation. At the state level all individual preferences 
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are being aggregated into the coherent body of well defined state - preferences, which are at 
core of strategic calculations of state officials and might be well correlated to the expected 
relative gains (incl. initial expectations) derived from the possibility of joining international 
institution. Once expected benefits speak for the initiation of cooperation with an institution, 
the actual engagement phase begins, in which state preferences and officials are exposed to 
institutional constrains, via the requirements of norm adoption and the bureaucratic effect of 
socialization and learning.  
 
Laready at this early stage we identify the inherent difficulty of operationalizing variables, 
generally acknowledged by many scholars.
1
 How the degree of autonomy of the bureaucratic 
staff of an international institution can be measured? Can international bureaucracy be 
detached from the interests of member states, or should we dismiss this suggestion from the 
very beginning, well aware of Max Weber‘s argument that, the bureaucrats are those ―who 
have not wished to be lords themselves, but who have entered the service of political lords‖.2  
The formidability of the task to validate the measurement is twofold: first is its contingency 
on the clarity of concept design, and the second - in the choice of measurement tools to 
capture best the possible ways and the object of measurement. As Giovani Sartori 
passionately states, only in this case data collection becomes meaningful, otherwise will 
resemble the mission of fishing data without the proper net.
3
 Thus we will provide a detailed 
explanation of the concept - operationalization in a separate chapter, which devotes also a 
great deal to the question of the measurement and data - sources.  
 
At this stage, however, given the neo - liberal claim on the relevance of international 
institutions in terms of information distribution and coordination management, we will 
assume that NATO bureaucracy serves the purpose of objectivity and neutrality. Further, the 
national representatives once placed within the institutional framework, will be primarily 
affected by common standards, norms and procedures leading to the reevaluation of the 
expected benefits, and, consequently,  to their  readjustment with original expectations via the 
process of consultations (two - level game), effectively described by Robert Putnam. The final 
stage of intensive domestic consultations formally represents the ultimate assessment of 
relative benefits international institution can provide. Many factors (e.g. position of powerful 
interest group or elite) might play decisive role for the political decision to be made. As 
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widely known, participation in international institution (II) does not result in improved 
performance inside the country.
1
 At the same time, the legitimating effect of II in domestic 
affairs might turn to be decisive trigger for accepting political outcome, that is, in our case, to 
initiate transformative effect. Our concept offers a plausible picture of influence - mechanisms 
that can be explained from rationalist as well as constructivist standpoints. Most importantly, 
they indicate certain dimensions or avenues, through which II exerts its influence and delivers 
messages. Though not explicitly reflected here, we attribute those dimensions to political, 
functional and ideational modes of institutional influence, to which national representatives 
are exposed and that are indicative for the subsequent empirical measurement.  
 
2.4.2 Introducing Variables and Hypotheses 
 
Effects of institutional influence pose a serious challenge to the task of their valid 
measurement. Though very successful in bringing more insights of political processes, 
institutions still lack on effective measurement tools for their characteristics and impacts in 
various policy areas.
2
 Hence, the crucial importance of the predefined analytical concept 
capable of generating useful results has to be clearly recognized. The challenge of identifying 
observable processes and examples might be alleviated by proposing properties that can help 
measure unobservable (intangible) phenomenon through the effects in various functional 
areas. Conversely, we must be aware of serious challenges that accompany the overstated 
reliance on technical aspects of the research, by which students increasingly are awarded for 
their ―mathematic acumen‖ rather than their ability to analyze the ways organizations operate, 
as stated by Peter Katzenstein.
3
 Similarly, Giovanni Sartori warns in a passionate way from 
the widespread tendency of assigning qualitative statements quantitative substances that has 
little if any to do with quantification.
4
 To avoid the risk of sliding into the same temptation, 
we constructed the model in a way as to allow ourselves to strongly link ideas with observable 
processes we can measure. Equally, the data we will collect must precisely capture the 
essence of ideas, pertaining to the analytical design. This is how effective operationalization 
of the concept is being achieved and the validity of measurement enhanced.
5
 The contextual 
effects of observation and measurement should not be fall into oblivion. Data collected in 
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certain contextual settings might not necessarily represent the same meaning in different 
circumstances. As Barabara Geddes puts it, concepts must be operationlized in concrete ways 
to ―reduce the ambiguity surrounding their identification in real - world settings.‖1  
 
The discussion on strengths and limits of our analytical construct would logically subsume the 
chapter (methodology), which tackles the necessity and advantages of comparative case - 
study analysis. However, methodological considerations would be best presented if separated 
from the aspect of conceptual design as the cause of measurement validity, largely related to 
the challenge of variable identification. Concepts are theoretical and practical platforms for 
data gathering. Variables in this sense represent channels, where information is concentrated. 
Undoubtedly, it is a considerable task to select relevant ―channels‖ that lead to valid causal 
explanation. Giovanni Sartori underscores the problem of conceptual understanding of 
variables and criticizes the current state, in which nearly everything is regarded as variable 
(which in fact they are not), significantly complicating the gradation and measurability of 
observations.
2
 We acknowledge the simple necessity that variables must measure what they 
supposed to measure. By doing that we also take account of the clear distinction of variables 
that measure qualitative characteristics from the variables that measure quantitative dimension 
of the phenomenon. It is the issue of magnitude and quality that makes this distinction, and 
ultimately the measurement valid.
3
   
 
As briefly mentioned afore, the contextual underpinning of the study exerts significant impact 
on the ways and the interpretation of results gained. Further, we share and stress Robert 
Adcock‘s claim that the validation of one set of scores in one context, does not imply the 
same interpretation within the different context, especially apparent in cross - country, cross -
regional comparisons and within - unit analyses.
4
  We base our validity claims with reference 
to specific indicators that are carefully selected with a great sense for politico - social meaning 
and context in each case - country. Inevitably, we construct such a model, in which cases are 
similar once dependent variable is considered, that is three dimensions of defence 
transformation. The merit of such design though, is the ability to discern the common set of 
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explanatory factors that ―can push scholars to discover new explanations that might not have 
emerged from the analysis of a more homogeneous set of cases.‖1 
 
The picture below (Figure 3) illustrates the relationships of independent and dependent 
variables, by allowing the dimensional aspects of the analytical concept to be translated into 
explanatory independent variables (political, functional and ideational). Obviously the process 
of transformation turns the defence institution into the dependent variable.
2
 It is disaggregated 
into three sub - variables so as to provide a clear set of issue areas, where indicators could be 
best identified. It is assumed that independent political and functional variables have major 
effects on the areas of political adherence and structural/functional optimization, but also 
partially affecting third (ideational) dimension.  Thus the in - depth analysis of independent 
variables becomes a must, to establish strong relationship between variables and indicators or 
particular outcomes.  
 
Figure 3.   Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable  
Variable - 1 Variable - 2 Variable - 3 
Defence Institutions  Political Adherence to 
Cooperation Objectives 
Structural / functional 
Optimization/Efficiency 
Commitment to Community 
Affiliation 
 
Possible Indicators  
 Parliamentary Sessions 
on Defence (incl. 
Committee sessions) 
participated 
 Meetings with MOF 
and NSC participated 
 Meetings with NGOs 
 Legal Norms changed  
 Policy documents 
released/published 
 Internal regulations changed 
 Structural changes 
 Policy documents 
introduced, reviewed 
 
 Programs, courses, exercises 
participated 
 Personnel retained after course 
participation 
 Course participant distribution at 
different position levels 
 
We will analyze the content of independent variables to identify priorities of policy agendas 
and program objectives as well as constitutive elements of functional and ideational influence. 
It must be noted that the regional security concerns, i.e. the factors associated with regional 
conflicts will not be excluded from the analysis and will serve the purpose of explanatory 
variables. With the developed set of variables, we hope to clarify and test the validity of 
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mechanisms an international institution (NATO) can apply to influence, and shape the 
behavior of the actor (defence institutions of Armenia and Georgia) to gain a particular 
political outcome (degree of transformation).
1
 Objectively, the results of the study must be 
based on meticulous work in a terrain not explored before and often associated with 
information not intended for public use. Even more, as Collier would argue, the intensive 
analysis of few cases would most probably render much more positive results than a broader 
study.
2
 This approach allows collecting more data on dependent variable ―by observing the 
same variable in another context, or by observing another dependent variable that is an 
implication of the same theory.‖3  
 
Based on the general model constructed and the variables offered, we suggest following 
hypotheses: 
 
 The degree of institutional influence (domestic compliance), i.e. transformation of the 
national defence systems is contingent on compatibility of aggregated national preferences 
with the benefits / relative gains calculated within the framework of institutional (NATO) 
cooperation.  
 
 Further, we claim that the extensive application of NATO - shared values and norms 
domestically by a country is contingent on the prevalence of external (international) 
political objectives over internal political agenda.  
 
 Participation in NATO - institutional frameworks predominantly serves the purpose of 
legitimization of domestic actions and does not lead to imminent implementation.   
 
Alternatively we argue that: 
 
 International power - relations and security interests by far determine the speed and depth 
of defence transformation as the political outcome of institutional compliance.  
 
 Cooperation mechanisms existing between NATO and Armenia and Georgia support the 
adoption of norms and practices of democratic control over armed forces, consequently, 
contributing to the increased level of institutional accountability rather than to the 
objective of military effectiveness.  
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
If effectively applied, the concept, which we have developed, seems to be very capable of: 
first - elucidating the variety of issues relevant specifically to neo - liberal institutionalist 
theory. Yet it also promises to tackle other aspects of a political phenomenon (institutional 
influence) that correspond to the core of other theoretical concepts.  There is a great potential 
that students engaged in other theoretical domains could benefit from the insights of 
institutional theories. I am far away from claiming to bring revolutionary insight into the 
relevance of the theoretical approach adopted. However, while attempting to explain a 
particular case by testing certain theoretical propositions against identified phenomenon, we 
directly contribute to the additional development of the theory. Once again, we underscore our 
forceful desire to join the club of ―conscious thinkers‖ who realize ―the limitations of not 
having a thermometer and still manages to say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, 
warmer and cooler.‖1 By devoting specific attention to the analytical concept and its 
constituting theoretical ideas we hoped to provide a solid fundament for the methodological 
choices, the structure and techniques of the scientific inquiry, we have privileged in the 
following chapter.   
 
While adopting neo - liberal views to international institutions we aim at providing additional 
and more complex understanding of institutional mechanisms that strengthen the effects of 
compliance and furthermore, might serve as powerful tool to certify case - countries for 
certain type of governance (democratic or authoritarian), based on particular institutional 
patterns accepted towards NATO. It is especially relevant, once we start to analyze the 
performance of certain institution in a particular country that is embedded in the democratic 
transition process, as in cases of Georgia and Armenia. The analytical concept and the 
generated hypotheses contribute to the general debate on the relevance of particular 
theoretical approaches (neo - liberal, realist and constructivist) dependent on the context 
reviewed. Furthermore, we expect from our study to highlight important aspects of realist 
research agenda in relation to key determinants of state performance while transforming 
defence (strategic calculations and interests). Throughout analysis we will be able to discern 
key findings that would clarify the particular mode of state‘s decision - making (rationalist vs. 
social context dependent) chosen to engage institutional framework of the Alliance. Last but 
not least, empirical evidence we base our analysis on, is supposed to reveal the practical 
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achievements in military reforms, most probably to be attributed to the role of NATO –
structual and bureaucratic bodies as agencies pursuing the strategic function of professional 
socialization. Not for nothing, the claim about the centrality of institutions in illustrating 
various aspects of national and international politics becomes more and more convincing.  
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Chapter III: Methodology  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Taking on the aspect of methodology, which we are about to adopt, the degree of its practical 
utility to collect and analyze the evidence (i.e. empirical data relevant for the hypotheses and 
research questions) becomes very central. Often regarded as the practical toolkit necessary for 
data measurement, the methodology and methodological preferences, in fact, represent a 
direct result and the logical consequence of how careful the entire concept was developed. As 
our highest goal is the establishment of valid causal inferences and effects, the success of the 
methodological application is ultimately contingent on the clarity and the particular 
characteristics of the analytical concept established in chapter before.
1
 Bearing this in mind 
we must clearly distinguish the level of methodology from the level of research techniques, 
the last one best suitable for the collection and/or manipulation of data. As Giovanni Sartori 
puts it, most literature on methodology deals with survey techniques, is busy with methods of 
physical science and has nothing to do with the proper understanding of methodology, which 
is the logical structure and procedure of scientific inquiry.
2
 Sometimes the capacity of the 
field of political science to absorb and tolerate the multitude of approaches and analytical 
formations stimulates the creation of eclectic techniques, where qualitative effects are being 
translated into quantitative results and thus hardly can be accepted. Such pitfalls heavily affect 
the reliability of data analysis and might render false results. We are aware of this danger and 
remain conscious about the need of our research design to respond convincingly to key 
research questions we have formulated. Furthermore, our concept was designed as to avoid 
any possible thematic stretching aimed at broadening of its meaning and the range of 
application. Good concepts are best tools for data collection and help very much understand 
the problem of what we actually are about to measure. Thus, we will first try to identify the 
spectrum of methodological options available and benefits associated. Then we will justify the 
particular approach we have selected. As last we will delineate the limitations that inherently 
feature the adopted methodological toolkit.  
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3.2 Methodological Options available  
 
 
Before touching upon the classical divide between qualitative and quantitative mainstreams, 
the entire study, perhaps, would best benefit if we shortly outline the particular aspect of the 
methodological pluralism, commonly known as the complementaristic approach. By that we 
imply efforts directed towards integrating varying (behavioral) explanations, that ultimately 
help very much understand the relative priority and the particular benefit of a certain 
methodological (qualitative/quantitative) approach. The methodological individualism 
strengthens the need of the individualistic approach to the analysis within social science. The 
extensive use of the microfoundation - analysis, i.e. the individualistic prism to explain the 
social phenomenon of a larger scale (group, class, and organization) is one of the valuable 
avenues for our research. On a number of fairly well developed examples Daniel Little draws 
the general conclusion that the macro level behavior and interests cannot be explained without 
detailed account of mechanisms working behind. Respectively, it leads to the need of 
analyzing individual interests and choices that constitute the larger group.
1
 Pretty in line with 
rationalist school argumentation, the claim of necessity to provide micro - foundations for 
macro - explanations of social patterns seems very plausible. For instance, the mere reference 
to the role of a state to serve the interests of a certain interest group or a class (a functionalist 
explanation) cannot be regarded as sufficient. The collective interest here is referred to a 
rational choice of the individual actor, which contributes to the aggregated consequence of 
individual decisions.  
 
Alternatively, the critique is being exercised by rejecting the narrow focus of the individual 
rationality (egoism) as impossible basis for social cooperation. Furthermore, each individual 
action is regarded as a kind of compromise between the individual interests and collective 
commitments, ideological believes and moral values. Emil Durkheim continues the mentioned 
course of argumentation and brilliantly stipulates the very essence of social facts (the way of 
acting, thinking and feeling) that are brought from outside and do not have the individual 
source.
2
 The clear distinction of social from individual is the focal point of his argument and 
thus, a great help in attempt to avoid the confusion between what is called social fact and its 
―reincarnation‖ in individual. According to him, collective (group) aspects are determinants of 
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individual behavior daily manifested in infinite ways.
1
 Social phenomena are too complex to 
be explained solely on the basics of individual behavior. The army, for instance, is not a 
military organization due to number of soldiers, but the other way around - the institution of 
army makes from an individual a soldier.
2
 Understanding existing problems in interpreting the 
nature of social phenomena is critical both from the conceptual and methodological 
perspective. It is, in fact, instrumental, in generating clarity about the facts and processes we 
are about to observe, as well as about the tools available to measure the mentioned facts and 
processes. This, in turn, enables us to decide whether qualitative or quantitative framework of 
the analysis would apply best to render valid results.   
 
It is a perennial question, whether qualitative studies match the degree of the reliability of 
data produced in the field of quantitative research. Jack Levy, for instance, argues that the 
most parsimonious theory he could identify, which is the Neo - realism, is strongly anchored 
within the qualitative domain and is able to produce universally generalizable conclusions.
3
 
He advocates the combined application of quantitative tools with case - study methods, where 
a great deal must be devoted to the justification of the case - selection and control - variables 
in ―meaningful subsets‖ in order to describe, explain or predict.4 Two factors play important 
role in this regard: the call for the improvement of measurement strategies and the validity of 
scores achieved that are balanced by the findings of within – case (s) analysis. In this context 
Evan Liebermann argues that the Nested Analysis – an intensive combination of statistical 
tools with Small N - studies, is best to produce most reliable results.
5
 However, central to this 
model is that specific conditions must be provided, such as the different levels of analysis 
within the case, and the variety of the dependent or explanatory variables.
6
  The need for case 
- or cross - case analysis already indicates that the qualitative approach will play a crucial role 
while performing our research. Often the amount of information processed within the 
qualitative design is comparably equal to the massive flow of statistical data. Some authors 
even go further to assert that the methodological differences quali vs. quanti are in fact of 
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minor importance, and expose no contradiction in the fundamental process of inference.
1
 This 
aspect, formulated as ―supplementary mode of causal inference‖ is also highlighted by James 
Mahoney, who takes the case - study approach under serious scrutiny and identifies its great 
utility to grasp the context and the complexity of the reality.
2
 Nevertheless, while 
acknowledging the priority of the qualitative approach to our research, we must be aware of 
the limitations and pitfalls of such approach.  
 
We agree to the claim, that the cases we select pretty much affect the results we expect from 
analysis. It may be attributed, among others, to the violation of the rules of the ―general 
convention‖ or to the inherent deficits of the ―convention‖.3 Further concerns may arise about 
the validity of observations and measurements. Attempts to operationalize certain concepts 
and link them to observations and measurement - indicators, usually, presuppose their 
validity.
4
 Yet the process of connecting facts (observations) meaningfully with ideas that 
makes up the concept often generates the problem of validation and interpretation of 
generated scores. The contextual uniqueness (political, social, cultural etc.) is the key limiting 
factor while making comparisons between the regions or different time - periods. The same 
applies while conducting a within - case analysis of different sub - units. James Mahoney 
suggests to limit the number of cases to those that share similarity in ―causal and conceptual 
homogeneity.‖5 He is also supported by John Gerring, who convincingly puts forth the need 
for typical - representative cases that are relative to some causal relationship.
6
 Ultimately the 
problem of the extreme multiplicity of variables, where everything is regarded as variables, 
should not be underestimated. It devaluates the proper meaning of variables and significantly 
limits one‘s ability to measure and collect data, resulting in the low generalizability of 
findings.  
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3.3 Justification of the selected methodological Approach – the 
Case Choice and Comparison  
 
 
The starting point of our methodological justification will naturally refer to the importance of 
highlighting the unit of analysis of our research, which determines the pro and contra for the 
selection of a particular methodological toolkit. As we have mentioned, we need a method 
best for confirming the hypothesized relationship between the institutional performance 
(condition) and the policy - outcome. The dilemma of choice between the individualistic and 
collective scope of analysis should not be dismissed while taking into account the peculiarities 
of defence ministries as key units of our analysis. We need to have a good account of 
mechanisms working behind the scene, often very much person - related and unobservable, 
significantly affecting the course of action within the defence ministries. In this regard, the 
decomposition of a social structure (defence ministry) into micro - foundations cannot be 
bluntly rejected, but might turn to be very beneficial in understanding the individual related 
basics of social phenomena – the transformation of defence sector. On the other hand, it will 
be hard to deny that institutional transformation as any social phenomenon is of a very 
complex nature difficult to explain solely on the basics of the individual behavior. The 
distinction between individual and collective becomes a tough mission, and the international 
dimension makes the whole effort much more complex and difficult to model.
1
  
 
3.3.1 Opting for qualitative Approach  
 
Steven Lukes‘ statement that the institution of military – the army makes from an individual a 
soldier is equally valid and not less problematic than the assertion of opposite. Ultimately, we 
must admit that some social acts (if not all according to Emile Durkheim) have less if any 
individual source and possess the imperative of collective behavior.
2
 Following this logic the 
ministries of defence of Armenia and Georgia represent complex political institutions that are 
exposed to individual influence and serve as powerful source of influence too. Defence 
institutions reveal the quality of unitary actors, but are also deeply involved in the thick 
network of domestic national as well as international structures, through which various 
interest - groups and individuals act and have a significant impact on the decisions and 
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processes.  Thus we don‘t see any need to limit ourselves beforehand and adopt a single scope 
of analysis, significantly reducing by that the probability of alternative dimensions of causal 
linkages. The methodological complementarism we regard as a valuable tool for keeping the 
needed flexibility. Even if we‘d try to isolate a single mode of analysis to respond to a 
particular epistemological objective such as to describe, explain or predict, the inherent 
divergence of the resulting methodological toolkit would extremely endanger the ultimate 
validity of our claims.    
 
The mentioned balance was less relevant for the decision we‘ve made in favor of the 
qualitative approach of the study.  Although Evan Lieberman admits that comparative method 
is a weak approximation of the statistical method, the causal inferences derived from the 
qualitative analysis of cases across the time and levels seem to him to be very helpful to 
confirm ―hypothesized relationship between the institutional form and policy outcome.1‖ We 
agree to the argument that statistical analysis, and especially the cross - national statistical 
analysis is of great advantage in producing the preliminary information and the range of 
dependent variables to test.
2
 However, the nature of data available for our study, largely 
caused by the high sensitivity of the security and defence related issues, significantly reduces 
the probability of access to relevant sources and thus the probability of the full - scale 
statistical survey and analysis. Despite the high desirability of combining quantitative and 
qualitative approaches (Nested Analysis), we objectively have to resort to qualitative tools that 
offer distinct benefits that are even enhanced once applied in a comparative (cross - case) 
framework.     
 
3.3.2 Arguments for Case - Selection and Comparison  
 
The comparison of defence ministries of South Caucasus countries (Armenia and Georgia) 
that are exposed to the influence of external processes (NATO - integration) invites us in the 
realm of international relations and foreign policy that according to Bennet and Elman are too 
complex, unstructured and difficult to model and test statistically.
3
 This argument is 
persuasive and invites to accept a predominantly qualitative approach with the major effort to 
be devoted to cross - case analysis with the over - time comparison. Often a conventional 
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statistical approach is marginal to projects due to the serious deficits of the research design in 
observational settings.
1
 The contextual scope becomes very critical for the selection of cases, 
which in turn requires the clear understanding of its implications on research outcomes.
2
 
Mostly, it is best achieved provided the analytical concept is able to illustrate a strong link 
between the hypothetical logic and the domain of argument. We believe our concept does it. 
All units of our analysis (defence ministries and armed forces) represent countries (Armenia 
and Georgia) located in the same region that had common soviet past with no tradition of well 
- functioning democratic institutions and are now undergowing processes of democratic 
transformation, with NATO playing a significant role in national security and defence policy - 
making of each country. The Alliance as independent variable is less relevant for the choice 
of cases; however, the processes within which it applies all available elements of 
conditionality we are about to study, dictates a clear choice of case - selection, where similar 
developments took place. To avoid the selection bias caused by the inherent dependence on 
dependent variable, we evidently choose small number of case that share the similarity of 
―causal and conceptual homogeneity.3‖ The contextual scope is, consequently, mirrored in the 
process of case selection, and reveals the strong relation to certain causal linkages. The heavy 
focus on the dependent variable prerequisited the within - case approach with a consequent 
application of the cross - case analysis of two countries, which we believe is best able to 
illustrate the elements of NATO - conditionality and their effects.  Further, the empirical 
justification of the intentional limitation of cases by Armenia and Georgia, with exclusion of 
Azerbaijan, has to be explained by the political stance of Azerbaijan, that of neutral balancing 
between the NATO and Moscow led CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which 
makes the narrow comparison of only Georgia and Armenia with their radically different 
strategic policies more plausible and even intriguing. The plausibility of such limitation, i.e. 
choice of cases that are not typical in their polical objectives to the Alliance, is largely 
explained by a higher benefit of finding causal relationships that such analysis would reveal 
as compared to cases (Azerbaijan) that show even more political contextual similarity. 
Ultimately, the amount of information necessary for the chosen qualitative approach in case 
of Azerbaijan exposed a dangereously insufficient level, already limited by the nature of 
sensitive data – sources, so typical for the defence and security institutions.  
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Touching upon the very basic question of the benefits and limitation that the method of 
comparison exhibits, we must at first acknowledge that political science is largely of 
comparative nature. Political scientists always make comparison, and that is not to say that we 
put equation mark between the comparison as method of variable measurement, and 
comparison as technique. We are aware of this distinction. The real problem, once dealing 
with national political systems, is the usual asymmetry between the small number of cases and 
large number of variables.
1
 It is further aggravated, as in our case, if the application of 
statistical data - gathering is not possible and the mere reliance of ―objective interpretation‖ of 
inherently subjective data generated from interviews seems problematic. The danger of over -
reliance on (dependent) variables will be examined in detail in following chapter. Here, 
however, we take advantage of Collier‘s suggestion, by designing the comparison of cases 
that are matched on the dependent variable, but might reveal extreme differences in other 
respects.
2
 From our analysis we hope not only to distill a common set of explanatory factors 
but to discover new explanations. There is little knowledge about the given phenomenon, 
which is the institutional influence of NATO over the defence institutions of Armenia and 
Georgia. Our cases have the contextual and conceptual similarity, but vary on dependent 
variable exposing different outcomes of institutional (political and military) performance. 
Thus, we believe that the comparison of cases we have selected is the most productive way to 
become deeply ―familiar with the processes under investigation‖ and to increase the validity 
of our conclusions.
3
  
 
 
3.4 Methodological Limitations  
 
As Barbara Geddes argues, the pitfalls of violation of the norms of ―general convention‖ are 
often caused by inherent deficits of the ―conventions themselves.‖4  We agree that deficits are 
unavoidable, nevertheless must reduce them by increasing the degree of the measurement 
validity. The conceptual setting established in previous chapter provides us with the logic that 
appears to be more beneficial for our study and encompasses both questions rather than just 
one:     
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 What caused the outcome X? 
 What was the effect of the cause Y? 
 
The vast amount of information we collect must be appropriately marshaled and interpreted. 
One way to do it is to gather more observations on the dependent variable or by observing the 
same variable in another context.
1
 This is very much critical to our study, due to concerns 
about the validation of scores generated in one contextual setting that have been put within 
another context. Additionally, national units, subunits or subgroups may also significantly 
vary in their political, social or cultural context.
2
 Consequently, we do not apply a large 
number of explanatory variables but reduce them to those that carry similar underlying 
characteristics, as suggested by Arend Lijphart.
3
 By doing so, we, in fact, compare the 
political phenomenon of institutional influence between the units of analysis (ministries of 
defence) on the basis of common trait - configuration (political functional and 
ideational/cultural change). We largely follow the objective to keep our analytical concept 
simple, which is only possible if we restrict the number of variables to the really major ones. 
It will prevent us from endangering the entire quality of the study by overwhelming readers 
with large number of variables and currents of data that human intelligence has ―difficulty to 
cope with.
4‖ To meet the requirements of the general convention we selected the variables 
that are kept constant for all cases, as shown in our research design (analytical concept). They 
are purposefully selected to measure, what they are supposed to measure – the outcomes of 
NATO - influence in three key dimensions of institutional performance: political, functional 
and soliological/ideational. Similar to King, Keohane and Verba‘s claim we place the research 
design at the center of our study as the key provider of appropriate units/objects of analysis 
and the variance of explanatory variables.
5
 This enables us to conduct measurement 
predominantly across qualitative categories (Elites, Bureaucracy, state agencies etc.), with 
some combination of quantities of the same variable. Numbers are important but not the 
central issue. An intensive research within each case, performed in the way of 
multidimensional observation, helps significantly to improve the measurement - stability, and 
makes sure that scores gathered will meaningfully capture the ideas contained in our concept.
6
  
                                                 
1
 King, Keohane, and Verba, ―The Importance of Research Design in Political Science,‖ 479. 
2
 Sartori, ―Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,‖ 1048. 
3
 Lijphart, ―Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method*,‖ 687. 
4
 Ibid., 690. 
5
 Caporaso, ―Research Design, Falsification, and the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide,‖ 457. 
6
 Mahoney, ―Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics‖; Adcock, ―Measurement Validity,‖ 530. 
62 
 
 
Obviously, the term of result - generalizability refers to the need of theoretical parsimony that 
is to explain more with less, and which is scientifically difficult to neglect.  Knowing well that 
any political phenomenon is hardly possible to recur in different contextual settings, its degree 
of generalisibility remains always questionable. By narrowing down the scope of our case-
analysis we naturally conditioned the applicability of expected results in other areas.  
However, the strong validity of the applied theory and concept can be very well tested against 
the cases and evidence that are representative in their subject (contextual area). By developing 
our explicit questions and inferences we also increase the utility of our approach to the 
falsification principle. Thus, the results generated from our study will be judged against prior 
relative expectations by avoiding the risk of Sartori‘s conceptual stretching. The example of 
the realist school theory is the best manifestation of a strong parsimony of qualitative studies 
as confronted with those of quantitative scholars.
1
 Our cases reveal strong relation to certain 
causal linkage, show liitle potential to become idiosyncratic and less informative with 
questionable external validity.  
 
As frequently mentioned afore, the political phenomenon and institutional performance, in 
particular, are very difficult to measure. Competing concepts speak for the preferable and 
distinct pool of data - sources.  The questions we pursue to answer, to greater extent, 
encompass an intensive interplay between bureaucracies and various political groups, as well 
as individuals and public players. Monitoring these activities helps to shed light on particular 
preferences and interest - areas. Yet, exactly this aspect is an ongoing issue among political 
scientists.
2
 For, within the domain of tnternational relations, as well as for domestic affairs, 
monitoring function is largely associated with ―gathering and analyzing empirical data‖ from 
the members or domestic organizations.
3
 In fact, these ―monitoring reports‖ represent the 
primary and most important source of information that are performed periodically and reflect 
best the qualities of national institutional performance. NATO, however restricts the access to 
this kind of documents due to sensitive (security and defence related) nature of information 
contained. National bodies (defence ministries and other agencies) also refuse to disclose 
related information both for the reason of national interest and bilateral (with NATO) 
obligations. We do not expect security policies to change soon in this regard and make certain 
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documents public on routine base as it was done by the World Bank by 1993.
1
 Therefore, we 
will heavily rely on a broad spectrum of information sources consisting of three distinct major 
data – pools, making the function of triangualation, i.e. data – comparison for proving the 
strength of evidence, quite possible.  
 
The available NATO – documents (reports, communiques, assessments etc.) represent a first 
strong body of available data, we naturally refer as primary sources. National official sources 
such as official documents, government decisions, statements and internal agency reports are 
the second pool of available data. Finally, contributions of respected think – tanks (national 
and international), academic and policy - centered journals (articles, surveys and analytical 
papers), as well as interviews with key – individuals complete the third pool of data. 
Interviews are of critical importance to our study due to large amount of information already 
collected and analyzed, and the ability of respondents to indicate causal, relational and 
motivational linkages between facts, individuals and behavior. We pay high importance to 
relate collected data to certain period of observation, and to distill concrete outputs from each 
interview conducted. This approach increases the visibility and structure of observations as 
well as the degree of responsiveness of a reader and his ability to understand the behavioral 
and motivational aspects of institutional decisions. Our interviews will be centered on facts, 
i.e. ―observable implication‖ presented within the personal opinion of a respondent, and 
reflect motivations and preferences of people working at NATO, national defence ministries 
and other state agencies.
2
 Whenever the data availability is limited or, as in our case, the 
phenomenon is especially difficult to observe, the relevance of interviewing techniques 
becomes much more understandable. For with each more interview conducted, a stronger 
consensual evaluation on certain issues and processes will be constructed. This, in fact, 
increases the degree of objectivity of findings, since the more individuals among those ―in 
best position to know‖ agree on certain issue, the more objective conclusion can be generated 
that must be taken very seriously.
3
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Chapter IV: Operationalizing the Concept of NATO - 
Influence  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Given the existing multiple level interconnection lines between NATO and national 
representatives of Armenia and Georgia, and the possibility of influence degree derivations 
among different players within the analytical model, the necessity of operationalizing the 
process of influence becomes apparent. The notion of influence already complex in its essence 
refers to the mere ability of an institution (NATO) to shape one‘s behavior, among others, by 
having power to establish a certain set of requirements necessary to meet, i.e. the behavior is 
conditioned. This in turn creates a necessity to understand the relevance of factors or 
incentives motivating actors (in our study national defence ministries) to either comply with 
certain requirements or deny (fully or partially) compliance.  
 
The second dimension of influence refers to the content of the defined requirements 
themselves and enables by that the illumination of the character, i.e. the basic principles and 
objectives of behavior that has to be accepted. This is insofar instrumental as it helps devise 
an adequate measurement system by establishing an effective set of measurable indicators. In 
other words, three things have to be clarified: 
 
 Whether a formal framework of compliance existed (conditionality). 
 In what areas compliance happened (what requirements have been met). 
 What factors (interests, benefits or incentives) motivated the compliance.  
 
Formally, the first and third questions have to be attributed to the notion of Conditionality, 
and the second one is linked to the domain of Security Sector Reform (SSR), though all 
questions are very much interrelated.  Consequently, we will first highlight the importance of 
conditionality to the concept of NATO - influence, as the key determinant, within which 
various factors cause national compliance. Second, we will assess the relevance of SSR to the 
concept of conditionality and identify whether the principles of SSR are systematically 
embedded within the NATO - policy of cooperation/enlargement. Additionally we will review 
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the viability of socialization aspect of the Alliance‘s influence to the concept of conditionality 
and the degree of convergence of SSR - principles with the potential outcomes of NATO‘s 
socialization process. As last, a measurement tool will be offered, which explains the sources 
and techniques of data collection, its validation and the potential limitations.  
 
4.2 Influence – an implied Conditionality 
 
The question of national compliance is inherently related to the concept of conditionality, due 
to the core principle of agreement between two actors, whereby one gets reworded by another 
if certain conditions (i.e. commitments) are fulfilled
1
. Thus, by highlighting particular aspects 
of defence cooperation between the Alliance and Armenia and Georgia, we hope not only to 
bring about more insight into the ability of the Alliance to apply various mechanisms of 
compliance, but not least the limitations of those mechanisms. It also elevates the importance 
of domestic factors and political incentives that either supported the national decision to 
comply, or in fact impeded any decision, leading to indecisive domestic actions and to 
increased concerns on the side of the external (international) institution (NATO).  
 
The driving force of the successful cooperation within the institutional framework is, clearly, 
the readiness of the actor, i.e. the state to accept common procedures and policies that are of 
external origin yet constitute the logic of appropriateness related to the individual behavior. 
For instance, in the field of democratization studies the principle of adherence to democratic 
standards and norms is given huge importance. The process of the democratic transition 
within a country (e.g. EU-enlargement) usually involves an institution which is still infected 
by rules conflicting with the new requirements, and often results in a continuous adaptation to 
context and learning mechanisms.
2
 Understanding external factors of influence in domestic 
affairs is crucial. Yet as some authors argue, the membership prospective alone seems to be 
the strongest incentive for democratic transformation and consolidation in East Europe.
3
 
Furthermore, the membership promises, though very critical, require additional features to 
speed up or to keep the pace of country‘s transformation. Lisa Martin isolates three core 
elements of national compliance that ensure a high probability of successful democratic 
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consolidation: the degree of credibility of state commitments, the effectiveness (effects) of the 
agreement and the role of sanctions.
1
   Obviously, the second and third factors are also very 
relevant to the concept of conditionality; in fact they are the essence of it. Sometimes the term 
transformative engagement is being used to highlight the fluid nature of the processes, still 
highly contingent on the results achieved.
2
  
 
4.2.1 Conditionality and Compliance 
 
Though many authors recognize the existence and the need for further elaboration of 
constraining measures to bring about compliance and punish uncooperative behavior, most of 
the attempts to produce more insight into the effectiveness of NATO mechanisms applied 
towards aspirant countries remained fairly unconvincing and vague.
3
 One of the most 
prominent writers in the democratization field Frank Schimmelfennig is not an exception in 
this regard. His contributions represent brilliant work illustrating the complexity of social and 
even political socialization of the aspirant countries‘ officials during the period of intensive 
negotiations with EU - executives.  Yet, despite his exemplary findings that favor interest 
based explanations of the European policy of conditionality, the problem of scant evidence on 
the motives of the commitment to domestic transformation remains unresolved.
4
  
 
As already mentioned, the notion of conditionality has mainly to be regarded as an analytical 
tool facilitating proper understanding of institutional influence, applied to Armenia and 
Georgia. Within this logic the close affinity of the category of compliance to the overall 
concept of conditionality exists, for which we will often use henceforth the abbreviation ―CC‖ 
(Conditionality and Compliance). Clearly, every social phenomenon is a unique process, with 
its own historical context, not likely to reappear in other settings.
5
 This fact, however, should 
not prevent us from extensive application of valid propositions to case - study examples of 
NATO - accession, which most probably will result in even more valuable findings, bringing 
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us closer to the truth.  Bearing this in mind we focus our attention on a number of categories 
that appear to be most critical to the CC - concept. First, we capture the notions of incentives 
and relative gains (pay - offs), due to their close contextual and semantic relationship to state 
interests. As Celeste Wallander argues strong incentives allow countries to conform to 
international norms.
1
 Naturally, the strength of incentives will increase if they correlate with 
states interests.  
 
Whenever a state decides to engage an international organization (and NATO is not an 
exception here) or other states within the organization, the question of the hierarchy of state 
interests (preferences) for the formation of the mode of behavior becomes of utmost 
importance. From the analysis on NATO enlargement Franks Schimmelfennig could conclude 
that ―…in this account, the alliance identity and norms had no independent effect on the 
enlargement outcome but simply happened to be in line with the preferences of the most 
powerful actor(s).‖2 Admittedly, this statement bluntly challenges the whole concept of CC 
and once more underlines the strength of the interest-based argumentation line of enlargement 
studies. Preferences are also often identified as expected pay-offs from certain action 
(decision), and as subject to rational orderings made by state.
3
 They must be substantial in 
order to be detected by a state, and in the best case, to correlate with existing incentives to 
ensure rapid action and implementation. Incentives are rewards, offered by an external actor 
(NATO) in case of compliance; however, they also exist in the domestic realm, and together 
with potential gains at this level offer very powerful alternatives for a state to behave.  
 
The evidence of post - communist European experience shows, the prospect of NATO - 
membership is a major stimulus to reforming the state and improving institutional 
performance.
4
 However, as argued by Marina Caparini even though the carrot of membership 
appears to be very influential, the imperatives of the domestic agenda may turn this source of 
influence to become very vulnerable.
5
 Domestic interests (preferences) and constituencies 
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play a crucial role in creating such behavioral alternatives: partial compliance or non - 
compliance. The conflict between external and domestic might be very real and can very well 
illustrate the existing problems in preference orderings. We readily join at this point Stephen 
Krasner‘s resolute statement by slightly amending it, that the key question is rather, how 
essential and strategic are the objectives to be achieved both for the external actor as well as 
for the state.
1
 Since the prospect of membership is the only substantial incentive - ―carrot‖ and 
―stick‖ at the same time, the probability of real influence on the candidate (*) must be 
assessed as high, so according to Reinhard Janine.
2
  Applying this logic to the NATO - 
relations with Armenia and Georgua, where the prospect of membership at first glance is 
neither imminent nor procedurally guaranteed, the causal relationship between membership 
promises and democratic transformation of the national defence sectors seems to be 
problematic. Thus, the priority ranking of conditions, assumed to be fulfilled by a candidate, 
must be thoroughly studied, and may render surprising conclusions contrary to our initial 
expectations.  
 
Not less important is the understanding of the Alliance‘s own interests. As some authors argue 
the more NATO is strategically interested in enlargement the less attention is paid to strict 
evaluation of conditionality (as was done earlier with former socialist satellite countries in 
east Europe).
3
 Or the other way around – the less interest is shown in the enlargement the 
more scrutiny will be put to assess the aspirant country‘s performance. Other studies also 
reveal that the probability of good governance, reduced autocracy, and democratic 
consolidation increased, once NATO - allies demonstrated credible commitments to the 
survival of other states, contrary to other states that did not receive such guarantees and 
continued to face existential external pressures.
4
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4.2.2 Implementing Commitments – An Imperfect Indicator for the 
Compliance 
 
The interests of a state may well be defined and identified, but not the preferences and their 
ordering. The decision-making process, which leads to the preference orderings, is also very 
difficult to observe, if at all.
1
 We might detect them by decisions and actions in which state 
officials are involved; nevertheless, the ability to prove and measure the level of compliance 
at the functional level of bureaucracy still remains the component of wishful thinking. The 
problem of indication and measurement is twofold. On one hand, CC conditions must be 
clear, the mechanisms of the control of adherence identified, and the measurement performed 
transparently in a periodic manner.
2
 Additionally, the security and defence sector cannot be 
fully transparent. Understandably, information about the effectiveness of defence 
transformation and the degree of implementation of external commitments in various 
functional areas can be of very sensitive nature, thus classified. Unfortunately the credibility 
of national commitments can be validated only by imperfect mechanisms of implementation 
that in turn require close analysis and adequate data-interpretation. Finally, we are not secure 
from instances, where CC ends up with formal implementation at the national level, leaving 
the essence of a domestic ―code of conduct‖ unaffected.3 Indeed, the danger of formality has 
several dimensions, each potentially detrimental to the success of CC. It might be a formal 
commitment, without any domestic consequences. Or it can take the form of formal 
compliance, meaning the initiation of certain regulations and legal provision that provide the 
impression of practical compliance, though still lacking the proper process of real life 
implementation. Ultimately we might face some evidence of implementation, yet of sporadic 
and false nature, very easy to reverse.  
 
Based on key elements of the CC - concept that we have formulated before, and the intrinsic 
limitations of CC - concept measurement, we suggest at this point to regard our concept as a 
general analytical construct largely dependent on the interplay between external/domestic 
incentives and expected relative pay offs that are either negative or positive, and can lead to a 
positive effect on state behavior – compliance, or the negative effect – non compliance (see 
Figure 4). In the course of analysis, the generated findings will be placed into this model, 
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shedding light upon the mechanisms and motives of particular behavior. Consequently the 
final, more developed chart will be presented in the concluding part of this paper, visualizing 
the key data and causality lines within the effects of the CC.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Interplay of Incentives, Preferences and Pay - Offs 
 
Nation 
Incentives Domestic factors /Preferences External Factors/Preferences Negative Pay Offs 
 
NATO Positive 
Pay Offs 
 1 
 2 
 
   
 
 
 1 
 2 
 Balance / Imbalance 
of Incentives and Negative Pay Offs 
 
 
 
Behavioral 
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Following the adopted logic we found it problematic to concur to a basic sociological 
hypothesis, that argues that the faster the adoption of common norms and values, the earlier 
the membership prospective.
1
 Leaving aside the case of Turkey in NATO, where a serious 
critique is directed towards the obvious lack of adherence to the norms of liberal democracy, 
we offer following hypothesis: 
 
If the value of external incentive cannot overweigh cost-calculations of domestic 
action, compliance will not take place and conditionality will fail. In other words, if 
relative gains of pursuing a state’s external commitment are lower than the expected 
pay-offs from conflicting domestic action, compliance will not take place resulting in 
the failure of conditionality.  
 
To prove the validity of our claims the problem of measurement indicators has to be touched 
upon once again. What mechanisms do we need to prove the degree of compliance and how 
do we avoid the risk of ―buying‖ formal commitments and compliance (Masking) of the real 
implementation? Out of multiple mechanisms of foreign influence offered by Pevehouse, we 
choose legitimization and political pressure as most promising avenues for further 
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investigation of behavioral motives.
1
 The particular aspect of financial assistance can be 
generally disregarded, due to our major focus on the Alliance only as the institution, and the 
bilateral (country to country) nature of financial assistance, which frequently originated on 
behalf of NATO - initiative and to which it is often difficult to apply concrete tools of output 
measurement. As suggested by Lisa Martin, the role of the legislature in affecting the 
credibility of national commitments should not be underestimated, since it provides valuable 
information on the legal status and prospects of compliance.
2
 The mentioned elements of 
national compliance (political pressure and legitimization) will be additionally 
instrumentalized in the chapter ―SSR – Bridging Measurement Deficiencies‖ and translated 
into categories of political and normative adherence, measured by an appropriate set of 
indicators.  
 
4.3 Security Sector Reform – a Term of Reference for NATO 
Conditionality  
 
Although over the last six decades the Alliance has developed a solid body of normative 
documents regulating the principles of accession as well as of general cooperation, the very 
basic act of its creation, the Washington Treaty 1949, already stipulates in a general manner 
core requirements for alliance members that at later stage found much more detailed 
manifestation, i.e. explanation in the concept of Security Sector Reform. The preamble 
defines clearly that parties of the treaty:
3
 
 
(…) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of  
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule 
of law.” 
 
Additionally the second paragraph of the document further elaborates future steps aimed at 
cementing that principle and asks participating countries to contribute to peaceful and friendly 
international relations by ―by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded.‖4 The principles of 
democratic governance and the rule of law are directly recognized here as fundamental pillars 
upon which the institutions should be based. They both emphasize structure and processes to 
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get things done. Moreover, the notion of Governance refers to the ability of the institutions (in 
our case defence ministries) to get things done based on certain structures, processes or best 
practices (as far as the element of effectiveness is concerned).
1
 The Geneva - based Center for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces shares this approach and formulates Security Sector 
Governance (SSG) as structures, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and 
their implementation.‖2 Understandably, the best practices of governance have to be 
developed internally over time, or brought in from outside and internalized. This process is 
termed as Security Sector Reform (SSR). According to the OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) Handbook, Security Sector Reform is defined as 
the establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system, 
characterized by local ownership and sustained delivery of better security services.
3
 Without 
deepening into the broader notion of security, which encompasses nearly all aspects of human 
life, and would be excessive for our approach, the governance and reforms in the security 
sector are clearly based on the understanding of state institutions as key areas where processes 
unfold and changes are applied.  
 
4.3.1 Institutional Aspect of Governance – A Key Message of SSR 
 
Defence and defence institutions represented by ministries of defence (MOD) and armed 
forces (AF) directly fall under such classification. They in fact belong to the core areas of 
security, often more powerful than others in playing the central role in protecting a state‘s 
sovereignty.
4
 Interestingly, the requirements of the effective security governance in the 
defence sector did not find a quick articulation, but developed over time. The demise of the 
socialist block and the clear victory of democratic rule over the communist alternative 
strengthened the process SSR - understanding and formulation. By 1994 the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) drafted the Code of Conduct on Political-
Military Aspects of Security, which solidified the idea in the West that all security services 
and, especially, the defence/military had to be put under democratic control.
5
 It should be 
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acknowledged that this coincided with the inauguration of the Partnership For Peace (PFP) 
framework by NATO in 1994 that made possible cooperation between the Alliance and non-
member states in the Euro - Atlantic area, based on similar principles anchored in the OSCE -
Code. As Marina Caparini aptly puts it, SSR promotes good governance, which is based on 
norms, rules and law of civilian control of security structures, the rule of law, a strong 
judiciary and a civil society that have evolved in mature western democracies.
1
 Despite the 
comprehensive nature of the SSR - definition, in terms of practical utility it usually affects the 
wide range of functional areas, where state institutions execute their work. As far as defence 
and military are concerned, the SSR - focus on following areas becomes even more apparent:
2
 
 
 Legal framework 
 Strategic planning and policy - making  
 Budgetary processes 
 National capacity to manage and evaluate processes 
 
The last function, which refers to the ability of defence institution to monitor, review and 
evaluate the processes, is critical for the proper functioning of reporting mechanisms within 
the defence system, as well as at the national level. Its existence is essential for the 
sustainability of reforms, and a serious indicator of continuing national commitment, with 
clear implications for daily work. In fact the controlling function is multidimensional. The 
multiple layers of control encompass internal (MOD) control, control from the executive 
(government), parliamentary oversight, judicial review and civilian oversight.
3
 The 
availability of control mechanisms, especially monitoring and reporting tools, is devoted a 
special place within SSR.  They serve two basic objectives. The first, is to identify the degree 
of efficiency to make the best use of available resources.
4
 The second, is directed towards 
measuring the practical results of the reform. This in turn establishes a sound picture of 
progress, and supports the implementation of follow - up findings.
5
  
 
The model of Putnam‘s Two - level Game and its inherent features of intensive interplay 
between international actors, national representatives and domestic factors are fully 
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transplantable in the domain of SSR. The degree of local (national) commitment is directly 
linked to the political risk of domestic reform. The danger of formal implementation or the 
possibility of defence reform manipulation is always present. It is usually manifested by a 
declaration of support to reforms‘ - objectives and a persuasion of different interests instead.1 
Thus the importance of a common understanding of SSR - objectives, and of the progress 
deficiencies among key players involved in and driving the transformative processes, should 
not be underestimated.
2
 The communication between key actors involved in the process of 
defence transformation, according to SSR - principles must be clear and effective. Ultimately 
it ensures that national representatives remain deeply committed to reforms despite the high 
political sensitivity of certain issues, and that supply-driven assistance is avoided.
3
 
 
Key conclusions that we can drew from SSR can be summarized as necessary points of 
reference that have to be used in the following two chapters. On one hand, we have to prove 
whether its key principles have been properly reflected in the evolution of NATO - 
partnership and enlargement policies. On the other hand, we have to ensure that SSR - 
indicators find their place in our measurement tool, and support our effort of bridging 
measurement-deficiencies inherent in institutional performance. A specific emphasis will be 
made on the existence of well - functioning reporting mechanisms internally (within the 
defence ministry and the state structures) and externally (within NATO), that are able to 
produce a correct picture of transformational results (progress or setbacks) and ensure proper 
communication between the sides. The strength of the domestic commitment, so important to 
SSR, will be also instrumentalized in light of practical achievements that either support the 
evidence of formal compliance and rhetorical actions, or subscribe to real implementation of 
commitments taken. After all, the objectives of SSR, such as the effectiveness of armed 
forces, the efficiency and democratic oversight, should in fact reinforce and not run against 
each other.
4
 In other words, the desire to establish democratic oversight and sound planning 
and budgeting practices (efficiency) by no means contradicts the objective to keep high 
combat readiness of forces. To the contrary, they are complementary.  
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4.3.2 SSR - The Message throughout The NATO - Partnership  
 
In this chapter we evaluate the long path that the Alliance covered from its initial phase of 
developing partnerships with non-member states to the establishment of a clear mechanism of 
individual cooperation and membership. The objective is to prove clear evidence of 
conditionality principles based on Security Sector Reforms (Governance) that define the 
character of cooperation between the Alliance and the states that pursued different objectives: 
from the non-binding partnership, to full-scale membership. Already in the early nineties 
multiple and follow-up studies reinforced the idea that democracies tend to cooperate and 
enter joint commitments rather than other regime types.
1
 Other researchers indicated that 
democracy had more chance to develop: 
 
 If internally no domestic group had absolute dominating power over other 
groups and power structures.
2
  
 If externally the existing threats (e.g. territorial disputes) are minimized upon 
the alliance-formation.
3
 
 
Facing the challenge that former socialist bloc countries neither had any experience of such 
findings nor they had any clear view of how to transform their defence - and other state 
institutions, the sustainment of democratic values and principles while bringing those states 
closer became fundamental to NATO. The Western concept of security, which is based on a 
value system, sets as a primary state‘s objective to ensure security of individuals, and only 
then of other groups and structures at a higher level.
4
  Therefore it became apparent that the 
mere reference to democratic control over armed forces was not sufficient. As a result, as 
some authors argued, the focus has been broadened towards a more comprehensive approach 
and targets a much more complex issue of the democratic governance of defence and other 
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security related institutions.
1
 Since democratic governance is the core of SSR, the reform 
processes launched within it directly meant the existence of certain conditions and intentions 
to change the essence of the institution. Naturally all of this has to take into account 
international best practices and the sustained will to implement and, if needed, to enforce 
them.
2
 
 
Basically both NATO and SSR - language embraced the same terminology demanding 
numerous actions under general references to democratic governance and democratic control 
of the armed forces. We agree with some authors, that in the early nineties, far from having 
formalized its accession criteria (Membership Action Plan – MAP), the Alliance introduced 
the Partnership For Peace framework (PFP) that provides clear evidence of conditionality by 
enforcing particular conditions of cooperation.
3
  Launched in 1994, the PFP draws its essence 
from two official documents simultaneously issued on January 11, 1994. Signed by heads of 
the member - states the PFP - Invitation Document addresses the intention to cooperate with 
former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in fact they welcome the NATO -
expansion, by strong commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance. It 
briefly outlines the areas where cooperation seemed desirable, however ―At a pace and scope 
determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states.‖4 Another 
document, called Partnership for Peace Framework Document reiterates the fundamental 
principle of adherence to democracy and substantiates fields of cooperation by admitting new 
partner countries to objectives of facilitating transparency in defence planning and budgeting, 
ensuring democratic control over armed forces, developing NATO - interoperable forces in 
the long run, and participating in joint training and exercises in the fields of peacekeeping, 
humanitarian operations  and search & rescue.‖5 Certainly, the degree of conditionality here is 
somehow lowered by leaving the right to define the deepness of commitments in hands of 
national representatives. Nonetheless, despite this early inceptive nature of the cooperation 
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framework, it did, in fact, ensure a very important mechanism of conditionality – the 
monitoring. As the framework document states: 
 
 6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings: 
e. building upon the OSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states 
and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or 
are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to 
ensure the democratic control of armed forces.
1
 
The limitations of conditionality, i.e. free choice of scope and intensity of cooperation, 
intentionally or not, laid out the platform of two - track cooperation mechanisms: one 
intended for those nations with membership aspirations, and another for those with no 
membership aspirations on their agenda. In essence the aforementioned objectives could be 
grouped into two sub-sets: one aimed at improving institutional efficiency, and the second on 
military interoperability of forces. The latter gained more importance for nations, who were 
about to enter closer partnerships with the Alliance.
2
  As we have already noted, the intention 
of further expansion of the alliance was clearly formulated in the declaration of heads of 
member - states in 1994. Having this initial set of criteria in place, we can conclude that the 
SSR indeed was a core message of the NATO PFP - framework. It consolidated Europe and 
proved to be ―a powerful engine for enlargement.‖3 We might interpret the engine in different 
ways, yet the simple logic links it with conditions that countries had to accept, once pursuing 
the interest of cooperation. It implied that western standards of security sector governance had 
to be adopted. Along with standards of a political and military nature, it introduced various 
institutional mechanisms (programs, missions and exercises) to support the pace of 
interoperability and as Svante Cornell argues, helped ―foster a new generation of military 
officers whose thinking differs markedly from the Soviet military mentality of their 
predecessors.‖4 
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Although the criteria for accession were not formalized until the introduction of the MAP - 
mechanism, the idea of NATO - enlargement continuously occupied the political agenda of 
alliance-members as well as former socialist bloc countries. The reform of military and civil - 
military relations became an apparent factor for future accessions and formed the Alliance‘s 
vision of a family of liberal democracies.
1
 The Enlargement Study, initiated and made public 
in 1995, still was not able to define formally the rigid list of accession criteria, but it deals 
with the general purpose and principles of enlargement (Chapter I, II), the role that PFP can 
play (Chapter III) and, most importantly, the impact of enlargement on potential new 
members (Chapter V, VI). Thus all relevant references to the need of democratic control over 
armed forces, transparency in defence planning and budgeting, accountability to the 
parliament and public are spread throughout the document and are frequently repeated. Yet 
the degree of conditionality is even further strengthened where in multiple places a detailed 
description of actions is given, by which the behavior of candidates will be evaluated and 
measured. For instance, it is declared that ―Possible new members' commitment to the shared 
principles and values of the Alliance will be indicated by their international behavior and 
adherence to relevant OSCE commitments.‖2 Three times the necessity to adopt the 
principles, policies and procedures of the member - states is explicitly mentioned, and once 
more strengthened as under the forth chapter (on implications for future members) potential-
members are requested to put them into practice. A clear attempt to avoid the risk of formal 
implementation is visible here.      
 
As compared to PFP - framework document the Enlargement Study is much more elaborated 
and offers additional insights of how the alliance envisages the practical dimensions of 
cooperation that reach to the military criteria of conditionality, commonly referred as 
interoperability and standards. Though the document clarifies that the full interoperability is 
not a major precondition for the accession, the certain minimum of standards, however, is 
recognized as essential for proper functioning of the alliance. This minimum covers the 
following areas: command and control, communication equipment, and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) in selected areas, especially in headquarters.
3
 In the final chapter of the 
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document the military aspect of standardization is even more deepened and additional 
elements are added for the sake of clarity: 
 
76. …Current NATO standardization priorities include commonality of doctrines and 
procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications and major 
weapon systems, and interchangeability of ammunition and primary combat supplies. 
77. There are at present over 1200 agreements and publications that new members 
should undertake to comply with. Compliance should be an evolutionary and 
controlled process to enhance Alliance operational effectiveness. 
 
Symptomatically, the emphasis is on the word compliance, and throughout the document 
eleven times the word must is applied in the context of expected behavior of potential 
members. The word should is also mentioned more than thirty times in relation to future 
candidates. As for PFP, it is assigned an even increased role in transforming partner countries 
defence sectors closer to the standards of the western model (especially with regard to joint 
peacekeeping operations), and the core elements of SSR such as transparent defence planning 
and budgeting are frequently highlighted.   
 
It is no surprise that after years of intensive work on the subject of what criteria potential 
members should meet to be accepted into NATO, the natural divergence of conditions came 
about. Those dealing more with the nature of political governance and others specifying more 
practical dimension of military cooperation. The political dimension was heavily influenced 
by the democratic ideal and concentrated around democratic (civilian) control over armed 
forces, which naturally catapulted SSR to the major deliverable of foreign military assistance 
and defence diplomacy.
1
 The United States, the most powerful member of the alliance, 
eagerly supported this approach aiming at achieving stability in new partner countries via 
democratic legitimacy. The U.S. and NATO took on the mission of ―….transforming the 
government institutions and military structures to more closely mirror western standards.‖2  
 
The need for a more structured approach to areas, where partner countries and potential 
membership - candidates required making most of their efforts, motivated the Alliance to 
draft in 1999 the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The document basically listed the areas 
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(chapters) and subsequent actions aspirants had to consider, once a membership goal was 
accepted. Five chapters (Political/Economic, Defence/Military, Resource, Security, and 
Legal) discuss issues that support transformational processes, to be formalized under Annual 
National Plans (ANP) - a subject of annual review and progress assessment. Though MAP 
twice explicitly states that the document and issues discussed within it should not be 
considered as a list of criteria for membership, the focus on detailed actions contributing to 
the development of military capabilities in accordance with NATO - standards provides much 
higher sense of inclusion than any previous document.
1
 What matters though, is that fulfilling 
the agreed objectives under MAP does not guarantee membership, and the decision is made 
case by case based on consensus, which clearly is a ―escape clause…devised largely with 
Russia in mind‖ as argued by Jan Arveds Trapans.2 Similar to the Enlargement Study, the 
document recognizes the PFP - framework as the major instrument strengthening an aspirant‘s 
political and military ties with the Alliance. As for PFP‘s operational dimension, the 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP) is offered for careful consideration, where ―certain 
generic areas would be marked as being essential‖ for membership to participate in.3 Despite 
significant progress towards the clarifying conditions of accession in terms of practical 
activities (adapting national laws, norms and regulations to those of NATO – as one of many 
most critical), MAP still fails to go beyond general SSR - statements in the domain of 
democratic control of armed forces. As Marina Caparini rightly comments ―the precondition 
of democratic civilian control was not defined in depth… These criteria were to be met prior 
to accession, and meeting them did not necessarily guarantee accession.‖4 
 
Since the introduction of MAP no substantial progress has been made towards further 
specification of accession - conditions necessary to comply with. Perhaps, this explains why 
in 2003 the Swiss government initiated a NATO - internal discussion about the possibility of 
incorporating SSR as an integral part of PFP - programs.
5
 Though, officially, it failed to 
become a separate formal NATO-instrument of defence transformation, it received extremely 
high importance and recognition within the next phase of intensified partnerships (marked as 
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Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), launched after the Istanbul Summit 2004. The 
Summit appointed the Special Representative of Secretary General of the Alliance to the 
Caucasus and Central Asia (Robert Simmons), which from U.S. - perspective had the main 
mission ―to encourage democratic civil-military relations, transparency in defense planning 
and budgeting, and enhanced force inter-operability with NATO.‖1 Parallel to that, the 
Istanbul Summit introduced the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building 
(PAP - DIB), whose main objective was defined as to ―build democratically responsible 
defence institutions.‖2 Given the fact that key participants of the program are the Geneva 
Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and other institutions (centers, 
universities, NATO - educational centers etc.), heavily involved in SSR - research, launching 
PAP - DIB cannot be regarded other than as a clear testimony to SSR - relevance and its 
practical incorporation by the Alliance.  
  
 
4.4 Socialization in Defence and Military – The invisible Hand of 
NATO - Influence 
 
The objective of this chapter is to show the capacity of the Alliance to use its socialization 
power as an additional tool of influence to bring about national compliance via ideational 
changes of national representatives engaged in the process of socialization.  Especially, the 
domain of the military relationship lays at core of our analysis, because as very important 
branch of a government military organizations share common believes and values as ―military 
members‖ that are border - transcending.3  The article drawn by a former High Representative 
of the NATO‘s Secretary General in South Caucasus, Mr. Robert Simmons in 2007 
exemplifies the complexity and wide variety of the linkages, through which the ideational 
influence of the Alliance is exercised.
4
 Frequent references in the article to common thinking, 
shared values, common purpose and security culture point at the very environment, where 
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integrational processes unfold. Yet at the same time they show the ultimate result, at which 
the Alliance aims within the cooperation - frameworks with partner countries.  
 
Socialization is defined by Alderson Kai as a two - track (individual and political) process, in 
which changes of individual believes of individuals holding political power ―…can produce 
behavioral compliance‖, and institutionalization is required to sustain it.1 In others words, the 
change of believes, causes a desire to change, and generates policy initiatives to fix the 
changes in real life.  As Alexandra Gheciu concludes on the example of former socialist bloc 
countries‘ relationships with NATO, the role of socialization is ―the power to shape its 
socializees‘ interpretations of the world and ideas about proper ways of acting in that world‖, 
resulting in internalization of new norms.
2
 Since the compliance is nothing else as a fulfilled 
requirement of the new norms‘ adoption, the power of socialization should be given its proper 
place within the concept of NATO - influence and conditionality. Not for nothing Jamie Shea, 
a former Spokesman of the Alliance, and current Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Emerging Security Challenges regards enhanced partnerships as best insurance policy to 
promote norm - based cooperative security.
3
  
 
4.4.1 Military Socialization as the Means of normative Adaptation  
 
Once the relevance of socialization processes is recognized, the next challenge is to filter out 
the particular mechanisms of influence and the areas of its practical impact. This is insofar 
relevant, as allows the identification of valid indicators, and best evaluation strategies. 
According to Alexandra Gheciu a successful socialization would manifest in re - definition of 
the identity within the political elite, military and public, and its sustainment through 
embedding in institutions, legislation and practices.
4
 The key areas (political, military) and 
indicators (legislation, practices) mentioned here, are pretty much compatible with those that 
indicate institutional performance. Thus their wider application, discussed in much greater 
detail in the following chapter (―Measuring NATO – Influence‖), should be accepted without 
a major reservation.  The mechanisms of socialization have been already indicated in the 
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fundamental NATO - documents that deal with the essence of cooperation with non - NATO 
members. Here exists a common understanding that PFP - framework with its dominant 
emphasis on education and training, as well as on conceptual and normative approach, has 
developed various channels of interaction such as:
1
 
 
 Educational courses (in country) and mobile expert teams  
 Technical cooperation  
 Military assistance  (financial, sells, in country training)  
 Field exercise (drills or combat operations)  
 
These elements play important role in understanding the size and intensity of socialization 
processes. As rightly observed by Alexandara Gheciu,  they give also a clear indication about 
the degree of the national commitment to actions within each program, as well as about the 
degree of legitimacy (teaching and persuasion) assigned to NATO - assistance by national 
socializees.
2
 Various NATO - attached institutions, particularly the International (Military) 
Staff (IS, IMS) George Marshall Center, NATO Defence College, U.S. key military 
educational centers, Geneva Center for Security Policy and others ensure the widest possible 
coverage of assistance programs. As Mr. Bruce Bach, a former NATO - official dealing with 
Georgia and other partner - nations till 2009, ―the IS - desk officers constantly act as the 
experts … over the years have always been helpful when nations seek more information or 
clarity on an issue.‖3 Hence these contacts enable national representatives see ―firsthand how 
professional and experienced personnel conduct themselves, and how to behave and prepare 
for those contacts.‖4 The consequence of such active professional interactions is that the 
selected cohort of professionals (military and civilians) share the western way of running the 
defence system and military meeting by that the principles of democratic governance. 
Consequently, within their authority they execute political decision - making and thus develop 
―new institutions and practices, thereby altering the fundamental character of the political 
institution.‖5 Naturally, all the activities are intended to contribute to commonly agreed goals 
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of cooperation, which in turn, need to be politically accepted by highly committed 
individuals. Their job would be supporting defence reforms and fostering defence institutions 
that indeed goes beyond the mere objective of improving the military interoperability, and is 
directly supported by the intensive political engagement of the NATO - high level 
representatives.
1
   
 
4.4.2 Power of Identity - Change and its Limitations  
 
As we refer to socialization process as containing mechanisms of norms and the behavioral 
change, the claim can be made that, in core, while socializing in the defence and military area, 
a certain institutional design is being transplanted. This idea is actively supported by 
Melnykovska Inna, and Rainer Schweickert.
2
 However, the norm adoption or the change in 
behavior does not necessarily imply that the identity change had place. As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, the Alliance has continuously stressed the importance of like - mindedness 
between the allied nations, as well as in relation to partner - countries. The fact, that among 
PFP - nations many can be easily identified as not like – minded, raises the stakes of 
cooperation additionally. Jamie Shea, the former NATO – spoksman (1993 - 2000) and 
current Deputy Assistant Secretary General of the Alliance, admitted that despite the existing 
differences, the bridges to these countries must be established.
3
   Putting these differences into 
a more general political context, the issue of how and in what forms the socialization may 
result, asks for better clarification. Since the core of our discussion deals with security sector 
reform and the respective mode of governance exercised through and by state institutions, the 
political effect of socialization is greatly mirrored by the underlying political structure of a 
state. Alexander Wendt calls it the ―political identity‖ of the state that is identical to those 
widely known as regime types: from democratic to semi - democratic and non - democratic 
(authoritarian or totalitarian).
4
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At this point, we must point at serious skepticism towards the state‘s behavior, which may 
significantly deviate from the intention of changing the political identity (mode of 
governance) and become more democratic. In line with the rationalist perspective states may 
decide to enter cooperative relations while pursuing very rational objectives such as military 
benefits in form of improved skills of personnel, combat effectiveness of military units, 
material and financial benefits etc.
1
 Thus this approach may ultimately result in a significant 
reduction of socialization - impact. According to Alexandra Gheciu, there is enough evidence, 
that while applying its norms in former socialist countries NATO minimized its role and 
interacted only with decision - makers relying solely on effects of ―self - socialization‖.2 Most 
importantly, this can lead to manipulation or the reliance on rhetorical actions to ―to secure 
the rewards provided by NATO with a minimum of domestic adaptation.‖3 In light of these 
serious deficiencies, the role of the accurate monitoring mechanisms to verify the degree of 
commitment - implementation, i.e. procedural and structural change in a variety of poly areas 
(personnel management, equipment maintenance, doctrine development etc.) becomes even 
greater.  
 
As the most powerful and potent alliance - member the U.S. has explicitly pursued social 
interaction with foreign militaries to promote American (i.e. western) values, norms and ideas 
as the significant avenue for strengthening democratic institutions and governance.
4
  The U.S. 
National Military Strategy 1997 unequivocally states that: 
 
(…) contacts between our military and the armed forces of other nations, promote 
trust and confidence…the development of democratic institutions, and helps keep some 
countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow.
5
  
 
Pursuing these objectives the U.S. - authorities have developed two major programs that 
allowed for a tailored military cooperation with friendly nations.  The International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program is considered as one of key instruments of U.S. 
security assistance on a grant basis to foreign students. Furthermore, IMET: 
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(…) facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships, 
which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society 
that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic 
governments.
1
 
 
Among three key objectives, that combine a very rational interest of U.S. to have well capable 
and interoperable friendly forces close aside if needed, a particular one directly formulates the 
desired effects of socialization efforts:   
 
Expose foreign military and civilian personnel to the important roles democratic 
values and internationally recognized human rights can play in governance and 
military operations.
2
  
 
This and other programs initiated and monitored under the lead of U.S. State Department and 
the Department of Defence allow national representatives of partner - countries to familiarize 
themselves with NATO – common procedures in practical fields (for instance during field 
exercises, training, seminars or educational courses) of the defence and military management, 
as well as create the mutual understanding of the proper, common mode of governance. 
Symptomatically, one of such initiatives The Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) launched in 1994 
for assisting PFP - countries has transferred the management responsibility for the WIF - DIB 
(Defence Institution Building) to the Center for Civil - Military Relations at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
3
  
 
 
 
 
4.5 Finalizing the Notion of NATO - Influence  
 
The NATO - membership has been increasingly defined through the reference to a 
community, whose borders are defined not by geography, but rather by a common identity, 
cultural tradition, and a solid portion of trust to each other.
4
 In particular, democratic 
institutions (including norms and procedures) are seen as serving the primary cementing 
function for the Alliance.
5
 The former British foreign minister Ernest Bevin (1945 – to 1951), 
as well as Walter Lippman, an influencial American political writer and commentator (died in 
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1974), also readily focused on the aspects of ―spiritual‖ unity and civilizational similarity to 
underline the cognitive roots of NATO‘s creation.1 Those principles gained even more 
relevance once the military aspect of global confrontation radically diminished in the early 
1990s. The guiding criteria for future membership (introduced in 1995) remained the same, 
and largely refered to the adherence to democratic principles and procedures, necessary for 
prospective member - states to adopt.
2
 The core importance of democratic values and of 
functioning democratic institutions also became a major motivational factor for justifying the 
Alliance‘s enlargement plans. While highlighting the internal aspects of negotiation and 
decision - making of the first former Warsaw Pact - countries that joined the Alliance, Frank 
Schimmelfennig very quickly comes to the conclusion, that adherence to democratic rule and 
norms represented the constitutive value of NATO and facilitated the recognition of 
democracy promotion as the organizational mission of the Alliance.
3
 The Study on NATO 
Enlargement states explicitly four times the importance of ―like - mindedness‖ and twice the 
need for ―assimilation‖ of new members.4 Out of eight political - economic requirements for 
the potential membership, three unequivocally stress the primacy of democratic rule and 
institutions, and one directly advises aspirant states to commit to social justice and economic 
liberty.
5
 
 
The brief review of the normative foundation of the Alliance as well as the context of its 
gradual development makes it possible to conclude, that the mere intention of cooperation 
with NATO, not to speak about the membership, preconditioned a certain degree of national 
compliance, i.e. institutional transformation in various defence - related areas. A country 
entering partnership relationship with NATO would face fundamental requirements similar to 
the principles of Security Sector Reform that predominantly are focused on a deep democratic 
transformation of defence and military institutions. Sharing the claim that the Alliance 
consistently promoted the norms of transparency and democratic control of armed forces, we 
still struggle to find the deep and coherent elaboration of political criteria, whereas the 
practical - military dimension of criteria is much better structured under the concept of ―force 
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interoperability‖ and mechanisms of its improvement (PFP, IPP).1 Generally, NATO - 
requirements and standards are better defined conceptually than practical - procedurally and 
are based on the common acknowledgement of the major role democratic institutions play in 
running a country. Applied to the field of defence - and military, it essentially rests upon the 
primacy of the democratic control of military forces and the wide application of SSR to 
establish western standards of governance in defence.  
 
Though the Alliance possesses the mechanisms of monitoring and evaluating the degree of the 
national compliance via progress reports within the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) or Annual National Program (ANP), the existing framework 
of cooperation and partnerships (PFP) still leaves enough space for national authorities to 
decide themselves on the speed and depth of cooperation, which does not rule out actions that 
run against the spirit of compliance (free riding). As the former NATO - IS official Mr. Bruce 
Bach (in active duty till 2009) states ―no NATO standards are mandatory for any Partner 
country, other than those spelled out in the fundamental PfP - program, which members are 
bound by‖, and no requirements can be applied if a partner country does not seek to join the 
Alliance.
2
 This ambiguity generated from the very first steps of launching partnership 
framework, is in fact an inherent challenge of a normative nature with a high likelihood of 
negative practical repercussions. The feature of ―hollowed conditionality‖ might be explained 
by the desire of ―founding fathers‖ to assist countries that aspired NATO - membership, but 
also to create architecture perfectly suitable to those countries, which do not seek the 
membership and would like to ―contribute to Euro - Atlantic security without compromising 
their own distinct foreign and security policies.‖3 The conditions for the second category of 
countries theoretically must be the same as for those countries that despite their desire to join 
the Alliance did not get the explicit guarantees of imminent accession. This claim is plausible, 
since according to Mr. Steffen Elgersma, a NATO – IS official dealing with Armenia, the 
―stick and carrot‖ – principle has no relevance for countries with no membership objectives.4  
 
The example of Armenia and Georgia speaks for the existence of two sets of partner nations 
for NATO: those (Georgia) interested in full membership, and those (Armenia) interested in 
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maintaining some kind of cooperation with the Alliance due to various internal or external 
interests.
1
 Similar to other partner - countries, all both republics enjoy (ed) PFP as a major 
tool for developing deep political and military cooperation - ties with NATO. Since for 
neither country the membership perspective is provided (Georgia was not admitted to MAP in 
2008) the question, how to provide stronger incentives for cooperation, becomes essential and 
very hard to respond. In this case, some authors ask about the essence of added value of the 
Alliance and out of 1600 PFP - activities struggle to define the ―carrot‖ other than 
membership (know - how, training, expertise, skills) strong enough to ensure compliance.
2
 
Given the risk of partner country‘s partial compliance, and even free - riding, the unique PFP 
- platform of practical military cooperation, gives an additional impetus to creation of ―two - 
tire armed forces‖: first one – that meets NATO - standards and is interoperable, and the 
second – remaining by the old model, and usually much larger than the former.3 
Consequently, if evidences of a such national behavior are found, the underlying motives of 
states (actors representing state and institutions) must be thoroughly studied, with specific 
emphasis made on the convergence of strategic interests of a state and the Alliance, domestic 
agenda priorities, and the potential benefits of rhetorical actions.  
 
 
4.6  “Measuring” NATO - Influence 
 
Social phenomena are generally very difficult to detect and measure. As Walter Powell and 
Paul DiMaggio have stated, such phenomena ―cannot be reduced to aggregation or 
consequences of individual attributes or motives.‖4 The phenomena of political conditionality 
and compliance do not belong to the category of factors that have been well measured. 
Though many attempts have been made within the broader framework of Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) to identify clear mechanisms and areas of indication and measurement, it still 
remains a formidable challenge to all pioneers, who grapple with the particular topic of 
implementation of external commitments. Countries that are in a similar position as Georgia, 
usually, have the norms and procedures imposed on them from the outside that once were 
domestic properties of constituents of an international organization. From this perspective, 
NATO‘s standards and procedures are indeed the externalization of those properties. The 
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commitment to comply, curiously, would imply the internalization of once externalized 
internal properties.
1
 However, the concerns attached to the logic of Alliance‘s accession are 
twofold. The first is that the behavioral regime imposed on a candidate is not guaranteed 
during the pre - membership period. The second is the basic assumption that the behavioral 
regime imposed on a country by the pre - admission criteria will persist once that country 
becomes a NATO - member.
2
  
 
This assumption is quite problematic. It voluntarily eradicates the risks and negative effects 
on domestic political structures, which are subject to changing influences of the deep - rooted 
political traditions and domestic incentives. Stephen Krasner underlines the flawed nature of 
the external influence and draws our attention to the need to change the domestic authority 
structures through the intensive application of clear and predictable rules, predominantly 
within the area of institutional capacity building and governance.
3
 The degree of 
implementation is an imperfect alternative for the commitment - credibility, but compliance 
seems to be the best tool available for the moment. Mark Kramer claims that NATO has 
developed disciplinary measures to deter or to punish countries that fall back into 
undemocratic practices.
4
 Yet, similar to other scholars, he fails to provide clear evidence of 
such disciplinary mechanisms. We might infer that the broadly formulated NATO - 
requirements indeed represent key areas, where assessment teams perform their mission. 
However, unlike the progress reports on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that are 
regularly posted online, the classified nature of all defense related documents makes our 
entire effort appear almost futile.
5
 A significant effort must be made to provide much more 
clarity about the process of defense transformation in Georgia and Armenia in light of the 
respective cooperation processes with NATO. It would certainly stimulate the better option 
for deliberation and public debate, as well as a better understanding of the final cooperation - 
outcomes. 
 
                                                 
1
 Schimmelfennig, ―NATO‘s Enlargement to the East,‖ 15. 
2
 Thomas S. Szayna, ―Chapter Two: The Planning Context,‖ in NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants 
and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping, vol. 1243 (Rand Corporation, 2001), 21. 
3
 Krasner, ―International Support for State-Building: Flawed Consensus,‖ 67–69. 
4
 Kramer, ―NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement,‖ 756. 
5
 Transparency International, ―Georgia Has Implemented a Large Portion of the EU Requirements, TI Georgia's 
New Interim Report Finds,‖ TI Georgia (16 October 2013); available at 
http://transparency.ge/en/post/report/georgia-has-implemented-large-portion-eu-requirements-ti-georgia-s-new-
interim-report-fi. See also ―The Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.‖ 
91 
 
4.6.1 Translating NATO – Requirements into meeasurable Defence 
Transformation Areas 
 
Operationalizing NATO - influence helped us delineate the relevance of conditionality 
principles and the incentives (relative gains), as key motivators for national compliance. It 
also provided a more structured understanding of SSR - principles as essence of the NATO - 
policy of cooperation, partnership and accession. Though the Alliance gradually developed a 
set of criteria to evaluate partner - nation‘s performance and applied particular monitoring 
mechanisms of PARP and MAP (ANP), two major deficits cannot be overseen. One is linked 
to the lack of clarity of mentioned criteria, and the second - to the classified nature of NATO - 
reports that limit the access to needed information, and force one to relay on more detailed 
mapping of defence related areas, the Alliance identified as critical to defence institutions‘ 
performance.     
 
To avoid instances, in which objective assessment and ―tailor - maid action plan‖ for 
institutional capabilities - building has been promised, but, in fact, no valid measurement 
toolset of institutional progress is provided, a clear translation of NATO - conditions into the 
language of defence transformation areas must take place.
1
 We must also explicitly admit the 
difficulty of measuring SSR - based effectiveness. The lack of the ability to define and 
measure the progress of reforms is largely attributed to the trivial challenge of adopting ―a 
―NATO compatible‖ defence establishment‖, simply because there is no commonly accepted 
model among 28 allied nations.
2
 In fact, the OECD Handbook on SSR, though extensively 
dealing with measurement nuances and problems of conceptual, i.e. expertise clarity, misses 
the objective of evaluating the institutional (defence) performance and instead devotes great 
deal to improving tools and techniques of assistance programs.
3
 Dealing largely with 
qualitative methods of data analysis within our research, the notion of measurement must be 
accepted cautiously and interpreted exclusively as the synonym for the evaluation of research 
- results. Thus we should not rule out some challenges even if we formally adopt the SSR -
approach to the analysis of defence institutions. Further, we support Ursula Schroeder‘s 
understanding of Security Sector Governance (SSG) as the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies to defence sector with a focus on 
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transparency and accountability in decision - making.
1
 This inevitably links the objectives of 
transformation processes in various defence - related areas (policy fields) to the political set of 
requirements caused by the common western model of governance. We also add the element 
of civilian oversight and the management of resources as key components of the political 
control over military.  The political segment of defence management must be augmented by 
an additional set of functional areas, where objectives and progress have to be studied even 
more thoroughly due to the significantly higher degree of practical implementation as 
compared to fuzzy nature of political requirements. Ron Mangum and William Craven 
suggest adopting the system that defines 10 critical functional systems/areas (most relevant in 
bold) of defence establishment, which includes:
2
  
 
 Strategic planning 
 Resource management 
 Force management  
 Training and education  
 Command and control 
 Personnel management 
 Defence logistics 
 Infrastructure 
 Public information  
 Intelligence  
 
We regard command and control, logistics, infrastructure and intelligence of lower relevance 
at this stage, as they largely refer to narrow military (combat) functions, are mostly classified 
and thus less relevant to the core of SSR and our measurement approach. The rest, however, is 
crucial to evaluate due its huge importance in terms of normative and procedural 
developments within institution, as well as reference to key tenets of SSR, such as the civilian 
control over AF, institutional planning capacity, ideational effects within personnel, and the 
level of transparency. Indicated functional areas are specific and incompatible with widely 
used global indicators. As Ursula Schroeder states, the deficiencies of global indicators are 
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acute once applied to the domain of security sector governance, especially in an attempt to 
link causally the effects of external factors with changes on the ground.
1
   
 
 
4.6.2 “Measurement Tool” Offered 
 
The progress or deficiencies of institutional performance are heavily dependent on a clear 
understanding of practical achievements in the functional areas of defence. The crucial 
moment here is both, to have a comprehensive picture of policy statements (normative 
dimension) mirrored in policy papers, concepts and laws, as well as the sense of a practical 
implementation and changes on procedural level (best practices) of the real life. This is, 
admittedly, a very difficult mission to do. In this respect, the established practices and 
traditions, along with auditing provisions of the government must be also studied.
2
 We 
complement this claim and suggest that the existence of well functioning reporting 
(monitoring) mechanisms within the defence institutions as well as outside (public or 
government), is an essential element of the sound progress – measurement tool. Ron Mangum 
and William Craven take this need even deeper for all levels of defence management by 
developing the Defence Management Tracking Chart along with clear reporting criteria and 
metrics.
3
 Yet, the metrics, as they admit, is largely based on a subjective judgment and only to 
limited extent on mathematical tabulation.
4
 Each area we identified as critical for our analysis 
inevitably will rely on individual evaluation. The in - depth analysis of dynamic processes 
cannot be substituted by other indicators (global like), and, as Ursula Schroeder insists, the 
significant limitations inherent to this kind of studies pretty much highlight that ―there is no 
alternative to constructing aggregated indicators on the basis of subjective or perceptions -
based measures.‖5 
 
We pay respect to this acknowledgement, which turns the results of the study to a subject of 
the individual assessment and intersubjective reflection. However, we will ameliorate the 
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mentioned deficit by evaluating how results achieved mathed the objectives, i.e. desired 
outcomes in each functional area (policy field) of defence institutions. The existing 
mechanisms of cooperation between NATO, Armenia and Georgia cover all related areas, and 
formulate relatively well the particular goals agreed within each area. By adopting following 
evaluation criteria (assigned value) of institutional performance (in relation to progress of 
reaching the identified objectives) as ―strong‖, ―partial‖, ―partial+‖ and ―no progress‖, we 
hope to be able to capture best the degree of national compliance in defence related policy 
areas (functional sectors). The ultimate aggregation of the sectoral results will result in a 
complex and detailed picture of a national compliance translated into the general degree of 
NATO - influence (see Figure 5 below) exerted over a particular country.  
 
 
Figure 5. “Measurement” of NATO - Influence: indicators, progress - status  
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Three aggregated indicators are offered within this model. The Political indicator 
encompasses the areas of diplomatic activities, parliamentary control of the defence, and the 
civilian control of the military as the key components of democratic governance. Within each 
area the intensity of actions and the validity of national commitments will be evaluated. The 
same approach will be applied to areas of Functional performance, which relates to the very 
practical fields of defence management (Structure, Planning, Budgeting, Personnel and 
Transparency), as well as to the normative dimension of policy change.  A detailed 
explanation of the Ideational indicator is located separately under the third box. The 
socialization power of the Alliance is strongly individual based and ideally unfolds within all 
sectors manifested in rhetoric, language, terms and definitions adopted in politics, legal 
sphere, policy documents or daily military work. Thus ideational effects might be detected 
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throughout the study in various fields of the chart (such as political adherence, internalization 
of norms and policy related practices); Yet, it must be said, that the intensity of socialization 
linkages are best reflected in the fields of military training and education, participation in 
NATO - led operations, and the foreign (NATO, NATO - member) assistance (scale, 
structure).  
 
The structured approach to the sectoral analysis of defence institutions in Armenia and 
Georgia makes it possible to conduct a truly cross - case analysis, comparing not only the 
general aggregated results of each country, but looking deeper into sectoral and functional 
disparities existing between national defence institutions. It will highlight policy areas, where 
significant discrepancies might become visible, and suggest the underlying causes of such 
divergence, or, in contrary, point towards areas of the behavioral (compliance) convergence. 
The picture below (Figure 6) shows a graphical visualization of the desired cross - case 
comparison.  
 
Figure 6.  “Measurement” of NATO - Influence: Cross - Case Comparison 
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By offering this assessment model we assume that all commitments have formally been 
recognized, received an appropriate place in each national agenda (legislative initiatives, or 
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policy papers, official statements), however by no means have guarantees of implementation. 
It is the mission of this study to find out whether the gap between the declaration of intentions 
(commitments) and the factual implementation on the ground exists, and try to respond why. 
The selected approach helps measure with a relatively high accuracy the status of progress, 
points towards areas, where alternative (domestic or external) factors (interests or motives) 
disrupt or might have disrupted the pace of compliance, and reveal the evidence of rhetorical 
actions, i.e. formal implementation. Since we have to deal with processes that are highly 
dynamic and unfold in different time - periods, the timelines of national commitments to 
reach agreed objectives will be assigned a high relevance, and might have a significant impact 
on the value of assessment. For instance if a certain goal was finally completed, yet required a 
significant extension of timelines, the compliance will not be assessed as ―strong‖, but lower, 
and will require an additional research of delay - factors that in turn may reveal additional 
deficits within the institutional architecture of the studied country. Similarly, an explanation 
will be made why certain areas, though showing the signs of positive compliance, do not 
result in an overall positive degree of NATO - influence, which might be attributed to 
conflicting domestic interests, the structural resistance or inefficiency of foreign assistance. 
Ultimately the developed model will als be able to demonstrate the practical utility of the 
existing institutional mechanisms, both national and NATO – owned, in implementing the 
made commitments.  
 
Additionally, we intend to augment our analysis with the results of multiple structured 
interviews conducted with national – and NATO - representatives, directly involved in 
defence transformational processes in Armenia and Georgia. For the purpose of increased 
representativeness of overall findings, we believe it would be beneficial to summarize 
respondents‘ topic related statements, in order to identify a tendency of divergence or the 
existing gap in the assessment of cooperation - status. The results, consequently, can be 
attributed to various factors, such as the deficits of political communication, the prevalence of 
national agenda - imperatives, institutional interest etc. Interviews serve also as a direct bridge 
to the domain of ideational influence. Due to individual and personal references to 
professional linkages as well as to the very understanding of terms and principles, they are a 
very potent means for providing a more nuanced picture of sociological influence and 
ideational transformation of national representatives.    
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4.6.3 Data Sources 
 
The validation of achievements of national ministries of defence (MOD) will proceed by 
looking at various data sources, often not directly related to the defence area. The high 
sensitivity of security – and defence related issues turns most of relevant data (PARP and 
ANP, and to certain degree the IPAP - reports) to classified records, significantly reducing the 
amount of publicly accessible information. We face an additional challenge that the amount of 
available information differs significantly from Georgia – to Armenia, first one offering the 
plentitude of sources (less in IPAP), and the second with much more limited amount of 
information.  Nevertheless, the pool of sources containing disclosed official documents, legal 
acts, media - interviews, statements, news and like constitute a solid empirical ground for 
launching our analytical investigation. The pool of primary sources consists of publicly 
released IPAP - documents that despite their notably reduced content and the ―correct‖ 
language are still able to provide the best coverage of related issues and progress achieved. 
NATO - Parliamentary Assembly mission - reports (NPARs) are additional valuable source of 
information that offer a deep periodical review of cooperation – status in respective case - 
countries. NATO official documents (statements and communiqués) along with U.S. official 
reports (Congressional Reports, reports of State Department and Department of Defence,  
etc.) about the progress achieved by various areas of national defence institutions, the deficits 
to overcome or the nature of military assistance provided to Georgia and Armenia 
complement the list of NATO - related primary documentation. As for national sources, the 
publicly accessible official documents such as legal acts, policy - related concepts and 
regulations, budgetary information and official statements will comprise the basis of analysis. 
To widen the spectrum and reduce the danger of limitations in primary sources, so familiar to 
scholars working in sensitive fields of the security and defence, we will also resort to a large 
container of secondary sources, that are primarily based on interviews with key individuals 
that have or had a direct impact on defence transformational processes of Armenia and 
Georgia. These individuals are active and former representatives of national and NATO -
bodies, who strongly contributed and still continue to shape various formats of cooperation 
with the Alliance. Additionally we will look at academic journals and contributions (incl. PFP 
- institutes) along with other think - tank and local reports (DCAF, ICG, TI etc.) that 
permanently produce brilliant assessments, based on their large expertise in respective areas 
(parliamentary control, budgetary transparency and corruption, and conflict resolution) and 
long experience in dealing with particular local stakeholders.   
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Chapter V: Basics of Influence: NATO’s Interests in 
the Region and Mechanisms of Cooperation  
 
In this chapter we intend to provide a brief overview of the complex nature of interests, the 
Alliance pursues towards the South Caucasus region and Armenia and Georgia, in particular. 
We stress again the importance of the periodic limitation to our study, and concentrate on the 
basic events that had happened within the time - span of 2004 - 2012. Since many aspects of 
the Alliance‘s partnership - policy had already been touched upon, and the particular linkages 
to each country is the subject of the separate chapters, the main emphasis at this stage will be 
made on the essence and nature of NATO‘s general political messages towards the region, 
and the cooperation mechanisms it developed over time. Additionally, the specifics of the 
existing practical leverages to secure declared interests of the Alliance in the region will be 
briefly reviewed.  
 
 
5.1 The Alliance’s Interests in the South - Caucasus Region  
 
One of the key conclusions drawn from the analysis on the Alliance‘s policy of conditionality 
was that the success of conditionality, i.e. the degree of national compliance is strongly 
contingent on the strategic interest of the Alliance in a partner country, and respectively, on 
the credible implementation of taken national commitments. Thus it is of high relevance to 
know, how NATO viewed the region in the period of 2004 – to 2012, and what place the case 
-countries acquired within the strategic agenda of the Alliance.  
 
In 2002 the Secretary General Lord Robertson (served in 1999 - 2003) stated that the South 
Caucasus (SC) region was of no specific relevance to the Alliance.
1
 It is understandable, since 
1994 all of SC - republics were engaged within a broader PFP - framework with no specific 
political course identified till NATO Prague Summit in 2002 (where Georgia first voiced its 
desire to become a member) that would unequivocally confirm any nation‘s major interest to 
join the NATO. As a former NATO - International Staff (IS) member Bruce Bach recalls, the 
Alliance pursued one principle objective towards all three SC - republics ―to engage them in 
the processes and activities, which they seek while leaving open how deep an engagement 
                                                 
1
 Martin Malek, Velizar Shalamanov, and Frederic Labarre, ―NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks,‖ Connections The Quarterly Journal, 2008, 30. 
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may be.‖1 Just one year later the same Secretary General made a round - trip visiting the 
capitals of all three countries, meeting presidents and defence ministries, and publicly stating 
the importance of the region for the security in Europe.
2
  
 
5.1.1 From Summit to Summit – From Neglect to Recognizing the 
Benefits of Military Cooperation  
 
The growing importance of the region to the Alliance should not be regarded in isolation from 
global context, and practical steps, that followed from NATO - side, speak clearly for that. 
The Istanbul Summit in 2004 elevated the partnerships with Caucasus and Central Asia -
countries to a top priority, and paved the way to the creation of the position of Secretary 
General‘s Special Representative in both regions, assumed by Robert Simmons.3 In 2003 
NATO took over the command in ISAF - operation and invited actively partner nations to 
contribute to the operation either by force - deployment or by other options. As an excerpt of 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) puts it: 
 
The growing size and significance of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan has increased 
both NATO’s emphasis on developing PfP countries’ capabilities for participating in 
NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central 
Asian PfP countries to NATO, given their proximity to Afghanistan.
4
 
 
It meant that the ISAF - operation and the geographic proximity of SC - countries to Central 
Asia provided an additional logistical capacity (airlift and railway) for coalition supplies in 
Afghanistan; not least the proximity of Azerbaijan and Armenia to Iran played a certain role 
forming the Alliance strategic attitude.
5
 Politically it was accompanied by the appointment of 
two liaison officers in both regions, who recived the main mission to work daily with local 
defence and other state institutions and to assist the Special Representative in developing 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Bruce Bach, a former member of NATO IS (Defence Policy and Planning Division), Brussels. 
2
 Priego, ―NATO Cooperation towards South Caucasus,‖ 52–53; ―NATO Secretary General to Travel to 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan,‖ Press Release (2003)046 046, Www.nato.int, (May 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_20003.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
3
 Simon Schmidt, NATO and the South Caucasus: An Analysis of Cooperative Activities within the IPAP 
Framework in the South Caucasus Partner Countries, viewpoint (Yerevan: International Center for Human 
Development, ICHD, January 26, 2012), 2. 
4
 ―NATO Partnerships,‖ 3, 17. 
5
 Cornell, ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security,‖ 130; Socor, ―NATO Prospects in the South 
Caucasus,‖ 2. 
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advises with regard to NATO‘s overall strategy toward Caucasus and Central Asia.1 It should 
be also noted that over time all SC - countries joined the U.S. military operation in Iraq by 
sending troops, thus creating an additional field of bilateral military cooperation. As the 
recognition of these efforts, the next Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
(from 2004 to 2009) visited Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 4 - 5, 2004 and 
made a specific emphasis in Tbilisi on values of democratic rule, whereas the prospects of 
peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict have been discussed in Baku and Yerevan.
2
 
During these visits the growing menace of global terrorism and transnational crime was also 
highlighted as well as the potential contribution of the region to European energy - security. 
Basically, the South Caucasus linked with Central Asia had been recognized as an important 
transit route for energy resources and ―a bulwark against drug smuggling and extremist 
organizations‖3. This particular view was commonly accepted in the Alliance, with some 
national nuances. It emphasized the growing role of SC - countries in NATO - led operations 
as well as the danger of conflicts in the region due to geographic and political proximity to 
NATO - territory (Turkey).
4
 Georgia‘s desire to join the Alliance created an additional 
dimension of political linkages to the region, which in turn, elevated the relevance of the 
particular military reforms in line with commonly accepted norms of democratic governance. 
As NATO Parliamentary Assembly‘s report puts it the open door policy and the framework of 
military cooperation in the region had to be regarded as assistance to national armed forces to 
develop ―in a manner consistent with democratic governance.‖5 
 
Even though the overall stability in the region has been recognized as the primary political 
objective of NATO in South Caucasus, the potential involvement of the Alliance in the 
processes of conflict - resolution (Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) had been 
vehemently rejected. During the mentioned visits, the statements or speeches of Secretary 
Generals‘ always stressed the priority of OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) engagement in facilitating possible solutions, and left NATO no viable option in this 
regard. The Riga Summit Declaration in 2006 demanded the peaceful solution of ethno -
                                                 
1
 ―The NATO Secretary General‘s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia,‖ North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, March 27, 2014, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50101.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
2
 ―Caucasus Visit Focuses on Partnership,‖ Www.nato.int, November 3, 2004, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_20669.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
3
 ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Region,‖ Committee Report, 168 DSCFC 06 E (NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2006), 4, available at http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=998. 
4
 Interview with Steffen Elgersma,  NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP IS), Brussels. 
5
 ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Region,‖ para. 4,5. 
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territorial conflicts in the region; however, it did not explicitly define formats or desired 
model of solutions.
1
 On another instance, the possibility of sending NATO - peacekeeping 
force in SC was explicitly ruled out in 2006 by the Chairman of the Alliance‘s Military 
Committee General Raymon Henault.
2
 It seems that the general consensus has been reached 
among NATO - members, which does not foresee any serious political action, not to speak of 
military one, aimed at increasing NATO‘s peacekeeping role in the region. Nonetheless, 
NATO was able to agree on one of the fundamental principles of conflict resolution, and 
favored the importance of territorial integrity, on which the special emphasis was made during 
the Chicago Summit 2102, causing Armenian delegation to reduce its level of participation.
3
   
 
The decisions made public during the Chicago Summit represent a logical continuation of the 
policy - review started short before the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The significant increase of 
NATO‘s dependence on force - contributions and material/financial donations of partner - 
nations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, in light of serious defence budgetary cuts by member -
states, forced the Alliance to assign the Partnership Concept a much higher weight than 
before. The Strategic Concept adopted at Lisbon Summit in 2010 specified the role of 
partnership in general terms as preparing interested nations for membership.
4
 Interestingly, 
however, it also specified with a great clarity, that it would develop existing partnerships 
―while preserving their specificity.‖5  The messages of the Chicago Summit, followed in May 
2012, reiterated the need for keeping flexible formats of partnerships with no impediments for 
deepened cooperation in operational context (incl. NATO Response Force - NRF), the 
training and exercises.
6
 Even though the declaration did not provide any specific details on 
Armenia (except. the reiteration of Georgia‘s membership aspirations), the signals sent, were 
clear enough to indicate that the military - operational dimension of cooperation lay at core of 
                                                 
1
 ―Riga Summit Declaration‖ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Press Releases, November 29, 2006), 
para. 39, 43, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm. 
2
 Malek, Shalamanov, and Labarre, ―NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on 
Different Tracks,‖ 49. 
3
 ―Chicago Summit Declaration,‖ Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, Press Release (2012) 062 (Chicago: North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, May 20, 2012), para. 47, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease; Richard Giragosian, Zaur 
Shiriyev, and Kornely Kakachia, ―Security Perceptions: The Views from Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia,‖ in 
The South Caucasus 2018: Facts, Trends, Future Scenarios (Tbilisi: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013), 205–206, 
available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35353-1522-35-30.pdf?130913081416. 
4
 ―NATO - Active Engagement, Modern Defence - Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,‖ 
NATO, November 19, 2010, para. 29, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. 
5
 Ibid., para. 30. 
6
 ―Chicago Summit Declaration,‖ para. 22. 
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the Alliances interest with those countries, that do not pursue the goal of membership. 
Evidently, Armenia falls under this category.  
 
5.1.2 The U.S. Interests and the “good for Alliance”  
 
The U.S. being the most potent member of the Alliance traditionally pursued the general 
objectives of regional stability and the promotion of democratic transformation. Within this 
general pattern, the U.S. interests initially were ―non – country - specific.‖1 The radical shift 
of the American policy in addressing the global threat of terrorism, and related risks, caused 
also changes in the approach to the South Caucasus region. As Vladimir Socor, a Jamestown 
Foundation analyst, highlights, the U.S. regional policy disregarded traditional (military) 
threats and made great emphasis on addressing international terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), arms and drug smuggling.
2
 In this context and in light 
of the tremendous increase of Caspian states‘ capacity to export energy sources to Europe, the 
role of the each country in South Caucasus got much more articulated. The Congressional 
Report 2010 identified Georgia - as a model for implementing democratic reforms in post-
soviet area and a ―key conduit through which Caspian Basin energy resources flow to the 
West.‖3 Armenia received in the document a comparably less recognition, and is mentioned 
within the general context of international crime, the conflict resolution in Karabakh, and the 
desirability of improved relations to Turkey. The U.S. global security interests played key role 
in initiating security and military cooperation with all SC - countries. The follow- u p chapters 
will provide a detailed picture of particular cooperation programs. At this stage we would 
merely highlight that intensive military programs launched in the region from 2003 onward 
were also intended to support the general process of domestic political reforms. As the former 
Assistant Secretary of State in European and Eurasian Affairs Elizabeth Jones (served from 
2001 – to 2005) stated in 2003, the results of the US - assistance are that ―as each day passes, 
the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus are becoming better equipped, better trained 
and better coordinated‖, and all efforts are integrated to enhance human rights and political 
reforms.
4
 The continuity of the mentioned policy and objectives is visible in the 
Congressional Budget Justification documents for foreign operations from 2004 - to 2012, 
                                                 
1
 James Nixey, ―The South Caucasus: Drama on Three Stages,‖ in America and a Changed World: A Question of 
Leadership (London: Robin Niblett, 2010), 126, available at http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-
halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00005179/CH_16492_us0510_nixey.pdf. 
2
 Socor, ―NATO Prospects in the South Caucasus,‖ 3. 
3
 Nichol, ―Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,‖ 32–33. 
4
 Ibid., 31–32. 
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which turns South Caucasus to the largest financial recipient of US - aid (about 1/5 of all aid 
to Eurasia).
1
  
 
On April 2, 2009 the German Foreign Minister Frank - Walter Steinmeier formulated in a 
―Der Spiegel‖ - article the core of NATO interests, embracing the trinity of ―goods‖:  the 
good for the candidate country, good for NATO, and good for pan - European security.
2
 It is 
symptomatic how quickly the cancellation of NATO - Russia Council‘s as a reaction to 
Georgia - Russia War in 2008, was lifted in March 2009.
3
 It exemplifies how the interests of 
an aspirant country can be overruled by the interests of the Alliance, i.e. key members of the 
Alliance.  The German ambassador to NATO, for instance, called the decision to freeze the 
relations with Russia simply ―stupid.‖4 The decision to restore the Council‘s work was 
explained by existing common interests with Russia in Afghanistan and in areas of arms 
control and disarmament, weapons of mass distruction (WMD), terrorism, piracy and drug - 
trafficking.
5
 This example testifies for the existence of a significant disparity inside the wide 
spectrum of Alliance - interests. It also makes clear, that despite the political commitment to 
admit Georgia to membership at Bucharest Summit in 2008, which increased NATO‘s 
political ties to the region, the importance of strategic calculations should never be 
underestimated.  
 
In the end the Russia itself has been considered by NATO as a partner country, though 
clearly, with a different approach and the incomparably wide spectrum of common issues to 
work on. Compared to that, countries of the South Caucasus are engaged in a completely 
different set of cooperation packages. Yet as a former NATO – spokesman Jamie Shea 
argues, all partnerships can only be strengthened if common security interests persist that 
further ―common or at least compatible value systems.‖6 Since the tendency of rapidly 
diminishing and uncoordinated defence spending among NATO - members gradually 
amounted to the problem of the serious capability shortages, the integration of partners in the 
planning and command structures to participate in the ―sharp end of operation‖ was a decision 
                                                 
1
 Nichol, ―Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,‖ 42. 
2
 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ―Germany‘s Foreign Minister on NATO: ‗We Face New Threats and Challenges,‘‖ 
Der Spiegel, April 2, 2009, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-s-foreign-minister-
on-nato-we-face-new-threats-and-challenges-a-616969.html. 
3
 Ahto Lobjakas, ―NATO Lacks the Stomach for South Caucasus Fight,‖ Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 5 
(April 16, 2009): 3. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Gegeshidze, ―Post-War Georgia: Resetting Euro-Atlantic Aspirations?,‖ 8. 
6
 Shea, ―Keeping NATO Relevant.‖ 
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NATO - leadership favored and was ready to provide ―a full seat at the NATO table‖ for 
respective partner nations.
1
  Here we clearly see the core area of mutual benefits, where not 
only Georgia, but especially Armenia its interest to embed national forces into ongoing and 
future NATO - operations.  
 
5.2 Mechanisms of Cooperation  
 
The organizational interests of every institution usually are backed by mechanisms that are 
intended to suit best the formal and practical requirements of both internal and external 
cooperation. NATO is no exception in this regard and applies a number of cooperative tools 
that reveal clear linkages to generic principles of western type defence governance, and can 
also serve the particular interests of some nations. The effectiveness and outcomes of these 
mechanisms will be paid a much greater attention in following chapters dealing with Armenia 
and Georgia. Here, however, we regard it as indispensible to provide a brief introductory 
overview of relevant cooperation formats that are utilized by the Alliance in cases of Georgia 
and Armenia. These programs and plans are not simply the venues, within which intensive 
military and defence - related interactions take place, but they represent a kind of ―structural 
umbrellas‖ under which intensive processes of professional socialization, i.e. norms adoption 
and internalization unfold.  
 
5.2.1 Partnership for Peace (PFP) – Tools  
 
Established in 1994 the Individual Partnership (Cooperation) Program (IPP/IPCP) allowed 
any in PFP involved country to identify among dozens of general areas the activities (over 
1400) that best suit their political and military objectives.
2
 The list of activities might vary 
from year to year and range from observer status in a maneuver exercise to training, language 
and other educational courses in various NATO - facilities.
3
 The IPP is indeed a first and 
foremost practical level of cooperation, where the selected list of activities must be approved 
from the NATO - side. The Alliance can reject some activities and on some instances provide 
                                                 
1
 Ibid. 
2
 ―Partnership Tools,‖ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 13, 2014, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_80925.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
3
 ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Region,‖ sec. II, BOX I, para. 3. 
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a full or partial coverage of participation costs.
1
 In fact, the introduction of the PFP - 
framework served major objective of bringing closer the partner nations‘ military to the 
standards of NATO - forces. The IPP was in this regard a perfect platform and the invitation 
at the same time into the ―world of NATO - annual activities.‖ Yet the interest of the deeper 
political and military cooperation between a partner - nation and the Alliance under the PFP - 
umbrella could be only served if joint force - and capability planning procedures were 
initiated. Thus, along with IPP, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) had been 
established in 1994. It imitated the NATO force - planning system and allowed the interested 
nation to develop its force interoperability via assessing its military capabilities by NATO - 
teams and establishing specific goals (Partnership Goals - PGs) that enhance national 
capabilities for participation in NATO - operations or exercises.
2
  The military - operational 
dimension of cooperation has been further enhanced as the Operational Capabilities Concept 
(OCC) was introduced in 2004. This relatively new program deepens the interoperability of 
designated national units with NATO - forces to a higher level.  Countries are asked to 
identify units (no matter land, air or naval) they wish to form in full accordance with NATO - 
standards and thus will be evaluated and certified by the Alliance.
3
 The OCC came into life as 
a response to the growing role of partner - nations‘ contributions to ISAF (International 
Security Assistance Force), and therefore serves first of all a very narrow objective of 
developing operational capabilities of partner forces. The evaluation and certification process 
of units can take several years, ultimately ensuring that partner units are ready to work with 
Allied forces once deployed.
4
 The OCC is also used for developing partner‘s capabilities 
intended to become a part of NATO Response Force (NRF), and the achieved interoperability 
is usually ensured and evaluated via participation of respective units in various field - 
exercises.  
 
The prevalence of the operational focus within the general PFP and PARP - objectives has 
become weaker over year, as the importance of general defence reforms in PFP - countries 
gained momentum. Consequently, PARP was increasingly used to support transformation of 
national defence institutions, and speed up military reforms. Alongside OCC the Partnership 
Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP - DIB) was agreed by member - states at 
NATO Istanbul Summit 2004, which aimed at exploring the needs and gaps of defence 
                                                 
1
 Ibid. 
2
 ―NATO Partnerships,‖ 15. 
3
 Ibid., 15, 17. 
4
 ―Partnership Tools.‖ 
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institutions and facilitate reforms that would develop efficient and democratically responsible 
defence institutions.
1
 Naturally, the PAP - DIB objectives were in line with general PARP - 
objectives of a partner‘s forces‘ enhanced interoperability and the adoption of NATO - 
standards in a wide range of areas.  For instance, educational standards serve the common 
understanding of basic military staff procedures, NATO doctrines, proficiency in English 
language (STANAG 3 level), high admission criteria, core mandatory areas to pass, high 
academic ethics etc.
2
 PAP - DIB is used to develop tailored assistance programs for 
improving democratic control over armed forces, transparent management and budgeting, 
defence and security policy, or to check the compliance with agreed international norms and 
practices.
3
 In fact, PAP - DIB‘s objectives are fundamental to the objective of building 
modern defence institutions. Thus it enjoys high attention from the NATO International Staff 
(IS) and the NATO - affiliated educational centers that try to ensure intensive networking of 
people, and the targeted exchange of ideas and programs. This platform of networking is 
being sustained by two NATO agencies that cooperate closely and provide partners with 
modern concepts and best practices: the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP 
- a more strategic policy making body) and the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence 
Academies and Security Studies Institutes (PfP - Consortium, an educational forum of nearly 
300 institutions).
4
 The PASP and PFP - Consortium have their own work specifications. The 
former for instance aims more at streamlining the security assistance by sharing relevant data 
and promoting donor - recipient country relationship via particular ―Clearinghouse‖ 
mechanisms (national assistance programs).
5
 The latter has much heavier focus on the 
educational aspect of assistance, thus concentrating on documental (conceptual and 
normative) development and building strategic community through education and research. 
The ultimate objective here is building ―common understanding of security and security 
policy.‖6   
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5.2.2 Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and Annual National 
Program (ANP)  
 
At NATO Prague Summit in 2002 the Alliance decided to start a new partnership initiative 
called the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). It brings all defence and military 
related activities under one, much more politically loaded umbrella, with a heavy focus on 
domestic reform efforts.
1
 Armenia and Georgia joined the framework, which identifies four 
major areas of reforms: political and security cooperation, defence, public information, and 
civil - emergency issues.
2
 The first chapter clearly serves the political purpose and highlights 
the criticality of common security understanding between the Alliance and a partner - country. 
It also stresses the political relevance of security and defence reforms, as compared to 
particular objectives within the defence and military chapter, aimed at enhancing combat 
readiness or force interoperability. In general, IPAP‘s first chapter deals with various 
elements of democratic reforms and governance (e.g. judicial, economic etc.) and  the second 
- with military reforms, in particular with policy and planning, budgeting, standardization and 
interoperability with NATO - forces.
3
 This format is based on a two - year cycle and allows 
participating country to develop specific cooperation goals with NATO that are in the end 
assessed against progress achieved.
4
 The assessment is made by the NATO (IS) - team and is 
reviewed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The cooperation goals in the document are 
tied to a concrete schedule of actions and provide an excellent platform for active political 
dialogue with NATO by means of regular meetings in Brussels.5    
 
The most intensive and inclusive cooperation mechanisms are the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) and Annual National Program (ANP). The second is similarly designed as IPAP and 
used to be a working plan of countries being under MAP. Yet, the evaluation criteria of ANP 
(MAP) are more rigorous than of IPAP in terms of progress in achieving political objectives 
(functioning of defence institutions in accordance with NATO standards), and are conducted 
annually.6 These programs are, in fact, the last formal stages, where intensive membership -
preparations must be completed to certify a partner country for full membership.  Thus they 
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are much more the subject of political influence than the IPP, OCC or PARP with their heavy 
emphasis on the military - operational dimension. The increased focus on tailoring individual 
formats of cooperation made the process more dynamic, but also pushed some early collective 
formats of cooperation (such as the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council - EAPC) into the 
growing irrelevance. The desire to establish a unique and individual cooperation process 
turned the ―28 + 1‖ formula to the mostly used format between partner - countries and NATO, 
partially also due to non - decision making nature of the EAPC, and ―because some PFP 
countries are reluctant to discuss their security concerns, given other countries that attend.‖1 
This observation pretty much attests the limited weight a partner - country can attach to 
general PFP - requirements of supporting transparency and collective trust, once confronted 
with the dilemma of security concerns and the need of sharing defence - and security related 
information. Both case - countries use actively the ―28 + 1‖ format, with Georgia moving a 
step ahead by having a separate NATO – Georgia Commission (NGC) created in the 
aftermath of war with Russia in 2008.2 Interestingly, the desire to revitalize the ―cooperation 
between the partners‖- format is openly acknowledged in Armenia‘s IPAP documents that 
directly urge the country to ―Actively engage in efforts to revitalize the Partnerships, in 
particular the EAPC‖.3  Out of all cooperation formats PARP - reports are the best documents 
that measure national performance in the defence area by assessing progress in achieving 
Partnership Goals (PGs), yet are unavailable for public review and analysis due to the 
sensitive nature of information contained. Some IPAP - reports are made public, though went 
under the significant censorship. In all documents (with except of OCC - evaluation) the 
progress review is structured in accordance with areas relevant to defence reforms and 
democratic governance and pretty much reflect the sectoral area - division of our 
measurement concept. Often we encountered instances, where no clear assessment or vague 
statements were made. However, the language and formulation of agreed objectives or 
commitments made it easy to understand the nature of national efforts (discontent or 
approval), and at what stage of progress the national authorities stood at the time of 
assessment.  
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Chapter VI: NATO and Defence Transformation in 
Armenia  
  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It has been already said that the turning point in the relationships between NATO and SC - 
countries was the inauguration of the IPAP. And even though, all countries were long before 
already engaged in PARP and IPP - formats, the real political push, i.e. the changes on the 
ground became visible only from 2004 on, as Georgia entered the IPAP and Armenia joined 
in the following year. The overall condition of the defence and security sectors in both 
countries at that time largely were described as being heavily affected by the soviet legacy. 
Some reports testify that the entire hierarchy of values was constructed in the way that the 
security of state was given much higher priority than that of individual, thus kept under 
secrecy by turning defence institutions as: 
 
(…) over - centralized decision - making system on strategic and even operative 
issues, a hierarchy which excluded civilian involvement in formulating, controlling 
and implementing defence missions, an arbitrary system of resource allocation, the 
absence of transparency to the public and public representatives, and a poor capacity 
to achieve medium and long - term planning.
 1
 
 
The appalling deficits of defence institutions (ministry and armed forces) could be certainly 
attributed to the existing gaps in democratic governance. The tendency from 2004 to 2005 
showed signs of some worsening, allowing Freedom House to attest Armenia the quality of 
weak governance, the prevalence of vested interests within power - structures and the 
insufficient level of law-enforcement and monitoring.
2
  Not surprisingly, the quality of the 
political control of the armed forces, represented by the oversight - function of the national 
parliament and the civilian leadership of the defence ministry, raised serious questions. The 
defence system was highly militarized and inhabited serious signs of corruption and financial 
interests.
3
  
 
                                                 
1
 Avagyan and Hiscock, ―Security Sector Reform in Armenia,‖ 40; Fluri and Bucur-Marcu, Partnership Action 
Plan for Defence Institution Building, 5. 
2
 ―Nations in Transit: Armenia 2004,‖ Freedom House, 2004, available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/armenia#.VHx-nTHF-08. 
3
 Avagyan and Hiscock, ―Security Sector Reform in Armenia,‖ 1. 
110 
 
6.2 NATO in National Agenda: The Political Purpose of 
Cooperation and Defence Reforms  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the degree of political influence NATO was 
exerting in Armenia from 2004 to 2012 by assessing how successful it was in promoting the 
Euro - Atlantic cooperation as the crucial foreign policy objective of the national political 
agenda and in strengthening key principles of democratic control of defence and military.   
 
6.2.1 NATO in Armenia’s Strategic Agenda 
 
The regional approach was a major featuring element of the Alliance‘s policy towards the 
South Caucasus. According to Armenia‘s First Deputy Defence Minister Davit Tonoyan (in 
this position since 2010) the ―indivisibility of the region‖ developed by the Allaince is a 
distinctive platform, which serves well for the individual policy formulation towards each 
country.
1
 No doubt that the existing security situation in the region is very complex, and 
events in any country might have significant impact on the others. From this perspective the 
role of Karabakh conflict must be once more highlighted. It heavily influenced the security 
culture and domestic politics in Armenia and allowed political leaders from Karabakh in late 
1990s to gain power in Armenia, consolidate it and eventually ―capture the Armenian 
presidency‖ by Robert Kocharyan (served as the President of the breakeaway Karabakh 
Republic from 1994 to 1998) in 1998.
2
 Since then the security of the breakaway region 
became even more the integral part of Armenian security policy considerations and 
determined the very nature of country‘s political structure and decision - making. Thus it was 
no surprise that not only the defence area but the entire political culture was ―driven by a 
deeper trend of insecurity and militarization‖ often resulting in the predominance of primitive 
politics.
3
 Another factor playing its crucial role in forming Armenia‘s security perceptions is 
the traditional view that regards Turkey as the main enemy and brings it in the direct context 
of the possible confrontation with Azerbaijan. As the deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan 
stressed in his interview in 2014, Armenia‘s security perceptions are strongly influenced by 
the role (negative) Turkey plays in the region, and effectively has an impact on Armenia‘s  
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policy towards NATO, as well as on the relevance of the Russian factor for the country.
1
 The 
tense relationship between these two countries is no secret for NATO - officials. As a former 
NATO – IS (DPPD – Defence Policy and Planning Division) official Bruce Bach stated, 
Turkey remains as challenge for Armenia bearing the potential of causing problems at any 
time.
2
 Despite these reservations, the growing size of the Alliance and the global scale of 
operations it assumed, raised its political relevance for Armenia and invited a policy change. 
Already in 2003 the Armenian foreign ministry voiced its desire to ―ensure its security by 
developing the widest possible international ties, especially with the world‘s ―most 
influential‖ security body.3 Similarly, the NATO - affiliated Batlic Defence Review was 
reporting that, though the very strategic goal of counterbalancing the Turkish - Azerbaijani 
alliance was met by the Russian military presence in country, deepening cooperation with 
NATO was regarded as very beneficial and served following objectives:
4
 
      
 To stimulate the political dialogue on international security issues 
 To create forces interoperable with NATO and able to participate in international 
peacekeeping missions 
 To use PFP programs to reform the Armenian armed forces 
 To enhance bilateral military - political ties with NATO - member and partner 
countries 
 
Yerevan identified both multilateral as well bilateral frameworks of cooperation to pursue a 
very practical interest of institutional reforms and transformation of the defence and military 
to support its strategic security interests. The National Security Strategy (NSS), adopted in 
2007 and which is the guideline for consequent actions, formulates the intensification of 
cooperation with NATO as an integral part of the policy of complementarity.
5
 This notion is 
largely referred to the ability of country to pursue multi - vector foreign and security policies 
with an aim to cover all directions that promise certain potential benefits. The benefits of the 
complementary policy in the context of NATO would mean better international political - 
military linkages and better security guarantees for Armenia. The statements of Presidents 
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Robert Kocharyan (in office from 1998 to 2008) and Serzh Sargsyan (in office from 2008 to 
present) must be also taken into account, since they shared the view that ―joining NATO 
would barely improve country‘s security, and affect its relations with neighboring countries‖.1 
In line with these claims some sources also argue that the European Union (EU) would be 
much more relevant for Armenia in long run to lessen its dependence on Russia.
2
  However, 
the considerable size of normative and policy - evidence suggests that these and similar 
statements seem to be mostly directed towards the Russian audience and perform more the 
function of political pacification of major ally rather than of real policy imperative. In this 
sense, the review of Armenia‘s strategic level documents would contribute to more clarity 
about foreign policy objectives. At this stage, we choose to do this within the separate chapter 
(Defence Policy and Planning) that deals with country‘s institutional capacity to produce 
sound strategic security - and defence related policy documents. Yet a short excerpt from 
IPAP - document makes clear that the national desire of the ―full integration into European 
structures and institutions‖ is qt leqst formqlly accepted as ―Armenia‘s main foreign policy 
objective.‖3  
 
Concerns had been expressed in the context of potential added value of cooperation with 
NATO to those countries that don‘t envisage the membership as the ultimate strategic goal of 
cooperation. This question got especially relevant in cases, where the Alliance had not 
identified its strategic interest, as in the case of Armenia, and seems to pay less attention to 
the country, as compared to Azerbaijan and Georgia with their large energy resources - and 
transport potential.
4
 Benefits of such cooperation are generally attributed to the increased 
capacity of political negotiations, the access to training and technical assistance programs, the 
increased interoperability, stimulation of defence reforms and the ability to ―counter external 
pressures from other countries.‖5 It seems that the mentioned opportunities exactly matched 
the Armenian expectations, motivating the political leadership to intensify its ties with the 
Alliance. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report (NPAR) findings capture the official 
position of Armenian authorities that reiterate the vital importance of NATO to country‘s 
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security interests.
1
 It becomes apparent, that due to small size and very limited resources of 
the country the national authorities very well realized the necessity of broadening the 
instruments of national security policy - making. According to former Armenian Foreign 
Minister Vardan Oskanyan (in office from 1998 - 2008), shared by many officials, with only 
two borderlines open, the flexibility in foreign relations becomes a very important and sound 
basis for conducting foreign policy.
2
 Understandably, the partnership aspirations towards 
NATO are formulated in a way as not to endanger the existing military ties with Russia. 
Nevertheless, the priority of strengthening the relationships with the Alliance became 
apparent even in the rhetoric of country‘s top officials. For instance, in 2008 the President 
Serzh Sargsyan stressed that Armenia‘s top foreign security priority was the friendly relations 
with Russia and good relations with the United States and NATO, so that the latter does not 
jeopardize the former.
3
  
 
The period between 2007 and 2010 is featured by a significant increase of political 
consultations at various levels between Yerevan and Brussels (NATO HQ). The President of 
Armenia Serzh Sargsyan as well as the Defence and Foreign Ministers visited the NATO 
headquarter, and the Special Representative of the Aliance Robert Simmons visited Yerevan 
for bilateral consultations at least twice a year.
4
 The regularity of meetings at all levels has 
increased significantly, and can be easily monitored by official sources of respective 
ministries or the Alliance. According to Armenian Mission to NATO, annually nine - to 
tvelve official visits are conducted by NATO - officials to Yerevan, and eleven - to sixteen 
visits made by Armenian officials to Brussels.
5
 Thus, summarizing the strategic - political 
aspect of the developed relations to NATO, it can be said, that the heavy reliance on Russian 
military guarantees and the close political - institutional linkage to Moscow (Armenia is a 
member of Russia led CIS and CSTO) did not prevent Armenian government to seek the ways 
of beneficial cooperation with the Alliance.
6
 Since Russia itself had institutionalized its 
contacts to NATO, there was no good reason not to do the same.
7
 As Mr. Steffen Elgersma, a 
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NATO - Internationa Staff member (IS) argued, Armenia regards the Alliance ―as a useful 
tool for defence transformation…some even consider the possibility of future membership 
and therefore view the existing contacts with the Alliance as a necessary tool for political 
bargaining with Russia.‖1 Additionally, some sources convincingly point out, that the 
motivating desire for Armenian authorities to join PFP - framework was, first of all, the fear 
of falling behind its neighbors Georgia and Azerbaijan and the necessity to be informed about 
the material aid and training provided to Azerbaijan.
2
 This argumently is convincingly 
strengthened by Bruce Bach (a former NATO – IS/DPPD official), who mirrors the same 
logic in the case of Azerbaijan and argues that Azerbaijan basically ―wants to not see the 
Armenians gain any military political advantage from what it might do with the Alliance.‖3   
  
6.2.2 Purpose of Cooperation and Defence Reforms 
 
The formulation of clear objectives, i.e. expected benefits from NATO - cooperation formats 
has found its place in Armenia‘s strategic documents. For instance, the National Security 
Strategy, adopted in 2007, pursues deeper connections to European security structures, the 
higher compatibility of forces with NATO - forces and the modernization of armed forces in 
―closer conformity with the defence systems of advanced states, including their forces.‖4 We 
must admit the existence of a certain ambiguity in the statement mentioned. There is no 
explicit mentioning of NATO or its member - state militaries. The modernization here can be 
translated in terms of technical upgrades and innovations, but also can refer to reforms of a 
general defence system and the military. The latter however, implies much deeper 
transformational processes (institutional, procedural, structural etc.) than the mere technical 
aspect of modernization. As we know, the stronger scope of military interoperability (PARP) 
was enlarged in 2005 to the broader emphasis of institutional reforms (IPAP), and NATO 
parliamentary report (NPAR) 2007 confirms this claim.
5
 The evidence however, speaks more 
for the prevalence of practical benefits of force - interoperability and related standards. 
Especially, the active engagement of Armenia in NATO - led operations (in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan) since 2004 pushed for more intensive bilateral military cooperation with key 
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allied nations (USA, Germany, France, Greece and Italy) and, naturally, brought up the 
military - technical aspect to the forefront overshadowing other aspects of cooperation.
1
  
 
Armenian authorities recognized the existing disbalance, yet it seems that this was exactly, 
what they were expecting. The NPAR - 2006 testifies that the NATO PA - delegation   
identified a broader consensus among political parties in Armenia that were more interested in 
practical benefits of cooperation such as the political dialogue and ―certain standards.‖2 This 
stance is somehow strengthened by first eputy minister Davit Tonoyan. According to him, the 
initial weight of the ―democratization‖ of the defence sector and the democratic values have 
been nowadays replaced by a heavier emphasis on practical benefits of cooperation, more 
related to national participation in NATO - led operations and the valuable expertise, 
predominantly provided by member - states and not the Alliance as organization itself.
3
 Thus 
a clear distinction must be made between the value of membership and the value of 
cooperation for Armenia. The benefits of cooperation are tangible, identified and very much 
appreciated. Concerning the value of membership, there is no evidence of the wider 
discussion within the government. And those officials, who openly supported the idea of 
NATO - membership, seem to generate a serious discomfort for the Armenian leadership. The 
case of the National Assembly Speaker Artur Baghdasaryan, who in a Frankfurter Algemeine 
Zeitung‘s interview in 2006 outlined the strategic goals of Armenian membership in EU and 
NATO, is very much telling, as he was forced to step down and withdraw his party ―Orinats 
Yerkir‖ from the government.4 As long as the issue of membership is off table, the open 
support of cooperation activities with NATO and its key member - countries seem much less 
problematic. For instance, in July 2011 while discussing the IPAP - implementation the 
Armenian and U.S. - officials agreed to hold joint exercises in 2012 and expand the ―spheres 
of cooperation‖, that according to U.S. - officials did not pose any obstacles for Armenia‘s 
military pact with Russia.
5
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It is crucial to understand how Armenian authorities translate the notion of defence and 
institutional reforms. The reasons are simple, since the picture and views they share are 
directly reproduced with some changes into national commitments embedded in bilateral 
documents (IPAP or PARP). These in turn are acknowledged by NATO - representatives as a 
national obligation to pursue reforms in line with agreements made with the Alliance.
1
 As 
already mentioned, the sequential introduction of every new cooperation format was designed 
in a way, as to enlarge and complement the existing ones by adding new elements, where the 
cooperation seemed beneficial. Thus, it is no surprise that the PARP increasingly used for 
addressing institutional aspects of defence reforms, was in this particular area supplemented 
by PAP - DIB, which itself proved instrumental in shaping the IPAP - format. In fact they are 
fully compatible and strengthen each other in achieving defined objectives.
2
 Interestingly, the 
rare examples of local expertise in Armenia - NATO relations reveal a common 
terminological tradition of security sector reform, which draws kind of dividing line between 
the notions of democratic and defence reforms. For example, a report produced by the Centre 
for European and North Alantic Affairs (CENAA) in 2013 mentions the Armenian IPAP as an 
important tool for facilitating democratic and defence reforms. NATO is regarded here as a 
key provider of assistance and advice in democratic, institutional and defence reforms ―that 
would bring the Armenian armed forces into conformity with NATO standards.‖3 The 
emphasis on armed forces and NATO - standards, as well as repetitive contextual 
disconnection of defence, institutional and democratic reforms points towards a peculiar 
understanding (intuitive or not) of defence reforms as the major means to achieve primarily 
the military - technical interoperability of national armed forces with the Alliance.   
 
The closer familiarization with this particular aspect of cooperation will be offered in the next 
sections of this paper that deal with country‘s strategic level, normative and policy 
documents. Yet even at this stage, we can conclude, that the peculiarity of contextual 
understanding of IPAP‘s mission is further supported by Armenian perception of the PARP, 
which according to some local sources is a core element of cooperation with NATO, and is 
―helping to develop the ability of its forces to work with NATO forces on operations.‖4 
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Contrary to this statement, the NATO - understanding of defence reforms seems to be a bit 
different and attaches defence reforms the higher objective of democratic and institutional 
improvement.  Already in the very first year of Armenian participation in the IPAP (2005), 
the requirements of defence institutional reforms stressed the need of separation of the 
General Staff (GS) from the Ministry proper, the establishment of civil servants‘ corps and the 
reform of defence planning and management areas.
1
 The same NPA – Report 2007 also states 
clearly that the IPAP would strengthen the institutional cooperation of Armenia with the 
Alliance and provide more transparency in governance. As an active NATO - offcial dealing 
with Armenia, Steffen Elgersma makes clear that NATO regards ―democratization …., in 
particular the democratic control over Armed Forces as the key objectives, a part of which is a 
more decentralized, western style structure of defence.‖2 A strong mismatch of perceptions is 
visible here. It is also evident that a strong continuity of the selected approach is preserved on 
the Armenian side, as the Armenian delegation to the NATO - Parliamentary Assembly 
frequently reiterated, that various cooperation mechanisms with NATO support the 
modernization of the defence system, its efficiency and interoperability.
3
 We might find 
different explanations for the term modernization, yet in general, it is comprehensible that the 
modernization in this particular context implied the recognition of superiority of the western 
military thinking and technology. This stance is additionally strengthened, as the first deputy 
defence minister Davit Tonoyan stressed in his interview, that the enhancement of fighting 
capacity of the armed forces is the main goal of cooperation with NATO.
4
 The further 
analysis of the relevant documents as well as national actions implemented will provide a 
more telling picture of concrete priorities in this regard.  
 
The expected benefits of cooperation, naturally, might differ from the real benefits gained and 
cause significant delays of cooperation processes during the course of actions. Nonetheless, 
the decision of Armenian authorities to link the idea of defence reforms with the major 
assistance from the NATO - side, and not under Russia‘s guidance, is an extremely interesting 
example itself. It raises multiple questions we will try to respond to in this study. Yet it is 
already evident now that Armenia successfully established political linkages to a global 
security organization, within which the process of adoption of common communication 
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language to international stakeholders had been initiated.
1
 There is no good reason to deny the 
existing differences in perceptions and expectations of involved parties.  And it becomes very 
critical to distinguish the differences on the essence of defence reforms that require a deep 
systemic transformation, from the divergence of views on other less relevant issues of policy - 
making. In this regard illustrative is the dilemma, described by local experts, who admit that 
the military mission of the armed forces is dependent on the effective implementation of 
reforms in the defence area, which is hampered by external threats, ―current circumstances‖ 
and ―significant objective limitations.‖2 Although we don‘t have any better explanation of the 
mentioned circumstances and objective limitations, we will look further whether this concern 
find their reflection both in fundamental policy documents as well as actions or inactions on 
the ground. We will try to illuminate the nature of such reservations that either lead to the 
evidence that support the former claim or rather reveal the formality of such excuses. If 
second is the case, it would indicate the objective of disguising the reality, in which, 
according to Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) - report of 
2007, in fact, no critical factors were identified, that impeded ―a swift revision of the current 
practices of defence control on behalf of the electorate and implementation of required 
improvements.‖3 
 
Finalizing this section we can conclude, that the cooperation with NATO turned to become an 
integral part of Armenia‘s security agenda. Though some sources claim that the EU is much 
more important for the country in long-run due to its ―day – by - day steps‖ effects on human 
rights, rule of law and lessening dependence on Russia, the same logic can be also easily 
applied to NATO.
4
 For example, according to the explicit statement of the Armenian 
delegation made in NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report in 2007, the IPAP and the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) must be regarded as complementary.
5
 The Alliance 
asks for the general compliance with the norms of democratic governance of defence, offers 
tailored detailed plans of cooperation, and via the concepts of NATO- standardization and 
force - interoperability should, in fact, lessen the dependence of Armenian armed forces on 
Russian military. The benefits Armenia hopes to gain from the cooperation process are 
twofold: one is linked to the desire of establishing a certain balance of global powers in its 
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strategic policy - making, and the second is related to the very practical gains of military - 
technical cooperation contributing to the effective upgrade of units in a western manner. This 
approach seems to be acknowledged by NATO - officials. According to Bruce Bach (a former 
NATO – IS/DPPD official) Armenia seeks what it can get from the Alliance and has made 
more progress in military domain, which is ―a sole reflection what they desire to get out of 
any engagement.‖1 After all, the Armenian Military Doctrine unambiguously stipulates, that 
the key rationale for foreign security cooperation is the introduction of best international 
military experience based on the study of practical achievements in ―international military 
scene, warfare and military - technical progress.‖2 For this purpose the variety of tailored 
mechanisms is applied within the general PFP - framework (IPP, PARP, OCC, and IPAP). 
Here again we see some evidence of the different interpretations of missions of the mentioned 
programs by NATO and Armenian officials. Whereas the Alliance increasingly regards the 
mentioned mechanisms as means to strengthen the democratic institutional pillar of defence 
reforms, the Armenian authorities primarily focus on developing interoperability and general 
capabilities of the armed forces. In fact, according to Mr. Steffen Elgersma, the NATO – IS 
official dealing with Armenia, the defence reforms are justified in Armenia by reference to the 
need of enhanced military capabilities, which also implies the adoption of democratic 
standards and practices.
3
Additionally, the collective format of the PFP, initially widely 
welcomed and supported, seems to lose its relevance due to the clear preference of partner-
countries to engage NATO in ―28 + 1‖ (former 26 + 1) format, and the priority is given to 
bilateral programs (member country – partner country), along with growing negligence of the 
wider EAPC – framework (NATO + all partners).4  
 
Next chapter will provide more clarity on Armenia‘s performance in the field of democratic 
control of armed forces. Released IPAP - documents, DCAF - reports, as well as NATO -
affiliated academic contributions and local reports will contribute to the comprehensive 
analysis of national achievements. Being aware that IPAP - documents are much more 
―political‖ than the PARP and typically are based on the content of the preceding IPAP - 
cycle documents (especially in the introductory part), the language and formulation of agreed 
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objectives and actions provide us with a sufficient degree of clarity about the made progress 
in the defence areas relevant to our study.  
 
 
6.2.3 Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
 
As the title of the chapter suggests, it will deal with the political aspect of democratic control 
of Armenian armed forces. It is usually represented by a strong capacity of the national 
Parliament to control and monitor processes within the defence, by its constitutional 
obligation to hold the executive (incl. ministry of defence) accountable for their actions, and 
creating better conditions for a wider public involvement. Further, the proper decision - 
making chain between various bodies of the government with the civilian authority on the top 
complements the control function. The findings of previous chapters support the claim, that 
for Armenia‘s leadership the practical aspect of defence cooperation with the Alliance appears 
more relevant as compared to its ―political‖, i.e. democratic dimension. An impression cannot 
be avoided, that the phase of ―defence democratization‖ is formally completed allowing the 
parties to proceed with practical actions both sides can benefit from.  Thus, we will briefly 
overview and prove whether democratic requirements of the alliance had been indeed fully 
met by the Armenian side, and how NATO interpreted the national achievements.  
 
6.2.3.1 Civilian Oversight of the Military and the Role of Governmental Structures 
 
Richard Giragosyan argues that defence transformation process in Armenia can be bluntly 
divided in generations of reforms, with the second generation aiming at introduction of 
democratic principles of civilian control of armed forces.
1
 If narrowly translated, the civilian 
control of the military refers to the governmental structure, in which the civilian minister runs 
the defence ministry and the President or the head of the government carries out the highest 
political responsibility of country‘s defence and security. The view provided by Armenian 
representative, Defence Advisor at NATO HQ Mher Israelyan supports this approach. As he 
stated, that the adoption of the IPAP meant a step towards higher responsibility in supporting 
defence reform - program focusing on a stronger western model of civilian control within the 
ministry and other steps to improve force capabilities in peacekeeping operations.
2
 Again a 
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strong reference to the practical - military aspect of cooperation cannot be overseen here. Still, 
as the civilian control of the military has turned to become the major principle of democratic 
reforms, its implementation became vital for the general objective (mirrored in IPAP) of 
getting closer to standards of western governance.
1
 Naturally, the democratic pillar of IPAP -
requirements led to the consequent enlargement of PARP content in 2005, adding ten new 
partnership goals (PGs) to twenty three agreed in 2004. In 2007 it made 39 PGs in total.
2
  
   
The National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in 2007 clearly recognised the dependence of 
the overall security of Armenia on a number of key factors, among which the democratic ones 
enjoy the higher priority in the document. It declares democratic principles of governance 
(transparent, efficient institutions and independent judiciary) as top guarantees for national 
security that rank above the force compatibility.
3
 The ambiguity of the compatibility of the 
armed forces will be touched upon closer at later stage. It is crucial, however, to note that the 
primacy of the democratic governance over other factors for national security formally has 
been recognized by national authorities, and, respectively, anchored in the top strategic 
document. Furthermore, within the area of domestic security the NSS attaches the institutional 
reforms to strengthen democratic governance (incl. efficient public administration) again the 
first priority ahead of building the effective armed forces (second priority), which itself 
according to document must be based on civilian control and the ―democratic planning.‖4 
Again, putting aside the ambiguity of the term democratic planning, which raises the general 
question of its utility within the military, key point here is, clearly, the national adherence to 
democratic principles as the first prioritiy to meet and ensure. For this purpose we have to 
take a brief look at the presidential authority as the top of the executive responsible for 
democratic and transparent functioning of defence institutions. Next we should overview the 
interplay of executive bodies within the government and ultimately examine the status and the 
capacity of the national parliament to execute its oversight and control functions.  
 
Within the period of our research (2004 - 2012) the President Robert Kocharyan was re –
elected (in 2003) for the next five year term, and as a response to internal political tensions he 
agreed to constitutional changes in 2005 that would ―distribute some power away from the 
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presidency.‖1 Despite the constitutional amendments, and active involvement of the Venice 
Commission, the presidential authority remains substantial, and the ―power ministries‖ stayed 
strongly under his personal grip.
2
 As the DCAF - report 2008 states, the president continues 
playing key role in foreign and security (defence) policy making, keeps the responsibility to 
convene the government sessions on relevant security issues, and holds defence minister 
personally responsible for developing and implementing defence policy – priorities.3 The link 
between the president and the government remains strong, and the position of defence 
minister is clearly attached more power and authority as compared to other members of the 
government. Exemplary was the Parliament‘s decision to withdraw the initiated changes in 
the Law on Compulsory Military Service in 2004 after Defence Minister Serzh Sargsyan 
stated, that there was no initiative from the Ministry‘s side, neither the intention to approve 
the changes. In the same manner the Minister refused to agree on the creation of the post of 
military ombudsmen, although explicitly addressed in the IPAP document.
4
 Ultimately as the 
result of the law amendment, the post was created in 2006, yet not as a separate body, but 
under the Office of the Human Rights Defender.
5
  
  
NATO - reports and assessments do not reflect the internal mechanisms of governmental 
decision - making. However, they might well address issues of intra - governmental 
coordination or cooperation. This aspect of governance is very much relevant, as it relates to 
the general process of democratic deliberation, and reduces the risk of single - handed actions, 
especially in the field of defence. In 2005 the Alliance accepted Armenia‘s plan for defence 
reform, which also envisaged the creation of an interagency commission to oversee the 
military.
6
 In fact, this body acquired a more detailed mission after the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) was put on defence reform - agenda, as the key action to perform. Considering 
the overall coordination of reform actions and their communication to the Alliance, the close 
linkage between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence is well visible. 
The first IPAP - document presented in NATO headquarter and signed by the Defence 
Minister Serzh Sargsyan, was developed in strong cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs and the President‘s Administration.1 Another source claims that the coordination of 
ministries was managed by the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the President and 
the Minister of Defence in a capacity of the Council‘s Secretary.2 According to the source, the 
NSC has no clear status and permanent secretariat, thus acting like an informal arena for 
coordination of joint political actions. Although the constitutional changes ensured the NSC to 
become a permanent advisory structure under the president, there is no evidence of its active 
and continuing work on the defence related issues.
3
 Given the circumstances, the role of 
President‘s Administration in formulating national defence priorities, objectively, gets more 
importance. It becomes also instrumental in organizing the NSC - meetings and defining its 
agenda. This view is additionally strengthened by the fact that the initiative of building the 
Center for Strategic Studies was picked up and effectively implemented by the President‘s 
Administration.
4
 Once again it underscores the existence of two centers within the executive 
branch responsible for the formulation of defence and security policies, and suggests close 
linkages between the President and the defence minister, with less chance of interference from 
the rest of the government. Not to mention, that all senior military and civilian officials in 
ministry of defence are appointed by President.
5
 In this regard, the role of personalities and 
the relevance of personal ties should not be underestimated.  A good example is General Hayk 
Kotanyan, who chaired the Center for Strategic Studies serving at the same time as the 
military advisor to minister, and occupied the position of the Head of Staff of the National 
Assembly till 2009.
6
 Current President Serzh Sargsyan himself served as the defence minsiter 
from 2000 - to 2007, keeping simultaneously the position of the Secretary of the National 
Security Council.
7
 Similarly, the acting defence minister Seyran Ohanyan occupied various 
military positions in the breakaway region of Karabakh from 1992 to 2000 (Chief of Staff and 
Defence Minister) and in 2007 assumed the posts of the Chief of Staff and the First Deputy 
Defence Minister of Armenia (under the Minister Serzh Sargsyan).
8
  
 
Since defence reforms encompass various fields of defence activities, where new defence 
policies have to be implemented, defence officials are usually required to cooperate with the 
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rest of the government to achieve needed legal or defence budgetary amendments. According 
to first deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan, the Ministry of Finances (to lesser degree the 
Parliament) remains the main venue for addressing defence budgetary issues.
1
  However, even 
within the financial domain the government seems to be limited in its authority to monitor and 
control the defence spending. As DCAF - report highlights, although the prime - minister 
formally has all means available to audit the Ministry of Defence, no evidence of such 
auditing has been found sofar.
2
 The general weakness of the government to exercise the 
effective control over defence institutions might be attributed to the traditionally strong 
position of the defence minister within the executive. The exceptional linkages existing 
between the minister and the President contribute to the mentioned quality and the 
inviolability of defence institutions. Additionally, as some authors argue, the passive use and 
the inadequate weight of other state institutions, along with marginalization of the National 
Security Council does not allow the proper use of formally existing mechanisms, thus leading 
to mere implementation of already made decisions under the dominance of President‘s 
authority in security and defence policy - making.
3
   
 
6.2.3.2 Role of National Parliament 
 
As for the issue of Parliament‘s (National Assembly) authority to execute its constitutional 
power of holding the government and the ministry of defence, in particular, accountable, a 
certain dichotomy comes onto light. On the one hand Armenia‘s legislative body formally 
owns all means available, yet in reality the application of control and monitoring mechanisms 
appears very limited. According to DCAF - report in 2005 the National Assembly‘s authority 
rests on the number of basic and well defined functions, such as legislative initiatives and 
amendments, inquiries and ability to question the members of executive, the budgetary 
control and monitoring of state procurement, and the approval of strategic defence policies as 
well as of the armed forces size (manpower).
4
 The first document relevant to our research 
period and made public is the IPAP - 2005, which identifies number of areas, where 
substantial gaps had been identified and subsequent actions agreed. For instance, it 
acknowledges deficits in parliamentary control and civilian participation in defence policy 
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and a serious need in speeding up the subsequent legal processes. In particular, it urges the 
Armenian side to enhance the committees‘ role (for Defence and Security, Financial - Credit, 
and Budgetary and Economic Affairs) in the oversight of the defence sector, and improve 
their capacity by providing specific education and training to their respective staff - 
members.
1
 Additionally, the need to review the Military Discipline Code along with the 
establishment of the post for military Ombudsman is suggested.  In fact, the first IPAP - 
document challenges the ability of the Parliament to perform its defence related mission in a 
broad range of fields: defence - policy, defence - budgeting and defence - legal. The 
budgetary aspects mostly relate to the ability of the defence ministry to develop financial 
plans in a sound manner, and present them in great details. These functions will be discussed 
in the respective chapter dealing with defence budgeting and transparency. But as a short 
general reference we can conclude, that as for 2005 the defence budgets submitted for review 
to parliamentary committees, were not detailed, defence related laws contained many gray 
areas, and the only issue that caused the heated discussion, was the force - deployment in 
Iraq.
2
    
 
By looking at the next IPAP - cycle document we were able to draw some conclusions about 
the progress made or not within the mentioned areas of parliamentary authority. Since the 
document for some reason is not made public, we rely on the secondary source, which at that 
time had access to the relevant information. Within the IPAP - period of 2007 - 2009 Armenia 
intended to optimize the parliament‘s role and involvement in defence issues by reviewing 
existing laws and providing additional staff training and educational courses.
3
 Most 
importantly, a national commitment was made, according to which a project team was to 
establish to conduct a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) based on the updated National 
Security Strategy, Threat Assessment and Defence Concepts. It was also acknowledged that 
the team had to establish a reporting mechanism, that would keep the MOD and other relevant 
state agencies informed about the progress of the SDR.
4
 Since we review the SDR much 
closer in the chapter dealing with functional aspects of national defence transformation, at this 
stage we limit ourselves with the summary of the evaluation of parliamentary functions. The 
DCAF - 2007 report attests serious deficits in investigative functions of the National 
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Assembly on defence matters, defence budgeting or other independent actions that would 
differ from the practice of authorizing the decision taken by the government.
1
 Another DCAF 
- 2008 report continues in the same manner and identifies the absence of formalized methods 
of control and auditing, the heavy reliance on minister‘s annual report and the risk of turning 
the control function to a mere political rhetoric.
2
  
 
The language to formulate national actions used in the IPAP - 2009 provide sufficient level of 
understanding about the degree of progress Armenia has achieved in the subsequent period. 
Among 52 actions fighting corruption and improving democratic oversight of armed forces 
take key positions for the success of democratic and defence reforms.
3
 In general, the 
language of the earlier IPAP - documents is being repeated with the same emphasis on the 
same range of defence related issues. This fact clearly does not speak about the significant 
improvement in the quality of the parliamentary control. The same notions of promoting 
democratic oversight and parliamentary capacity along with committees‘ expertise are used 
again.
4
 The references to the need of updating disciplinary code of military, as well as of the 
necessity to ensure maximum transparency in defence policy, budgeting and military human 
rights has not been changed.
5
 There is also no major change in the language used by IPAP -
document for the period 2011 - 13. Similar emphasis on parliamentary committees‘ staff 
training and the need to increase the general expertise in areas of national security, defence, 
budgetary planning and finances are once again reiterated.
6
  
 
The legislature‘s weakness to follow its duties in the area of democratic control of the military 
is very well acknowledged by defence officials.  As deputy minister Davit Tonoyan stated, the 
defence related parliamentary committee meetings lack both the quality and the quantity of 
discussions, that partially has to be attributed to the lack of expertise among committees‘ 
members in defence and military matters.
7
 He also points towards the general passivity of the 
parliament in terms of initiating general inquiries about the processes and issues relevant to 
defence, i.e. asking ministers for more accountability. Furthermore, the ministry of defence, 
as explained by the Armenian Defence Advisor to NATO, does issue about ten annual reports 
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addressed to the President, Parliament, Security Council, Cabinet of Ministers, interagency 
commissions and other stakeholders, and provides targeted reports to public organizations 
(NGOs) mostly on demand.
1
 This fact speaks rather in favor of the ministry of defence, being 
able to provide relevant information if required. But it also highlights two inherent deficits of 
parliamentary control of the military: first – except the annual ministerial reports there are no 
institutionalized mechanisms of a periodical reporting system; and second – there is a limited 
capacity of the legislative body to identify the areas of interest and provide the needed 
expertise in defence and military matters.  Some rare events, e.g. the heated discussions about 
the potential negative effects of Armenian participation in RRCF (Rapid Reaction Collective 
Force of the Russial led CSTO) with a high risk of being involved in conflict with neighbors, 
points towards the existing potential in cases, where strategic level issues are at stake.
2
 
However, as far as narrow defence related policy areas are concerned (planning, budgeting, 
human resources etc.) no evidence of a strong parliamentary involvement has been found 
sofar.   
 
6.2.3.3 Converging Views on generational Division of defence Reforms  
 
It seems that there is a common view in Armenia, which regards the defence transformation 
process subdivided between the generations of defence reforms. In line with deputy defence 
minister Davit Tonoyan‘s statement, some local sources claim that the ―second generation‖ of 
reforms largely dealt with institutional development of the democratic (civilian) oversight of 
the military and achieved a significant improvement.
3
 According to this view, the 
democratization phase of defence reforms has been successfully accomplished.  Thus, 
according to source, a ―third generation‖ of defence reforms is mainly aimed at practical 
improvement of defence management in areas of personnel management, military education 
and at increased transparency of the defence sector to avoid human rights violation within the 
armed forces.  Indeed, the ―civilianization‖ of the ministry and other defence structures 
improved in 2007 and the defence minister was no longer a military official.
4
 It implied that 
the authority of the strategic decision - making moved to the civilian body, yet the 
composition of the ministry was by and large military dominated. The majority of the top 
leadership constituted former military servicemen with an extensive military and combat 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Mr. Mher Israelyan, Defence Advisor at Armenian Mission to NATO. 
2
 Novikova and Sargsyan, ―Chapter 1: Armenia,‖ 14. 
3
 Giragosian, ―Armenian Military & Security Policy: Regaining a Strategic Balance,‖ 2. 
4
 Fluri and Bucur-Marcu, Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building, 17. 
128 
 
experience in Karabakh conflict region, who went to civilian positions by the presidential 
decree in 2010.
1
 Ideally, the military experience of a civilian servant speaks for the better 
quality of expertise and competence in the field of defence. Yet it is still, whether the soviet - 
mold military experience still has any effect in policy - formulation and implementation, 
which we might better explore in chapters dealing with functional and socialization effects of 
the Alliance on the process of defence transformation in Armenia. At this stage, we can 
strongly conclude, that the formal NATO - requirement of the civilian leadership in the 
ministry is completed. As for the ―civilianization‖ of the lower level positions, it will be a 
matter of human resources (HR) policy evaluation in the subsequent section of this study. 
From the NATO perspective, as Steffen Elgersma (a NATO – IS official) argues, a tendency 
of bringing more civilian staff in defence institutions is clearly visible, with much more still to 
be done.
2
  
 
Concerning the overall assessment of reform - generations, we see some signs of divergence 
of views between Armenian officials and particular NATO - representatives. In 2006 the 
NATO Liaison Officer for the South Caucasus Romualds Razuks briefed the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly – delegation, that the cooperation - focus has switched from 
promoting democratic values to assisting Armenia in establishing a democratic civilian 
control over armed forces with an increased emphasis on budgetary, resource - and personnel 
management.
3
 This statement reveals also the differences in approaches to the issue. Whereas 
the Armenian defence officials regarded the civilian oversight as the key element of 
democratic reform, and largely completed, the emphasis of NATO Liaison Officer on better 
defence policies as the precondition for better democratic and civilian control over the armed 
forces, makes it clear that the ―second generation‖- reform might not yet be completed. This 
stance is also supported by findings from IPAP - documents that attest over the period of eight 
years (2004 – 2012) the continuing deficits in parliamentary control, and its capacity to 
monitor defence institutions. The Freedom House identified the lack of transparency in 
governance as one of key problems of the country assessed as ―partly free‖, semi - 
consolidated authoritarian regime with the worsening democratic governance index since 
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2009.
1
 Some authors‘ argument can formally be applied here that explains the 
democratization deficit in Armenia by significant limitations imposed by external threats and 
strategic circumstances.
2
 However, it is less comprehensible, why actions aimed at increasing 
parliaments‘ competences in defence area that contribute to the effectiveness of defence 
management and the development of sound and affordable plans and policies must be 
regarded as the jeopardizing factor to country‘s security. Evidently, this is also not an 
argument for NATO – officials. As Gustav Vroemen, a NATO – IS/DPPD official, puts it 
―there is a link between democratic control of defence and better military, since the building 
of well - educated and broad - minded officer corps supports the achievement of the long - 
term defence objectives, better planning and distribution of available resources.‖3 
 
 
6.2.4 Summirizing the political Dimension of Cooperation     
 
Finalizing the entire chapter on the status of political influence of NATO in Armenia, we 
might already draw some preliminary conclusions. First, we have sufficient evidence to state 
that the cooperation with NATO had been strongly established within the national political 
agenda as one of the major strategic objectives, serving countries security interests. The 
benefits of cooperation for Armenia relate mostly to practical results in areas of military 
interoperability and force combat effectiveness. Some NATO officials share this view and 
underline the major importance of force - interoperability for both parties, as Armenia does 
not share membership aspiration.
4
 However, the entire picture seems not as simple as at first 
glance, and the political emphasis on democratic reforms in the defence is not entirely 
dismissed. Politically, Karabakh conflict seems to be used as the major reference for reform 
limitations. As Bruce Bach, a former NATO – IS official, puts it on Armenia and Azerbaijan 
―progress is limited by that overriding consideration in their capitals as well as with Allies.‖5 
The democratic dimension of defence reforms are clearly acknowledged by national 
authorities and formally mirrored as national commitments in respective cooperation 
documents as well as in top national strategic documents. Yet, the value parties (Armenia and 
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NATO) attach to the relevance of these requirements to defence reforms, as well as their 
interpretation, vary significantly with the tendency of preserving such differences over the 
entire period of research. This conflict is very well visible through the permanent repetition of 
identical formulations in all IPAP – documents reviewed. Though the civilian control of the 
military at ministerial level is formally well established, the continuing deficits in 
parliamentary control and monitoring, leaves an ambiguous picture of the democratic 
(political) compliance. Consequently, it can be indicative either for the formal (hollow) nature 
of the democratic requirements set before country, or the inability of the Alliance to provide 
added value of enhanced cooperation and the subsequent compliance in this respect.    
 
 
 
 
6.3 NATO - Influence in functional Areas of Defence 
 
6.3.1 Introduction  
 
As already introduced before, the functional aspects of defence transformation encompass 
changes that occur in the fields of defence policy and planning, law making, force structure 
and standards, budgeting and human resources. We are limited in our efforts to analyze the 
progress made by the Armenian defence ministry and armed forces on annual basis. Yet we 
still have sufficient data allowing us to compare the status of progress achieved by 2012 with 
the initial state of defence institution in early years of the millenium.   
 
It is no surprise that due to decades of the soviet military legacy, defence ministries and armed 
forces of all former soviet republics were heavily influenced by the soviet military thinking 
and relied exclusively on the Russian made military hardware. By 2005, as Saferworld - 
report states, the Armenian army was run predominantly along soviet traditions, with the same 
hierarchy, military doctrines, culture, equipment and the officer corps receiving the military 
education in Russian military academies.
1
 This tendency did not experience a radical change 
immediately after the launch of the IPAP - initiative. According to DCAF - report, fifteen 
years of the independent rule (since 1991) did little to challenge strong soviet traditions within 
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the military and bureaucratic circles.
1
 Yet the global processes and the expansion of Euro -
Atlantic cooperation ideas did not go unnoticed. Even though the was no demand for 
immediate change in the Armenian defence ministry, the acknowledgment of the need for 
reforms was firm. There is much of truth in the words of the deputy defence minister Davit 
Tonoyan: 
 
The changed strategic environment basically forced the Armenian defence 
establishment to acknowledge, that the existing system was not responding to 
challenges of the time and stared looking for options to improve, especially its military 
education, defence planning and budgeting mechanisms, ultimately resulting in a 
significant improvement of capabilities of armed forces.
2
 
 
This statement, in fact, highlights key areas, where most of reforms were intended to happen. 
It also makes clear, that the domain of the military hardware and supplies had not be 
considered as reform - relevant. The signs of the potential dichotomy should not be dismissed 
prematurely at this stage, since in light of the expected western – type reforms Armenia was 
still heavily reliant on Russian arms delivery and maintenance. The existing dependence in 
this particular field has significant effects in areas (military training, doctrines and education) 
that are commonly regarded as having adopted a strong pro - western perspective.
3
 The 
dilemma facing the Armenian leadership is quite understandable as well as their particular 
approach to the transformation process itself. It embraced a certain logic, according to which 
the best traditions of the soviet military school had to be preserved, and the radical changes or 
fundamental reform programs had to be avoided.
4
 Translated into the military realm, any 
reform effort had primarily to support the high combat readiness of forces (due to the ―frozen‖ 
conflict in Karabakh) and, if possible, improve the overall defence management. Given these 
circumstances, it becomes clear why Armenian officials do not contradict the common view, 
which puts the interoperability of the national armed forces with NATO as the major 
objective of Alliance‘s reform - recommendations.5 Under the ―interoperability umbrella‖ a 
valuable advice and expertise are being provided in various functional areas of the defence. 
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report - 2007 underscores the critical importance of 
communication systems, logistics and HQ - officers‘ education as key areas, where national 
standards had to be compatible with those of NATO. It also recognizes the PARP (introduced 
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for Armenia in 2002) as a major mechanism for achieving interoperability with NATO.
1
 
Consequently, it must be clarified whether NATO - standards are widely applied within 
Armenian defence institutions (ministry and armed forces), and not come into conflict with 
those standards that are necessary to operate Russian hardware. If defence planning and 
budgeting can be traditionally categorized as the domain of ministry‘s political responsibility, 
the education and training, along with logistics and communication represent the very area of 
standards‘ application inseparable from the armament systems military operates. We take 
account from the firtst deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan‘s statement, that the 
enhancement of the fighting capacity of the armed forces is the ultimate objective.
2
 It is the 
mission of every responsible defence official to support this objective. Yet the question, what 
standards and to what extent are being introduced within defence, and how they affect the 
different branches of the defence, is key to understand the essence of defence transformation. 
It also pretty much reflects the dilemma of two - tire force (Russia - mold, and NATO - like), 
we formulated before with regard to Armenia‘s increased participation in NATO - operations. 
Subsequent chapters help clarify this ambiguity and make emphasis on particular issue – 
based (functional) areas of defence transformation, where NATO‘s influence can be identified 
and assessed. The legal aspect of change is subsumed here by policy - reviews, due to their 
practical implications on policy formulation and change.    
 
 
6.3.2 Defence Policy and Planning 
 
In this section we attempt to shed light on a particularly important field of the defence – the 
defence policy and planning, which is the source of strategic level considerations and the 
national decision - making. Due to the top (strategic) nature of the field considered, the 
drafting process and the content of two critical documents will be reviewed, the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the Military Doctrine (MD). By that we will be able to detect 
whether NATO - like approaches and procedures were applied by Armenian counterparts, and 
how the logic of western strategic analysis was adopted and reflected in the national strategic 
and defence policy objectives.  
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In a broader sense defence policy and planning refers to the process of identifying policy 
objectives and developing plans of their long – mid - or short term achievement. Various 
excerpts from the IPAP - 2009 document reveal the recommendation to revise the chain of 
command and control procedures within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the General 
Staff (GS), to ensure the conformity of armed forces transformation to values inherent to 
democratic society.
1
 In fact, this was a request to adopt basic procedures similar to those of 
NATO - countries.  Within the same chapter, the document also asks to adopt ―the required 
legislation‖ that would enable the implementation of new procedures. Already in 2005 NATO 
- officials indicated the need for Armenia to review defence policy and iniciate the defence 
policy related legal amendments. As NPAR – 2007 (NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report) 
states, recommendations were primarily directed to the development of strategic level 
documents, e.g. National Security Strategy.
2
 For NATO it was of high importance to support 
the formal adoption of strategic level documents in Armenia developed in close cooperation 
with other relevant state agencies. All IPAP - documents released stressed the need to reform 
defence policy and planning system, based on the adoption of strategic documents and 
building national planning capacity that subsequently affect and define the development of 
long - term plans in various field of the military. Most importantly, from the very first IPAP - 
document in 2005, the Alliance pointed to, and Armenian side agreed to adopt the western 
chain of policy and planning development (formulation), which starts by developing the NSS 
as a basis for drafting the Defence Doctrine (DD), and recognizes the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) as the key mechanism for long - term capability and resource analysis.
3
  
Naturally, the serious involvement of NATO - advisory teams in providing expertise as well 
as supporting the interagency - work approach, was a serious factor stimulating the entire 
process.
4
  
 
6.3.2.1 A new Practice – Developing Strategic Policy Documents 
 
Although the topic of SDR takes the central place in the analysis of the capacity of Armenian 
defence institutions to perform proper defence planning, it would be reasonable to tackle it 
only after the general process of policy document adoption has been carefully reviewed. 
Further, the deficits identified in the initial phase of policy development might serve as very 
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indicative for the subsequent gaps and failures we might encounter within the Armenian SDR 
- process.  
 
According to DCAF - report in 2008, Armenian defence ministry had shown no evidence of 
producing subordinated policy documents before 2007 that would regulate various fields of 
activities, and heavily relied on President‘s dominant authority in this regard.1 Indeed, the 
IPAP - document 2005 offers a detailed plan how the National Security Strategy and the 
Defence Doctrines had to be adopted. It attaches the Interagency Commission a great deal of 
responsibility to draft these documents, consequently to be approved by the National Security 
Council and the Parliament. This western model of security planning was recognized by many 
national observers as more beneficial due to the higher level of policy discussion and public 
involvement.
2
 As one of the ―fathers‖ of Armenian NSS Hayk Kotanyan admits, the general 
model of the ―complementarity‖ of foreign and security policy made it unavoidable to adopt 
the US - model of the NNS, Military Doctrine – and the SDR development.3 Armenian 
authorities followed the IPAP - 2005 recommendations literally. By December 2005 an 
interagency commission was created, headed by the Secretary of National Security Council 
(at that time Serzh Sargsyan) and his advisor Hayk Kotanyan, to draft both documents.
4
 It 
must be noted, that despite the limited experience, Armenian authorities showed an open 
desire to make the work truly ―interagency‖. The lead role for the work was given the Institute 
for National Security Studies (INSS), which seemed pretty logical due to the lack of expertise 
within the military and the requested quality of interagency cooperation.
5
 Yet despite positive 
signs, the entire period of the NSS - development showed challenges, that drafting process 
had to encounter and that become a featuring element of the entire field of defence policy and 
planning. It took over two years to finalize the document and to receive its approval by the 
National Security Council on January 26 in 2007.
6
  
 
A general overview of the content of both strategic documents provides an impression that 
strong links to the Alliance are welcomed and appreciated as the top priority and important 
tool for enhancing bilateral relations with the U.S. and other members of the Alliance. This 
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observation is also shared by some local observers.
1
  While taking a closer look at the content 
of the NSS we are able to identify following important elements of the national approach to 
the issue, often exposing conflicting statements and intentions. First, the cooperation process 
with NATO is translated as an effort to maintain the modern and professional armed forces 
that are compatible with NATO - units.
2
 Here we must clarify that the compatibility of units is 
attributed to the Armenian peacekeeping battalion, identified by the document as the unit 
designated for participation in NATO - led operations.  The NSS is consistent with IPAP - 
document messages and regards the IPAP - implementation as the major tool for fostering:  
  
(…) greater modernization and efficiency of the Armenian defense system and will 
bring it in closer conformity with the defense systems of advanced states, including 
their armed forces.
3
 
 
Knowing well from the IPAP - documents that conformity and interoperability with Alliance -
forces means the increased adoption of western standards, the frequent reference to the 
notions of modern and modernization would imply the application of NATO - standards to the 
entire armed forces in long - run.  Similar to NSS messages, the report submitted by the 
Armenian delegation to NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2007 states, that the main goal of 
Armenia - NATO cooperation and the IPAP is to ―shape a modern defence system and armed 
forces in Armenia, with the view of jointly functioning in NATO - led operations.‖4 Again we 
see here a clear signs of potential expansion of ―interoperability‖ outside the margins of the 
peacekeeping battalion. As second, we hold it very plausible to conclude, that according to the 
Armenian view, the interoperability (adoption of NATO - standards) must be regarded as a 
synonym for modernization and enhanced combat readiness (in document – combatability). 
However, the next statement, which attaches the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) key importance in terms of major arms supplier under favorable conditions, turns the 
validity of previous political claims very much questionable.
5
 As already discussed before, the 
NATO - standards primarily relate to the areas of communication, logistics, training and 
education. Yet as a member of CSTO, and heavily reliant on Russian supplies with 
―compatible weaponry‖, with a large Russian base in the country as ―indivisible part of 
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Armenia‘s security system‖, the objective of NATO - interoperability especially in long - run, 
runs against the need to have the same forces interoperable with CSTO - forces.
1
  
 
The conflicting nature of the revealed statements is mostly related to the technical - military 
dimension of the armed forces‘ life and seemingly less problematic on the level of political 
formulations.  The strategic objective of force - interoperability is, in fact, the key defence 
policy objective and determines the entire process of military planning. Thus, we must further 
look for possible discrepancies in Armenian Military Doctrine, as the primary document 
exclusively dealing with defence issues of national importance. The 2007 adopted Doctrine 
states with sufficient clarity that the improvement of military standards goes hand by hand 
with the need of increased interoperability and compatibility with ―leading security systems 
and defence systems of allied countries…to…carry out international missions.‖2 As we can 
see, the ambiguity about what leading security systems are that are worth to get interoperable 
with, still persists. The document strongly avoids any mentioning of the force modernization 
requirement in the context of the western military model.  Interestingly, it also does not stress 
the relevance of interoperability of the Armenian military with Russian forces, but reiterates 
the requirement of interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces in the chapter of 
―International Military and Military - Technical Cooperation‖ for the sake of participating in 
international operations.
3
 Since the issue of interoperability has been put in no relation with 
the Russial dominated CSTO, and got a clear emphasis on NATO and the U.S, the reference 
to interoperability with leading defence systems of allied countries, could mean only NATO 
and its allied nations. Nonetheless, the existing ambiguity cannot be fully lifted, because of 
defence systems formulated in plural, leaving by that a chance of association with the CSTO.   
 
The Doctrine defines very clear that the objectives and tasks set before the national armed 
forces determine the development and the consequent implementation of short to mid - term 
operational plans.
4
 Even though the term operational plan is not well formulated here, and 
probably relates to armed forces‘ development plans, the excerpt indicates some deficits 
existing in the area of the long - term defence planning. This view is even strengthened as the 
very first page of the document presents the course of modernization of the Armenian military 
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only in the context of short and mid - term perspective.
1
 The further analysis of the Doctrine 
reveals some additional elements that characterize the status of Armenian defence policy and 
planning for 2007.  First of all, it recognizes the need for reforms and the improvement of 
―defence planning bodies‖ by specification of ―clear - cut‖ functions within the Ministry 
(defence policy, budget formation and procurement) and the General Staff (planning and 
management of units).
2
 Second, it is recognized that the existing chain of defence planning 
was not effective due to the lack of capabilities ―necessary for the establishment of a system 
to assess, plan and finance defence needs.‖3 Ultimately, the document assigns the ―strategic 
review of the Military Security System‖ (probably the later Strategic Defence Review – SDR) 
the mission of reforming every single area of defence management (command, personnel, 
resource and capability needs, logistics, education and training) to be completed by 2015.
4
 In 
fact, the SDR will be given a special mission by all IPAP - documents to identify a future 
force structure, capabilities and budgetary needs. Yet, apart from the findings of the SDR, the 
conclusions of the Military Doctrine made in 2007, are confronted by the provisions of the 
first IPAP - document, which already in 2005 demanded the introduction of the sound, 
affordable and transparent plans, as well as the planning cell, responsible for long - term 
planning.
5
 The cross - comparison of relevant IPAP - statements makes possible to locate 
existing gaps and nuances of the defence planning that according to NATO - and Armenian 
officials had to be significantly reshaped and improved. Though the revision of the Military 
Doctrine is overdue, and no other relatively new document on defence matters (except SDR) 
is available, the only source for the sequential assessment of policy and planning issues 
remain the IPAP - 2009 and the IPAP - 2011 reports.   
 
The first paper asks for the revision of strategic documents, conduct of the SDR based on the 
updated Threat Assessment, introduction of a new planning and budgeting system and, similar 
to IPAP-2005, reiterates the need to establish a separate cell for long - term planning.
6
 The 
mentioned and other formulations indicate with great clarity, that by 2009 neither the major 
tool of defence planning (SDR) had been utilized, nor the needed structures and capacity was 
generated to meet the agreed defence planning objectives. The next cycle document (IPAP - 
2011) stresses once more the need to revise the strategic documents based on the updated 
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Threat Assessment, to establish the long - term planning cell and to complete the SDR.
1
 Three 
major conclusions can be drawn from the document. First, it proves that four years after 2007 
no revision of the NSS or MD had been conducted, as requested by IPAPs. It also reveals 
serious internal deficits within the decision - making to adapt timely the organizational 
structure to the existing needs (requirements) and to generate the institutional capacity needed 
in the area of long - term defence planning. Further, the problems linked with the proper 
conduct of the SDR cannot be overseen, for even the language of the last IPAP - 2011 in 
relation to SDR is very confusing, if not problematic. Initially it states that ―Armenia started to 
implement the results of the Strategic Defence Review‖, however, in the next section it identifies 
the national objective to be achieved as follows: ―complete the conduct of a Strategic Defence 
Review defining the structure, the infrastructure (bases, airfields, HQs), tasks and equipment 
of the armed forces.‖2 It is unclear from the document, whether the SDR was already 
completed, and the implementation started, or NATO was asking the Armenian defence 
authorities to complete the Review. We might assume that the revision of the wide spectrum 
of threats and risks was conducted under the framework of the SDR, as the Military Doctrine 
specifies with reference to ―Strategic Review‖.3 This would be a logical and necessary step, 
before launching any defence system analysis. IPAP – texts, indeed, point towards the 
existence of an ―updated threat assessment‖, however, no guidance is provided, how this 
document is procedurally guaranteed and updated outside the SDR - margins.  
 
Generally, the ambiguity in language and definitions is a common feature of the Armenian 
defence policy and planning. The additional findings are provided by the SDR - text body 
itself. Interestingly, the Military Doctrine formulates the SDR - mission as the identification 
and approval ―of priorities of military strategy in a long - term perspective.‖4 We were not 
able to identify the nature of military strategy, as a document, due to the general absence of 
this document and no clear hierarchy between the existing defence policy documents. It seems 
that the military strategy is exclusively regarded as the component element of the SDR 
dealing with defence priorities. Yet, the reference to the long - term nature of these priorities 
turns the role of the military strategy very questionable, due to the mere mid - term validity of 
the Military Doctrine and the SDR themselves.   
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6.3.2.2 Key Role of the Strategic Defence Review and its Deficiencies 
 
The work on the comprehensive analysis of the defence system within the SDR implied a 
close coordination of various state agencies under the lead of the Ministry of Defence. An 
interagency working group was established, entrusted with the coordination of the SDR - 
daily management. According to the document itself the actual work started in September 
2008 and was completed by March 2011.
1
 As illuminated before, the Alliance suggested 
Armenian Ministry of Defence already in 2005 to start implementing reforms in a variety of 
functional areas, and by 2009 reflected in the IPAP - document the SDR as a project already 
launched. Though the DCAF - report of 2008 describes the SDR as a cornerstone of the 
unpublished IPAP 2007-2009, the vague formulation of the next IPAP 2009-2011 on Armenia 
just intending to conduct ―a thorough Strategic Defence Review‖ suggests that the real work, 
in fact, did not start before 2009.
2
 Basically the SDR was regarded as a major driving force 
for institutional changes and defence reforms in Armenia. It had to analyze armed forces 
capability and resource requirements, and produce a prioritized future force - structure and 
implementation plans with the specific emphasis on following areas:
3
     
 
 Defence policy and planning 
 Military education 
 Human resource management 
 Resource planning and acquisition 
 Financial defence management  
 Public relations  
 
What progress has been achieved in the mentioned areas (except defence policy and planning) 
will be closer discussed in the respective sections to follow. There we also hope to get more 
clarity, whether the SDR indeed was a major cause of reforms. In fact, the coherence and 
consistency of reform implementation serves as a strong indicator of the reform - plan 
existence istelf, i.e. SDR - implementation plan. As already touched upon earlier, we see 
certain inconsistencies between the formal declarations and the realities on the ground. The 
Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan (in office from 2008 - to present) reiterated in December 
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2010, that potential threat scenarios have been analyzed and subsequent military planning 
conducted within the SDR.
1
 The SDR - text itself claims to be based on the analysis of 
strategic level policy documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine.
2
 
This, however, would imply the new threat and security analysis reflected in an updated 
National Security Strategy. In other words, since 2007 the NSS had to be at least once revised 
and published. The same argument is valid with regard to the Military Doctrine, which was 
similarly drafted in 2007.  Even though all IPAP - documents since 2005 explicitly require the 
periodic review and update of the national security policy - and strategic documents, no public 
release of these documents was available before 2014.
3
      
 
Another aspect, which appears somewhat problematic, is the general reservation made in the 
SDR - document. It claims that the periodic violation of ceasefire in conflict region of 
Karabakh significantly complicated the SDR and limited the Defence Ministry‘s ability for 
―more rigorous defence reforms.‖4 It is pretty in line with the general approach, which reflects 
greater caution not to affect the current level of combat readiness of forces, i.e. 80% of 
Armenian units placed on the frontline.
5
 Problems associated with this claim are twofold. On 
one side it cools any high expectations of comprehensive defence reforms. Further, it 
strengthens our hypothetic claim made before, that Armenia may face the risk of creating two 
- tire force, with larger part still being formed along Russian traditions. Given that Armenian 
forces regularly participate in combined military drills with units of ―Karabakh army‖ and the 
Russian 102
nd
 Base in Gyumri, the fears of the growing army - dichotomy should not be 
easily dismissed.
6
 We regard the mentioned reservation with a great deal of skepticism, 
because of two reasons: the SDR serves the purpose of initiating defence reforms, and reforms 
themselves, as we were able to conclude, are regarded by Armenian defence officials 
predominantly as means to increase the fighting capacity of armed forces. If the ultimate 
objective of the SDR is nothing else but the higher combat readiness of forces, such 
reservations are less comprehensible. In an interview given to ―Mediamax‖ news agency on 
August 9, 2011, the deputy defence minister Tonoyan indicated the areas (defence policy, 
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human resources management, education and training and the development NCO - corps) 
where the SDR - implementation was expected and the U.S. - assistance appreciated.
1
 The 
messages of the interview, indeed, omit the relevance of force structure and combat 
capabilities for the SDR, and given the mentioned reservation, presuppose less if any changes 
related to the combat readiness of forces, i.e. the force structure, unit design, combat 
capabilities, field doctrines and training.  
 
The SDR is a milestone event, which is inspired and assisted by NATO in order to bring the 
Armenian defence institutions to a higher level of strategic thinking and planning. On July 27, 
2011 in a meeting with North Atlantic Council the Armenian Defence Minister Seyran 
Ohanyan directly linked the Strategic Review with the plan of defence reforms in the period 
2011-2015.
2
 In the same year the public version of the document was released, which, 
understandably, censored large parts dealing with combat readiness and capability 
requirements of the Armenian armed forces. Unfortunately, the text content is 
disproportionally reduced, leaving the impression of the document featured more by general 
statements with less intention to provide a more detailed picture on what type of armed forces 
Armenia actually wants to achieve, and how. The document makes also clear, that quite a 
number of defence reforms have been conducted or completed during the course of SDR - 
development, and some will be a matter of future actions. This fact speaks less in favor of the 
Armenian approach to the process itself, and indicates somehaw incoherency and and hasty 
nature of reform - actions that actually had to be performed only after all SDR - findings had 
been finalized.  
 
6.3.2.3 Summarizing the Progress   
 
Concluding the findings of this chapter, we recognize the fact that a general NATO - model of 
defence policy and planning has been formally adopted by the Armenian Ministry of Defence, 
as the most appropriate tool for identifying missions, objectives and structure of the national 
armed forces. The leading role here has been assumed by the Ministry of Defence, which was 
increasingly civilianized since the law amendment in 2007, which separated its functions from 
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those of General Staff (GS).
1
 The newly created Defense Policy Department  (within the 
MoD) and the Strategic Planning Department (within the GS) created a strong link between 
the MOD and GS in performing the crucial function of strategic guidance and the 
management of planning processes, inclusing budgeting and the SDR.
2
  Key elements of the 
western defence policy and strategic planning process such as drafting strategic documents, 
the SDR and the interagency mode of work have been put in practice and implemented. 
Nonetheless, a number of challenges associated with the proper implementation and 
routinization of policy and planning procedures cannot be overseen. Though formally 
adopted, the process of the routine revision and update of strategic documents is still missing, 
largely owing to the legal deficits on the clear hierarchy and procedural (inter - or intra -
agency, timelines) nuances of the strategic policy - paper development. Significant delays in 
implementation of the agreed objectives (e.g. long term planning cell) additionally point 
towards inherent internal difficulties (organizational or capacity based) to master new policies 
and procedures. The claim of the DCAF - report 2007, that no clear evidence of the 
correspondence between the desired objectives of strategic documents and the procedures of 
force planning and capability development was visible, is largely valid.  Finally, some 
conflicting statements we found in the IPAPs and other documents uphold the ambiguity of 
the understanding of ―force interoperability‖ and the risk of the ―two - tire force‖ further 
unresolved.    
 
6.3.3 Interoperability and NATO - Standards  
 
The narrow military nature of information concerning the application of NATO - standards in 
the Armenian armed forces is a limiting factor for our research. The sensitive nature of 
information concerned makes it quite difficult to provide a detailed picture of the progress 
made in every relevant area of ―standardization‖ according to services, units or technical 
areas. Nonetheless, using multiple sources that record available scarse information makes it 
possible to generate a general picture of Armenia‘s defence transformation from the 
perspective of NATO - interoperability and the adoption of western military standards.  
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6.3.3.1 Peculiarities in Understanding NATO – Standards and Interoperability  
 
The Military Doctrine as the major defence policy document provides a pretty muddling 
statement about the need to improve proceeding and functions ―in conformity with the logic 
of Military Security System modernization programs and deriving tasks and requirements.‖1 
The notion of modernization, as we have established, revealed a strong contextual affinity to 
the need for Armenia to adopt NATO - processes, standards and procedures that are believed 
to contribute to the overall enhancement of the armed forces‘ effectiveness. NATO - officials 
mostly refer to this as the process of standard - adoption under the interoperability - objective. 
According to Steffen Elgersma, a NATO - IS official, ―the usual understanding of NATO-
standards refers to the field of STANAGs that entail the vast number of standardized 
agreements in various fields (logistics, language, armament etc.).‖2 This view with an 
additional emphasis on the critical relevance of military standards (equipment, training) for 
conducting joint missions and operations is shared by Lieutenant Colonel Ferdinand Dycha, a 
NATO – IMS representative, and Gustav Vroemen, a NATO – IS/DPPD officer.3 Since the 
PARP and IPAP are regarded as main vehicles of cooperation with the Alliance, and reflect 
agreements reached between NATO and Armenia, we might assume, that all interoperability 
and standardization issues are translated into partnership goals (PGs) and objectives 
formulated in the PARP and IPAP. As Armenian defence advisor in NATO, Mher Israelyan 
puts it ―the notion of Interoperability is of practical nature and is handled within PARP - PGs 
(Partnership Goals) in accordance with strict standards and objectives run exclusively by 
MOD and Military.‖4 It must be also noted, that whatever partnership goals envisaged, they 
are contingent on the national approval, and once agreed can always be changed. The partner - 
nation‘s desire is decisive in this regard, as argued by a former NATO – IS official Bruce 
Bach.
5
 
 
The strategic security and defence documents of Armenia, though highlighting the need to 
increase the interoperability of forces with NATO, always reiterate the critical importance of 
CSTO and Russian military assistance (arms supply and 102
nd
 military base in Gyumri) for 
Armenia‘s defence.  Hence the ambiguity of what standards (Russian or NATO - based) and 
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what organization is more important in terms of military interoperability, remains unresolved. 
To lift it, we have to focus on force (unit) - structure and the nature of foreign support 
provided to units that are mostly affected by interoperability demands. By the beginning of 
the millennium the Armenian defence system and the armed forces were largely soviet model 
based with old ―hard security - oriented mindset and decision - making processes.‖1 The 
basics of Armenian military thinking were in fact influenced by the Russian military culture, 
with the entire personnel exclusively relying on Russian made equipment and heavy 
hardware
2
.  Naturally, the soviet legacy was directly manifested in every policy area of the 
defence, thus affecting the entire process of decision - making. As Jan - Hendrik Zur Lippe 
states in his paper, the featuring element of this kind of system was a centralized leadership, 
the training and education heavily focused on technology and science, and the lack of civilian 
staff in military structure.
3
 As already mentioned, the Armenian armed forces still entertaine 
close contacts to Russian counterparts (incl. the military base in Gyumri), and exercise 
frequent joint military drills with Russian forces as well as units of a breakaway region of 
Karabakh. This fact should not be surprising, since about 80% of Armenian armed forces are 
located on or close to the frontline with Azerbaijan.
4
 Knowing the common approach of 
Armenian defence officials that rejects any changes to the current level of combat readiness of 
forces deployed, it was no surprise that as for 2012 the most part of Armenian forces were 
still of soviet model, organized around regiments having three motorized rifle battalions and 
companies in each regiment.
5
 The regimental structure of forces is also reiterated by the SDR 
- document.
6
 
 
In light of the intensive ties existing between the Armenian and Russian armed forces, the 
frequent reference to the interoperability of forces makes it even more relevant to clarify the 
essence of this national objective, formulated by the National Security Strategy 2007 as ―force 
compatibility‖ and the ―guarantee for national security.‖7 In line with the NSS, where the 
conformity of national forces with NATO - standards is given high importance,  the NATO - 
Parliamentary Assembly stipulates that the ―firm belief of Armenian authorities‖ to deepen 
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the cooperation with NATO was associated with Yerevan‘s plan to dedicate one battalion for 
peacekeeping (PK) missions with the possibility to increase the size of the unit.
1
 Interestingly, 
the Military Doctrine offers conflicting passages and declares the need of interoperability of 
this unit with ―different security systems and separate countries‖ to meet the allied 
commitments.
2
  Here we should not forget, that while being a member of the CSTO, Armenia 
entered a number of serious international commitments. Armenian defence forces constitute 
important component of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Collective Force (RRCF) and since 2007 
established the Combined Task Force (CTF) on bilateral basis with Russia.
3
 Based on the 
general acknowledgment that Armenian military units by and large are Russian like, we 
suggest intuitively at this stage to focus on the analysis of units designated for missions under 
the NATO - command. By doing that we‘d be better able to capture a much better picture of 
the achieved progress within the context of ―NATO - interoperability‖ and standard - 
adoption.   
 
6.3.3.2 The Scale of Standard – Application in Armenian Armed Forces 
 
As NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report 2006 (NPAR) states, Armenia announced in 2005 
its desire to create a fully interoperable brigade, which would meet NATO - standards and be 
able to participate in NATO - led peacekeeping operations by 2015.
4
 The next NPAR - 2007 
clarifies, that the plans had actually been devised since 2004, and the objective was to 
establish a peace - keeping battalion with all support units (logistical, communication, 
medical, CBRN and anti - tank), modern equipment, subsequent training and appointment of 
staff officers in NATO - HQs by 2010.
5
 All this, of course, had to be accomplished by 
meeting NATO - standards, according to the same excerpt of the document. Interestingly, the 
most relevant sources, the IPAP - documents place under the interoperability issue no actions 
except those associated with the peacekeeping unit. The IPAP - 2005 talks, in fact, only about 
the battalion size unit, and the IPAP - 2009, similar to Military Doctrine of 2007, identifies 
the brigade level and the sustainment of one deployed battalion, as the final objective.
6
 A bit 
                                                 
1
 ―Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,‖ para. 29. 
2
 ―The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia,‖ 28. 
3
 Exclusive Interview of the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Davit Tonoyan to 
Mediamax Agency; Novikova and Sargsyan, ―Chapter 1: Armenia,‖ 14. 
4
 ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Region,‖ para. 50. 
5
 ―Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,‖ para. 29. 
6
 ―Armenia‘s Commitment under Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO,‖ sec. 2.3; ―Individual 
Partnership Action Plan 2009: Armenia,‖ sec. 2.5.1. 
146 
 
different prospect is provided by the SDR - document, which speaks about the half - brigade 
deployable for PK - missions, with the exclusion of the logistical component.
1
 The IPAP - 
2011 actions see no major change is this regard and again urge Armenian Ministry of Defence 
to ensure the brigade interoperability with NATO forces up to one deployable battalion with 
combat and combat service support
2
. The latest findings on the issue uphold the existing 
discrepancies. In a Mediamax interview on August 9, 2011 the deputy defence minister Davit 
Tonoyan described the current level of readiness of the 12
th
 PK - brigade to be fully 
completed in 2015, by having two fully equipped infantry battalions able to provide two 
company level units for PK - missions on rotational basis.
3
 He also added, that the third 
battalion was in a formation phase, and the logistical component was under development. 
Whatever the interpretation of two companies on rotational base might be, the mismatch of 
planed objectives is clerly visible. We see also the change of objective deadlines as well as the 
low progress between two IPAP - cycles 2009 - 2011 in terms of the brigade - interoperability 
level.  
 
All segments of the designated unit, such as communication, command and control, logistics, 
medical etc., logically, must conform to NATO - standards. It implies, that certain procedures, 
practices as well as the technical aspect of operating equipment would differ from those 
existing in the larger (Russian like) rest of the armed forces. The assistance provided by the 
Alliance (largely bilateral, and predominantly U.S. – led as we will se next) could reveal the 
priority areas of assistance regarded as key enabler for interoperability improvement. Within 
the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) programs the U.S. and Armenian side agreed in 2004 on full modernization of 
command and communication systems.
4
 The analysis of other sources such as reports of U.S. 
State Department confirms this and reveals following dynamics of financial aid and priorities: 
 
2004 - Delivery of communication equipment via FMF (2,490,000 USD) and English 
language training courses via IMET (870,000 USD).
5
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2005/2006 – Delivery of individual equipment, communication and medical assets, 
non - communication gear, limited unit equipment and language courses, support in 
planning of national logistics via FMF (2005-7,940,000 USD, 2006 - 3,96,000 USD), 
and IMET (2005 - 820,000 USD, 2006 - 840,000 USD).
1
  
 
2007 – Provision of PK - brigade with U.S. standard equipment (demining equipment, 
communication gear and vehicular assets) and training of 25 officers and non-
commissioned officers in USA (FMF - 3,880,000 USD, IMET - 460,000 USD).
2
 
 
2008 - Delivery of transport equipment and radios, the equipment for surgical field 
hospital and demining center, specialized training and English language courses (FMF 
- 2,980,000 USD, IMET - 930,000 USD).
3
  
 
2009/2010/2011/2011 – developing defence institutions capacity in areas of 
peacekeeping, medical, humanitarian law and transparency (FMF – 3,000,000/ 
3,000,000/ 2,994,000/ 2,994,000 USD, IMET – 360,000/ 449,000/ 449,000/ 675,000 
USD).
4
 
  
Two observations can be made from the sources above. First, we have a sufficient amount of 
evidence to conclude, that the first five years of cooperation were largely focused on the 
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priority of providing technical equipment for the PK - unit (battalion, brigade) as well as the 
language training. Second, the decline of the U.S. financial support from the year 2008 
(especially FMF) coincides with the change of the cooperation priority, from 2008 on directed 
towards developing national institutional capacity within the ministry and armed forces.  This 
is clearly reflected on the significant decrease of FMF funded equipment delivery and the 
relative sustainment of the IMET- funding level. Structuraly the PK - Brigade shows by 2013 
no adaptation and little change in the existing soviet model, exposing the personnel 
breakdown (200 officers, 80 warrant officers, 200 sergeants ) very similar to the old soviet 
rank model, where the officers‘ ratio reaches 30 % and stands in strong contrast to U.S 
example, with officers‘ ratio close to 17% and lower.1  
 
The evidence above speaks for the fact that all units desigfnated for NATO - led or other 
peacekeeping operations are predominantly trained and equipped under the U.S. assistance. 
According to deputy minister Davit Tonoyan, during the official visit in Washington D.C. on 
July 18-21, 2011 Armenian officials continued discussing the expansion of the cooperation 
scope onto the wider adoption of U.S. - capabilities by Armenian peacekeeping units and the 
organization of bilateral and multilateral combined exercises.
2
 We tend also to conclude, that 
in line with respective IPAP - actions NATO - interoperability and standards are, in fact, 
regarded exclusively in connection with the PK - Brigade. As the evidence shows, the 
interoperability and standard - adoption is predominantly applied to the domain of technical 
equipment, its operation and the ability to communicate with Allied forces (communication 
gear, language training). The statement of the Armenian Defence Advisor in NATO Mher 
Israelyan, that standards are mainly applied to the Peacekeeping Brigade additionally 
strengthens the validity of our claim.
3
 Finally, Dr. Jim Barret, a key U.S. advisor in the DEEP 
(Defence Education Enhancement Program),  while assessing the status of Armenian defence 
reforms, bluntly admits that except the designated peacekeeping brigade defence reform had 
progressed in Armenia slowly.
4
 Evidently, he refers to the adoption of western standards and 
efforst to reach a high degree of interoperability as the main indicators of the successful 
reform - implementation.  
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Apart from peacekeeping units, the PFP - framework, as we know, allows partner - nations to 
designate certain units for the PFP - pool of forces that must be also fully interoperable and 
evaluated (certified) for meeting NATO - standards. It is commonly known as the Operational 
Capabilities Concept (OCC). The Armenian authorities, apparently, decided to avoid the 
duplication of efforts and extended the OCC also to all PK - units. The IPAP - 2009 indeed 
confirmes, that the PK - brigade had to be evaluated in the framework of OCC, and the IPAP - 
2011 states that PK - units were intended to be evaluated in accordance with OCC - 2 level.
1
  
This would mean that from 2009 on the national PK - units successfully completed the OCC - 
1 level evaluation (national self - evaluation) and were ready for the next evaluation - phase. 
In 2011 an engineer battalion, which was declared for the PFP - pool of forces, joined the 
Armenian PK - contingent, and had to undergo OCC - evaluation as well.
2
   
 
Apart from the selected units, the IPAP - documents reveal an initially cautious approach to 
the possibility of a wider application of NATO - standards and practices within the Armenian 
armed forces. For instance, the IPAP - 2005 urges the Armenian side to use the experience 
gained from the PK - units ―as a catalyst to improve training and promote the gradual 
transformation of other units of the armed forces.‖3 The next document dated by 2009 
reiterates the same objectives and the following IPAP - 2011 added the demand to ―ensure 
OCC Level - 2 NATO evaluation and certification of one battalion from the Peacekeeping 
Brigade and its Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.‖4 Little change in the 
IPAP - language indicates not only the difficulrties on the way of a wider standard – 
application, but also the limited progress and procrastination of the entire process with regards 
to designated PK - units.  
 
6.3.3.3 NATO – Standards: the Prevalence of technical Understanding 
 
As introduced before, NATO - standards commonly refer to the technical aspect of 
equipment, as well as the rules of engagement and conduct, communication, language, 
logistics, doctrines and training. Similarly, the deputy minister Davit Tonoyan places them 
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largely within the technical domain, which encompasses the hardware, communication and 
logistics. Yet, most importantly, the minister also underlines the crucial role of STANAGs, 
(standard agreements) especially NATO - manuals and regulations that enable Armenian units 
to adopt procedures commonly practiced in NATO - units.
1
 This particular aspect is crucial to 
note for the following reasons. The OCC - relevant units include Combat Support (CS) and 
Combat Service Support (CSS) elements. These are explained by IPAP - 2009 as follows: 
anti-tank, mortar, reconnaissance, artillery, combat engineer, air defence, intelligence, 
military police and NBC (Nuclear Bilogical Chemical) as CS; and logistics, supplies, 
maintenance, recovery and medical as CSS.
2
 However, only the areas of logistics, 
communication and some other equipment are recognized in the next IPAP-2011 as most 
problematic, where improvements had to be made.
3
 We have no evidence of U.S. equipment 
supplies other than communication, medical and transport assets. Thus, with great certainty 
we can assume that the most capabilities of Armenian PK - units, especially those relevant to 
actual fighting remain Russian made and by and large pose no significant problem from the 
perspective of NATO - interoperability.  As for the logistics and communication, as well as 
the ability of Armenian officer corps to be fully envolved in the command and control chain 
of operations, we see a completely different picture and incomparably high attention paid 
from the NATO - side. Hence, no wonder that the requirements of interoperability and NATO 
- standards are voiced here with much greater emphasis. Both IPAP – 2009 and 2011 
documents expand this particular aspect of interoperability and highlight Armenia‘s intention 
to develop a long term C3 (Commannnd Control and Communication) plan and the 
architecture for C3 systems, in which the NATO - expertise and support is appreciated ―for 
NATO - interoperability testing activities.‖4 In addition to that NATO - standardization 
policies are also suggested to be introduced in national logistics and industry. This is a fairly 
new initiative aiming at creating the national standardization and codification systems for the 
effective use in Life Cycle Calculation (LCC) and the acquisition of equipment.
5
  But it also 
provides clear evidence that by 2011 no significant progress was made in the area of logistics, 
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which according to deputy defence Minister Davit Tonoyan, was identified in 2011 as one of 
the major areas, where national authorities were eager to study NATO - practices.
1
 
 
Our concluding findings support the claim, which attests significant limitations existing in 
area of NATO - interoperability and standard adoption by the Armenian armed forces. Even 
reduced to the vey narrow military - technical understanding of common norms of ―doing 
business‖ (standards) the process of their internalization reflects slow pace and is exclusively 
utilized to small portion of units designed for peacekeeping (NATO) operations. There are 
also no signs of expanding NATO - standards to the rest of the army.  As for the risk of 
creating  a ―two - tire force‖ within the Armenian army, the fact that the large majority of the 
units remains unaffected by reforms due to the perceived risk of decreasing units‘ combat 
readiness, remains uncontested.
2
 The deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan dismissed these 
fears in his interview owing to the technical nature of changes (standards) happening on the 
tactical level.
3
 We indeed have sufficient evidence to conclude that the NATO -
interoperability context in the Armenian reality omits large parts of the technical (fighting) 
equipment and primarily focuses on tactical communication, logistics, command and control 
and the medical support. We also have some evidence that as for 2013 the PK - brigade 
structure and rank - breakdown was still soviet model like.  Along with long-lasting deficits 
existing since 2005 in the mentioned areas and little progress in efforts to expand NATO -
standards to other units of the armed forces, we can suggest that the fears of ―two - tire force‖ 
are unjustified and ungrounded. Even the units designated for peacekeeping missions and the 
OCC - pool are still largely Russian model - like and similar to the rest of the armed forces. 
As former NATO – IS official Bruce Bach stated, the issue of interoperability mostly matters 
to those partner - nations that want to join the Alliance, thus Armenia has ―no particular need 
to be more widely interoperable...and NATO does not sanction a partner, who doesn‘t achieve 
a goal.‖4 This claim very much conforms to the statement of another NATO - official, former 
senior officer for partnership and cooperation, George Katsirdakis, who regards NATO - 
standards predominantly within the larger context of shared understanding of ―doing 
business‖, thus as we understand at this stage less relevant to Armenia.5 
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6.3.4 Budgetary Planning and Transparency 
 
In the earlier section we discussed the ability of the Armenian Parliament to execute its 
financial, i.e. budgetary control functions and to monitor the general process of defence 
financial planning. The defence budget and processes associated with its development and 
implementation is another pillar of the control capacity of the Parliament.  Thus the review of 
defence budgetary planning and the degree of public awareness on it will expose the character 
of the relationship between the Defence Ministry and the National Assembly. Broadly 
speaking, the evidence we collected revealed some clear deficits of the national legal 
framework on defence, encompassing not only the process of drafting and approval of 
strategic documents, but not least the absence of clear policies and regulations that would 
coordinate defence related work of state institutions other than the Ministry of Defence. 
Although we don‘t have sufficient number of ministry level regulations at hand that delineate 
responsibilities and timelines of defence budget development and execution, the cross-
document comparison of assessments provided by IPAP, SDR and other sources make it 
possible to generate a general picture of the progress made in this field. 
 
6.3.4.1 The Practice of Developing Defence Budget 
 
By 2005 the bad practice of submitting defence budget proposals with little details and insight 
of priorities continued its existence, so that even the respective parliamentary committees had 
no better information, and the defence - procurement could not be checked by the State 
Committee on State Procurement or any other body. As the Saferworld - report 2005 bluntly 
puts it: 
 
Following this, the National Assembly is presented with a final budget figure, which is 
not explained at all, which it can either approve or disapprove. This procedure is 
further weakened by the fact that the budget presented has little in common either with 
the Armed Forces genuine needs, nor their true expenditure. Instead, the budget that is 
presented reflects the highest figure that is thought acceptable, with the rest coming 
from other sources, including industries that are controlled by the Ministry.
1
 
 
We were not able to find any serious brakedown of information concerning the financial 
appropriations for the defence in the period concerned. Some short exerpts from the 
governmental budgetary plans were provided, yet with serious gaps on priorities of defence 
sector, mirrored in respective financial programs and objectives. Pretty in line with DCAF - 
                                                 
1
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report in 2008, we see a common practice of presenting defence budget by a single article, 
with the possibility of more detailed discussion at Defence Committee‘s closed sessions.1 For 
instance, the government‘s ―Medium - Term Public Expenditure Framework 2003 - 2006‖ 
document puts Defence, National Security, Law Enforcement and State Emergency in one 
article and provides information on total defence expenditure, its share to the state budget, and 
the change or the forecast merely by a general figure (see figures below): 
 
Table 1.  Defence Spending in MTEF 2003-2006 Document
2
 
 
Expenditure for the Main Sectors or Functions as a Share of Total Expenditure between 2003 
and 2006 
Indicators  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defence, national security, public order 
protection, criminal-executive and state 
emergency systems 
18.35% 20.21% 20.51% 19.87% 
 
 
Proposed Changes in Resource Package of the State Budget for 2004- 2006 (Million Drams)  
Indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defence, national security, public order 
protection, criminalexecutive and state 
emergency systems 
No data 5 459.5 6 571.7 4 030.2 
 
 
Forecast of State Budget Expenditures for 2004-2006, by Consolidated Groups of Functional 
Classification (Million Drams) 
Indicators  2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defence, national security, public order 
protection, criminalexecutive and state 
emergency systems 
61 330.2 66 789.7 73 361.4 77391.6 
 
State Budget Expenditures for 2004-2006, by Functional Classification (Million Drams) 
Total Expenditure  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defence 36 388.5 44 324.0 48 524.4 52 770.0 56 017 
 
The exchange rates of the national currency can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 2. Yearly Exchange Rates 1 US. Dollar to Armenian Currency (Dram)
3
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
578,74 533,43 457,70 416,04 342,08 305,98 363,31 373,72 372,46 401,74 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Yenokyan, ―Country Study - Armenia,‖ 19–20. 
2
 ―Republic of Armenia 2004-2006 Medium-Term Public Expenditure Framework‖ (Yerevan: Government of 
the Republic of Armenia, 2003), 5, 49, 50, 63, http://www.gov.am/files/docs/48.pdf. 
3
 ―Central Bank, Exchange Rates,‖ Best Exchange Rates: RATE.am, accessed October 3, 2015, available at 
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The IPAP - 2005 document depicts the existing deficits not only in the area of defence 
budgeting and transparency, but not least in the national capacity to conduct sound and 
reliable financial planning. In particular, it argues to ―explore different planning and 
budgeting systems‖, to introduce stable and ―sound financial planning‖ and to finalize the 
introduction of the budgeting system, supported by a trial period and ―more transparent and 
improved auditing and accounting processes.‖1 Additionally, the Armenian government is 
advised under the same section to explore best practices in the area of defence budgeting and 
planning to develop the national expertise with the involvement of the Ministry of Finances. 
The Armenian Military Doctrine shares the spirit of the IPAP - document and admits the need 
for more transparency in defence and budgetary planning.
2
 As we have no NATO - document 
at hand, which would evaluate the period between 2006 and 2008, we resort to two major 
sources available. First is the DCAF - report of 2008 and the second is the ICHD - Policy 
Brief issued in 2007. The ICHD - report highlights the national intention to conduct joint 
NATO - Armenia actions to implement the new and effective budgetary planning procedures.
3
 
Evidently, this statement largely refers to early IPAP - objectives, we already reviewed. As 
for the DCAF - report in 2008, it continues attesting the Armenian Ministry of Defence 
serious gaps in defence budgeting. According to it the defence budget is based on the 
―Program of Military Needs‖ as a part of the ―Medium Term Expenditure Framework‖, in 
which the decision of allocating and distributing resources rests on ministerial level with little 
possibility for internal, lower level segments to take influence on final decision and 
respectively, to change the top - down system.
4
 Since the same report states that the modern 
―Planning Programing and Budgeting System‖ (PPBS) was not introduced yet, the made 
comment raises questions about the soundness and reliability of the general budgetary 
planning.  Despite the huge importance of the armed forces for the security of the country, the 
―Government Program for 2008 - 2012‖ issued in 2008 leaves merely a short notice that ―the 
Government will introduce a legislative initiative to increase democratic and civil oversight 
over the military forces.‖5  
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To see how Armenian authorities responded to the existing criticism a short review of the next 
cycle IPAP - documents is indispensible, where NATO - suggestions have been transformed 
into national commitments. Since 2005 the language used in IPAP - 2009 document has not 
changed at all and still encompased a serious need to improve budgeting processes within the 
Defence Ministry. It is worth quoting the key section of the paper: 
 
Evaluate planning and budgeting system best fitting national situation and ensure 
proper coordination between all ministries and other appropriate government bodies 
involved in the planning process. The planning system should also aim at introducing 
a more stable planning basis and should be based on sound financial planning 
including life cycle costing methodology. The new system should provide for a timely 
and firm budget forecast for the next financial year as well as a reliable estimate for 
the following three to five years.
1
 
 
 
Comparing to the content of previous IPAP - cycle objectives, we clearly see the lack of 
progress since 2005. The only difference visible is that the requirements are even enlarged 
and include the proper training of MOD - and GS personnel in defence and budgetary 
planning field, along with the introduction of sound accounting and auditing processes.
2
 
Within the same period the 294 pages strong government program issued for the period 
between 2007 and 2009 has little to say if any about the defence budgeting priorities.
3
  The 
next available program aiming for the period between 2011 - 2013 upholds the same tradition 
of secrecy, and under the Chapter 18, simply notes ―18.1. DEFENCE, 18.1.1. Provision of 
Military Demands (confidential).‖4 The only information we were able to distill from the 392 
pages strong volume was that of aggregated value in ―functional classification‖ and the 
percentage of defence programs implemented in the period of 2009 - 2010 by means of 
internal sources (see charts below).
5
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Table 3. “2011-2013 MTEF Framework” – Government Programs  
 
The framework of 2009-2010 state non-financial assets expenditures by aggregated 
groups of functional classification (in Million Drams) 
 
 2009 Actual 2010 Budget 
DEFENCE  29,222.7 26,572.2 
 
 
Programs implemented by the 
means of internal sources 
percent of programs implemented by the 
means of internal sources in the total 
expenditure 
2009 actual 2010 Budget 
DEFENCE  33.2 65.3 
 
The general dynamics of the defence budget development is best provided by the SIPRI and 
documents its absolute numbers as well as changes in the share of the national GDP (see the 
table below).
1
 As it is clearly visible, a significant increase of defence spending occurred 
since 2008 and kept relatively stable, slightly above 400 million USD mark till 2012. The 
initial increase by 45 million USD was followed by subsequent increases in 2009 (16 million 
USD) and in 2010 (19 million USD).  
 
Table 4. Dynamics of the Defence Budget Development  
  
In Millions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Armenia 
Defence 
Budget 
199 
 
2,7% 
244 
 
2,9% 
288 
 
2,9% 
337 
 
3,0% 
392 
 
3,4% 
408 
 
4,2% 
427 
 
4,3% 
391 
 
3,9% 
408 
 
3,8% 
  
No records are available that would explain either the first 13% increase of the defence budget 
or the subsequent budgetary changes. As the Parliament approved the defence budget 
proposal in November 2012 public interest for details of budgetary appropriations was largely 
ignored. For many in Armenian public the Defence Minister‘s explanation to the Parliament 
that additional funds will be spent on ―increasing the number of professional soldiers and the 
acquisition of new arms and armaments‖ appeared insufficient.2 Hence, the long standing 
deficits in the ability of Armenian Defence Ministry to produce long - term plans based on the 
sound analysis of objectives might be attributet either to serious gaps in the capacity of 
                                                 
1
 Figures are in millions of U.S.D at constant (2011) prices and exchange rates. Years are calendar years except 
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2
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drafting defence budgetary plans or the unwillingness to make them public due to security 
considerations. We will try to illustrate what factors could play the decisive role in keeping 
such approach.  
 
6.3.4.2 Conflicting Messages of Planning Documents  
 
In his interview on 30 July 2014 the deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan admitted, that the 
work on modern planning and budgeting system (PPBS - Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System), which started some years ago (in 2008), did not result in a full ability of 
the MOD to produce detailed long term budgetary plans and programs.
1
 Recognizing this and 
other restricting factors such as the inability of other state agencies to provide sound financial 
forecast data, the ministry reduced its ambitions and is focused more on mid - term budgetary 
planning. The SDR - document conforms to deputy minister‘s statement by announcing the 
establishment of a full cycle mid - term defence planning that, as it argues, links the defence 
budgeting system with the areas of the military education, acquisition, infrastructure and 
industry.
2
 Let aside the optimistic nature of the statement, we resort to IPAP - documents as 
the main source of measuring bar for progress, including the area of defence budgeting. Since 
they represent a mutually (NATO - IS, Armenian officials) agreed list of objectives and 
formulations, their credibility must be regarded higher than of those documents approved only 
by national authorities. As for 2011 the IPAP - 2011 similar to early cycle IPAP - documents 
urges again to improve planning and budgeting systems, to develop ―affordable, transparent 
and sustainable defence plans‖ with effective account and auditing support processes that 
include the full life cycle costing (LCC) methodology.
3
 Contrary to the SDR - statement and 
partially in line with deputy defence minister‘s selfcriticism the IPAP - text basically points 
towards following challenges: 
 
 There are problems within the general process of defence budgetary planning 
 There are also problems within the mid - term budgetary planning, due to little 
specific distinction made between the long and mid - term perspectives 
 The existing LCC - system seems to be inadequate for proper budgetary and 
financial planning 
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In a great contrast its own previous optimistic statement, that mid - term defence planning has 
been fully established, the SDR makes a short - term assumption that ―the reforms in the 
budgeting and financial planning processes will progress significantly.‖1 It goes on also to 
declare, that the detailed life - cycle and the cost analysis of equipment replacement were 
done to ensure the purposeful planning of expenditures. This claim cannot be easily accepted 
because of its strong contradiction to IPAP - messages on that particular issue, we highlighted 
before.
2
 Further, we resort to the LCC - analysis of the Armenian peacekeeping brigade made 
in 2013, which revealed a significant mismatch between the current model of cost - 
calculation and the NATO (U.S.) - based brigade cost model, confirming by that the IPAP – 
skepticism and the need for improvement. According to Jan – Hendrik zur Lippe the standard 
NATO (U.S. - based) LCC - calculation would include the analysis of the full strength of the 
brigade, with the different payment, rank and the retirement structure, resulting in a 
significant increase of necessary funding by nearly six fold.
3
  
 
Understandably, the peacekeeping units operating in a different (coalition) environment 
require different approach, including a different, more standardized (NATO) financial 
planning. However, it does not presuppose the need for Armenia to apply the new cost 
calculation model to the rest of armed forces, i.e.units that have not been affected by NATO - 
standards. Thus the LCC - methodology identified by IPAP - 2011 as the problem area is still 
less problematic as compared to the general ability of conducting sound financial 
planning,which would conform to standard practices of the western (NATO) planning model, 
commonly titled as PPBS. The only serious evidence of referring to facts of PPBS - utilization 
is the SDR - document, which claims that the strategic review process was: 
 
Combined with the review of all the MOD financial planning and forecasting 
procedures and the development of a program - based budgeting system that will make 
it possible to plan financial requirements into the future and to forecast the financial 
commitments several years ahead.
4
 
 
If according to Deputy Minister Tonoyan the work on PPBS started some time by 2008, the 
critical messages of the IPAP dated three years later unmistakably conclude, that the 
                                                 
1
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mentioned modern system was not even yet put in practice. In particular, the respective IPAP 
national objective is formulated as follows: 
 
Finalise the introduction of planning and budgeting system supported by more 
transparent and improved auditing and accounting processes, conduct a trial period 
and finalise implementation of the new system. The planning system should also aim at 
introducing a more stable planning basis and should be based on sound financial 
planning including life cycle costing methodology.
1
  
 
Consequently, we tend rather to conclude that as for the 2011 the Armenian Ministry of 
Defence, as the major institution responsible for financial planning and defence budgeting, 
was still lacking the capacity of producing stable financial plans that would meet the 
requirements (NATO) of modern program - based planning system. To the credit of Armenian 
defence officials, they cleary understand the relevance of proper budgetary planning to the 
general transparency of the defence ministry. As Armenian Defence Advisor at NATO HQ 
Mher Israelyan puts it, there is a strong connection between the notion of institutional 
accountability of defence and the field of defence planning and budgeting.
2
 According to him 
the former is intensively required by the Alliance, and to certain degree presupposes the 
change of the mindset. Additionally, along with the obvious deficits in professional expertise 
of national personnel involved in the field of defence planning and budgeting, the argument of 
―professionally necessitated secrecy‖ should be regarded as equally relevant as the argument 
of ―war caused secrecy.‖3 
 
6.3.4.3 Defence Transparency - No Light in Sight  
 
All mentioned facts, obviously do not subscribe to a high level transparency of defence 
institutions in Armenia and the increased degree of public involvement in defence matters. As 
already mentioned before, the common believe shared among Armenian officials was that 
transparency and too much public control over the military would damage country‘s security, 
i.e. the combat readiness of forces deployed on the frontline.
4
  In 2007 the major transparency 
problems were associated with the inability of a wider public to monitor the army, as well as 
the blurred division of responsibilities between the security related state institutions.
5
 The 
deficits were acknowledged by every party including NATO. Geneva Center (DCAF) - 
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reports as well as all IPAP - documents identify several problem - areas and suggest to 
enhance ties with the wider public and to establish a reporting mechanism that would keep the 
Defence Ministry, Parliament and other institutions informed about the progress of reforms.
1
 
National objectives agreed bilaterally in all IPAPs, basically, demand the maximum level of 
transparency applied to every defence reform action, along with the increased capacity of the 
civil sector and Ombudsmen to monitor the defence sector. The need for expanded 
competence of the Ombudsmen - office is given a specific emphasis in IPAP2011-13, by 
suggesting the familiarization of the Office‘s staff with international standards and 
experience.
2
  
 
The historical record shows no clear evidence that defence funds were spent for acquisition 
purposes based on sound and institutionalized planning or management mechanims. DCAF - 
and CENAA reports attest significant deficits and the bad practice of discussing the military 
budget and spending in the Parliament on rare occasion, usually behind the closed doors.
3
 
Since then some national commitments have been implemented, especially the ―Code of 
Conduct on Political - Military Aspects of Security‖, which gives the Armenian parliament 
the possibility of a deeper involvement in defence related policy formation and launching 
inquiries and investigations on budgetary allocations if required.
4
 Further changes were also 
made in the field of military acquisition of armament and equipment. The responsibility of the 
military acquisition was transferred from the armed forces General Staff to the civilian 
Material - Technical Supply Department, which is placed under the ministry of defence, yet 
structurally is detached from the MOD administration staff.
5
 Additionally, an important step 
towards the increased transparency was done, as Armenian MOD joined the NATO sponsored 
―Building Integrity in defence Institutions‖ - program, a self assessment based on a detailed 
survey.
6
 Despite these changes no actual information is available, how funds are being spent 
or what mechanisms ensure the needed transparency. Since 2005 we don‘t have any evidence 
of the major improvement. As the ―Eurasianet‖ - article concludes in 2011, any defence 
budget related information ―is considered out of bounds for public debate‖, and the Control 
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Chamber, which monitors the state budget and government‘s financial wrongdoings, has 
never published any information about the Defence Ministry‘s financial practices.1  
 
The deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan admited, that the notion of transparency is based 
on two basic principles: the openness to a wider public, which reduces the amount of 
information unnecessary classified, and the transparency within the domain of financial 
resources and acquisition, which is negatively affected by country‘s security challenges.2 The 
positive message of the first principel is directly negated by the dilemma of second principle. 
It seems that the second principle prevailed and keeps its dominant position even today. On 
the other hand, the needed degree of transparency is usually ensured by the public itself, 
reflected in media, non governmental organization - and civil activities. They had increased 
their weight in the development of policy and strategic concepts, however, very much lack 
financial resources to initiate independent activity, or, as DCAF - report states, are fully 
dependent on governmental bodies, as far as defence is concerned.
3
 It must be also noted, that 
not the financial plans and defence budgetary priorities per se are the object of intensive 
demands on transparency. Rather it as a general requirement to improve the awareness of the 
wider public in Armenia about the essence and priorities of ongoing defence reforms and 
transformation. This is exactly what IPAP - documents capture while demanding more active 
cooperation with the Public Council, more transparent defence and budgetary plans, and more 
civil participation in implementation of defence reforms.
4
 The latter, admitadly, is not 
possible without the cooperation will from the MOD - side. As for 2011 the IPAP - document 
still urges Armenian defence authorities to make concrete steps to create a public information 
task group and conduct an information campaign on defence reforms as well as NATO - led 
operations.
5
 The same sections of the document aknowledge the growing role of Information 
Center on NATO in Yerevan, especially by conducting annual ―NATO weeks‖, seminars, 
conferences and other public events. Yet this seems clearly insufficient for achieveing the 
requested high transparency level.  
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 In general, we see some initiatives towards the improved transparency of the defence budget 
and the efforts to reduce corruption practices by structural optimization of the Ministry. 
Nonetheless the problem of budget, not being made public for disclosing the objectives and 
priorities of military spending, remains acute. NATO - officials share the same concern and 
despite some good signs still seriously doubt Armenia‘s ability to conduct proper mid - to 
long term priority planning, still largely relying on a one year planning focus.
1
  
 
 
 
6.3.5 Human Resources and the Pace of “Civilianization” 
 
While taking on the issue of personnel management in Armenian ministry of defence and 
armed forces, the need for an additional overview of the ―civilianization‖ factor of the 
ministry becomes indispensible. Already in early 2000s Armenian defence authorities 
explored various options for restructuring the ministry in an attempt to make it more suitable 
to modern requirements and the objective of the civilian control of the military. A number of 
meetings, seminars and workshops were held in Yerevan, as well as in NATO educational 
centers. For instance, an interim evaluation of Armenia‘s progress was made in May 2006 and 
an important NATO - seminar (under the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies) was conducted on 5 - to 7 February, 2007 aiming at discussing the experience of 
NATO - countries in the ―civilianization of the Ministry of Defence‖ with preceding 
amendments to the Law on Defence and Civil Service.
2
 During his speech to seminar 
participants the Deputy Defence Minister, Lt. General Arthur Aghabekyan highlighted the 
importance of the IPAP as the driving force for the defence reforms; and the Marshall Center 
Professor, Marine Colonel James Howcroft reiterated the value of recommendations to be 
elaborated by the experienced international team. According to him: 
  
The working groups, which included a number of Marshall Center alumni, were 
composed of serious professionals who provided a number of concrete and realistic 
proposals for the Ministry of Defense regarding the division of responsibilities 
between the ministry and the General Staff, the filling of certain positions with 
civilian personnel and the development of a civilian personnel career management 
system.
3
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It must be acknowledged, that the defence transformation effort at least in some policy areas 
at national (strategic) level in Armenia reveals a solid degree of the coordinated governmental 
approach and interagency cooperation. The internal examination of various structural options 
for the ministry of defence, in fact, was accompanied by a time - consuming but thorough 
analysis of staff - positions and the possible legal amendmends to follow. In 2007 the reform 
program for the national defence was approved by the President, and the consequent approval 
of the Law on Special Civil Service followed on November 28.
1
 The management of 
personnel did not embrace an immediate full transition from the military positions to civilian 
ones, and adopted a more gradual approach. As DCAF - reports admit, although by 2007 the 
Minister of Defence was civilian, civilians within the ministry were assigned marginal 
positions, and the real first steps of change have been initiated only by 2008.
2
 The 
representatives of the ministry confirm the slow pace of reform, and attribute it to the natural 
need of adapting the entire legal body to the initiated change. The deputy defence minister 
Ara Nazaryan even labeled the post law - amendment period as the: 
 
Preparation stage, during which over a dozen of normative - legal acts were 
approved, 12 normative decrees were issued by the Defense Minister, related to the 
order of holding the competition for vacant positions in civil special service, 
attestation and retraining of civil servants.
3
  
 
These work had been further enhanced by new internal regulations of the Defence Ministry 
and the GS of the Armed Forces. These are, naturally, mentioned in the Armenian Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) document with the specific emphasis on the introduction of civil 
positions within the MOD.
4
 In fact, the SDR was meant to drive the transformation process of 
the armed forces, and, as long as reforms continue till 2015, additional steps are further 
envisaged.  In the period between the initiation of reforms and the SDR - final document 
several problems have been identified. As DCAF - report argues, the larger part of the 
ministry (about 70 % of positions) remained occupied by former military servicemen, and the 
performance and evaluation system for civilian and military personnel exposed serious gaps, 
thus negatively affecting selection and promotion procedures that are not guided by standard 
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and transparent policies, but by a very high level of authorization.
1
  The process of 
―civilianization‖ of the ministry continued throughout 2009 by involving other state agencies 
in defining the nuances of the civilian service. In particular, as Deputy Minister Nazaryan 
recalls: 
  
The list of positions in the civil special service was composed, the authority to approve 
which belongs to the Civil Service Council of Armenia. After approving the list, the 
Defense Minister approved the staff list, the lists of positions in each group and 
subgroup. And already on December 12, 2009, the corresponding people were 
approved for positions in the civil special service.
2
 
 
This particular statement makes it clear that, as suggested before, some kind of preparation 
phase was in place from 2007 to 2009, when the structure of the MOD was redrafted and the 
civilian positions identified. It seems that certain kind of ―learning by doing‖ was adopted, by 
which setbacks and errors could not be avoided. The IPAP - 2009 document identifies these 
deficiencies by pointing following aspects of personal management:
3
 
 
 The need to ensure adequate mix (incl. senior positions) of civilian and military 
personnel in the MOD. 
 The need to introduce more civilians into MOD and review of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) on civilian and military sides. 
 The need for a clear job - description of positions with respective length of 
service before retirement, as well as the development of a clear promotion and 
evaluation system, along with a standard and adequate salary system.  
 
The objectives above, in general, encompass various areas of personnel management, where 
deficiencies have been detected by NATO - evaluator teams and agreed by national defence 
representatives as the objectives for future improvement. As for 2010 the total number of 
civilian positions in the Ministry of Defence was counted by 403, and they were not directly 
related to military functions (i.e. legal, financia l -budgetary, others dealing with issues of 
planning, public relations, military education and staff).
4
 The problems of the adequate 
payment for the newly introduced system indicated by IPAP - 2009, have been responded by 
the defence leadership by ammending the law on ―Payment for the Work of Civil Servants‖, 
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which anticipated additional payments to the basic salary of civil servants.
1
 Despite the 
initiated changes, the next cycle IPAP - 2011 repeats the same language and urges to find the 
adequate mix of the personnel in the Ministry and General Staff and to improve job-
descriptions, selection, promotion and standard compensation policies along with the 
improved evaluation system.
2
 The SDR – text, though not fully in line with IPAP – messages, 
still agrees with the need of additional work on certain aspects of HRM - improvement. For 
instance, it requires the amendment of the Law on Military Service, the improved regulations 
in the Disciplinary Code and the Code on Internal Service to increase the professionalization 
(NCO - ratio) level of the armed forces.
3
 Most importantly the document states, that a 
guidance was issued to General Staff to examine the entire HRM and respective policies for a 
more integrated system, which will be developed in the period of next two years.
4
 Some 
national reaction on NATO - advises is visible. In response to IPAP - evaluation and future 
objectives a NATO (U.S. staffed) working group continues assisting Armenia in restructuring 
its human resource management and the Disciplinary Code, in fact, was quickly amended, as 
Defence Advisor in NATO HQ Mher Israelyan stated.
5
 Despite these moves, as the former 
NATO IS - official Bruce Bach puts it, the legacy of soviet era system in Armenia still 
persists with some old practices of treating the personnel.  
 
 
 
6.3.6 Training, Education and Participation in NATO - Missions  
 
In this section we intend to show training – and educational activities within the NATO - 
cooperation framework with Armenia that are best utilized as the means of ideational 
influence of the Alliance. Mirrored in the variety of field exercises, courses, educational and 
foreign assistance programs, they increasingly gained importance and turned to develop into 
the powerful vehicle of professional military socialization. We will first refer to the general 
statistics on Armenia‘s participation in NATO (PFP) – exercises, as well as to the record of 
Armenian peacekeeping efforts under the Alliance - umbrella. Then, we will touch upon the 
issue of bilateral assistance, primarily provided by the U.S.. As last, the educational aspect of 
Armenia‘s military will be reviewed and related to the particular examples of ideational 
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transformation and effects of professional socialization that unfolded under the contacts to 
NATO military and civilian staff - members.   
 
6.3.6.1 Growing Intensity of Cooperation: The welcomed NATO - Assistance 
 
One shoud be reminded first, Armenia is a co - founder of the CSTO and benefits from the 
membership by sending its personnel to Russian military schools, receiving military hardware 
(incl. Air Defence and fighter planes planes) at low prices and hosting a large Russian 
military base in Gyumri (3.500 estimated) with additional Russian boarder control units in 
country.
1
 After the closure of two Russian bases in Georgia by 2008 most of the withdrawn 
personnel and equipment were relocated to Armenia, increasing by that the number of 
Russian presence in country and the scale of joint exercises (about 4.000 in summer 2008), 
partially also held in Moscow.
2
  The mentioned serves the purpose of factual objectivity and 
completeness, in order not to be overly impressed by a subsequent abundance of information 
on the growing intensity of Armenia‘s practical military cooperation with NATO.   
 
In 2003 Armenia hosted a joint PFP - exercise ―Co - operative Best Effort‖, where eight 
NATO - member states and eight PFP - nations sent their forces for participation.
3
 A similar 
large format exercises ―Co - operative Longbow‖ and ―Co - operative Lancer‖ were also 
conducted in 2008.
4
 According to NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report (NPAR) - 2007 a 
NATO - expert team from the Allied Command Operations (ACO) visited several times the 
country in following years and a delegation of the Joint Force Command (JFC) - Brunssum 
agreed with Armenian defence counterparts on mobile teams to arrive in Armenia for 
thematic training and support. Further, Armenian military participated in various Allied 
Commant Transformation (ACT) events, and one officer was appointed at ACT headquarter.
5
 
As mentioned before, the PFP - framework serves as the basic platform for all related 
activities, no matter host - nation or invited/joined as simple participant. The initiation of the 
IPAP - format caused a gradual increase of the number of activities. For instance, in 2006 
Armenian defence representatives participated in 95 military related IPP - events, and in 2007 
the number increased to 105 encompassing 20 cooperation areas (incl. peacekeeping, 
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language training, communications and management systems, education, logistics, defence 
policies, military medicine, budgeting and planning).
1
 The tendency of keeping the high 
intensity of participation above the ―hundred‖ - level preserved throughout the years, 
according to Armenian Defence Advisor Mher Israelyan.
2
 A NATO - official Steffen 
Elgersma also points towards the high intensity of contacts, reaching at the peak some 180 
PFP - events participated annualy.
3
 The intensity of military contacts embraced not only the 
area of field exercises, but also caused the enlarged involvement of Armenian military 
representatives in Alliance‘s PFP - related command structures. According to IPAP - 2009 
Armenia had to appoint staff officers in NATO PFP – Staff Element (PSE) posts to provide 
them with international staff work experience, as well as to look for NATO trainers in support 
of national operational and exercise planning.
4
 As the official website of the Ministry of 
Defence reveals the national military representatives are indeed present in Brussels, Supreme 
Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE/ACO) in Mons and Allied Command 
Transformation in Norfolk, USA.
5
 
 
As for Armenia‘s participation in NATO - led operations, it is important to mention again, 
that all PFP (IPP) activities are regarded as basic means for partner - nation forces to enhance 
their interoperability with NATO - units, in order to operate smothly in NATO - operations. 
Thus, the short overview of the dynamics of Armenia‘s peacekeeping efforts would be 
indispensable, to illuminate the scale of progress and areas of the increased interoperability. 
Since 2004 a platoon (35 servicemen) is deployed in Kosovo within the Greek battalion 
command, and in 2005 a small unit of 46 men had been sent to Iraq, later pulled out in 2008.
6
 
Armenian troops had been also participating in ISAF - operation, being deployed in Kunduz 
under the German command up to the level of 121 men by January 2014.
7
 On the whole, 
some 161 servicemen of the Armenian peacekeeping brigade are permanently deployed in the 
―theatres of multinational operations‖, and those participating in ISAF have been exclusively 
trained under the aegis of U.S. - assistance programs since 2001, according to deputy defence 
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minister Davit Tonoyan.
1
 The areas of training assistance included practical exercises in 
peacekeeping, communication, medical and emergency response, as well familiarization with 
equipment acquired from special funds. The broader emphasis on fighting against terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was increasingly shifted by 
2004 to modernization of command and control system of the armed forces, along with the 
humanitarian demining under FMF (the equipment and training of national demining center).
2
 
The FMF (Foreign Military Finance) and IMET (International Military Education and 
Training) programs constituted the major programs under which the U.S. - military assistance 
unfolded. The precise figures will be provided below (see Table 5.), yet the total figure of 223 
million of U.S. dollars of the financial aid to Armenia provided from 1992 - to 2010, is 
illustrative for the increased importance of the military cooperation with Yerevan to the U.S.
3
 
On average 3 - to 5 milion U.S. dollars are allocated in support of Armenia‘s military 
(education, language and medical courses, and preparation of the Armenian troops for 
peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo).
4
 According to 2012 financial year 
reports 269 armenian students accomplished the training at cost of 1,88 million U.S. dollar, 
and 115 participants belonged to the peacekeeping brigade trained by the USEUCOM (U.S. 
European Command) at the Grafenwoehr Training Facility in Germany.
5
 The results of the 
intensified cooperation, especially in this field, are greatly appreciated by the American side. 
As Manmohan Lal, a lieutenant of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) in the 
ISAF Command ―NORTH‖ puts it, with some need of English - language improvement the 
performance of Armenian soldiers left ―high impression of Armenian soldiers discipline and 
combat readiness‖  and good knowledge of nato - rules, procedures and equipment, and the 
ability to operate under foreign command.
6
 The figures of various U.S. - funded assistance 
programs are provided below (Table 5.) 
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 Table 5. Security Assistance Funding (in thousands USD)
1
 
 
Account FY 2007 FY2007 FY 2008 FY 2008 FY2009 
 Actual Supp Estimate Supp Request 
FMF 3,883 -- 2,976 -- 3,000 
IMET 904 -- 286 -- 300 
NADR 1,005 -- 600 -- 600 
 
 
Table 6. Security Funds Budgeted FY 1992-2008 (in million USD)
2
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The cumulative financial aid to Armenia between 1992 and 2007 under the U.S. Peace and 
Security Assistance program accounted for 170.1 million USD (3 times less than for Georgia 
and roughly the same level as Azerbaijan - 187.8 million USD).
3
 Compared to that the funds 
allocated for defence institution building (Warsaw Inistative Fund - WIF), though seem 
minimal, reveal in the Armenian case the tendency to receive much more recognition, as 
compared to Azerbaijan (950.000 USD – Arm. vs. 550.000 USD – Azer. in 2010; 1.177.000 - 
USD Arm. vs. 879.000 USD – Azer.).4  
 
The figures above highlight not only the financial dimension of cooperation between the 
Armenian MOD and the NATO (largely USA), but much more the areas, where 
interoperability is regarded critical by both sides, requiring consequent actions in applying 
NATO - technical standards for training and education of personnel. As we see, the critical 
bulk of the assistance is accommodated within the programs intended for Armenian 
peacekeeping units. The shift, however, is clearly visible and attaches a growing priority to 
the areas of institutional development of the military and the defence sector.  The key role of 
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the national personnel involved in educational programs designed under the NATO - 
assistance can not be overseen here. Due to their intensive familiarization with western 
military educational systems, and the subsequent introduction of NATO - standardized 
training and education programs back home, Armenian officials, in fact, establish a formal 
pattern, under which the ideational transformation of the national military seem to unfold. The 
next section tries to respond to the question of how deep such efforts took roots in Armenian 
military and what results can be accounted sofar. Additionally, it reviews the role of NATO - 
International Staff (IS) as the crucial transit - point for national (Armenian) representatives to 
undergo the process of NATO - professional socialization.   
 
6.3.6.2 Thorny Path of adopting NATO - educational Standards   
 
In 2003 Armenia intensified sending its military officers to the U.S. and other NATO -
countries to train in multiple areas such as intelligence, communications, defence 
management, artillery, and infantry combat training etc. due to severe limitations of the 
national military education system.
1
 Existing gaps naturally caused a heavy reliance on 
courses and programs offered by Russian military education centers. As Major - General 
Hayk Kotanjan recalls, the most problematic issue was the education necessary for senior - 
level officers that Armenia was simply not able to provide, thus looking for Russian aid.
2
 
Although some cooperation programs existed even before 2003, as in case of Greece and the 
U.S, the coherent approach of building a comprehensive military education system evolved 
much later largely by focusing on the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) as the 
basic platform to be transformed in conformity with the U.S. National Defence University 
(NDU) model.
3
   As we have seen before, the Armenian top strategic documents such as the 
National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine frequently refer to the need of 
familiarizing with most advanced military experience of the world. This objective is 
consequently reflected on the level of military training and education, by efforts to establish a 
system compatible with most advanced educational models that meet high international 
standards.
4
 General Kotanjian, a founder head of the INSS (served as the military attaché in 
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USA from 1998 - to 2002 and the NDU - graduate in 2004) was, in fact, a leading force 
behind the process. He looked for  several methodological and other assistance forms from 
various U.S. military academic institutions (NDU, War College, INPS) and key faculty 
individuals to develop curricula and teaching methods that responded ―best practices in use in 
the Western defense education and training institutions.‖1 
 
The year 2008 marked the beginning of the period where the intensive adoption of NATO - 
standards in training and education system of the Armenian Armed Forces started. NATO 
heavily supported national authorities in providing regular educational modules in the 
Military and the Aviation Institutes, introducing the new modified junior officer courses and 
providing expertise and knowledge to develope a military education and training concept as 
one of the major IPAP - objectives.
2
 According to General Kotanjian, who was already put in 
charge of drafting the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, a first NATO-
expert team (Dr. Jim Barret – Royal Military College of Canada and Dr. Jim Keagle – U.S. 
National defence University) arrived in spring 2008 and under the DEEP (Defence Education 
Enhancement Program) the initial roadmap for defence education reform was developed.
3
 It 
envisaged the development of improved courses for non - commissioned and junior officers 
along with new command - and senior officer courses with a strong objective of building a 
military academy, a strategic defence institution similar to NDU that would meet Bologna 
Process standards. The IPAP - 2009 sets also an objective to launch a review of the education 
system, which would produce a new education and training doctrine, as well as courses 
already mentioned.  
 
Cooperative initiatives also suggested a strong development of the analytical capabilities of 
the INSS.
4
 Contrary to the stated objectives, the SDR - document issued in 2011, as well as 
the 2011- cycle IPAP - document mark no significant progress in this regard. In particular, the 
short - term assumptions of the SDR envisage, that the full cycle of officers‘ education and 
training program will be initiated by the ―guidance to the General Staff‖ to develop a modern 
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concept of professional military education.
1
 In essence, it implies that the overall concept was 
not yet completed or at least not yet ready for implementation. The IPAP - 2011 repeats the 
early national commitments with no greater change in language and urges to complete the 
implementation plan of the military education system review with the additional emphasis on 
developing Leassons Learned (LL) capacity from international operations (KFOR, ISAF).
2
  
 
What we have seen sofar speaks for a clear gap between the identified objectives and the 
results achieved. Let aside the new LL - commitment, the period between 2008 and 2011 
reveals no serious progress in transforming Armenian military education system in 
accordance with NATO - standards. Despite extensive support from NATO - expert groups, 
three years period seems not to produce any serious impulse for a full - scale change of the 
education system. Along with inability of the MOD to complete the review and the detailed 
development of the educational programs within the SDR - process (as document itself 
admits), the incomparably easier objective of improved language training by assuring its 
quality at all levels (Military Academy, peacekeeping units and for senior - officers), is also 
far from being completed, according to both IPAP - documents of 2009 and 2011.
3
 The same 
section of the IPAP - 2011 makes it clear, that the idea of transforming the INSS into an 
―Armenian NDU‖, strongly supported by the General Kotanjian and his NATO - colleagues, 
was not implemented, since the Institute was not even included by 2011 in the national 
educational system, and the MOD merely intended to study the fisibility of such inclusion.  
 
In his article Dr. Jim Barret, one of the leading figures in assisting Armenian officials under 
the DEEP, admits, that despite intensive national and international efforts, the quality and 
capacity of mid - and higher level officers‘ education in Armenia remained by 2012 very 
limited, and the first pilot command - and staff course could be launched not earlier than 
2014.
4
 We might assume, that the IPAP - cycle 2013 - 2015 will incorporate all important 
national commitments that remained uncompleted during the previous cycles. In an interview 
to ―Mediamax‖ news agency in 2011, The Deputy Minister Davit Tonoyan indeed assigned 
the next IPAP greater role in implementing the SDR - actions.
5
 Interestingly, he underlined 
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the need of studying capabilities for ―improving battle training programs for various types of 
Armenian Armed Forces‖ in the time, when no unified concept of military education was 
developed yet. It was put in place only in 2013.
1
  In light of the existing deficits this fact once 
more highlights existing incoherence in transforming the field of military education.      
 
Another indicator, which exposes the nature of educational dynamics, is the number of 
Armenian students sent to western (NATO) or Russian military educational facilities. 
According to deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan, the number of the first category is 
steadily growing with the ―major break - through‖ in the period between 2008 and 2009, 
partially explainable by the decision to form a peacekeeping brigade.
2
 He also admits, that 
there are still number of courses, where Armenia lacks significantly the capacity to provide 
education and training, thus will remain dependent on Russia. However, as he stressed, these 
courses are more tactical and of technical military nature (aviation, logistics etc.) and will 
steadily diminish, as the national capcity to cover more areas of military education will grow, 
and the number of students sent to Russia will decrease, not least due reduced ability of 
Russia to co - finance Armenian participants. 
 
 The full funding of foreign courses or the factor of co - financing appears to be a significant 
incentive affecting the overall ratio of Armenian students abroad. At this stage, however, it 
seems that the total number of Armenian militaries educated in Russia is still much higher 
than that of officers educated in NATO - centers, according to Armenian defence advisor to 
NATO HQ, Mher Israelyan.
3
 It can be simply attributed to the structure of courses needed, as 
well as the logic of the educational pyramid, in which the higher level courses require fewer 
participants. The reality is, that the category of officers intended for foreign deployment 
(under NATO - command), as well as some higher level officers undergo western style 
education and training, whereas the lower ranks, i.e. larger portion of armed forces still rely 
on Russian model (more tactical level) education and training generating the slow pace of 
change. Nevertheless, we see a certain logic and justification of such approach. A military still 
largely structured and equipped in a Russian style, objectively has little need for the dramatic 
change on lower (tactical) level, with a subsequent low pace of educational transformation. 
Yet in areas of international (NATO) cooperation, where both low - level officers‘ as well as 
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higher - rank western education is required, improvements, though far from being perfect, are 
clearly visible.  
 
Courses, field training and exercises are regarded by Armenian counterparts as very beneficial 
for developing particular capacities and capabilities of the armed forces. There is clear 
evidence that Armenian defence officials try to strengthen the ties of bilateral and multilateral 
military exercises under the NATO - umbrella. In summer 2011 the U.S. and Armenian sides 
were considering the possibility of bilateral military exercises, however, due to restoration of 
the NATO/PFP ―Live and Comand Post Exercises‖ the urgency of strictly bilateral exercises 
decreased, still remaining on the agenda of U.S. - Armenia consultations.
1
 The plans for 
bilateral peacekeeping exercises for 2012 and 2013 were also made public in 2012.
2
 In fact, 
the interview with the deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan exposed a deep carefulness of 
Armenian authorities, trying to decrease the sensitivity of the issue for Russia by favoring the 
PFP (multilateral) - format, in which despite the formal umbrella of multilateral participation 
the U.S. weight is dominant, i.e. expected cooperation benefits guaranteed.  
 
6.3.6.3 Individuals – Key Factor for Policy Approval and ideational Change    
 
Bilateral and multilateral exercises preserve important linkages of the professional 
socialization at every level of contacts, political or military. Many western officials praise 
Armenian leadership (President Serzh Sargsyan, and the Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan) 
for evry NATO - related gesture as the ―terrific partner‖s, and Celeste Wallander, the Deputy 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence noted that every time she meets with Armenian minister 
of defence, there is ―more and more to discuss.‖3 Similar to General Hayk Kotanjian, the 
deputy defence minister Davit Tonoyan, a major figure driving defence reforms and the SDR, 
can refer to his large professional experience with NATO, serving as the national Military 
Representative at NATO - ACO (SHAPE) and the NATO - HQ (Brussels) from 1998 till 
2007.
4
 He openly stressed the value of NATO (Western) military educational centers, where 
Armenian representatives receive a complex knowledge and ―their mentality gets shaped by 
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western value - system.‖1 Thanks hundreds of PFP - activities of various formats national 
participants are direcly exposed to NATO - military practices and the professional culture.
2
  
Similarly, Steffen Elgersma, a NATO – IS official, reiterates the critical importance of 
courses offered to Armenia, especially to the personnel of peacekeeping units and the General 
Staff officers. The reason is simple, because they often combine the core information on 
democratic control of the armed forces (such as defence institution building, its structure and 
functioning) with major subjects on military.
3
 As a result, the returning personnel often is 
confronted with the internal professional dilemma. As explained by one Armenian colonel, 
the virtual split of personality is on place within those officers who were born in soviet times:  
 
One personality remains loyal to the army where he began his service and developed 
is military traditions. The other personality has been to Western Europe, and to the 
United States, and has come to understand that the army he serves is not yet a modern 
army. So he is two people – a Soviet officer and a modern officer – and every day 
these two persons wrestle with each other to find an Armenian solution.
4
 
 
These words are the vivid reflection of challenges awaiting every ―socialize‖ in terms of 
cultural, menthal and procedural (professional) adaptation. As former NATO – IS/DPPD 
official Bruce Bach admits ―all civilian and military members are affected by their 
engagement in the NATO - environment and often adapt to the ways of that local environment 
and adopt the language and slang of that situation.‖5 The relevance of norm - adoption as the 
means of additional legitimation is clearly recognized both by NATO and national officials. 
According to Steffen Elgersma, the NATO – IS official, the example of the deputy minister 
Davit Tonoyan is the best illustration of transformative processes, where ―individuals 
involved in joint actions (training, courses etc.) as well as part of leadership, actively engaged 
with NATO, get more space, authority and legitimation to implement their reformist 
agenda.‖6 In other words, all structural platforms of the Alliance that allow interconnections 
to develop, serve as critical venues, where common norms are presented, practiced and 
ultimately internalized by national representatives. For instance, General Hayk Kotanjian 
stresses the crucial importance of personal communication between NATO - officials and 
Armenian senior leaders such as Defence Minister Seyran Ohanyan and his First Deputy 
                                                 
1
 Interview with the First Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia Mr. Davit Tonoyan. 
2
 Avagyan and Hiscock, ―Security Sector Reform in Armenia,‖ 25. 
3
 Interview with Steffen Elgersma,  NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP IS), Brussels. 
4
 Barrett, ―Education for Reform: New Students, New Methods, New Assessments,‖ 41. 
5
 Interview with Bruce Bach, a former member of NATO IS (Defence Policy and Planning Division), Brussels. 
6
 Interview with Steffen Elgersma,  NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP IS), Brussels. 
176 
 
Davit Tonoyan in reforming the military education system.
1
 Steffen Elgersma goes further to 
claim, that the members of defence establishments improve their skills and ―shape by that 
their behavior - logic that is NATO - based‖.2 The International Staff (IS) and its military 
branch the International Military Staff (IMS) are two major structural units, the Alliance 
possess, where partner nations interact with NATO - officials according to their political or 
practical need of cooperation (see the Table 7. below).  
 
Table 7.  Formats and Intensity of Contacts between the NATO - and  
  Armenian Representatives
3
  
 
Visits in Armenia (Annually) Visits in NATO HQ (Annually) 
Format Frequency Format Frequency 
SecGen/Deputy/Asist.SecGen 1 President  Once every 2 years  
Special Representative 1-2 Defence Minister 2-4 (ISAF, KFOR, EAPV, 
28+1/NAC) 
IPAP/PARP Assessment team 1 Foreign Minister 1-2 (ISAF, KFOR, EAPV, 
28+1/NAC) 
IS-team   Deputy Defence Minister 3 (28+1/PPC, PARP, 
CNAD, DPRC+1) 
IMS Team  1 Deputy Foreign Minister  1-2 (28+1/PPC, PARP, 
CNAD, DPRC+1) 
Mil. Educ. Ass. Team  2-3 CHOD 2-3 
Strat. Commands‘ Team  2-3 GS/MOD-departments‘ 
Heads 
3-4 (Logistics, CNAD, 
NC3B, Medical…) 
NATO Week (PDD) 1 Minister/Deputy Minister  of 
Emergency 
1 
 
 
Dependent on the focus, which may lay on the priority of close political association or the 
sheer necessity of military cooperation, each NATO and IS - body maight assume the leading 
role. Although they seem have little influence on national decision - making of each member - 
state, the coordinating power and the ability of providing a deep expertise is undeniable. As 
deputy minister Davit Tonoyan highlighted, the Armenian side highly values the core function 
of the IS (International Staff), which is the coordination of efforts, as well as of the requested 
experience, knowledge and personal engagement in shaping national programs, IPAP and 
other cooperation formats.
4
 A similar view is shared by the Armenian defence advisor at 
NATO HQ Mher Israelyan, who stresses the limitations of the IS - staff to influence NATO - 
decisions that are based on concensus - principle between member - states, yet possesses a 
potential of growing influence over partner nations due to the growing intensity and scale of 
                                                 
1
 Kotanjian, ―Managing Strategic Changes Through DEEP Reforms: A View from the Perspective of U.S.–
Armenia ‗Smart Power‘ Cooperation,‖ 88. 
2
 Interview with the First Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia Mr. Davit Tonoyan. 
3
 Interview with Mr. Mher Israelyan, Defence Advisor at Armenian Mission to NATO. 
4
 Interview with the First Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia Mr. Davit Tonoyan. 
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political cooperation.
1
  Both high level officials appear to have the same perspective, which 
might be pretty indicative for the general position shared by the Armenian leadership. In 
particular, they place the IS and IMS much higher than the NATO Liason Office (NLO) in the 
regin, and the military aspect of linkages appears to have upper hand within the general 
process of cooperation.  
 
For instance, the First Deputy Defence Minister argues that ―due to increased importance of 
OCC (Operational Capabilities Concept) and NATO standards to Armenia, the role of IMS 
(military) is incomparably higher than that of IS (political).
2
 The same conclusion can be 
drawn from the next statement, formulated by Armenian Defence Advisor Mher Israelyan, 
who, once referring to the practical dimension of NATO - influence on Armenian defence 
institutions, makes a clear reservation that ―it can be clearly identified only within the margins 
of peacekeeping brigade.‖3 The core message of the previous chapters also was that, the 
application of OCC and NATO - standards was an issue exclusively regarded in relation to 
peacekeeping units. In line with our early observations, the balance between the value of the 
IS - assistance and the weight of bilateral (NATO - nation/Armenia) cooperation tends to be 
much in favour of the latter, for as Mr. Israelyan argues:
 
 
 
The NATO as organization can rely only on limited pool of assistance and expertise, 
especially when it comes to more targeted assistance. In terms of practical assistance 
on the ground the bilateral cooperation format with NATO-member states is more 
efficient, providing more resources and possibilities…especially, in the case of our 
contribution to NATO - led operations.
4
  
 
 
 
 
6.4 Concluding Findings  
 
 
While evaluating the progress of national institutions within the transformation process of the 
defence sector and the role NATO played in it, a general impression is, that the initial efforts 
and goals set by Armenian authorities had been very energetic and ambitious. The Alliance 
enthusiastically supported Armenia´s intention to reform and transform its military and 
defence related institutions into a kind of western model, yet was quickly confronted with a 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Mr. Mher Israelyan, Defence Advisor at Armenian Mission to NATO. 
2
 Interview with the First Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia Mr. Davit Tonoyan. 
3
 Interview with Mr. Mher Israelyan, Defence Advisor at Armenian Mission to NATO. 
4
 Ibid. 
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slowed pace of reforms and the significant mismatch between the objectives agreed and the 
results achieved. Despite the direct involvement of some key figures from the top of the 
Armenian leadership, the internalization of common norms of ―doing business‖, largely 
refered as NATO – standards, turned to become a dragging process with the significant 
limitations. The findings, we were able to draw from our analysis, allow us to fill the pre–
designed country ―measurement‖ - model with the following progress - values (see the Table 
8. below).        
 
In early years of the millennium we see Armenian political and defence officials actively 
embracing the opportunity of intensified cooperation with the Alliance. Despite the strategic 
limitations for the possibility of future membership and the ―cooling‖ factor of Russia, the 
dynamics of political contacts and linkages in the period between 2004 and 2012 showed 
clear signs of the revival. The relevance of NATO for the national strategic agenda has not 
been diminished and continued to keep an important place both in the political rhetoric as well 
as in strategic security - and defence - related documents. We assess this as the first and most 
positively affected area, to be given the evaluation value ―partial+‖. The area of the 
democratic control of the military, which is divided into parliamentary and civilian control of 
the defence, shows both some progress in establishing the effective mechanisms of control, as 
well as continuing deficits significantly limiting the control - function. Though the civilian 
control of the military at ministerial level is formally very well established, the serious gaps in 
the parliamentary control and the capacity of respective committees to excert their monitoring 
power, leaves an ambiguous picture of democratic achievements. Consequently, the 
respective values assigned are ―no progress‖ and ―partial+‖.  
 
Table 8.  NATO – Influence in Armenia:  Results  
Country Sectors 
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partial 
 Some Positive Progress Little Progress Positive  
Progress 
Status of 
NATO-
Influence / 
National 
Compliance 
 
Some positive influence on Political and Ideational Dimension with little effects on 
Functional (Policy) areas of defence  
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The most problematic area, revealing the variety of serious challenges and setbacks for 
NATO to exert influence and initiate change, is the functional area of the defence, closely 
related to policy areas of defence transformation. The western model of defence policy and 
planning had been formally adopted, and key elements (drafting strategic documents, the SDR 
and interagency mode of work) of authority division within the defence planning process 
between the respective MOD - and GS departments had been also approved. Nonetheless, a 
number of challenges associated with the proper implementation and routinization of policy 
and planning procedures, legal amendments, timely update of strategic documents and the 
serious delays of agreed objectives cannot be overseen. This altogether points towards the 
inherent internal difficulties (organizational or capacity based) to master new policies and 
procedures. Similarly, the lacking capacity of producing stable financial plans that would 
meet the requirements of modern long - term program based planning system and make public 
defence priorities, do not provide a positive picture of progress. Some steps, initiated to 
improve transparency of the defence budget and reduce corruption practices, still show little 
effect on the overall increase of defence transparency for a wider public. NATO documents 
expose continuing deficits in personnel management of the Armenian military, from the 
overall structure down to the job - descriptions, selection, evaluation, promotion and standard 
compensation policies. In light of these and other mentioned capacity shortages the argument 
of ―professionally necessitated secrecy‖ of the defence sector gains more weight as compared 
to ―war caused secrecy.‖ Hence, the value given to each area is ―partial‖ with exception of 
defence budget - transparency that received ―no progress‖ due to major concerns from the 
NATO - side over the entire period of analysis. As for NATO - interoperability and standards, 
the findings clearly show their application exclusively in relation to units designated for 
peacekeeping (NATO) operations. The focus is primarily made on the technical equipment of 
units such as the tactical communication, logistics, command and control, and the medical 
support. The Armenian army is still Russian model based (hardware and structure). Even the 
units intended for foreign (NATO) deployments have Russian like rank – structure, i.e no 
signs of expanding NATO - standards to the rest of the army, thus receiving the value 
―partial‖.   
 
As last the ideational dimension of the Alliance´s influence exposes some promising signs, 
being disaggregated into three venues, where national commitments are channeled. The 
foreign assistance remains relatively stable over the years with the constant focus on 
peacekeeping units and the military education (incl. language) courses, receiving the value 
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―partial‖. The transformation of the overall traning and education system, though 
energetically approached in initial phase, faced serious delays of implementation and is still 
lacking major break - through. Contrary to that, the peacekeeping units appear to be the bulk 
of the Armenian army, mostly exposed to western (NATO/US) model of field training and 
professional education, thus deserving the value ―partial+‖. To sum up, we aggregate the 
evaluations of single sectors and suggest the following general conclusion on the degree of 
NATO - influence on the process of defence transformation in Armenia: 
 
The Alliance was able and continues to exert some positive influence on Political and 
Ideational dimensions of defence institutions; however, it exposes little effects on 
Functional (Policy) areas of defence management.  
 
Along with the evaluation model generated, we are also able to offer a completed schematic 
picture of the interplay of incentives/pay offs (positive and negative) and the national 
preferences (see Figure 7. below), we suggested in the introductory chapter, which dealt with 
the concept of conditionality and compliance (CC). The Benefits of cooperation relate 
foremost to practical military domain such as participation in NATO - led operations and the 
valuable expertise, equipment and capabilities predominantly provided by member - states 
and not the Alliance as organization. The democratic requirements, key to NATO, are 
acknowledged, but less implemented as institutional pillars of defence reform falling behind 
the imperative of enhancing fighting capabilities of the armed forces. Consequently, it can be 
indicative either for the formal (hollow) nature of democratic requirements towards the 
country, or the inability of the Alliance to provide added value of enhanced cooperation and 
subsequent compliance in this respect.    
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Figure 7.  Armenia: Interplay of Incentives, Preferences and Pay – Offs 
 
Armenia 
Incentives/Relative Gains  Domestic  
Preferences 
External Factors Negative Pay Offs 
 Strategic bargaining with 
Russia  
 
 PfP-information share 
similar to Azerbaijan 
 
 Support of defence reforms 
 
 Practical benefits of force-
interoperability (limited to 
military-technical aspect) 
 
 Democratically run military 
 
 Valuable NATO expertise in 
various policy fields of 
defence 
 
 Potential for strong bilateral 
relations and assistance  
 
Security of Karabakh  
 
Weak democratic system 
 
Security-sation of the 
political system  
 
Strong personal ties between 
key officials 
 
Weak public control  
NATO Enlargement 
 
Georgia, Azerbaijan – PFP 
members 
 
Turkey – still as enemy 
 
CSTO – Russia as major 
security guarantee 
 Russian dismay and reduced 
military support 
 
 Defence priorities transparent 
to potential enemies 
 
 Full democratic control of the 
military negatively affecting 
the combat readiness of units 
 
 NATO-standards as challenge 
to combat readiness of forces 
 
 No security guarantees 
provided by  NATO 
 
 Dependence on public support 
for defence spending priorities 
 Balance / Imbalance 
of Incentives and Negative Pay Offs 
 
Though negative pay offs outweigh the positive 
ones on the whole, the selective or limited 
acceptance of some positive pay offs that do not 
cause any serious negative consequences (pay 
offs) has taken place. 
 
Behavioral 
Result under Weak Conditionality 
 
 
 
Positive Effect 
 
 
Negative Effect 
 
- non Compliance - 
 
 
Compliance   
 
Partial 
Compliance 
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Chapter VII: NATO and Defence Transformation 
in Georgia  
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The case of Georgia serves as the best example of a country that shares the historical and 
contextual similarity with Armenia, however starkly differs through the strong willingness to 
join NATO (as early as the Prague Summit in 2002) and firmly follows the chosen path 
towards the full membership.
1
 Similar to the case of Armenia the key document that enables 
the comparison of agreed objectives between Georgia and NATO and the results achieved is 
the IPAP document 2004 - 2006. It delineates large number of steps to be done in the broad 
political and narrow defence areas, and illustrates by that the utility and effectiveness of the 
existing mechanisms that are supposed to support the process of national defence 
transformation. The validation of national achievements will be structured along the 
functional/thematic lines of the IPAP - document and mirror the analytical - structure already 
adopted in the case of Armenia. Despite the fact that no other IPAP - document had been 
made public since 2006, and the Annual National Program (ANP), introduced in 2008, 
remains classified, the latter reflects the same functional division of working areas as the 
IPAP does, with the only difference of annual assessment as compared to the biennial 
assessment mechanism of the IPAP. Whether NATO declarations or communiqués, all 
official documents broadly indicate the degree of national progress achieved. Other pool of 
sources such as the defence related official documents, national and international reports, 
legal acts, interviews and media news constitute a solid foundation for identifying the effects 
of NATO - conditionality or results to be associated with domestic interests and cost - 
calculations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, n.d.; available at  
http://mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=453. 
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7.2 NATO in Georgian National Agenda – The Purpose of 
Cooperation and Defence Reforms 
 
This section will examine the strategic nature of formally declared objectives pursued by 
NATO and Georgia, review actual policy priorities, and attempt to establish a general picture 
that would either prove a high degree of congruence between policy objectives of both actors 
or indicate the existing or a widening lack of alignment of respective political agendas.  In 
doing so, we will naturally refer to all available sources to establish a picture of the normative 
foundation and the ideational paradigm, necessary to be confronted with  the processes at the 
functional level of the defense ministry in terms of practical implementation and procedural 
compliance. At this stage, we are primarily interested in understanding, how consistently the 
Georgian government and leadership established the idea of NATO - membership as the 
major goal of the national political agenda. Furthermore, we are focused on how effectively it 
was able to capture and reflect the common (democratic) identity messages of NATO within 
the process of defence policy formulation, and how those messages were balanced with long 
existing security concerns.  
 
 
  
7.2.1 NATO – Cooperation: The Prevalence of Security Concerns in 
Georgia 
 
The history of Georgian clear - cut membership aspiration starts with the NATO - Prague 
Summit in November 2002, where President Shevardnadze voiced the desire to join the 
Alliance.
1
 The unresolved territorial and ethnic conflicts and the existence of Russian military 
bases in Georgia caused the Georgian government to regard Russian forces as the persistent 
security problem since its independence and to welcome NATO as a ―guarantee for Georgia‘s 
security‖, as declared by President Shevardnadze in a radio – interview after the Prague 
Summit.
2
 The turbulent events of November ―Rose revolution‖ in 2003 and the subsequent 
change of political leadership brought even more intensity in pursuing the goal of 
                                                 
1
 Socor, ―NATO Prospects in the South Caucasus,‖ 2. 
2
 From Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector 
Reform, Fluri Philipp H., Cole Eden (Eds.) (Vienna, Geneva: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry 
of Defence, National Defence Academy ; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 
19, available at mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/.../21_From_Revolution.pdf; Elkhan Mehtiyev, 
―Perspectives of Security Development in the South Caucasus,‖ in Security Sector Governance in Southern 
Caucasus: Challenges and Visions, Ebnöther Anja H. and Gustav E. Gustenau (Eds.) (Vienna, Geneva: National 
Defence Academy, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, PFP-Consortium of Defence 
Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2004), 184, available at http://www.bundesheer.at/wissen-
forschung/publikationen/publikation.php?id=122. 
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membership.
1
 In October 2004 the first IPAP - document was approved for Georgia under 
President Saakashvili, and since then ―NATO has become the very embodiment of the entire 
―western idea‖ for Georgia‖ as described by Kakha Imnadze from the Georgian Institute for 
Russian Studies.
2
  
 
The Georgian leadership enthusiastically supported the idea of membership and even tried to 
achieve the national consensus on this issue. In March 2007, the representatives of all relevant 
political parties in Georgia and parliamentary fractions drafted and signed the memorandum 
―On Membership of Georgia in North Atlantic Treaty Organization‖ as a sign of a wider 
national consensus that the membership in NATO is the strongest guarantee for security and 
democratic development of the country.
3
 Yet the understanding of the Alliance, its essence 
and the principles remained beyond public attention and discourse. Thus, we regard it as 
imperative to assess the value of security concerns, Georgian authorities attached to the idea 
of the membership. In this context the issue of territorial integrity and its relevance as one of 
the key factors determining the Georgian security perception and the national political agenda, 
cannot be avoided. Further we will weigh out national security perceptions with the signals 
and political messages NATO was sending to Georgian leadership, and try to establish the 
degree of congruence. As last, we will attempt to find out whether the brief war with Russia in 
2008 had caused any general revision of security and defence related policies, with effects on 
the issue of their practical implementation.  
 
7.2.1.1 Security as the Motive and the Military as Enabler for NATO – Integration  
 
Since presidential authority represents the highest point in the executive pyramid in Georgia, 
we began our analysis with documents posted on the president‘s website.4 Interestingly 
enough, out of 215 contributions related to NATO, only one could be formally regarded as an 
official document (a record of a speech that was similar to other summaries of presidential 
                                                 
1
 The ―Rose Revolution‖ in November 2003 is assosiated with the peaceful removal of President Shevardnadze‘s 
rule and his government by mass – demonstrations organized an led by United National Movement (UNM) party 
under Michael Saakashvili. 
2
 Malek, ―NATO and the South Caucasus,‖ 34, 40; ―Regional Developments in the South Caucasus: Challenges, 
Opportunities and Prospects (Report),‖ Seminar Reports, 73rd Rose-Roth Seminar, Yerevan, Armenia, 11-13 
March 2010 (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2010), para. 24, available at http://www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?CAT2=0&CAT1=0&CAT0=576&SHORTCUT=2183&SEARCHWORDS=Regional,develop
ments,. 
3
 Malek, ―NATO and the South Caucasus,‖ 35–36. 
4
 The website has been completely changed after the new President, Giorgi Margvelashvili was elected in 
October 2013, and many previously posted documents and sources have been removed. 
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speech records). A close study of those transcripts reveals an appalling deficit in the 
formulation of Georgia‘s prospective NATO - membership in the framework of common 
identity and shared democratic values. NATO is almost exclusively regarded as a security 
institution providing security guarantees, and as an important justification for meeting certain 
standards of military - technical interoperability.
1
 According to various sources, whether at 
NATO multilateral or bilateral meetings with national officials from member states (including 
a visit to Georgia‘s major strategic partner, the United States), President Saakashvili‘s core 
messages disregarded the value - based perception of the Alliance, and nearly completely 
avoided mentioning the transformation of Georgia‘s defense sector in accordance with 
democratic principles.
2
 Already in 2004 he was pointing at strong security guarantees Georgia 
was looking for, and reaffirmed the government‘s position by following statement that ―We 
need stable guarantees of security, and NATO is the only guarantor.‖3 Similar references to 
the security imperative were frequently made by other government - members. The former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gela Bezhuashvili (in office from 2004 to January 2008) was 
stressing the security effects of Georgian integration to NATO by creating a ―stabilizing 
effect‖ on the relationship between Georgia and Russia.4 The former Defence Minister David 
Kezerashvili (in office from 2006 to December 2008) used the security related argumentation 
during the meeting with NATO-parliamentary delegation and defended the view that the 
highest priority had to be given to security and army in a ―(…) climate of potentially serious 
security threats.‖5 
 
The National Movement Party, once it came to power, immediately reflected the NATO - 
membership aspiration in governmental structural changes and in major security and defense 
related documents. The careful review of the official policy documents as well as interviews 
and other relevant sources suggest findings pretty in line with the core of the mentioned 
statements. The National Security Council, as the leading body in crafting strategic security 
                                                 
1
 The Administration of the President of Georgia, 15 March 2007; available at 
http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/Documents?4952.  
2
 The Administration of the President of Georgia, 19 March 2008; available at 
http://www.president.gov.ge/en/PressOffice/News?3250. 
3
 Svante E Cornell et al., Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO (Washington, D.C.: 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins 
University, 2004), 74. 
4
 ―17-19 September 2007 - Visit to Georgia (Sub - Committees on East - West Economic Co - Operation and 
Convergence (ESCEW) and Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC)),‖ Mission Reports (NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, 2007), para. 17, available at http://www.nato-
pa.int/Default.asp?CAT2=0&CAT1=0&CAT0=576&SHORTCUT=1328&SEARCHWORDS=17-
19,September,2007,. 
5
 Ibid., para. 18. 
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policy in Georgia, placed remarkably little emphasis on the aspect of common democratic 
identity as it relates to Georgia‘s NATO aspirations. The current National Security Concept 
views the Alliance solely as a mechanism for securing Georgia‘s independence and stable 
development.
1
 The Georgia‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also tends to share this perspective, 
as it makes little, if any reference to the unifying power of common democratic values or 
identity.
2
 The Office of the State Minister on European and Euro - Atlantic Integration, as the 
center of gravity for all Georgian state agencies dealing with NATO - integration issues, 
follows the same path, as the entire issue of national priorities and progress made towards 
NATO – integration (incl. other relevant reports) are dramatically underrepresented at the 
office‘s webpage.3 
 
Contrary to the heavy weight of security considerations among Georgian interlocutors, the 
very sensitive nature of Georgia‘s potential membership caused NATO - assistance to be 
primarily focused on implementing key democratic principles from the very initial phase of 
reforming defence and military. The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), 
composed of internationally recognized and experienced high rank professionals (nine 
members from U.K., U.S., Germany and Baltic States) in military and diplomatic affairs 
developed and submitted a clear proposal for approval to President Saakashvili with the 
conclusion that ―Reform of the military sphere must be NATO - compatible.‖4 The plan, 
which envisaged the appointment of the civilian minister and staff - members as the civilian 
control element, was approved by the President in 2005 as the roadmap for the structural 
reduction and functional optimization of armed forces.
5
 This period can be characterized as 
the phase of overwhelming optimism reigning among Georgian officials and international 
partners. As the DCAF (Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces) - drafted 
document stated in 2005, the implementation of IPAP objectives would remove last obstacles 
for offering MAP, and members of the Georgian Mission to NATO were certain that ―If we 
                                                 
1
 National Security Concept of Georgia, n.d., 6; available at  
http://mod.gov.ge/documents/cfgeyzvjwhgeo.pdf. 
2
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia website.   
3
 ―The Office of the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration,‖ n.d., available at 
 http://eu-integration.gov.ge/index.php?que=eng/official_documents#. 
4
 Garry Johnson, ―Security Sector Reform in the Southern Caucasus,‖ in Security Sector Governance in Southern 
Caucasus: Challenges and Visions, Ebnöther Anja H. and Gustav E. Gustenau (Eds.) (Vienna, Geneva: National 
Defence Academy, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, PFP-Consortium of Defence 
Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 2004), 48–50, available at http://www.bundesheer.at/wissen-
forschung/publikationen/publikation.php?id=122. 
5
 Garry Johnson, David Smith, and Franz Werner, ―ISAB REPORT 2006‖ (Winchester UK: Georgian 
Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, February 15, 2006), 1, available at 
http://gfsis.org/media/download/GSAC/resources/ISAB_REPORT_2006.pdf. 
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conduct reforms effectively we could be able to join MAP.‖1 From the military perspective, 
the Georgian Chief of Staff, Levan Nikolaishvili also shared a very optimistic view and 
believed, that country could be admitted to MAP ―(…)as early as 2006.‖2 The language and 
arguments used by Georgian side pursued two objectives: first to convince NATO - partners 
that there was no other formal mechanism of deeper integration than MAP (the Deputy 
Speaker of the Parliament Mikheil Machavariani and the Deputy Head of the Committee on 
Defence and Security Mr. Nikoloz Rurua), and that this step was necessary to strengthen 
institutional reforms and to justify Georgia‘s participation in NATO - missions.3 In contrast to 
Giorgi Baramidze (former Vice - Prime Minister and State Minister for Euro - Atlantic 
Integration from 2005 - 2012), who stressed the key importance of Georgian participation in 
Irak and Kosovo - operations, Gela Bezhuashvili, a former Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Minister appears as a rare exception in Georgian leadership, who emphasized the relevance of 
the Alliance for consolidation of the democratic model, the country had developed so far.
4
   
 
7.2.1.2 Prevalence of democratic Achievements for NATO 
 
The conclusions NATO was able to draw from the existing atmosphere in Georgia was, that 
despite NATO - membership being a top priority of national and security agenda, the country 
in fact, needed a positive encouragement for enhanced institutional building that in turn would 
foster defence reforms and the speed of integration.
5
  The Riga Summit decision in 2006 to 
offer only the Intensified Dialogue (ID) format, must be regarded in this context as a cautious 
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 Kornely Kakachia, ―Chapter 4, Problems of Post-Conflict Public Security Management in Georgia,‖ in From 
Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, 
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attempt to reserve the right of checking the democratic progress of the country. The key event 
of Bucharest Summit in Apil 3, 2008 along with the rejection of granting Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) reinforced the heavy message of democratic requirements to be met by Georgia. 
The final declaration stated unequivocally that: 
 
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership 
in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.  Both 
nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations.  We welcome the 
democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair 
parliamentary elections in Georgia in May.  MAP is the next step for Ukraine and 
Georgia on their direct way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support 
these countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore we will now begin a period of 
intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still 
outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.  We have asked Foreign Ministers 
to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting.  Foreign 
Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and 
Georgia.
1
 
 
The in bold highlighted excerpts point to the prevailing division among allied nations about 
the degree of commitment from the Georgian side to perform necessary steps of democratic 
transformation. It seems that members were arguing to delay the decision on Georgia‘s MAP 
invitation, making it contingent on the assessment of the parliamentary election in May 2008. 
President George Bush was strongly in favor of MAP, and a strong partisan group of senators 
(led by Joseph Liebermann and Richard Lugar) adopted resolutions (S.Res. 391, 439) urging 
allies to offer MAP to Georgia and Ukraine; however, the U.S.A also regarded the May 
election as litmus paper for successful membership aspiration.
2
 Since the Summit declaration 
was issued after the violent crack - down of the opposition political forces in November 2007 
in Tbilisi, its message could only mean that if parliamentary elections were to be accessed 
positively, the next NATO - meeting even of the lower (foreign ministers) level would grant 
MAP to Georgia. What we see here, is a persisting feature of the Alliance relationship to 
Georgia, which turned the credibility of democratic reforms as the core of the strategic 
messaging and the key requirement for political decision for the next step of integration.    
 
All respondents interviewed, representing NATO in relation to Georgia at HQ or bilateral 
level, stressed the huge prevalence of country‘s democratic achievements before practical 
military cooperation for the membership decision. For instance Krisztian Meszaros, a key 
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interlocutor with Georgia in NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division (PASP), 
reaffirmed that: 
 
Much more attention should be devoted to issues of standard democratic procedures 
that are key because of their huge political importance. We need a functioning 
democracy in Georgia first, and some skeptical nations made it clear that not the best 
military performance and interoperability but the high level of democratization would 
be decisive for Georgia’s NATO-membership, because we have only a big carrot of 
membership, and no meaningful sticks.
1
 
 
 
The same position is shared by Gustav Vroemen, a senior officer representing NATO‘s 
Defence Policy and Planning Division (DPPD), as well as by Defence Advisors from Latvia 
and Estonia that highlight the dominance of the political aspect of cooperation (democratic 
transformation) due to membership - promise and the weakness of the existing enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure the national compliance.
2
 All documents related to Georgia reaffirm the 
key importance of democratic transformation as the primary channel towards full 
membership. The backgrounder document on NATO - Georgia relations explicitly highlights 
this requirement: 
 
As an alliance based on democratic values, NATO has high expectations of 
prospective new members and urges Georgia to continue to pursue wide-ranging 
reforms to achieve its goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. (…)The Euro-Atlantic 
partnership is about more than practical cooperation - it is also about values. In doing 
so (signing PFP - Agreement), partners commit to the preservation of democratic 
societies.
3
  
 
The same document strongly encourages the Georgian government first, to implement 
―Particularly democratic, electoral, media and judicial reforms‖ along with defence and 
security sector reforms.
4
 Often the official visits to Georgia were used by NATO high 
officials to reiterate the mentioned priority. In his speech to the audience at the Tbilisi State 
University in October 4, 2007, the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer made several 
point, with sufficient clarity and no space for misinterpretation: 
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The Alliance has long aspired to the creation of a Europe that is whole and free, 
united in peace, democracy and common values.  Both NATO and the European Union 
have played a major role in fulfilling this aspiration.  But it is not a reality just yet.  
There is still work to do. And NATO is very much committed to continue playing its 
part. 
(…) Over the past fifteen years, the Alliance has used the interest of countries in 
joining NATO to promote democratic and security sector reforms, and to hold 
aspirant countries to the highest standards.  This has already helped to make our 
continent much more stable and secure.  And that will remain our key objective.
1
 
 
The precise references to democratic reforms created a framework, within which the alliances 
narrow interests in Georgia can be defined. Understandably, the U.S. - interests played to 
large extent the dominating role in defining the practical steps initiated on the ground. The 
security cooperation with Georgia gained momentum in 2002 when the U.S. - military started 
training and equipping Georgian units to fight against terrorist groups in Pankisi gorge, and 
the Georgian government decided to participate with a large contingent in U.S. - led operation 
in Iraq.
2
 As already mentioned in earlier chapters, Georgia signed the memorandum on Host 
Nation Support (HNS) in 2005 that implied the country‘s readiness to support the deployment 
and transit of NATO forces once required.
3
 The logistical facilities provided by Georgia via 
road, rail and air presented an important communication and even more the political support 
to ISAF - operation. The critical importance of this assistance for operation in Afghanistan 
was clearly recognized by U.S. - authorities in respective official documents.
4
 During the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation visit to Georgia in 2007 the U.S. Ambassador in 
Georgia John Teft formulated four U.S. major goals in country, with the first one to support 
constructing the democratic system to ―Become an example for other countries in the 
region.‖5 In 2007 the U.S. Congress issued the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act urging 
under the strong support of senators to extend MAP to Georgia, shared by the U.S. delegation 
to NATO Parliamentary Assembly in May 2011.
6
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The overall political objective of Georgia‘s membership, in fact, has never been strongly 
pursued by NATO itself. Thus, the recognition of the membership aspiration appears here as 
just one side of the coin, which also complicated the practical essence of cooperation process. 
The ambiguity of the Alliance‘s intentions generated also certain doubts on Georgian side, 
even within military ranks. As the deputy Chief of the General Staff of Georgian Armed 
Forces Vladimir Chachibaya put it: 
 
I don’t think NATO has a major well formulated strategic objective in Georgia, Even 
the ISAF-operation and our active participation in it do not assign our position a 
strategic value. It is initiated by Georgian side and remains much more important to 
us than to NATO.
1
  
 
Similar as in case of Baltic States Jan Arveds Trapans asks for the clarification of the vision 
and intentions of NATO, to avoid ―Debilitating effect on military development (…) and (…) 
adverse effects on the steady democratic developments of the states.‖2 The alliance easily 
adopted a number of issue – areas, where its position could be made clear without any fear of 
political repercussions. It highlighted the importance of energy corridor and supply - lines 
(Baku - Supsa, Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan, Baku – Tbilisi - Erzrum) connecting the region with 
the world and upheld the non - recognition policy of Georgian breakaway regions.
3
 It also 
quickly switched the focus from promoting democratic values to strengthening parliamentary 
and public control of the armed forces by adopting transparent defence budgeting and 
resource management processes.
4
 As for the narrow military dimension, even the NATO-
parliamentarians were convinced, that NATO objectives were largely related to the 
improvement of operational capabilities of the Georgian military, as we will better see in next 
chapters.
5
 
 
7.2.1.3 The Importance of Territorial Integrity to the Issue of NATO - Integration  
 
The Crystallization of NATO - objectives run in parallel with Georgia‘s rapidly worsening 
relationship with Russia that elevated the dilemma of territorial conflict - resolution to the 
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highest political level. The Georgian leadership shared the common motivational 
understanding of joining alliances as a way of reducing the ―probability of being attacked‖ 
(deterrence) and of preventing an ―ally‘s alliance with one‘s adversary.‖1 As we mentioned 
earlier, the Alliance was not eager to take on conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus 
region. From the early stages of cooperation it has been made clear that ―NATO did not aspire 
to a role in the negotiation process, but that it would be ready to assist in any post - settlement 
arrangement.‖2 This line has been consistently kept by the Alliance and found its reflection in 
country - backgrounder documents.
3
 Not surprisingly, the security fears of the new Georgian 
leadership under the UNM (United National Movement party), and a high priority devoted to 
country‘s security and defence turned the issue of the restoration of country‘s territorial 
integrity to the top priority, according to former Parliament Speaker Ms. Nino Burjanadze (in 
office from 2001 till 2008).
4
  In one of his speeches President Saakashvili stated: 
 
Undoubtedly, our goal is NATO integration, since Georgia is not only a user of a 
security system. For me, as a democratically elected leader of my country, the main 
audience are people, rather than any expert or international organization.
5
  
 
The statement was made as the president addressed the Georgian Security Forum in his 
welcoming speech in 2006. Put aside the emotional aspect of the text, a clear neglect of the 
international dimension of commitments and of balance of interest is evident. Already in 2005 
Dov Lynch identified worrying ―conflation‖ of the Georgian nation with the issue of the 
territorial integrity, and the unification of the country as the driving force and the ―supreme 
goal‖ of his life, as declared by President Saakashvili.6 He (author) was worried about the 
style and handling of Adjara crisis in 2004 by the new government due to the ―reckless gene 
at the heart of the new leadership‖ that could become the strength but also its fatal weakness.7 
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Other sources additionally indicate the ever growing relevance of territorial integrity to 
national agenda. Not least it was do to prevailing idea among many Georgian officials that the 
membership was, in fact, preconditioned by the need to settle the conflicts and territorial 
disputes.
1
 According to NATO Parliamentary Report (NPAR) report in 2006 some 
government members were in favor of a military solution of the conflicts, but were held in 
check by more moderate voices and the pressure coming from some NATO - members.
2
 In 
September 2007 a large NATO - PA team arrived in Georgia and met President, 
parliamentarians, defence and foreign ministers as well as the U.S. - ambassador. During the 
meeting President Saakashvili firmly stated, the direct military intervention would cause a too 
high cost for Russia, because ―Georgia had come too far to be ―overrun‖ or ―subdued‖ and 
―Georgia would never trade these territories, even for NATO and/or EU membership.‖3  
 
The implications of real - world political actions were more in favor of the preponderance of 
the preservation of territorial integrity as the key legitimizing factor for the Georgian 
government in the domestic arena. The restoration of national dignity, domestic political 
momentum, and ―the heat of street‖ seemed to have higher priority than the capacity of 
rational thinking and well - developed planning.
4
 As stressed in July 2104 by the Head of the 
NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Georgia, William Lahue: 
 
The Georgian MOD, in my opinion, served different political objectives in the past. 
The former president inherited territorially and politically a very fractional country 
and his efforts were directed to solidify the power-structure.
5
 
 
A startling example of the dichotomy of Georgia‘s domestic military agenda has been 
provided by Geoffrey Wright, who identifies the fact, that the formal side of the Georgian 
objectives aimed at achieving interoperability with NATO forces, in practical terms meant 
forging a military force ―capable of leveraging a political settlement in the so - called Frozen 
Conflicts or, if necessary, reoccupying these territories by force.‖6 In this context, as the 
author argues, the organizational and technical interoperability of Georgian forces with 
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NATO was a desirable effect, but one, that was merely of a supportive nature to a primary 
domestic imperative. For this and other reasons, the policy of confrontation and ―menacing 
rhetoric‖ led to the advent of the August 2008 war with Russia.1 The International Crisis 
Group (ICG) reported in June 2008, that Georgian military was subtly making preparation in 
western parts of country, and some powerful advisers around president saakashvili were 
convinced that ―a military operation in Abkhazia is feasible and necessary‖ with an aim to 
establish a temporary partition of a brake a way region.
2
  
 
There have been early indications of discrepancy between the formal cooperation process and 
the practical implementation of policy. For instance, despite the recommendations of the 
International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) to reduce the actual strength of the armed 
forces, those actions have never been implemented. To the  contrary, the re - equipment of the 
Georgian Army‘s Fourth Infantry Brigade and the formation of a new Fifth Brigade run 
against all agreements and figures agreed upon during the first IPAP negotiation round, 
raising the question of Georgian credibility.
3
 The rapid increase in the nation‘s military 
budget was also regarded as a clear indication of Georgia‘s militaristic plans. Kříž Zdeněk and 
Zinaida Shevchuk concluded, that the significant share of national GDP (8 to 10 percent) 
spent on army modernization and hardware, combined with the character and structure of the 
forces, indicated the nation‘s primary motive to subdue militarily the secessionist regions.4 
The security prism, through which NATO has been perceived by the Georgian leadership has 
not changed even after the debacle of the 2008 war with Russia, where separatists‘ 
provocations led to a military clash between the Georgian and Russian armed forces, and 
continued to influence the formulation of Georgian security policy, leading to the relevance of 
the defense sector as a means of upgrading the armed forces‘ skills, equipment, training 
doctrines, etc.
5
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7.2.1.4 Russo - Georgian War in 2008 and Changes in Relationship with NATO 
 
We might suggest that, though the general attitude towards the Alliance has not been changed, 
the role of armed forces and military acquired a different interpretation after Georgia‘s violent 
confrontation with Russia in August 2008. The ―frozen‖ conflict in the Georgian breakaway 
region of ―South Ossetia‖ escalated, as separatist troops intensified heavy shelling of 
Georgian controlled villages in late July, and President Saakashvili ordered armed forces to 
subdue the enemy on August 8, 2008. Using this as a pretext Russian army invaded Georgia 
and drove Georgian units far out of conflict area close to the very outscirs of the capital 
Tbilisi. As Michael Mihalka and Mark Wilcox argue, after 2008 war debacle the military was 
increasingly viewed as a threat to the ruling regime, and a more moderate defence minister 
Vasil Sikharulidze (in office from 2005 to 2006 as a deputy defence minister, and from 2008 
to 2009 as defence minister) was replaced by Saakashvili‘s ―own man‖ Bacho Akhalaya (in 
office from 2009 – to 2012) with an objective to ―assert greater security service and regime 
control over the military, and to ensure the military will follow orders even when asked to 
move against civilians.‖1 This claim seem even more convincing since as authors report, the 
ministerial replacement happened short after the tank battalion mutiny in 2009, allegedly 
linked to Russian intentions to disrupt NATO - exercises, according to government‘s 
assertion.
2
 Key government members continued strengthening Georgia‘s NATO - aspiration. 
Giorgi Muchaidze, a Deputy Defence Minister (in office from 2006 to 2008) stressed to a 
NATO - PA delegation, that the priority of improved deployment capabilities will remain 
high on agenda.
3
 Overall, the delegation was assured that NATO remained the ―prime security 
partner‖ with the stabilizing effects in country and region.4 Though strong security concerns 
kept dominating position among NATO - integration motives, some clear signs of change 
could not be overseen. For instance, in 2010 contrary to the state minister for Euro – Atlantic 
integration, Giorgi Baramidze‘s claim that territorial integrity ranked among highest national 
priorities, President Saakashvili pointed rather to the need for Georgia to continue being a 
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―success story‖.1 Nonetheless, he avoided an explicit reference to the democratic reforms and 
defined the ―success story‖ as a model consisting of the fight against corruption, police reform 
and attractiveness for foreign investments. As for the ministry of defence, the Deputy Defence 
Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze (in office from 2009 to 2010) highlighted the issue of military 
interoperability along with a strong civilian control as the main priority to implement.
2
  
 
Initial steps taken by the new elected government, built as a result of the electoral defeat of 
the UNP – party in October 2012, illustrate some visible shift towards granting more 
recognition to democratic values and a greater awareness of the relevance of democratic 
change to the process of integration.
3
 As argued by the new defence minister Irakli Alasania, 
who also served in various governmental positions under president Shevardnadze and 
represented Georgia at UNO under president Saakashvili‘s rule: 
 
Former elite tried to bring NATO on top of the agenda as an effective tool of security 
bargaining with Russia. They believed through active cooperation with U.S. and 
intensive exploitation of “democracy lighthouse” image to become NATO member 
quickly.
4
 
 
This excerpt brilliantly gets to the point of the whole essence of Georgian behavioral strategy. 
At the same time it doesn‘t entirely rule out the existing challenge of capturing adequately the 
Alliance‘s priorities and organizational dynamics, and to fall into the delusion of premature 
expectations. It was clear that the war with Russia in 2008 severely damaged Georgia‘s 
NATO - membership plans, especially due to the country‘s damaged credibility in the West.5 
As explained by Bruce Bach, a former NATO – IS official with extensive experience of 
dealing with Georgia, ―politically, its cooperation has suffered since 2008, as its delegation 
and national leadership has had try to improve its image.‖6 The following actions initiated by 
the Alliance also indicated with the sufficient clarity that the way to NATO - membership 
became much more difficult. It suspended the NATO - Russia Council, however the work was 
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renewed by early March 2009.
1
 The language used by NATO - officials as well as documental 
sources additionally reflect the credibility problem the Georgian government faced. The 
frequent reference to ―disproportionate military action‖ while condemning Russia‘s 
aggression in Georgia, in fact, directly implies that if the military action was proportionate, 
the Alliance would not have any difficulty with that.
2
 The replacement of the IPAP and ID 
(Intensified Dialogue) by the Annual National Plan (ANP) in 2008 did not cause any change 
of the cooperation -spectrum covered formerly by IPAP, yet it elevated the political level and 
strengthened the democratic pillar of cooperation through the establishment of NATO - 
Georgian Commission (NGC).
3
 The format of the NGC allowed parties to commence on the 
levels of heads of states, ambassadors, military representatives, foreign and defence ministers 
as well as Chiefs of Staffs.
4
 
 
7.2.1.5 The Reluctance to Admit and the Divergence of Expectations 
 
Despite the structural innovations introduced for Georgia, the Alliance continued upholding 
its cautious stance towards Georgia with frequent comments at various levels on ongoing 
political processes within the country. For instance, the Secretary General (SG) Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen reiterated the attention the Alliance would pay to the judicial reform in Georgia, 
reflecting the cases of former government members brought to trial.
5
 As for the language 
utilized in official documents, starting from the key message of the Bucharest Summit in 
2008, the introduction of ANP was accompanied by a strong formulation of ―closely watching 
Georgia‘s democratic reform progress.‖ Additionally, NATO listed the whole spectrum of 
areas (military personnel management, transparency of the military budget, etc.), in which 
Georgia was urged to show better performance.
6
 Here, as well as in the Strasbourg/Kehl 
Summit Declaration of 2009, any reference to Georgia being offered MAP - status was 
avoided with the Allies‘ central focus remaining on the ANP as the core mechanism of 
assessing Georgia‘s integration performance. Similar to both declarations, the Lisbon Summit 
in 2010 did not offer radical improvements with regard to Georgia‘s hopes. While it 
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acknowledged her membership aspirations, as it also did toward the Balkan countries, it also 
made it clear, that negotiation on MAP remained a distant option.  
 
The issue of granting MAP - status is of critical importance. While NATO on the one hand 
denies Georgia any chance of being granted a Membership Action Plan as a firm guarantee of 
future membership, and urges Georgia to regard the ANP as an alternative mechanism of 
direct membership, the Alliance has openly extended to Bosnia - Herzegovina in May 2012 an 
invitation to complete formal preparations to be accepted in MAP process.
1
 No less important 
is the structural and topical organization of the documents mentioned, that reveal a significant 
dwindling of relevance of the enlargement - topic to the Alliance‘s organizational mission and 
dynamics. The strain placed on NATO by the ISAF - operation in Afghanistan, along with 
NATO‘s resource limitations and its military restructuring, have forced NATO HQ to rethink 
the Alliance‘s priorities and to lower the priority placed on enlargement plans. Thus, the 
Alliance requires from Georgia to undertake deep systemic and institutional reforms in 
accordance with democratic standards, norms, and values.
 2
 Second, it sends signals that 
expectations of quick membership are futile, and makes it clear that reforms that are 
requested, even if successfully implemented, have to be evaluated in a long - term perspective 
to ensure Georgia‘s democratic credibility.3 
 
The domestic debate in Georgia is less concerned with the above - mentioned aspects of 
integration, although capturing the clarity of NATO‘s strategic messaging and preference 
orderings adequately would greatly benefit the logic and efficiency of policy making 
domestically. At first glance, the understanding of strategic interests and preferences would 
favor the following formula that ―the more explicit the guarantee, the greater the likelihood 
that the commitment will be met‖, which is plausible in the case of Georgia‘s membership 
aspirations.
4
 As we have clearly seen, NATO is not ready to offer explicit guarantees to 
Georgia that would naturally imply an invitation to MAP process, nor has Georgia regarded 
NATO - integration higher than the objective of territorial integrity within its security policy 
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realm. These diverging interests have not been compensated by strong incentives that would 
keep Georgia‘s ambitions high while encouraging the transformation of its political and 
defense systems. In a very explicit sense the gaps in gains caused by cooperation had to be 
credibly limited or compensated by ―side - payments.‖1 Since it was not the case either, the 
North Atlantic Alliance was not able to elaborate credible insurance mechanisms for Georgia, 
nor was Georgia ready to abandon pressing domestic imperatives. As argued by a former 
Estonian Defence Advisor Christian Liflaender in : ―The government of Georgia needed 
external legitimacy to gain more power internally, and somehow NATO played a legitimacy -
enhancing role in Georgia to justify or reject some actions.‖2  
 
It is remarkable, how frequently NATO - and affiliated officials reiterated the critical 
importance of the consequent implementation of reforms in Georgia, including the defence 
ones. For instance, in an interview to Radio Free Europe in 2006 Robert Simmons (a NATO 
special representative in South Caucasus) four times stressed the crucial importance of the 
implementation of multiple promises made and urged Georgian side to ―carry them 
(especially the agreed IPAP - objectives) out in the practice of the Defence Ministry‖.3 
Similarly, the ISAB (International Security Advisory Board) - report produced in 2006 
identified the political will and dedication to implement reforms as the most critical factor 
determining the ultimate success of reforms.
4
 Other sources point also to other factor, with the 
potential of positive and negative repercussions. Antje Fritz, for instance, highlights the lack 
of implementation efforts as the major impediment for reforms, manifesting in a formally 
energetic support of MAP - idea with no consequent and consistent implementation actions. 
As she claims, it would even be worse, since ―in case Western support would stop, no chances 
would be left for any progress.‖5 Pretty in line with this claim, the Transparency International 
Georgia (TI) report in 2007 summarizes the views of local defence experts and states that 
―NATO - specific objectives have been fulfilled on paper only, while substantive reform has 
yet to be realized.‖6 Further it claims that the mentioned deficiency along with the ambiguity 
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of NATO - requirements to Georgia turned the overall compliance of national authorities to 
an especially difficult task.  
 
It is evident, that Georgian hopes of membership and actions implemented on the ground 
significantly mismatched the NATO - expectations. Despite President Saakashvili‘s insistence 
on the recognition of progress made by Georgia and Giga Bokeria‘s (head of the National 
Security Council till 2013) criticism of NATO lacking the vision ―on certain fundamental 
issues‖, the Alliance upheld its cautious approach to Georgia and continued denying the 
discussion on a ―big carrot‖ - MAP.1 Understandably, the Georgian considerations are 
legitimate in the light of Georgia‘s desperate search for strong security guarantees and the fact 
of their banal absence. Yet it is far from evident that Georgian authorities would decide in 
favor of the long path of NATO accession if they had an alternative bilateral military 
agreement with the U.S.. As Hooman Peimani observed, Georgians were very much 
interested in having a strong U.S. military presence in the country, preferably a large military 
base.
2
 His claims seem to have a solid foundation, since even after the change of the 
government in 2012 the new chair of the Security and Defence Committee, Irakli Sesiashvili 
admitted, that for him ―much more important is the status of the US - ally rather than 
integration in NATO.‖3 In the case of a U.S. - Georgia bilateral military agreement, being 
implemented without any precondition of democratic reforms in defense and security, the 
nation would meet its primary strategic objective - ensuring its physical security, thus 
eliminating the need and incentive to deeper institutional reforms, as required by NATO. The 
war with Russia made it impossible at least in mid - term prospective to pursue the imperative 
of the domestic agenda - the restoration of territorial integrity, forcing President Saakashvili 
to make in early 2009 a statement unthinkable before, as he stated that the ―EU membership is 
more important to us than integration into NATO.‖4 Naturally, this statement is not about the 
abrupt change of strategic orientation. But it also indicates, how strongly the NATO - 
integration process and defence reform actions were contingent on the political will of 
Georgian authorities.  
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As NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) report in 2007 puts it, the delegation was assured 
by Georgian counterparts, that the guiding principles of reforms were predictability, 
sustainability and continuity.
1
 Next chapters will shed more light in this regard and provide 
more insight about the degree, with which the mentioned ambitious principles were applied in 
various (incl. functional / policy) fields of defence transformation.  
 
 
7.2.2 Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
 
The large body of defence related strategic documents in Georgia has little to say about the 
democratic principles of governing defence. A relatively new document issued in 2012 on the 
Status of Defense Transformation similarly avoided any explicit mentioning of democratic 
values-related references within the context of NATO integration.
2
 The only powerful 
statement along these lines that we have been able to discover was the resolution of the 
Georgian Parliament on the major directions of the country‘s foreign policy. This document 
unambiguously interprets the Euro - Atlantic integration process of Georgia as the path 
towards strengthening democratic institutions, rule of law, and individual liberties.
3
 Along 
with an interview given by the Defense Minister, Irakli Alasania to MOD – press service, in 
which he recognizes the shortfalls of Georgia‘s democratic system from NATO‘s perspective, 
this parliamentary resolution is a rare example of anchoring the issue of democratic identity 
and shared common values in the agenda of official and policy - relevant documents.
4
  
 
7.2.2.1 Continuing Deficits of parliamentary Control  
 
The democratic control of armed forces has been commonly recognized as the guiding 
principle of security sector governance, and, as extensively touched upon in previous chapters 
on Security Sector Reform (SSR), is based on the managing role of the civilian defence 
minister and his civilian dominated staff, as well as on the crucial role of the national 
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parliament to hold the ministry of defence accountable for any plan or action. Despite the 
preponderance of security concerns in Georgian strategic agenda, the application of 
democratic rules of governance to defence sector, faced in fact, no formal, legal or practical 
impediment. Committing partners ―to preservation of democratic societies‖ had been a clear 
message, constantly addressed by NATO in relation to Georgia.
1
 An exceptionally strong 
speech was delivered by Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at Tbilisi State University 
on October 4, 2007: 
  
Contrary to what people may think, modernisation of the defence and security sector 
is not all that NATO is interested in.  As a matter of fact, quite the opposite is true.  
NATO supports Georgia's sovereign right to spend what it chooses on defence, and to 
organise its military forces as it thinks best.  However, the Alliance will continue to 
look carefully at how the defence process is conducted, in order to ensure that money 
is spent rationally, according to agreed plans, and balanced against other priorities 
like poverty reduction and education.  When assessing progress in Georgia, NATO 
has looked, and will continue to look, at the whole reform picture, and not just the 
military dimension. One crucial reform priority that is not linked to the military is to 
firmly establish the rule of law, which really is the cornerstone of any democracy. 
These are the very same values and principles of democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law that NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance has stood for almost six 
decades.  And that is why I hope, and expect, that Georgia will continue to embrace 
those democratic principles.
 2
 
 
Undeniably, the higher prioritization of democratic principles than that of purely military 
management is more than visible here. This statement also shows clearly the areas, where the 
Alliance expects Georgia to make progress, making the membership - aspiration almost 
entirely contingent on the scale of democratic achievements. Similarly, the NATO - officials 
dealing with Georgia on daily basis ―sign up‖ under the mentioned statement of the Secretary 
General. As Gustav Vroemen, a NATO IS - officer argues in his interview in 2013, despite 
the military, i.e. defence focus of the work ―first of all, we look how Georgia meets western 
democratic standards and government accountability‖.3 As for the essence of the democratic 
control of the military the NATO regarded following elements as necessary to implement:
4
 
 
 Appropriate legislation setting out the roles and responsibilities  
 Effective and transparent financial planning and resource allocation 
procedures 
                                                 
1
 ―Deepening Relations with Georgia,‖ 3. 
2
 ―Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia.‖ 
3
 Interview with Gustav Vroemen, NATO-IS, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Brussels, NATO HQ. 
4
 Ibid. 
203 
 
 Transparent management of Defence 
 
These principles indeed have been recognized by Georgian authorities as priority issues along 
with adoption of NATO - standards to enhance interoperability of forces. Yet as it becomes 
evident, the immature institutional structure and the peculiarities of the overall political 
system created serious impediments for the swift establishment of the democratic control 
mechanisms in early 2000s.  Based on the extensive use of interviews and surveys Antje Fritz 
concluded in 2004, that the whole defence and military system was determined ―by personal 
relationships rather than by well defined democratic procedures‖ resulting in clannish 
thinking, clientelism and corruption.
1
 The period of 2004 to 2007 is strongly characterized by 
the formal presence of strong legal provisions enabling the national parliament to execute 
control functions. However, as DCAF - report concluded, by 2005 the Parliament exposed a 
significant weakness in every day management and routine application of control 
mechanisms.
2
 In particular, the most difficult areas for the first IPAP - phase appeared to be 
the inability of parliamentarians to participate and execute their monitoring functions in 
defence policy formulation and the control of defence appropriations.
3
 The ISAB - team while 
drafting assessment and recommendations on defence reforms arrived to the same conclusion. 
It stressed the lacking practice and the weakness of the Defence and Security Committee of 
the parliament to check the transparency of defence spending and supplementary special 
funds.
4
 Similarly, the DCAF - report in 2007 attests the Georgian Parliament no practice of 
thorough investigations on defence matters, defence budget, nor other independent actions 
―other than authorizing policies and actions taken by the Executive.‖5 
 
The report describes the existing legal arrangements as ideal for implementing an effective 
parliamentary control. In reality, however, the inherent deficiencies of the oversight function 
could not be overseen and had to be related to following dimensions: the legal provisions of 
control, the structure of the formal control body, and the lack of professional expertise of the 
people involved.  The parliament can only approve or refuse the draft of the state budget 
submitted by the government, and the delegates cannot request the amendment of the budget, 
neither receive the detailed picture of defence appropriations, nor participate in budget -
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development or interagency budgetary discussions.
1
 The quality of the insufficient budgetary 
transparency, i.e. submission and approval of the budget based on very general defence 
budgetary parameters, will be dealt in depth in another chapter on ―Budgetary Planning and 
Transparency‖. Yet, it must be briefly mentioned, that through the annual reports provided by 
State Audit Office the Parliament possesses the ability to control the legality and feasibility of 
the budgetary spending of defence ministry.
2
 As the Georgian Atlantic Council final report 
reveals, during the review period of 2004 - 2014 the Audit Office checked only few offices 
and departments, and none of reports reflected any results of auditing ministry of defence for 
2011 and 2012.
3
 Evidently, there was no interest from the parliament to inquire or demand a 
financial investigation in defence matters and to utilize the Audit Office as effective tool of 
holding the ministry of defence accountable.  
 
The Defence and Security Committee is the key instrument to ensure the executive‘s 
accountability. Once a year the minister of defence has to present a report to parliamentarians 
on ongoing activities and plans of armed forces, as well as on the participation in foreign 
missions.
4
 The committee is the first body, through which the requested information is being 
channeled. It has eighteen members and ten staff - workers.
5
 Even with the support of the 
committee and its staff - members parliament is not liable to question the professional 
qualifications of senior military and civilian officials employed in the ministry and armed 
forces.
6
 Nor there is any informal tradition of inviting external experts, NGO - or Think -
Tanks representatives for discussing defence related issues or receiving independent reports. 
The former deputy Defence Minister Tamar Karosanidze (in office from 2012 to 2014) attests 
a serious deficit of expertise in Parliament till 2012 as ―it lacks the competence both in the 
committees and in the administration.‖7 Within the committee a group of confidence or so 
called Trust Group is mandated to question any issue and demand information or report from 
the ministry of defence. According to Georgian Atlantic Council report in 2014 the group had 
right to meet once a month in a non - public format before 2008; however, amendments made 
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in 2008 reduced the frequency of mandatory meetings to once in six month period.
1
 It is also 
noteworthy, that in 2005 a candidacy named for the Trust Group by the opposition was 
rejected by the majority of the parliament, the ruling United National Movement (UNM) 
party, leaving the group in a sole ownership of three UNM - members.
2
 Throughout 2007 no 
opposition party member was included in the group.
3
 Even after certain amendments were 
introduced in 2008, and the minimum frequency of meeting was defined as twice a year, a 
fully staffed Trust Group met only once in November 2008, and October in 2009.
4
 In light of 
heavy damages Georgian military suffered during the August war 2008 and the following 
energetic efforts to restore its military capabilities as well as the material base, the startling 
passivity of Trust Group requires a proper explanation, which can be only interpreted as the 
unwillingness of the Government and its party – majority (UNM) in the parliament to draw 
unnecessary public attention to the issue.
5
  
 
As a former independent researcher and current UNM – member, David Darchiashvili stated 
in 2007 that, starting from 2004 the defence committee resembled more a prolonged arm of 
the ministry of defence, since it always supported MOD‘s initiatives and never scrutinized 
them in terms of financial activity, or the violation of rights of the military personnel.
6
  
Similarly, the former deputy Defence Minister, Nikoloz Vashakidze recognized, that the 
―Parliament played a very formal role and allowed itself to be involved in defence matters 
only at minimal level. The defence ministers always had cart - blanche and could do whatever 
they wanted.‖7 Until the parliamentary elections of 2012 the parliament was dominated by the 
ruling UNM - party holding 119 sits out of 150.
8
 This posed a serious factor allowing ruling 
party to initiate or delay at will any defence - related investigation. The Defence and Security 
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Committee records on parliament‘s website do not expose any activities or reports before 
2012. However as Duncan Hiscock convincingly puts it, whenever seemed necessary and 
beneficial for the party, initiating intensive hearings was not a problem, as in the case of 
hearings of special investigative commission, where high political and military ranks 
including President Saakashvili himself were invited to testify about Russia‘s aggression in 
2008.
1
 Since neither before nor afterwards the investigative practice acquired the quality of a 
permanent parliamentary tradition, a conclusion can be made, that such exceptional actions 
served a certain political purpose, which seemed advantageous at that particular time and for 
the particular domestic or international context. Most likely it served the objective of restoring 
the government‘s damaged international credibility and legitimation. Not least it attempted to 
provide a picture of adherence to the basic practices of a western parliamentary investigative 
model. Nonetheless, no evidence of the routine and repetitive application of the mentioned 
practice leaves rather a disturbing picture of masking efforts than the coherent adoption of the 
commonly shared norms of behavior. 
 
Between 2005 and 2006 committee sessions were open, with the possibility of wide 
attendance from the civil sector, and till 2007 the information about ongoing reforms and 
activities in the defence sector was regularly provided on committee - and parliamentary 
hearings, among others, by a frequent attendance of deputy defence minister.
2
 Since then, as 
the source claims ―this practice has virtually disappeared.‖3 The period between 2005 and 
2006 seems indeed a rare example of a regular interaction between the Georgian ministry of 
defence and the parliament. As the Georgian Atlantic Council report in 2014 admits, only in 
2005 the deputy defence minister took part in five parliamentary/committee meetings, and the 
open format hearings in the next year on various issues of defence reforms and their 
implementation were frequently attended by senior military and civilian representatives of the 
defence ministry.
4
 Further, in the period between 2007 and 2010 the defence minister just 
once attended the committee session and once hosted the committee meeting in 2009 
discussing the defence concept, ongoing processes in armed forces and the situation in 
occupied territories.
5
  The strange mixture of issues discussed, barely to be completed even in 
a long series of sessions, indicate a very formal nature of the meeting with no real importance 
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or the chance of successive follow - up on the ground. This claim is further strengthen by the 
fact, that in the period from 2010 to 2012 no evidence of the particular interest on the side of 
parliament was found to hold a respective session and invite defence minister; neither minister 
showed any initiative to attend parliamentary meetings.
1
 The governmental change in 2012 
brought some change in this regard. The new defence minister Irakli Alasania declared in the 
Building Integrity Self Assessment report his desire to enhance its relationship with Parliament 
with a goal ―to communicate with the Defence and Security Committee leadership on a 
weekly basis.‖2 However, even in light of those optimistic words, the reality seemed much 
more sober. The tradition of the ―passive engagement‖ with the ministry of defence continues 
to preserve within the Defence and Security Committee. As Bruce Bach, a former NATO – IS 
official concluded: ―Only after elections in 2012 the opposition parties and NGOs have really 
become engaged in defence matters of any kind meaningfully‖ with persisting deficits in 
knowledge and initiative on Parliament‘s side.3  
 
Although some improvements in the domain of the parliamentary control of the military are 
visible, the overall picture is still featured by rare committee hearings, mostly initiated by 
Defence Ministry and attended by the passive or ―moderately critical‖ majority of the 
committee - members.
4
 In general, it is symptomatic, how passively Parliament followed, in 
fact, disregarded its legal duties prescribed by the Law on Defence Planning, especially with 
regard to discussing the defence development plans, concepts and budgetary programs.
5
 As 
Teona Akubardia highlights in an article, the central element of program - based budgetary 
planning and its implementation remained a perennial problem for the Ministry of Defence, 
and the parliamentary committee has done little if anything to correct ―this imperfection‖, nor 
it does better job to review key defence and security related policy documents.
6
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7.2.2.2 “Civilianization“ and incompetent Leadership 
 
The second, not least important element of democratic control of the armed forces relies on 
the effective management of the ministry of defence run by a civilian minister and an 
administration staffed predominantly with civilian professionals. Law on Defence issued in 
December 2004 delineated the chain of command and functional responsibilities between the 
president, defence minister and the chief of staff.
1
 The IPAP - report 2004 - 2006 testifies the 
swift transition to civilian - run ministry of defence, and praises steps to solidify the process 
by necessary legal amendments.
2
 Various sources confirm that by the year 2007 the overall 
process of ―civilianization‖ was completed. For instance, DCAF – report in 2007 highlighted 
that reforms ensured the minister was a civilian and all executive positions within the MOD 
were manned by civilians with total of 750 civilian personnel.
3
 Functionally the ministry was 
responsible for policy issues, financial management and international affairs.
4
 NATO 
parliamentary delegations documented the progress achieved in establishing a full civilian 
control over the ministry of defence, and basically confirmed the positive assessment of IPAP 
– 2006, which labeled Georgia as the ―most advanced country‖ in implementing reforms.5  
Yet the early indications of authoritative style of management could not be simply dismissed, 
due to common perception of the minister as a ―commanding officer rather than a civilian‖ 
creating such conditions, in which political authority directly interfered in military affairs and 
undermined the military chain of command as well as personnel policy.
6
 As William Lahue 
summarizes: 
 
In 2008 a new leadership came to the Ministry of Defence and everything changed, 
more to worse. As the previous defence minister Akhalaya was appointed, it was clear 
that the major goal was to ensure the 100% loyalty of the armed forces to the existing 
power-hierarchy.
7
 
 
Furthermore, the competence of the appointed leadership in ministry of defence raised serious 
doubts even within the military ranks. The deputy Head of the General Staff, Vladimir 
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Chachibaya admitted in 2014 that: ―In the past, one of the major problems was the lack of 
political will within the ministry to implement reform agenda, as well as the decision - 
making with a high dose of incompetence.‖1 After parliamentary elections in October 2012 
the former defence minister David Kezerashvili was charged in Georgia for bribery and 
money laundering, and another ex - defence minister Bacho Akhalaya along with Chief of 
Joint Staff Gigi Kalandadze and number of senior, mid - level military officers was charged 
for the abuse of power, torture and other crimes.
2
 Though all this aspects are of a particular 
importance to the isse of democratic control of the armed forces, we prefer to provide more 
details on this topic in the following chapter dealing with the particular issue of personnel 
management policy.  
 
Finalizing this part we can conclude that the period between 2004 and 2007 was largely 
characterized by two diverging processes. On one side the parliament has revealed continuing 
inability to control government‘s, i.e. defence ministry‘s activities and hold both accountable, 
which primarily had to be attributed to the lack of political will, and partially to the absence of 
the relevant expertise in the field.
3
 In 2004 a civilian minister of defense was appointed to 
head the office, which was also staffed primarily by civilians. Although budget plans have 
been regularly presented to NATO officials, critics pointed at inadequate legislative 
oversight.
4
 The critique also highlighted the few checks on executive authority and on the 
failure to adopt deep institutional reforms.
5
 The level of public involvement in discussing 
defense - related policy issues has been very low. Similarly, the parliamentary oversight of 
defense policy development appeared to be insufficient, rarely having broad discussion on 
defense priorities and the budgetary plans to meet the strategic and long - term requirements. 
The mere reference to a small Group of Trust, which possessed access to classified 
information on defense spending and acquisition, could not serve as a plausible excuse for the 
existing participatory deficit.
6
 The approval of defense budgets without any detailed review of 
budgetary appropriations and the required level of coordination with other state bodies has 
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frequently led to the creation of the ―exlusive club‖ of trustees, where no deper insight could 
be provided.
1
 Along with its budgetary control function Parliament largely disregarded other 
monitoring mechanisms of the defence such as discussing deployment issue and associated 
risk factors, the adequacy of troop equipment, the appointment of high - ranking military 
officers etc.
2
 The radical change of the political landscape in Georgia in 2012, brought some 
signs of revival, initiated and supported from the top of the new leadership (coalition 
―Georgian Dream‖). The new Speaker of the Parliament David Usupashvili was asserting to 
NATO - PA delegation that the supervising quality of the parliament as well as the degree of 
transparency increased significantly.
3
 Indeed, the Defence and Security Committee session 
reports are regularly placed on Parliament‘s webpage. However, the indigenous challenges of 
effective parliamentary control and participation remain still an issue.  
 
Throughout diplomatic visits to Georgia in 2013 (NAC in June 2013) and NATO HQ (NGC, 
on March 14, 2013), no specific comment was made on problems existing within the military 
realm of cooperation, but much on democratic transformation and international cooperation.
4
 
Consequently, referring to the ―solid achievements‖ in defence reforms brought up by U.S. 
State Secretary John Kerry on February 26 in 2014, we might suggest that these achievements 
were rather of functional and military nature than a radical break - through in democratic and 
institutional management of defence.
5
  
 
7.3 NATO - Influence in Functional Areas of Defence 
 
7.3.1 Introduction  
 
Since the notion of defense transformation is very much related to reorganization of defense 
policy, priorities, structures, capabilities, training, and even business practices, the application 
of NATO requirements, i.e. norms, standards and procedures would mean a significant 
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change in all areas mentioned afore.
1
 We admit that the lack of first - hand information, 
especially of NATO - reports, is a serious limiting factor for the reliability of findings we 
present in this chapter. Nevertheless, we believe that an intensive review of secondary sources 
still makes it possible to provide more than just a general picture of the results achieved by 
Georgian government and defense ministry in the period between 2004 and 2012. 
 
We could not avoid regarding the brief war with Russia in 2008 as a second point of 
analytical departure after the year 2004, which directly affected all decisions made by 
Georgian political leadership and the Ministry of Defence. Thus, whenever we revisit the 
policy areas for a closer analysis, the effects of the war in 2008 will be constantly kept in 
mind. In general, however, we should reiterate the critical importance of the situation created 
by the end of 2003, which was featured by a lack of basic understanding of security policy, 
the confusion of roles between the military and civilians, and the local politicians trying to 
establish a personal, rather than the state‘s control over armed units.2 
 
The reforms initiated in 2004, naturally, could not change everything overnight. The IPAP 
2004 - 2006 indeed praises the fulfillment of PAP – DIB (Partnership Action Plan – Defence 
Institution Building) objectives, however, it also highlights some areas, where a significant 
improvement is required. These are: affordable and sustainable defence strategies along the 
personnel and resource management.
3
 In a meeting with NATO - PA delegation in 2007 the 
Defence Minister David Kezerashvili admitted that the army had to be put together of 
scratch.
4
 Interestingly, however, the Transparency International report of the same year claims 
that the main reform efforts to meet NATO - requirements were directed to infrastructural 
projects, and many objectives were implemented on paper only, leaving substantial changes 
still missing.
5
 The aim of the following chapters is exactly to check the evidence of that claim 
and to prove, whether the reforms were indeed pushed by ―impatient reformers without 
reference to a wider sectoral strategy.‖6   
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7.3.2 Defence Policy and Planning  
 
Despite the extensive political focus on the key importance of the North Atlantic Alliance in 
safeguarding Georgia‘s independence and stability, close study of the relevant sources reveals 
an ambiguous picture of preferences existing among a range of national objectives.  
 
7.3.2.1 Confusing Messages of Georgian strategic Documents    
 
The parliamentary resolution mentioned earlier is the only document that places the Euro -
Atlantic integration at core of country‘s foreign policy, while recognizing its primacy among 
other foreign and security policy objectives. Contrary to that, the National Security Concept 
(NSC) assigns the Euro - Atlantic integration an unfortunate fifth place among Georgia‘s core 
national interests, whereas democracy and rule of law stand at only third place in the list of 
national values.
1
 While we do not wish to comment on the inherent failures of the document 
to present national values as key elements of national way of life, it was surprising that among 
the nation‘s security policy priorities NATO integration ranked below ―de - occupation‖ and 
the ―improvement‖ of defense capabilities.2  
 
Georgia‘s governmental websites exposed a general feature of frequent change since the 
practice of the quick turnover of governmental appointees became standard, resulting in the 
loss of previously posted information or documentary material. The Georgian ministry of 
defense is no exception in this regard. The earlier versions of the ―Minister‘s Vision‖ 
document have been withdrawn, with the exception of the last one, which was amended and 
renewed under Irakli Alasania, the defense minister appointed by the new government in 
2012. This short - term (2013 - 2014) policy paper lists the defense priorities of the ministry, 
and obviously assigns NATO integration the lowest importance due to its placement as last 
among the ministry‘s priorities. Furthermore, it is formulated in conjunction with the broader 
notion of enhancing international cooperation, and is directly defined as focusing on the 
interoperability aspect of cooperation.
3
 If this is formally the case, the single element of 
interoperability improvement in the NATO integration framework has then to be considered 
as equally relevant and not more important than other forms of bilateral or multilateral 
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defense cooperation. The same tendency of certain neglect is evident in other chapters of the 
document, where nothing specific to the Alliance‘s importance with regard to the priority of 
improving defense capabilities, or improving the NATO interoperability of Georgia‘s forces, 
is mentioned, not to mention the critical relevance of NATO requirements and standards.
1
  
 
Another important source of information is the Document of the “Defense Policy Priorities 
for 2005 - 2006: main directions of the Ministry of Defense.” It identifies three major policy 
priorities, among which the improved combat capabilities ranks as top one, the facilitation of 
NATO - integration process by enhanced interoperability of forces as the second one and 
better planning and defence management (personal, material, financial) system as the key tool 
for implementing decisions effectively.
2
 The solid evidence of the uncoordinated efforts of 
Georgian institutions to reflect the proper significance of the Alliance for country‘s strategic 
foreign, security, and defense policies points either toward the absence of the strong 
coordinating signals from the top of the government to pursue more coherent national actions, 
or the inability of government branches to detect and correct the policy inconsistencies. It can 
also have certain effect on the pace of integration with the Alliance, since the theoretical 
primacy of territorial integrity over the nation‘s Euro - Atlantic aspirations would imply the 
accession process to be only initiated once Georgia‘s sovereignty over its breakaway regions 
has been restored, and not vice versa.  
 
The lack of coherent defence planning had its roots in the serious deficits in understanding 
SSR. This in turn resulted in a chronic inability to produce a precise program of reforms based 
on a clear hierarchy of identified strategic objectives and interests, translated into the missions 
of the armed forces. As Antje Fritz testifies, the ―White Paper‖ drafted by the ministry of 
defence in 2002 failed to provide the needed clarity, and without approved National Security 
Concept it literally put ―the cart before the horse.‖3 An attempt is evident here, by which the 
formal acceptance of requirements of defence policy planning (formal compliance) by 
national authorities faced serious challenges in terms of their coherent implementation. Antje 
Fritz describes the symptoms of the problem as the conflict between strategic considerations 
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and personal influence, individual preferences of politicians and ambitions of ―military 
commandment‘s‖ resulting in a frequent structural and personnel change of the army.1 
 
7.3.2.2 Frequent Change - the Feature of Georgian Defence Planning  
 
By 2004 a general agreement was reached and consequently supported by the ISAB - team to 
move ―from quantity to quality, a reduction of numbers and an enhancement of capability to 
provide a more flexible military which is interoperable with NATO and other western 
forces.‖2  As Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole argue, after the Rose Revolution the military was 
given an objective of building a smaller and much capable military force to meet NATO -
requirements.
3
 By 2004 the ministry of defence was clearer about the reform intentions. 
According to Korneli Kakachia in 2005, the major principle was declared by defence officials 
to reduce the size of forces to 14.648 servicemen by significantly increasing its training, 
equipment quality and capabilities and to optimize the staffing structure of the civilian office 
and the General Staff.
4
 The number indicated does not differ radically from the number 
provided by other sources. For instance, Shorena Lortkipanidze refers to 15.000 as the size - 
objective of future forces to be downsized from 24.000 servicemen.
5
 Yet, the multiple 
uncertainties about the blurred lines of responsibilities, authority and the soviet legacy of a 
very centralized decision - making, left many doubts about the course of action open. In 
particular, two events seemed to be of crucial relevance. First was the western partners‘ major 
recommendation to integrate the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior into the regular 
armed force by the end of 2004.
6
 The second one implied the strategic review of the armed 
forces titled as SDR (Strategic Defence Review) to develop professional capabilities and 
ensure the necessary restructuring of forces. Noteworthy that the key phase of the SDR and 
defence planning system envisaged the development of strategic defence documents that 
would provide guiding principles in drafting and implementing various functional policies.
7
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Concerns about the credibility of Georgian plans were not ungrounded. As feared by many 
observers, the initial objectives of reforms were quickly reversed, as Irakli Okruashvili took 
over the ministry of defence in December 2004. According to some local observers, the new 
minister undermined civilian control, conducted a radical personnel change among civilian 
and military staff members and was involved in ―haphazard spending on weapons bought 
from former Warsaw Pact countries.‖1 Although the issue of SDR is devoted a separate place 
in this chapter, it should still be mentioned here that this document represented a major long - 
term planning guidance, approved by the President, and provided with sufficient clarity the 
overall size, structure and the needed capabilities of armed forces. The document envisaged 
by 2009 the decrease of forces to 26.000, which was clearly abandoned by the decision to 
form a fifth brigade and to increase by that the total number of personnel to 32.000.
2
 Here, we 
have a clear evidence of not only rejecting early given promises and commitments of force – 
reduction, agreed by all sides in 2004, but even worse, a spontaneous revision and disregard 
of the plans approved within the national SDR – process itself. As Gustav Vroemen 
highlights, NATO - officials could not justify the idea of creating fifth brigade and the 
―International Staff (IS) was arguing to use available scares resources to better optimize 
combat capabilities of existing four brigades.‖3  
 
As mentioned before, the conflicts regions of Georgia and associated security concerns 
heavily influenced the domestic agenda. We agree to Duncan Hiscock‘s conclusion that all 
this decisively affected the policy priorities of Georgian leadership with the subsequent follow 
- up steps in force planning that disregarded NATO‘s concerns and aversion to any kind of 
increase of Georgian armed forces, including the reserve units.
4
 Objectively, Georgian 
authorities had all reasons to be concerned with deteriorating security environment in the 
region. The eruption of violence in 2004 and 2006 were followed by increased provocations 
and air - space violation from Russian side in March and August 2007, during which 
Georgian administrative facilities were attacked.
5
 Facing the challenge of a growing military 
threat and combat capabilities of separatist forces, Georgian leadership indeed had to solve a 
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huge dilemma of how to respond to the worrying developments.
1
 As it became evident, the 
decision was made to revise the earlier agreed objectives and pursue the policy of a hasty 
force increase by formally reflecting the made changes post - factum in key defence policy 
and planning documents. In light of the early statements made by President Saakashvili and 
Defence Minister Okruashvili in 2004 and 2005, such decision appears less surprising. In 
February 2004 during the cabinet meeting President Michail Saakashvili made clear the 
intention ―to form the armed forces, which will terrify the separatists‖, and Minister Irakli 
Okruashvili declared in 2005 that Georgians were ―a warrior nation (…)We have no right not 
to unite Georgia.‖2 The made decisions on structural changes of armed forces indeed were 
later included in the SDR - document, approved by the President in November 2007.  
 
7.3.2.3 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) – rather Formality than the Guidance 
 
The frequently mentioned process of the Strategic Defence Review played a crucial role in 
shaping Georgia´s defence policy and planning capacity. The need of its initiation was already 
indicated as the one of the major IPAP - objectives in 2004 that would define the structure and 
capabilities of armed forces throughout 2015 and assign the interagency commission the 
monitoring function of implementation.
3
 As Shorena Lortkipanidze recalls in 2005, the 
Georgian ministry of defence was advised to start developing the SDR ―along the lines of 
reviews done by Western defence establishments‖, without which the government would 
―advance in an uncertain direction.‖4 It is symptomatic that the first major defence planning 
document developed and issued by the ministry of defence in 2007, is simply missing on the 
ministry‘s webpage, whilst other less important documents are still available. There might be 
multiple reasons explaining such awkwardness. We assume, however, that it has rather to do 
with the general fate of this document, turned to become completely irrelevant already on its 
approval day. For prooving this, we will briefly analyze the key statements and figures 
provided by the SDR - 2007 and compare them with the actions performed on the ground.  
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The SDR, basically, developed short - term (2007 - 2009), mid - term (2009 - 2012) and long 
- term (2013 - 2015) force structures and capability objectives.
1
 It was evident from the very 
beginning of the process that due to the lack of defence planning and policy expertise and 
institutional capacity, a clear hierarchy of the strategic level documents had to be established 
first. This objective was also reflected in the respective IPAP document.
2
 Consequently, 
several steps were initiated. The National Security Concept (NSC) was endorsed by the 
Parliament on July 8, 2005, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) made public in the 
same year.
3
 They were followed by the adoption of the Threat Assessment Document (TAD) 
and the Minister‘s Vision 2007, approved in December 2006.4 The IPAP served here as the 
driving force for listing major policy and planning documents and establishing an initial 
foundation of their legitimation. Yet, the proper mission of providing legal basis for strategic 
and defence planning was the draft law on Defence Planning adopted in 2006, which set out 
necessary procedures for drafting and executing force planning and budgetary cycles.
5
 The 
law provided a clear delineation of strategic and agency - level policy and planning 
documents, allowing ministry of defence and the General Staff to concentrate on Defence 
Planning Guidance and the multi - year as well as annual defence programs.
6
  
 
The public version of the SDR, which in its first chapters delineates major strategic 
documents along with the Law on Defence Planning as the crucial framework for force -
planning procedures, states clearly that the authorized strength of the Georgian armed forces 
(GAF) of 28.666 personnel in 2007 had to be reduced to 18.755 by the end of 2015.
7
 This 
radical reduction of forces had to unfold with a phased approach over a transitional period, 
limiting the personnel number in 2009 by 26.007 and in 2012 by 21.701.
8
 The inactivation of 
the 4
th
 infantry brigade and other smaller units was a key step in this regard. 
9
 Contrary to the 
plans of the already approved document, the changes made later, indicated an essential 
reversal of the declared policy, but also a significant disregard of the cyclic and sequential 
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procedures required by the newly adopted Law on Defence Planning. The changes added to 
the SDR envisaged multiple structural changes, among others, a serious increase of the 
regular and reserve forces to over 30.000 and 100.000 respectively.
1
 Most importantly, 
additional 5
th
 infantry brigade had to be created with all necessary infrastructure works and 
equipment, generating a harsh criticism that all this were not in line with NATO 
recommendations and budgetary guidelines.
2
 Furthermore, the Land Force Command was 
created already in 2006, though the SDR - draft document was presented only in June 2007 at 
NATO HQ in Brussels.
3
 As Teona Akubardia, an independent expert, recalls in 2010, many 
changes, especially the plans related to military reserve force were not guided by the proper 
calculations and capability analysis, but resembled rather a PR - campaign under the motto 
―Join the reserve! It‘s Cool!‖ with no consequent implementation actions, as promised by the 
SDR - implementation plan.
4
   
 
In fact, the SDR required the adoption of a new long - term financial and resource planning 
mechanism called PPBS (Planning Programing Budgeting System). Several times it states 
with a strong clarity that PPBS is a first action to implement in the context of NATO -
integration and improved defence management priorities, as well as stands for a backbone 
system to produce military development programs, defence planning guidance (DPG) and 
annual programs.
5
 Many steps indicated in the SDR - document such as surveillance of 
airspace and the control territorial waters were to accomplish by 2009 only after the close 
evaluation within the PPBS procedural framework.
6
 The law on Defence Planning and the 
PPBS are, in fact, based on the same conceptual planning requirements that shape the defence 
budget development for the financial year and the following four years period.
7
 As the 
Transparency International report claims in 2007, due to obvious capacity and qualification 
shortages, many of staff members of MOD were sent to U.S. and Europe for respective 
training, forcing the ministry of defence to expect the first tangible results of PPBS - 
utilization only in 2009.
8
 In terms of tangible results it would mean a fully program based 
defence budget, the force development programs, a defence planning guidance and the fully 
functional chain of decision - making. Despite the adopted law and the PPBS - manual issued 
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in 2009, the available planning mechanisms have not been institutionalized, i.e. internalized 
on routine basis.
1
 Contrary to the SDR the PPBS represents a permanent and procedurally 
well - defined institutional tool for a multi - year resource and financial planning. Yet as 
Teona Akubardia claims, even after the debacle of 2008 there was no evidence of its proper 
use, and the figures of approved defence budgets continue differing significantly from the 
figures projected in the SDR (see Table 9. below):
2
   
 
 
Table 9. Difference between the SDR - projected and implemented budgetary  
  Figures  
 
Year SDR-projected Implemented % of GDP 
2008 1.100.000 1.494.535 5.4 
2009 1.151.960 897.000 5.0 
2010 1.167.016 750.000 4.5 
 
 
Interestingly, the approved SDR - document provided two versions of defence budget 
estimation. First one was initially approved, and the second one as the Annex 1 added into the 
document, as it approved after the SDR was published:
3
  
 
 
Table 10. Difference between the SDR - projected Figures (initially vs. annex) 
 
Initially approved (In Thousands of GEL) 
Year Projected GDP Projected Defence Budget (DB) DB as % of GDP 
2008 18,878,000 736,000 3.9% 
2009 21,218,900 809,600 3.8% 
2010 23,851,700 780,000 3.3% 
2011 26,813,800 796,200 3.0% 
2012 29,495,180 737,380 2.5% 
2013 32,444,698 746,228 2.3% 
2014 35,689,168 820,851 2.3% 
2015 39,258,085 902,936 2.3% 
2016 43,183,893 993,230 2.3% 
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Annex 1 added (In Thousands of GEL) 
Year Projected GDP Projected Defence Budget (DB) DB as % of GDP 
2008 20,440,400 1,100,000 5.4% 
2009 23,039,200 1,151,960 5.0% 
2010 25,933,700 1,167,016 4.5% 
2011 29,171,400 1,166,856 4.0% 
2012 32,817,825 1,148,623 3.5% 
2013 36,920,053 1,107,601 3.0% 
2014 41,535,059 1,038,376 2.5% 
2015 46,726,942 1,074,719 2.3% 
2016 52,567,810 1,209,059 2.3% 
 
Shorena Lortkipanidze similarly attests a common practice of the Georgian executive, 
especially of the President to approve frequent budgetary increases without a detailed 
parliamentary discussion and bypassing the advanced decision - making and resource 
planning system at the MOD.
1
 Along with the Law on Defence Planning and the PPBS, the 
requirements of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) introduced by the 
Ministry of Finances since 2006 call all Georgian state ministries and agencies for submission 
of detailed budgetary plans projected for four – years period.2 As it is evident, the ministry of 
defence was either unable to provide solid and reliable plans, or it was unwilling to implement 
the approved ones. William Lahue, a head of NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi, argues that the 
problem of PPBS falls to certain degree under the category of ―formal implementation‖, by 
which hundreds if rules based procedures at various levels and their routine utilization had not 
been done.
3
 Another view - angle is provided by the former deputy Minister Tamar 
Karosanidze (in office from 2012 to 2014), who found in 2014 clear words for describing the 
past situation: 
 
The people trained to run program based, long-term resource management are now 
either out of MOD or their number is so low that the system simply cannot be run. The 
reason was that the whole issue of PPBS was either not the top priority of former 
administration or the people could not apply their knowledge properly, thus remained 
de-motivated, dismissed or left the armed forces on their free will.
4
 
 
A more detailed analysis of budgetary proposals will be provided in the chapter of budgetary 
transparency with the particular focus on the functional level of policy implementation. The 
strong linkage, however, existing between the the SDR and budgetary planning, indicates that 
the updated SDR 2013 - 2016, which was launched in aftermath of the political turnover in 
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Georgia in 2012, had the mission to correct the early document adopted in 2007, once again 
undermining its quality of a real strategic document. It reflects urgent steps the MOD -
leadership regarded necessary to restructure the General Staff Structure and armed forces. For 
instance, the Maritime Defence Department was established on place of the early abolished 
Naval Force Headquarter and the Armed Force Readiness Monitoring Division has been 
introduced.
1
  The force composition of the GAF, termed as ―current‖ in the document, 
significantly differs from that one described in SDR – 2007, and the suggested structural 
changes make the difference even more. It establishes two Operational Commands in East and 
West of Georgia, plans to create separate intelligence and medical units, as wella as the joint 
Command of Air Operations and Air Defence.
2
 As for defence budgetary projections the 
amended SDR provided following figures (see Table 11.): 
 
Table 11.  SDR 2013 – 2016 Defence Budgetary Figures3 
 
Year Projected GDP Projected Defence Budget (DB) DB as % of GDP 
2008 19 074 900 000 1 547 183 106 8,1% 
2009 17 986 000 000 869 015 694 4,8% 
2010 20 743 400 000 728 007 459 3,5% 
2011 24 344 000 000 728 427 012 3,0% 
2012 26 308 500 000 728 500 000 2,8% 
2013 28 863 100 000 660 000 000  2,3% 
2014 32 430 600 000 720 000 000 2,2% 
2015 36 095 200 000 770 000 000 2,1% 
2016 40 174 000 000 880 000 000 2,2% 
 
As expected, the data provided does not match the early budgetary projections of 2007, which 
is understandable due to significant negative effects imposed by the Russian aggression in 
Georgia in summer 2008. However, the proper defence planning would insead imply a serious 
re - launching of the strategic analysis and planning by updating all documents stated by the 
Law on Defence Planning and ultimately resulting in a full revision of the SDR with the 
planning horizon stretching far beyond 2016. In fact, we found a reference to the planning 
margins of 2016 in the document called Modern Armed Forces. This paper, owing no legal 
status according to Law on Defence Planning, resembles a kind of ―white paper‖, which 
declares policy achievements and objectives. Yet it makes clear that ―eight years have been 
established as a long - term reform period for the armed forces‖ divided in two sets of four - 
year planning periods, with the first one ending in 2016 and the second by 2020.
4
 Much 
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interesting is, however, that the Modern Armed Forces reflected the planned force 
restructuring and budgetary actions before the updated SDR was published, which raises 
serious doubt about its substitutive role for the proper SDR document as well as the total 
irrelevance of the latter. 
 
7.3.2.4 Defence Planning – A clear Evidence of sporadic Actions  
 
The picture provided so far does not speak about the strong tradition of the well established 
defence planning procedures in Georgia. The frequent disregard of the agreed plans and 
promises leaves a disturbing effect on the overall Georgian performance. More importantly, it 
indicates a permanent gap between the high, official level of promises made and the low 
degree or probability of their practical implementation. The benefits of the new planning 
mechanisms were also recognized by the high military ranks in GAF due to better picture 
provided for resources spent and the quality of unit combat readiness or the level of NATO -
interoperability.
1
 Yet, as it seems, they never received a clear political signal for the practical 
implementation of new policies. The Interagency Commission responsible for monitoring and 
supervising the implementation process never materialized, although explicitly mentioned by 
SDR - 2007.
2
 Further, the Management Teams (MTs) and Decision Making Board (DMB), 
the structural entities of teh decision – making chain designated by the updated SDR – paper, 
in fact, never fully took over the functions envisaged by the PPBS - framework, endangering 
by that the credibility of the entire planning process.
3
 As Gustav Vroemen, a NATO – IS 
official, puts it: 
 
The Georgian leadership must vitally be interested in benefits of implementation while 
reaching designed objectives. We clearly see it with new government that contrary to 
Akhalaya’s permanent promises and future plans has already provided sober and 
realistic timelines of Force-transition.
4
  
 
The evidence collected proves that the heavy weight of a solely rhetorical action and 
permanent promises was a major feature of the Georgian defence officials for the entire 
period of 2004 to 2012. Bruce Bach, a former NATO – IS official, doubts entirely on the 
ability of Georgian MOD to conduct proper long term planning, with much of focus on the 
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year ahead and the inherent difficulties to identify needed capabilities based on the rigorous 
process of requirements analysis.
1
 Not far from this conclusion is the statement of the Deputy 
Chief of General Staff of Georgia, Vladimir Chachibaya, who highlighted three critical 
weaknesses of the policy and planning process:
2
 
 
 Fragmented (chaotic) nature of strategic vision and planning 
 Inadequate prioritization of GAF - objectives 
 Formal nature of strategic documents and particularly the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) 
 
Another perspective of looking at the problem is to check briefly how the revision of the 
strategic planning documents unfolded within the period of analysis. The National Security 
Concept was not approved as late as August 2011, although the war against Russia occurred 
three years before.
3
 Similar observation can be made with regard to the National Military 
Strategy (NMS), which was updated as late as 2013 (five years after the war) and published 
by the MOD in 2014. This evidence of delays and the degraded sense of timing serve as a 
good indicator for the lack of institutional adaptation, capacity and interagency coordination. 
But this also testifies a significant disregard of formal policies and procedures at the level of 
decision - makers (mid - to high level), with the consequence of missing the policy norm and 
procedure - internalization at lower levels of daily routine. The assessment could be more 
radical, since it was the NATO that urged Georgia immediately after war in 2008 to continue 
reforms with ―lessons learned from the war in mind.‖4 This process of the comprehensive 
review of the security and defence sector was termed as the National Security Review (NSR). 
Its main objective was to unify national efforts in rationalizing the security agencies‘ 
functions, missions, and capabilities.
5
 The process strongly encouraged by the Alliance 
showed no real signs of life, and was largely stuck in the phase of strategic document 
revision. With no consolidated body of authoritative suggestion to transform the security 
sector in the long - run in accordance with strict implementation - timelines, officially 
approved by the involved state agencies, the picture of half - hearted Georgian actions would 
be difficult to get rid off any time soon. Bob Hamilton‘s, a key U.S. - military official at the 
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Office of Defence Cooperation (ODC) in Tbilisi from 2006 to 2008, comment that the lack of 
a modern military bureaucracy had its devastating effects in policy planning, is largely valid. 
However, as for the end of the first decade of millennium, the situation looked a bit more 
nuanced. The formal and legal framework as well as procedural policies of a western - type 
defence planning was, in fact, on place in Georgia. The practical output, however, showed no 
correspondence of the desired planning objectives with existing procedures and conducted 
actions.  
 
7.3.3 Interoperability and NATO - Standards 
 
Referring to NATO‘s standards, George Katsirdakis, a former senior NATO officer for 
defense partnership and cooperation, noted the absence of any formally agreed definition of 
NATO standards, yet he still stresses the common feature - that of a shared understanding of 
―doing business,‖ of objectives, resource allocation etc.1 Two dimensions can be 
distinguished in this regard: a more broad area of so called ―doing business‖, which is very 
much about shared understanding and values, and the second dimension of technical issues 
closely related to the principle of force interoperability. Since the value based identity effects 
are subject of another chapter dealing with professional socialization of the Georgian military, 
we will primarily deal in this section of paper with the issue of military - technical standards 
and interoperability.  
 
7.3.3.1 Initial Steps: a Bottom – up Approach in the Military 
 
Robert Hamilton, describes the state of Georgian armed forces in early years of millennium as 
poorly organized, having problems with the discipline and combat skills, and managed by 
―famously corrupt leadership.‖2 This assessment is shared by Georgian officials, who like 
Gela Bezhuashvili, a former Head of the National Security Council and former foreign 
ministry, admit that ―there was no fuel, no ammunition. The stockpiles were empty. Weapons, 
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machines, tanks – they were all in a disastrous position.‖1 It was no surprise that the most 
equipment, the Georgian army owned, was soviet made. Additionally, the long standing 
political cleavages with Russian government deprived Georgia of any meaningful possibility 
of spare part supply. As NPA - report states, Georgian forces lacked sufficient maintenance 
and inherited a significant shortage on experienced officers capable to provide ―essential 
leadership.‖2 The only first real highlight of the GAF on the NATO - interoperability issue 
was, the bottom - up approach initiated by the U.S. in 2001 and called GTEP (Georgian Train 
and Equip Program), under which four infantry and one mechanized battalions were trained 
and equipped by 2004 in accordance with NATO - standards.
3
 An early indication of the 
adopted version of NATO standard - understanding is clearly visible here, and mostly refers 
to the tactical level of unit training and mission - equipment. Objectively, this approach might 
have seemed more logical to stimulate a transition of the GAF to a modern military. 
Nonetheless, as Gustav Vroemen, a NATO – IS official, admits, the notion of standards must 
be taken more broadly and applied in a wide range of issue - areas. According to him, the 
military standards are fixed and based on Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) referring 
to common standards in training, equipment, supply, capability codes, unit composition etc.
4
 
They can be applied to all partner - nations. As for the standards of more political nature, the 
approach is more selective and country – specific, formulated in national Partnership Goals 
(PGs) that cover all kind of cooperation areas:
5
 
 
 Defence planning and budgeting 
 Stable budgetary planning 
 Implementation of defence reform 
 Public information and the role of civilians in formulating security policy 
 Legal arrangements for participating in collective defence 
 National programme for security cooperation with NATO  
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Interesting view is provided by William Lahue, the head of NLO, who stresses the mandatory 
nature of NATO - standards (political and narrow military) to those countries that want to 
become NATO member and must ensure that they are ready to join by exposing their 
―nature‖- similarity to other member nations.1  This aspect is as much important as it directly 
links the high level of standard adoption to membership - aspiration, i.e. ideally present in the 
case of Georgia.  
 
Despite the mentioned expectation, we have already detected a significant level of 
underrepresentation of NATO - standards and requirements in Georgian strategic policy 
documents. We also highlighted the systematic disregard of formal requirements and 
procedures formally adopted by Georgian authorities to guide defence reforms and military 
transformation. Contrary to Gustav Vroemen‘s statement, the core body of defence related 
institutional documents, though they pay significant attention to the critical importance of the 
Alliance to Georgia, basically concentrate on the issue of interoperability of forces as the 
major enabler of NATO cooperation. For instance, the current Minister’s Vision 2013 – 2014 
and the Military Strategy issued in 2005 strengthen the value of capability developments in 
various military areas as key determinants to achieving military interoperability with NATO 
forces and ultimately full membership.
2
 The newer, in 2014 revised document of the NMS, 
mentions only once the term standard within the context of improving standard operating 
procedures of the GAF, and the whole area of NATO - interoperability is subsumed by the 
broader issue of regional security and cooperation.
3
  
 
We should not be misguided by a wrong assumption that the Georgian leadership was not 
aware about the proper meaning and the applicability of NATO - standards. For instance, 
Giorgi Baramidze, a former State Minister for European and Euro - Atlantic Integration, 
promised to the NATO - PA delegation, that the government will make sure that ―Georgia is 
ready and fully compliant with NATO standards across a broad range of government 
responsibilities, many of which are beyond the realm of security.‖4 The statement could not 
be clearer. Furthermore, the proper communication on the relevance of the standards of force 
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- and budgetary planning had been included in nearly all relevant documents agreed between 
NATO and Georgian officials. For instance, the IPAP 2004 - 2006 links all life cycle cost and 
multiple actions within each GAF - service to the outcomes of the SDR.
1
 It must be also 
noted, that the drafting of the IPAP and ANP (Annual National Plan) documents involves the 
direct participation of not only mid - level issue - focused professionals, but often ministers 
and their deputies from various Georgian ministries. Hence, the concerns of improper 
messaging from NATO - side can be easily disregarded. It must be done so, not least due to 
permanent NATO - efforts to escape the ―operational patterns‖ of standards and to indicate 
their applicability even in the PARP - context far beyond the defence sector, as it is shown in 
the NATO - Backgrounder.
2
 
 
The evidence, nonetheless, speaks much about the approval of the practical military, i.e. 
operational approach by Georgian officials. Moreover the Georgian military regarded higher 
interoperability as the means of better combat readiness. General Vladimir Chachibaya for 
instance stated: 
 
I tend predominantly towards the technical understanding of standards, and leaving 
aside the political dimension of Georgian NATO - aspiration (acquiring MAP or not), 
this linkage between interoperability and higher level of combat readiness is very 
decisive to us.
3
 
 
Even after 2012, for instance, the Georgian Ambassador to NATO Grigol Mgaloblishvili, and 
the former deputy Defence Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze were referring to standards as issues 
of more technical nature relevant to force - interoperability and compatibility of units.
4
 Thus, 
it is not suprising that the first initial steps to resolve the interoperability and standard issues 
were done under the general force - restructuring umbrella.  
 
7.3.3.2 Nuances of NATO - Standardization in Georgia  
 
As reported by Shorena Lortkipanidze, an independent expert, in 2005, the plans of force 
downsizing from 24.000 to 15.000 personnel had to be conducted along with introducing 
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policies and procedures to meet western standards.
1
 The plans, as we know, were changed. 
The Chief of General Staff, Levan Nikoleishvili (in office till 2006) reversed the downsizing 
and identified the goal from the existing 16.000 to 23.000 personnel, structured in four 
infantry brigades, one artillery brigade and a special force brigade.
2
 As author describes, the 
primary concern came from western observers due to obvious ―inadequacies in long - range 
planning, establishing priorities, and resource allocation (…) and no feasibility study.‖3 
Despite the existing criticism, the ministry of defence initiated several steps largely focusing 
on infrastructure and training improvement. Several airfields (Kopitnari, Marneuli) have been 
modernized under the U.S. and Turkish assistance by 2004, and the Vaziani training center 
received a significant upgrade being able to conduct multinational exercises, i.e. meeting 
NATO - standards.
4
 The GTEP completed a structural turn towards brigade type units. Yet 
despite intensive efforts to restructure and especially retrain the GAF by introducing non – 
commissioned officers (NCOs) and building NCO - training center, the entire equipment of 
forces remained soviet made.
5
  
 
We don‘t have any open IPAP or PARP document listing all priority activities and objectives 
in the period after 2004. Yet the six page document Defense Policy Priorities for 2005-2006 
(main directions of the Ministry of Defense), drafted by the Georgian MOD not later than 
2005 and still available only on the Parliament‘s webpage, formulates all actions the Georgian 
leadership regarded as the top priority to be implemented:
6
  
 
 Modernization of the equipment, weapons and vehicle by replacing with new ones. 
 Ensure high readiness of 1st and 2nd brigades under SSOP - programs, and the creation 
of the 4
th
 brigade of the former interior troops. 
 Full reorganization and the equipment of the artillery brigade as well as Special Forces 
brigade.  
 By 2006 three brigades intended to be fully interoperable with NATO – forces. 
 Join the NATO - air situation data exchange and train specialists and modernization 
the air defence system. 
 Upgrade of military airfield in Marneuli meeting NATO standards.  
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 Develop and modernize naval service as well as the military intelligence system.  
 Training and equipment of 20 light infantry reserve battalions.  
 Full inventory of equipment and munitions, ensure the standardization and 
categorization system, i.e. logistics codification system and ensure HNS capabilities 
for NATO - led operations  
 Develop and equip the C4 communication system with modern NATO - interoperable 
equipment, by using partner assistance in equipping all brigades, especially  2
nd
 , 3
rd
 
and 4
th
 brigades with NATO - interoperable ―Harris‖ radio systems as well as training 
of signal specialists  
 
The information provided above allows us to make a major conclusion about the focus of 
Georgian efforts in increasing the degree of interoperability with NATO - forces and in 
ensureing the application of western standards. It makes it clear that, first of all, the brigades 
that underwent the GTEP and SSOP (Sustainment and Stability Operations Program), i.e; 
designed for international (and NATO) missions, had to be highly interoperable. The primary 
areas of interoperability, i.e. of NATO - standards‘ application had been identified as 
logistics, airfields and command, control and communication systems, as well as tactical 
training of respective units. The heavy accent on improving logistical capabilities corresponds 
very well with objectives of IPAP 2004 - 2006 to ―Ensure Host Nation Support (HNS) 
capability for NATO - led exercises and operations, Develop national HNS Capability 
Catalogue Database, Negotiate an MOU with NATO.‖1 Indicative is that these actions are 
placed under the section title ―Military and Interoperability Issues‖ and a clear statement is 
provided that: 
 
Georgia regards interoperability as essential, and intends to establish, training 
management policies and procedures and their correspondent institutions as related to 
the development of overall armed forces standards and practices.
2
 
 
Similar to the Defence Policy Priorities 2005-2006 the IPAP 2004 - 2006 accentuates the 
training and education along with logistics as the most relevant issues, explicitly regarded in 
the narrow context of interoperability. So, for instance, it urges Georgian side to enhance 
logistic interoperability with NATO - forces, to develop a national interoperability concept in 
logistics and to train logistics personnel. But it also identifies the development of individual 
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and small unit training standards and the review and adoption of NATO doctrines, tactics, 
techniques and procedures by the Georgian Armed Forces as the next objectives to reach.
1
 
Due to the lack of official reports on Georgian performance, we rely on secondary sources 
that are still able to provide valuable insight on the matter. According to one NPA - report in 
2006 the newly constructed Senaki Base, designated for the 2
nd
 infantry brigade, was ―in line 
with bases in NATO member states.‖2 A year after, the same delegation visited the base and 
notified a brigade organized along standard NATO - structure with lessons learned from 
operations abroad applied in tactical training and the objective ―to perform to NATO 
standards at all times.‖3  
 
More broadly, the increased defence budget allowed defence ministry to spend more money 
for military infrastructure (storages and bases) in Gori, Senaki and other locations, as well as 
speed up the renewal of military equipment, especially in areas of command and control, 
training and exercises and logistics.
4
 It seems that the area of most concerns remained the 
general (incl. fighting) equipment of nearly all units of the GAF. In September 2007, the 
NATO Parliamentary delegation was instructed by the defence minister David Kezerashvili, 
that growing acquisition of non - NATO standard military equipment from the East European 
countries was a result of the simple factor buying ―not what I want, but what I can get.‖5 In 
general, the attempts to ensure a swift transition towards NATO - standards faced several 
serious challenges in terms of funding, policy adoption and the coordinated approach. The 
rapid change of plans, planning objectives and the consequent disruption and the revision of 
planned activities took heavy toll on the GAF. As Teona Akubardia, an independent expert, 
reported in 2010, by 2008 the rapid mechanical increase of force - size led to the conditions 
that military units‘ officer positions were manned only by 60 - 70%, and brigade commanders 
lacked necessary knowledge and experience of command and suited rather the positions of a 
company or battalion commander.
6
 Hence, it is by far not evident, whether the Georgian 
defence leadership would manage the interoperability objectives without the serious military 
assistance, provided by foreign (NATO) partners and the U.S. in particular.  
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7.3.3.3 U.S. – Assistance : Focus on foreign Deployments  
 
Georgia started receiving U.S. excess defence articles under GBSLE program in 2002 and 
was supplied with communication equipment (radios and base stations), vehicles and 
helicopters (incl. spare parts), surveillance and detection equipment, computers for 
automation of applications and some 250.000 USD for uniforms.
1
 From the prospective of 
timing this process went in parallel with the GTEP (Georgian Training and Equipment 
Program) and must be understood as the constitutive element of it. Though the concrete 
figures are not provided, the scale and the spectrum of supplies is very much telling about 
deficits of the GAF and the initial U.S. assistance priorities. By 2004 following assistance 
teams were on place in Georgia:
2
 
 
 EUCOM Joint Contact Team 
 Turkish consultant , instructors in Commando battalion, and Marneuli Airbase 
 German advisors in Logistics and NCO - training 
 British advisor in PPBS  
 A Greek advisor in Georgian Navy 
 
The General Staff received NATO - styling and codified its departments as follows: J1 for 
Personnel, J2 for Intelligence, J3 for Operations, J4 for Logistics, J5 for Force Strategic 
Planning, J6 for Control and Communication, J7 for Infrastructure.
3
 Additionally, within 
brigades and separate units certain combat readiness standards were introduced by U.S. (in 
infantry units) and French teams (in mountain training center Sachkhere), essentially to 
prepare them for foreign deployments.
4
 The overall U.S. military assistance to Georgia 
appears very impressive, since from 2002 to 2007 nearly 200 million USD were spent for 
Georgian military, which thanks the rapid increase of budgetary funding, was able to take 
over some programs (training and maintenance of UH - 1 helicopter fleet) fully funded by the 
U.S. before.
5
 Some financial figures of the U.S. military assistance to Georgia are presented in 
the chapter of comparative summary (Table 22.) structured in accordance with the respective 
                                                 
1
 Cornell et al., Regional Security in the South Caucasus, 61. 
2
 Ibid., 60. 
3
 Lortkipanidze, ―Chapter 11, The Georgian Security Sector: Initiatives and Activities,‖ 239. 
4
 Darchiashvili, Security Sector Reform in Georgia 2004-2007, 30. 
5
 Hamilton, ―Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,‖ 1–2. 
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assistance program provided. The detailed description of the programs and the content of the 
assistance delivered can be summarized as follows: 
 
2004  
 FSA (Foreign Security Assistance) Border Security and Law Enforcement  - Provide 
uniforms, transportation, infrastructure upgrade, training, command-control-
communication devices (C3), vessels and aircraft, spare parts and maintenance, radar 
and management operation, new tactical utility vehicles. 
 IMET – English language courses and courses on civil - military relations required for 
PFP participation. Equip and train Georgian deminers to UN - standards. 
 FMF – Sustain efforts initiated under GTEP, (i.e. SSOP), equipment and training for 
UH - 1 helicopter unit.
1
 
 
138 students participated in IMET – funded courses and programs.2  800 Georgian soldiers 
went through the deployment in Iraq and the overall number of Georgian students traveled to 
the U.S. reached 283.
3
 
 
2005 
134 Georgian soldiers were deployed in Kosovo and 858 in Iraq and following equipment had 
been delivered to the GAF:
 4
 
 Equipment of the combat support units of the 1st brigade, support of UH - 1 helicopter 
personnel, aviation mechanics and squadron pilot training. 
 Training of 2nd brigade from the company to a brigade staff level, training in aero-
evacuation medicine, language training; assistance in strategic and operational 
planning issues, incl. SDR. 
 MTT assistance in establishing Captain Career Course and Basic Combat Training 
Course, sending 43 officers and NCOs to US military schools.  
                                                 
1
 ―FY 2002 - 2004 Europe and Eurasia,‖ Fact Sheet (Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and 
Eurasia, United States Department of State, 2002), 340–341, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17787.pdf. 
2
 ―FY 2004 Military Assistance,‖ Fact Sheet (U.S. Department of State, 2004), 196–199, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/42247.pdf. 
3
 ―Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Georgia,‖ U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative 
Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, January 2005), 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/55792.htm. 
4
 ―Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Georgia,‖ U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative 
Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, January 2006), 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/63174.htm. 
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The total number of students under IMET in this year reached 97. 
1
 Under the FSA similar 
assistance was provided as in 2004 to Georgian Coastguard and the GTEP - units to sustain, 
as well as to reduce the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance.
2
 
 
2006 
The number of 82 students was estimated under IMET, though 46 Georgian officers, NCOs 
and civilians attended the U.S. educational facilities.
 3
  According to the same source, the U.S. 
mobile training teams (MTTs) provided training in logistics, instructor development, medical 
care, self - deployment, SDR - development, as well as the training and equipment for the 2
nd
 
infantry brigade and assistance for UH - 1 helicopter unit. The U.S. continued efforts to train 
and equip Georgian deminers to UN - standards.
4
 
 
2007 
According to the U.S. State Department following areas were identified critical for providing 
assistance:
 5
  
 Assisting in developing SDR and PPBS. 
 Developing acquisition planning concept in HRM (human resource management) to 
erode a soviet style personnel management system.  
 Assistance in developing logistical supply chain concept and national intelligence 
concept. 
 Training and equipment of 2000 soldiers of the 3rd infantry brigade, training and 
equipment of the 1
st
 infantry brigade, training of 25 brigade and battalion intelligence 
officers and NCOs. 
  Assistance in developing logistics captain‘s course, introducing US - style Officer and 
NCO - courses. 
 
                                                 
1
 ―FY 2005 - 2007 Military Assistance‖ (U.S. Department of State), 218, accessed February 21, 2015, available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60649.pdf. 
2
 ―FY 2005 - 2007 Europe and Eurasia‖ (U.S. Department of State, 2005), 411, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60653.pdf. 
3
 ―FY 2005 - 2007 Military Assistance,‖ 218; ―Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Georgia,‖ 
U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, January 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/92787.htm. 
4
 ―FY 2004 - 2006 Europe and Eurasia,‖ Fact Sheet (Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and 
Eurasia, United States Department of State, 2004), 387, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/42251.pdf. 
5
 ―FY 2007 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia - Georgia,‖ FY 2007 U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative 
Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State), accessed June 24, 
2014, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy07/115976.htm. 
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2008 
Comparatively little information was available for this year, summarized as follows:
 1
  
 26 civilian and military defence officials attended U.S. military education institutions. 
 Equipment and training for the 1st infantry brigade (2000 soldiers) for deployment in 
Iraq and for the 4
th
 infantry brigade (2132 soldiers) along with the 1
st
 battalion and the 
Staff of the Special Operation Force. 
 
2009 
The tendency of scarce information was also a featuring element of this year:
 2
 
 52 civilian and military defence officials attended U.S. military educational 
institutions. 
 Training and equipment of 752 soldiers for the ISAF deployment.  
 Destruction of 16.000 obsolete munitions and clearance of 26 minefields through PFP 
- trust fund.  
 
2010 
The priorities of previous year have been largely maintained with some new elements 
introduced:
 3
 
 50 civilian and military defence officials attended U.S. educational institutions.  
 1500 soldiers were trained and equipped for ISAF deployment. 
 Launching the Georgian Coastguard maintenance program by refurbishing 2 primary 
patrol vessels and completing the modernization of another by granting 2 million 
USD.  
2012 
The amount spent for this year reveals a stable tendency of keeping the relatively same level 
of spending as in 2011 and 2010. Thus it is no surprise that the most assistance efforts were 
                                                 
1
 ―FY 2008 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance - Georgia,‖ FY 2008 U.S. Government Assistance to 
and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State), 
accessed June 24, 2014, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy08/117314.htm. 
2
 ―FY 2009 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia,‖ FY 2009 U.S. Government Assistance to 
and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia (Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State), 
accessed June 24, 2014, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy09/136825.htm. 
3
 ―FY 2010 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia,‖ Performance Report Highlights: Georgia 
(Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State), accessed June 24, 2014, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy10/156874.htm. 
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devoted to programs of equipping and training GAF - units designed for foreign deployments 
and for reducing the threat of landmines and unexploded ordinance, i.e. ammunition.
1
   
 
The U.S. policy of military assistance to Georgia can be described as a policy of heavy 
material - financial support in its initial phase to improve operational capabilities of Georgian 
forces, especially of those designated for U.S. or NATO - support operations. Logically, the 
tactical doctrines and training, as well as communication and logistical capabilities were key 
areas, where the U.S. support to Georgian units was greatly needed. NATO officials, similarly 
to U.S, regarded the small sized GAF as the best force capable of joint operations and 
interoperable with NATO - forces. On the other hand, the adoption of NATO - standards on 
tactical level, especially in command and control, field training and exercises, was equated by 
Georgian leadership to an automatic increase of combat capabilities of forces, with no logical 
impediment for the subsequent and significant force - increase in 2007.  
 
The inherent deficiencies and inadequacies of the Georgian decision - making in defence 
planning and policy took heavy toll on the results of war in 2008. As defence minister David 
Kezerashvili (stepped down after war) admitted, Georgia lost some 250 million USD 
equivalents of advanced weapons and hardware, including some 60 battle tanks.
2
 But the 
consequences of war also highlighted, that the application of NATO - standards in the GAF 
lacked both its comprehensive understanding as well as the continuity of their routine 
practice. The classified EUCOM (European Command) assessment of the GAF - performance 
in war revealed ―number of flaws in Georgia‘s planning, supply, co - ordination, air defence 
and combat communications systems.‖3 Robert Hamilton, who served as the Chief of the U.S. 
Office of Defence Cooperation in Georgia from 2006 to 2008, largely agrees to the leaked 
report and qualifies GAF as ―overcentralized, prone to impulsive decisionmaking, 
undermined by unclear lines of command, and led by senior officials who were selected for 
personal relationships rather than professional qualifications.‖4  
 
As for the period after 2008, we see a clear shift towards more emphasis on education and 
training. However, with persisting flaws in defence policy and planning the shared 
                                                 
1
 ―FY 2012 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia,‖ Fact Sheet (Office of the Coordinator of 
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, United States Department of State, June 2013), available at 
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2013/212977.htm. 
2
 Gomes Da Silva, ―180 PCNP 09 E REV 1 - Georgia and NATO,‖ para. 12. 
3
 Ibid., para. 30. 
4
 Hamilton, ―Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,‖ 1. 
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understanding of ―doing business‖, i.e. standards as defined by NATO, seem again hard to 
achieve. Nonetheless, the overall picture of the GAF - transition to NATO - standards leaves 
an impressive picture of large scale efforts initiated predominantly within the military realm 
and focused largely on the material - technical (facilities and equipment) as well as the tactical 
level of force - training and management. Despite numerious challenges the most progress 
achieved in the tactical dimension is best visible through the smooth integration of Georgian 
units within ISAF - operation, highly praised by all rank NATO - military representatives. As 
Tamar Karosanidze, the former deputy Defence Minister admitted: ―During the IMS 
(International Military Staff) visit to Georgia a terrific evaluation of Georgian performance 
had been made with no further objections to Georgian NATO - membership.‖1 Her 
assessment could be assessed as partially biased, yet the another assessment provided by 
Gustav Vroemen, leaves even more impressive picture of Georgian achievements:  
 
The best visible results are demonstrated in Afghanistan and the ISAF is a clear 
example how perfectly Georgian units fit into command structure and can perform 
combat operations with Allied forces without any difficulty. I would argue that from 
the ministry of Defence of Georgia I don’t see much of difficulties that would 
undermine future accession.
2
 
 
 
 
7.3.4 Budgetary Planning and Transparency 
 
 
The issue of budgetary planning and financial transparency is inherently tied to the ability of 
defence institutions to produce sound financial plans with enough details made public and the 
sufficient degree of public involvement to audit and hold the defence ministry accountable. In 
this light this chapter will also look how consequent the deep commitment of Georgian 
authorities to rearrange the budgetary planning in accordance with western standards (PPBS) 
had in reality been put in practice.   
 
7.3.4.1 The Budgetary Practices 2004 - 2012 
 
As for 2004 a general lack of understanding how to plan, allocate and spend defence 
resources was a matter of fact, even though, since 2001 the MOD was considering to adopt 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Deputy Defence Minister Tamar Karosanidze. 
2
 Interview with Gustav Vroemen, NATO-IS, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Brussels, NATO HQ. 
237 
 
the PPBS as the main planning framework, supported by a British advisor.
1
 The first IPAP - 
document similarly attests the absence of a proper resource management system in the 
defence area and urges the ministry to restructure the financial department and to train the 
financial staff with new accounting and procurement techniques and procedures.
2
 Detailed 
figures of early defence budgets unfortunately are not present on MOD‘s website, however, 
they are provided by the Ministry of Finances with some inconsistencies once compared to 
other sources. Interestingly, the way defence spending figures are structured and presented in 
the state budgetary documents speaks very much about the intentions and policies the defence 
and state authorities pursued with regard to the overall defence objectives, but not least about 
the degree of adoption of NATO - financial and accountability standards. It must be also 
noted that 2004 stands in a stark contrast to the subsequent financial years. The 2004 - state 
budget document and the document On Implementation of the State Budget issued in 2005 
provide a fairly good picture of annual defence activities planned and executed. The planned 
defence budget differs in absolute numbers once presented in different classification 
categories. The absolute number of ca. 183 million GEL (85 million USD) contrasts to ca.174 
million GEL (81 million USD) within ―activity‖-classification and to 169,4 million Gel (78,8 
million USD) within ―financial‖ category.3 Though no clarity is provided on 43,5 million 
GEL (20 million USD) of ―capital costs‖, the list of activities under ―NATO - and bilateral 
activities‖ (17.4 million USD) and ―Enhancing combat readiness‖  (52,6 million USD) 
generates a relatively clear impression of defence priorities among force services and planned 
activities:
4
 
 
Enhancing Force Readiness 
1. Land Force       8,6 million USD 
2. Reserve units     6,8 million USD 
3. Logistics      3,8 million USD 
4. Infrastructure     10,1 million USD 
5. Armament and Re-equipment  19,4 million USD 
 
                                                 
1
 Fritz, ―Status Report On Security Sector Governance in Georgia,‖ 129–133. 
2
 ―Georgia‘s Commitments under the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO - 2004-2006,‖ para. 
2.4.1. 
3
 ―2004 State Budget‖ (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed September 14, 2014, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4594. 
4
 GEL (Georgian Lari) exchange rate is based on CIA World Factbook 2004 in ―Facts & Information For 
Georgia,‖ Facts, Maps & Flags Of The World, accessed May 5, 2015, available at http://www.country-
info.com/facts/Georgia.htm. 
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NATO - and bilateral Activities  
6. PK Operations    3,9 million USD  
7. GTEP      12,5 million USD 
 
Clearly, even among priorities presented the GTEP; i.e. the training and equipment of 
Georgian units for peacekeeping operations takes the major bulk of defence spending along 
the infrastructure renewal and re - equipment efforts. The document On Budget 
Implementation reflects spending figures according to activities conducted (the way presented 
in the planned budget) and indicates general areas where most money was allocated. It 
confirms the priority of training and equipping 10 infantry battalions as well as continuing 
importance of infrastructure and the equipment/ammunition procurement.
1
 In general, all 
activities under ―NATO - Integration‖ category take the biggest chunk (65%) of defence 
allocations (ca.114 million from 174 million GEL), however the detailed breakdown of 
expenditures within various services, bodies and structural units of the ministry, though 
present, does not contain any figures. Following years show a significant increase of 
budgetary allocations but also serious deficits in budgetary figures and priorities provided (see 
Table 12. below).  
 
Table 12. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2005 (in GEL)
2
 
 
Planned Budget – 138.885.000 
 
Budget Expended 
1st Approved 
 
159.623.700 
2nd amended  
 
368.052.800 
Final planned 
 
392.365.700 
1st Correction  
368.952.800 
2nd Correction  
391.528.100 
3rd Correction  
393.275.700 
Expended 
366.765.100 
Expended 
389.292.600 
Expended 
391.061.700 
No detailed information on activities under the categories 
of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other Items and 
Services etc 
No detailed information on activities under the categories 
of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other Items and 
Services etc 
 
An intensive investigation in the mentioned budgetary documents of 2005 revealed a 
persisting priority of US - led training and equipment programs (SSOP) for Georgian units 
designated for peacekeeping operations (1714 servicemen participated in mission in Iraq and 
368 were sent to NATO-mission in Kosovo). Along no spending figures provided the several 
                                                 
1
 ―2004 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2004 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry 
of Finances of Georgia), accessed September 14, 2014, available at http://www.mof.ge/4672. 
2
 ―2005 State Budget,‖ 2005 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4592; ―2005 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2005 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4670. 
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waves of defence spending increase speak more about the hasty mode of decisions with ―no 
planning, no acquisition or procurement process, and no feasibility study.‖1  
 
The picture of the next 2006 year reveals no significant deviation from the established 
tradition of limiting financial data available for parliamentary or wider discussion. In line with 
existing criticism the ISAB - report 2006 identified the financial management and 
procurement area as one of the most deficient ones and recommended to use the principles of 
newly approved Law on Defence Planning to improve the process of multi - year budgetary 
planning.
2
 Another document called Defence Policy Priorities 2005 - 2006 and issued by the 
Ministry of Defence explicitly highlights the commitment to introduce the new budgetary 
planning methodology and to draft three - year development programs and budgetary plans.
3
 
The reality, however, looked much more sober (see the Table 13. below).   
 
 
Table 13. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2006 (in GEL)
4
 
 
Planned Budget – 392.570.000 
 
Budget Expended 
1st approved 
 
429.588.600 
2nd amended  
 
680.016.000 
Final planned 
 
716.157.000  
1st Correction 
684.919.400 
2nd Correction 
721.071.900 
Expended 
684.039.600 
Expended 
720.147.900 
230.694.800 were devoted for ―capital costs‖ usually 
associated with infrastructure works and procurement, 
and 268.675.600 for ―other items and services‖ with no 
further clarification.  
 
 No detailed information on activities under the 
categories of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other 
Items and Services etc 
261.236.400 spent for 
―other items and services‖ 
and 265.794.900 for 
―capital costs‖. 
269.984.800 spent for 
―capital costs‖ 
 
 
No detailed information on activities under the categories 
of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other Items and 
Services etc. 
 
 
 
The priorities of the planned Budget, in fact, match the actions reflected in the budget 
implementation document of 2006. Despite the exorbitant doubling of defence budget the 
major focus remained at equipping and training the units for PK  -operations under SSOP 
(about 1500 servicemen), foreign missions in Iraq and Kosovo, as well as continuing efforts 
to renew the infrastructure (bases, storages and facilities), armament and equipment, 
                                                 
1
 Lortkipanidze, ―Chapter 11, The Georgian Security Sector: Initiatives and Activities,‖ 246. 
2
 Johnson, Smith, and Werner, ―ISAB REPORT 2006,‖ 4. 
3
 ―Defense Policy Priorities for 2005-2006: Main Directions of the Ministry of Defense,‖ 6. 
4
 ―2006 State Budget,‖ 2006 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4590; ―2006 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2006 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4620. 
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whenever possible with NATO - standard hardware. As for the new priority areas, the salary 
increase and enhanced training of 28 reserve battalions complete the overall picture and 
provide general indication where the ministry of defence was actually heading to. The year 
2006 is not least important from the institutional point of view, as it marks the beginning of 
the period of Dutch assistance to the Georgian MOD in adopting the PPBS - procedures to 
increase financial efficiency and transparency. As the NATO parliamentary delegation was 
assured in 2007, the system (PPBS) had to be operational in 2008.
1
 This objective is also 
reiterated by the Transparency International (TI) report in 2007, which states that for 
operating the system, which went in effect by September 2006, the respective staff members 
have been sent to U.S. and Europe for qualification improvement; therefore, the full effects 
(nine major programs and program - based defence budget) of PPBS - utilization had to be 
expected after two years, i.e. in 2009.
2
  The optimistic prognoses made by Georgian officials 
found their reflection also in strategic level documents. As the SDR approved in 2007 
unequivocally stated, the PPBS process was fully utilized within the SDR - planning and was 
compatible with the MTEF (Mid/Medium Term Expenditure Forecast) framework established 
by the ministry of finances.
3
 The budget projections of the SDR share the negative features of 
the budgets of the preceding period and reveals merely general figures under the categories of 
personnel, operation and maintenance, and capital costs with no further details about the 
nature and purpose of defence spending.
4
  
 
The climax of the budgetary appropriations (planned and expended) falls in the year of 2007 
reaching its historical maximum of nearly 1.5 billion GEL (898 million USD).
5
 Similar to 
previous years‘ financial practice, the figures of the initially planned defence budget 
significantly differ from the final ones and provide no meaningful insight about the financial 
spending priorities, largely replicating the activity chart of previous budgets (see Table 14. 
below).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 ―Viewing NATO from the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,‖ para. 92. 
2
 ―Reform of Georgia‘s Defence Sector,‖ 2–3. 
3
 ―Strategic Defence Review: Final Report 2007 Unclassified,‖ 82. 
4
 Darchiashvili, Security Sector Reform in Georgia 2004-2007, 29. 
5
―XE Currency Charts (USD/GEL),‖ Www.xe.com, accessed May 9, 2015, 
http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=GEL&view=10Y. 
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Table 14. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2007 (in GEL)
1
 
 
Planned Budget – 513.270.000 
 
Budget Expended 
Amended 
 
 
518.696.600 
Final planned 
 
 
1.494.526.4000 
Under category 
―Functional‖ 
 
1.500.211.700 
1st Correction 
1.494.553.400 
Expended 
1.494.535.300 
722.549.100 were devoted for ―capital costs‖ usually 
associated with infrastructure works and procurement, and 
529.606.100 for ―other items and services‖ with no further 
clarification.  
 
 No detailed information on activities under the categories 
of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other Items and 
Services etc 
422.252.000 - ―other items and services‖   
841.636.000 - ―capital costs‖ 
150.355.900 – ―salaries‖ 
 
No detailed information on activities under the 
categories of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other 
Items and Services etc. 
 
 
 
The report on implementation of budgetary appropriations for this year briefly sketches out 
the activities performed within four major defence priorities and leaves an impression that the 
major bulk of efforts still was devoted to the extensive acquisition of NATO - standard 
equipment and ammunition (M4 rifles, communication devises and aviation upgrade), unit 
training for PK - missions (battalions and companies of 3
rd
 infantry brigade) as well as to 
infrastructure renewal (bases in Gori, Senaki, Khoni, Kutaisi and Vashlijvari). Most 
interestingly, the draft of defence budget describes planning objectives in four - year 
perspective (2007 - 2010), which clearly has to be attributed to the growing effects of PPBS 
and the planning requirements of the MTEF supported by the law on defence planning.
2
 
However, the vague notion of a multi - year framework in the document with no detailed 
figures of spending in respective year shows the embryonic nature of the desired western - 
like financial planning. As the DCAF - report in 2007 bluntly states, no evidence was 
observed that defence funds were planned, managed or spent wisely. Further, the defence 
budget replicated the model of appropriations defined by the ministry of finances revealing 
less common features if any with western - type budgetary planning and programming.
3
 No 
different picture is provided for 2008 (see Table 15. below).
4
 
 
                                                 
1
 ―2007 State Budget,‖ 2007 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4588; ―2007 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2007 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4666. 
2
 ―2007 State Budget.‖ 
3
 Fluri and Bucur-Marcu, Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building, 29–31. 
4
 ―2008 State Budget,‖ 2008 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4586; ―2008 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2008 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4664. 
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Table 15. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2008 (in GEL) 
 
Planned Budget – 1.100.000.000 
 
338.316.400 -  ―Salaries‖  
606.609.000 -  ―Items and services‖  
148.097.200 -  ―Non-financial actives‖ 
Budget Expended 
Final amended 
 
 
1.547.383.400 
 
1st Correction 
1.547.183.000 
 
979.191.300 – ―Items and services‖ 
210.581.400 – ―Non-financial actives‖ 
343.047.700 – ―Salaries‖ 
Expended 
1.749.424.870 
358.579.800 (salaries), 884.380.000 (items and service) and 
292.199.900 (non-financial actives) 
 
 No detailed information on activities under the categories 
of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, Other Items and 
Services and Mod-JS-and subordinated legal entities 
464.600.600 – “Items and services” 
1.284.824.270 – “Non-financial actives” 
 
No detailed information on activities  
 
 
Apparently, capital costs and salaries were merged with other costs under the category of 
―non - financial actives‖, and the increased figure of the expended budget shows much of 
efforts to restore and rebuild military infrastructure damaged during the war in 2008.  The 
textual part of the budget recognizes NATO - standardization in logistics and infrastructure as 
the top priority along the full implementation of PPBS as. The same tendencies are to observe 
in the next budgetary period of 2009-2010 (see Table 16. below).
1
   
 
 
 Table 16. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2009-2010 (in GEL) 
 
  
Planned Budget 
 
 
Budget Expended 
 
2009 
Planned 
942.000.000  
 
445.640.200– ―Salaries‖  
 
304.914.900 – ―Items 
and services‖  
 
178.057.200 – ―Non-
financial actives‖ 
Final corrected 
872.193.300 
 
343.868.200 – ―Salaries‖  
352.914.900 – ―Items and 
services‖  
 
153.057.200 – ―Non-
financial actives‖ 
Corrected  
869.286.100  
 
342.845.400 - 
―Salaries‖  
358.596.400 ―Items and 
services‖ 
 
144.404.000 (non-
financial actives) 
Expended 
869.015.700  
 
342.839.400 - 
“Salaries” 
358.467.000 – “Items 
and services”  
 
144.383.400 – “Non-
financial actives” 
                                                 
1
 ―2009 State Budget,‖ 2009  Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4584; ―2009 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2009 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4662; ―2010 State Budget,‖ 2010 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), 
accessed May 5, 2015, available at http://www.mof.ge/4582; ―2010 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 
2010 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4660. 
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2010 
749.550.000  
 
368.637.200- ―Salaries‖  
324.761.600–―Items 
and services‖  
49.480.000 – ―Non-
fiscal actives‖  
 
 
748.721.900,  
 
338.721.400-―Salaries‖ 
247.494.700 - ―Items and 
services‖  
77.800.900 – ―Non-fiscal 
actives‖  
 
No detailed information 
on activities under the 
categories of: Salaries, 
Transfers and Subsidies, 
Other Items and Services 
and Mod-JS-and 
subordinated legal entities 
748.721.900  
 
325.394.700 - ―Salaries‖  
147.001.400 - ―Items and services‖  
 
93.971.400 – ―Non-fiscal actives‖  
 
 
No detailed information on activities under the 
categories of: Salaries, Transfers and Subsidies, 
Other Items and Services and Mod-JS-and 
subordinated legal entities 
 
The only valuable information, we were able to extract from the budgetary appropriations of 
this year is that by 2009 Ministry of Defence had committed itself to a full adoption and 
implementation of PPBS within the mid - term planning period of 2009 - 2012. The budgetary 
implementation report of 2009 prooves that and states, that new financial planning 
mechanisms are fully adopted and applied in practice.
1
 If this is true, the next 2010 defence 
budget had to be developed in accordance with new procedures, ultimately resulting in a 
completely different picture and structure of the approved defence appropriations. However, 
the available evidence decisively refutes this assumption. Both planned and expended 
budgetary figures provide clear proof of the continuing old budgetary practices that disregard 
IPAP - commitments and also national legal requirements. The 2010 Budgetary reports not 
only still declare to institutionalize the PPBS, improve financial and procurement 
management and to develop PPBS - related manuals, but admit that 2010 - defence spending 
was only partially drafted along PPBS - lines.
2
   
 
No visible innovations are to detect in the next 2011 defence budget with a total planned 
figure of 660 million GEL (corrected to 711.7 million GEL) and the expended fugue of 728.4 
million GEL.
3
 A traditional practice of highlighting nearly every activity within the defence 
as a major priority without any indication of concrete goals and respective spending figures is 
still preserved. The only noteworthy feature we were able to detect for this year, was, that the 
most of priority activities were directed towards improving training and education centers‘ 
capacities (JCATS - simulation program in Krtsanisi, BCT in Khoni, National Defence 
Academy etc.) as well as programs  and doctrines, instead of acquiring combat equipment and 
                                                 
1
 ―2009 State Budget Implementation.‖ 
2
 ―2010 State Budget Implementation.‖ 
3
 ―2011 State Budget,‖ 2011 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, 
available at http://www.mof.ge/4580; ―2011 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2011 Zlis Saxelmzifo 
Biujetis 12 Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia), accessed May 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4652. 
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ammunition. In line with that, the President Saakashvili admitted that: ―In previous years we 
spent much more on arms than on training; now there will be much more training given and 
filling the arsenal will be a separate issue.‖1 Considering that a good planning implies a well-
balanced acquisition process of military hardware accompanied by the necessary training 
process to get the mentioned hardware operational, President‘s statement is a clear recognition 
of considerable deficits both in financial planning and acquisition.  
 
Among the reviewed budgetary documents only the 2012 defence appropriations reveal some 
visible attempts to modify budgetary drafts in accordance with the programmatic model of 
PPBS. Substantial improvements are visible by structuring the budgetary draft in four major 
defence programs with respective program codes. Funding figures are also available, contrary 
to post - factum tradition of preceding years, and the level of general information provided 
speaks about the much greater degree of desired transparency (see the Table 17. below). 
2
 
 
 
Table 17. Defence Budgetary Figures for 2012 (in GEL)
3
 
 
 Planned Expended 
Programs (Total) 675.700.000 730.604.600 
1. Combat readiness 626.981.100 677.326.300 
2. Military Education 19.799.600 13.812.300 
3. Healthcare and 
Social Improvement 
7.806.600 7.760.600 
4. Defence Science  
Research 
21.112.700 31.705.400 
 
Though each program is described with the sufficient degree of depth, the program objectives, 
i.e. expected results remain vaguely formulated or cause uncertainties about the end - states of 
actions performed.  
 
7.3.4.2 Aknowledgment of the persisting Deficits  
 
The current version of Georgia‘s Strategic Defense Review (SDR), issued in 2013 admits, that 
even though the PPBS - mechanisms have been in place since 2006, the MOD has not yet 
                                                 
1
 Kogan, ―Armenia‘s and Georgia‘s Security Agenda,‖ 20. 
2
 ―2012 State Budget,‖ 2012 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujeti (Ministry of Finances of Georgia, n.d.), available at 
http://www.mof.ge/4578; ―2012 State Budget Implementation,‖ Sakartvelos 2012 Zlis Saxelmzifo Biujetis 12 
Tvis Shesruleba (Ministry of Finances of Georgia, n.d.), available at http://www.mof.ge/4644. 
3
 2012 Exchange rate 1USD = 1.65 GEL from ―XE Currency Charts (USD/GEL).‖ 
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managed to make a full transition to modern resource planning, supposedly due to the low 
qualification of MOD personnel.
1
 After six years spent for making the system operationa 
since 2007 the inability of Georgia‘s MOD to fully implement the system imply, that either 
there was no higher level of readiness to implement the system at all, or that the inherent 
intellectual deficits of MOD - personnel to master the (well – known) system were too 
difficult to overcome. The latter is, obviously, not true. The SDR suggests studying the whole 
defense system again to better address the PPBS control mechanisms of program 
implementation and procedures. Yet if the main cause of the program‘s delay was the lack of 
knowledge on the part of MOD personnel, as stressed before, the appeal to re - launch the 
revision of the entire system appears as nothing less as an attempt to mask the inherent 
unwillingness of the defense ministry to adopt new planning and budgeting procedures that 
would establish much higher standards of political and financial accountability, reduce the 
chance of ineffective practices, and initiate positive change in other state agencies.  
 
NATO officials continue reiterating the need for improvement in financial planning, control 
and resource management.
2
 Compared to the diplomatic language of the NATO - officials the 
message of Building Integrity Report is much more devastating, attesting to the Georgian 
MOD a ―complete lack of a comprehensive system for acquisition, planning and financial 
management‖ over ten years with no adherence to international standards of accounting.3 The 
Transparency International report in 2007 accuses the ministry of being least accessible 
ministry with classified information on procurement and ―untargeted spending and misuse of 
public resources.‖4 In 2008, during the NGC - meeting as well as in 2009, NATO repeatedly 
asked Georgia to improve defence budget transparency and accountability.
5
 In fact, it is 
surprising, how persistently Georgian authorities disregarded the national commitments 
(IPAP), legal requirements (Law on Defence Planning) and international recommendations 
(ISAB, NATO) over years, damaging by that their own credibility and the overall institutional 
capacity. The former deputy minister of defence, Nikoloz Vashakidze agrees to this statement 
and resolutely claims: 
                                                 
1
 Strategic Defence Review 2013–2016 (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 2013), 6; available at 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/documents/yzqhgsgsreeng.pdf. 
2
 Interview with Gustav Vroemen, NATO-IS, Defence Policy and Planning Division, Brussels, NATO HQ. 
3
 ―Buidling Integrity Self Assessment,‖ 21–22. 
4
 ―Budgetary Priorities in Georgia: Expenditure Dynamics since the Rose Revolution‖ (Tbilisi: Transparency 
International Georgia, January 2007), 1, available at 
http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Budgetary%20Priorities%20in%20Georgia.pdf. 
5
 Akubardia, ―Security and Defence Policy Development,‖ 5; Gomes Da Silva, ―180 PCNP 09 E REV 1 - 
Georgia and NATO,‖ para. 30. 
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I can clearly say that the MOD never reached the needed degree of transparency. 
Even more, entire areas of activities had been classified to avoid public attention, and 
the damages of the short war in 2008 allowed minister Kezerashvili to write off many 
corruptions - deals signed in his time.
1
   
 
An important element of Georgian defence budgetary appropriations have alwas been the 
additional (external) sources of funding. For instance, in 2004 nearly 77.8 million GEL (42%) 
has been transferred from the presidential fund.
2
 Further, a so called ―army development 
fund‖ – a non commercial fund had been created, where private businesses made their 
donations.
3
  Led by the defence minister (Irakli Okruashvili) himself and his head of the 
procurement department, the fund approved around seven million USD in the period of 2004 - 
2005.
4
 Since no information was made public about the purpose of fund‘s spending, and nor 
the voluntary nature of donations seemed convincing, the overall degree of transparency of 
defence budgetary plans suffered severe deficits. In 2013 the Military Police investigated 53 
corruption cases as compared to 16 in 2012, and Inspectorate General inspected multiple 
violations and abuses of illegal acquisition, procurement at inflated prices, embezzlement and 
inappropriate high bonuses.
5
 Other sources rightly question the practice of not auditing the 
ministry of defence since 2006.
6
 Thus, even though the ministry admitted in 2013 the urgent 
need of creating an audit - department and to improve procurement monitoring functions, with 
no coherent approach from the rest of the government and especially the parliament, the 
likelihood of preserving old bad practices still remain high.
7
 
 
It seems that the change of the defence leadership in 2012 brought the clear acknowledgment 
of actions needed. For instance, flawed budgetary procedures in the past had been clearly 
recognized.
8
 The corrected SDR - 2013 also highlighted the need to improve parliamentary 
accountability by means of regular reports, yet it falls short of providing clear procedural 
suggestions.
9
 It does not say anything about the fact that some elements of defense planning 
could be easily made public without any extensive effort. The Defense Planning Guidance 
and the summary of Multi - Year Programs constitute a fairly small part of the PPBS. 
                                                 
1
 Interview with the former Deputy Defence Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze, Tbilisi. 
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 ―2004 State Budget.‖ 
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However, once they were made public, they would greatly enhance defense planning 
transparency, as well as the involvement of a broader public in the discussion, thus generating 
a better political deliberation. To support our findings, we also refer to the budget 
transparency index, and the anti - corruption index established by the Transparency 
International for Georgia. In 2011, the defense budget‘s transparency level was assessed as 
moderate to low.
1
 Th report marked in 2012 Georgia‘s transition to high anti – corruption - 
index category for defense budgets due to serious shortfalls, risk, and bad practices detected 
in defense acquisition and personnel promotion. The provisions of the statement of the 
December meeting of NATO foreign ministers in 2008, that called on Georgia to undertake 
―lessons - learned process from the recent conflict‖ and also urged the Georgian government 
to continue reforms in military personnel management, transparency of the defense budget, 
and other areas, can serve as additional and very valuable indication of fields, where 
significant problems had been externally detected.
2
 As for the issue of transparency to the 
general public, the MOD ranked at the worst level in 2010, and received an average rating in 
2013.
3
  
 
The IPAP 2004 - 2006 urged the Georgian side to improve public awareness in support of 
national reforms, and indeed some steps had been made to meet this objective.
4
 Since the 
country eagerly declared its aspiration to join the Alliance, the requirement of a better public 
awareness of defence policy and reforms, theoretically, acquired higher relevance as 
compared to those countries that show little interest in membership. Further, we must 
distinguish two types of information to be made public in this regard. First, dealing with 
NATO itself and its activities, and the second, on processes and plans within the national 
defence transformation process. The first track shows fairly active engagement of the 
Georgian authorities with the wider public by organizing regular NATO - weeks and 
seminars, meetings between NATO - officials and representatives of local organizations.
5
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Opening the NATO - Liaison Office (NLO) in October 2010 served among others this 
purpose.
1
 As for the second track of communication, the USAID funded report in 2014 
describes in detail the nature and the entire history of process - development in this regard. It 
recognizes the active engagement of the ministry of defence with various NGOs while 
developing series of strategic level documents such as SDR, the Military Strategy, Minister‘s 
Vision and the Threat Assessment Document.
2
  
 
The effort to institutionalize these relations has been also highlighted, as various 
memorandums had been initiated by the ministry to regulate the scope and character of the 
said cooperation. However, it also attests a clear signs of uncoordinated and willful approach 
to the issue from defence leadership, as three memorandums were signed in 2007, 2009 and 
2013, each time coinciding with the change of defence leadership.
3
 The first document 
specifies the areas of cooperation, and the second, similarly, lists the strategic and agency 
level planning documents that are to be developed in close contact with respective public - 
and non governmental organizations. It must be admitted, that almost all mentioned 
documents had been regularly sent to NGOs for respective evaluation, and the MOD resorted 
in 2010 to their expertise to run MOD - personnel through several educational courses. 
However, as report concluded, even despite the well established tradition of the Georgian 
defence and Security Conference (annual forum for regional security and defence issues), the 
institutional aspect of such cooperation remains underdeveloped due to the lack of regularity 
and the heavy dependence on political situation or the personal goodwill of officials, unable to 
turn this norm into routine practice.
4
  
 
Even though the policy and planning documents had been offered to relevant public 
stakeholders as the area of the most wanted collaboration, their practical implementation, 
review and monitoring of the objectives achieved, clearly remained outside of ministry‘s 
focus, with rapidly declining interest to existing cooperation format during last couple of 
years till 2012.
5
 As Gustav Vroemen, a NATO – IS official, puts it, similar to the improved 
practice of Georgian MOD to regularly update information on ISAF and the Georgian 
contingent in the mission, the Annual National Program (ANP) could also be made public 
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with some modification.
1
 That would be a right step towards the enhanced participation of 
civil society in a wider discussion of defence policies and plans, currently entirely dependent 
on the goodwill of defence ministry‘s leadership. In line with our general findings, the IDFI 
(Institute for Development of Freedom of Information) study showed that the degree of access 
to public information within the MOD from 2012 to 2013 increased dramatically from 0% to 
86%, which can only be attributed to the government change in Georgia and the respective 
replacement of defence minister.
2
   
 
Concluding this section we can draw following general observations. The requirement of 
establishing modern western financial planning mechanisms, though acknowledged and 
frequently declared by Georgian officials as about to be established, turned to become a 
hollow promise throughout the period 2004 - 2014. Although the MOD - personnel went 
through the extensive training program and the initial objective was to produce the PPBS - 
based defence budget by 2007, the declared policy never materialized till 2012, the year, 
which first time shows clearly recognizable signs of program - based approach to budgetary 
planning. Some key elements of a new resource and financial planning such as DMB and MT 
were created, yet as the USAID sponsored report concludes, they never became fully 
operational allowing almost all important decisions to bypass the existing expertise and 
prescribed formal procedures.
3
 The ministry of defence lacked completely the internal 
financial monitoring and audit system, able to check periodically the scale, with which the 
planned objectives were met. Most information on defence budgetary implementation was 
provided by figures containing in the general state budget documents, placed at the ministry 
of finances‘ webpage. The planned defence budgets in turn, reveal significant deficits in 
providing information on spending for concrete defence actions, as well as miss clear 
formulation of short - term objectives to achieve, not to speak about the mid - and long term 
actions, as required by the PPBS. Thus we have clear evidence of formal compliance, by 
which the old financial practices continued to dominate and significantly damaged the overall 
financial planning capacity, transparency, as well as the credibility of national authorities.  
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7.3.5 Human Resources  
Similar to the case of Armenia, Georgian first effort to ―westernize‖ defence institutions, 
primarily concentrated on the ministry of defence, however, it rapidly expanded its scope and 
soon included the entire armed forces. We will review the process, which Georgian defence 
authorities initiated since 2004, and the policies and practices adopted to mirror standards of 
the NATO - human resource management model.   
 
7.3.5.1 Personnel Reshuffling – a constant Feature of the new Policy 
 
The initial ISAB recommendations were largely in accordance with common requirements of 
the division of responsibility between the civilian Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, 
staffed by personnel with expertise in respective issue - areas.
1
 The period after ousting 
President Shevardnadze‘s government in 2003 led to a turbulent change among senior civilian 
and military personnel in various state - agencies with obvious lack of capacity for policy 
expertise and the overall competence.
2
 A featuring element of the post - Shevardnadze era 
was that the personnel - turn over, actually, never stopped. They occurred with great speed 
and fanfare, endangering the general need for stable personnel policies and causing doubts 
about the timeframe and comprehensiveness of reforms.
3
  From the very beginning of the 
regime change the ISAB - team seemed to be very concerned about the developing tendencies 
and specified in its recommendations that: 
 
There is, however, a clear and obvious need to put in place proper personnel 
development and employment procedures for officials and to reduce the frequency 
with which they are moved or replaced. Without the continuity that this would embed 
into the system, reform will proceed erratically and inefficiently, and the development 
of an efficient, dedicated and politically neutral civil service will be made more 
difficult to achieve.
4
 
 
Despite the fact that the sound personnel management (concepts, data - base, selection and 
other procedures) was among the top policy priorities to be implemented during 2005 - 2006, 
the total replacement of Shevardnaze - era officials led to a significant decrease of expertise 
and premature, ill - advised decisions that frustrated many western and NATO - officials.
5
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Probably, the best personification of such a corrupted policy of personnel - change is Irakli 
Okruashvili, a member of the Saakashvili‘s party (UNM – United National Movement), who 
after his defence ministerial appointment in 2004 dismissed almost all department heads, 
appointed by his predecessor Giorgi Baramidze (also a member of UNM), let many western - 
educated officers and staff - members to leave office and appointed his friend and 
acquaintances, later accused of embezzlement and abuse of office.
1
 These were nothing else 
than the warrying signals about the absence of any intention to introduce clear personnel 
policies. From 2003 till 2006 the ministry of defence was reshuffled three times, leaving no 
chance for policy continuity and implementation, and was described by a western diplomat as 
a situation, where ―as soon as we start to know who to talk to, this person has shifted 
position.‖2 Frequent personal shake - ups and a massive dismissal of military and civilian 
personnel, that accompanied the leadership change in the ministry, obviously, had to be 
attributed to the personal preferences and the desire of a full control and loyalty down to the 
lowest level. The former deputy Defence Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze provides a pretty 
radical assessment: 
 
The past experience showed unfortunately that the frequent change of the top-
leadership (ministers) led to the willful and shocking chain-effect of the entire 
personnel-change. Five “aggressive defence” ministers played basically very 
destructive role for the entire process of defence reforms by upholding the dentency to 
deprive its personnel educated in NATO-centers to man appropriate positions. Many 
of them were even suspended or left the GAF, causing the immense waste of financial 
resources that had been provided by NATO-countries‖3 
 
All this heavily affected the institutional capacity of a proper personnel management, 
hollowing the evaluation and promotion systems and causing heavy inconsistencies of career 
developments.
4
 The only palpable changes developed slowly, as under the minister David 
Kezerashvili (in office from 2006 to 2008) the Dutch and British assistance teams were 
invited to devise the HRM - concept and a selection board had been put in place in 2006.
5
  
 
The civilianization of ministry never proved to be a problem. By 2007 the majority (85%) of 
MOD - personnel were civilians.
6
 Yet another objective that is the full professionalization of 
military revealed many ups and downs. In 2007 the NATO parliamentary delegation was 
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instructed by President Saakashvili that the military reform was aimed at full 
professionalization of army, which had to abolish conscription by 2009, according to MOD -
sources and the SDR - 2007 document.
1
 The Transparency International - report in 2007 
claims, however, that the objective to make the army fully professional was identified for the 
year 2012, according to a MOD - spokesman.
2
 The updated SDR made public in 2013 does 
not specify the date of full transition to a contract based system, nor the Minister‘s Vision 
2013 - 2014 does it. As a matter of fact, the ratio of professional military servants in GAF 
reached 70% under the minister Irakli Alasania, who expected the complete 
professionalization of army by 2017.
3
 The frequent change of the plans, objectives and dates 
of army professionalization supports the claim that the mechanisms of force and resource 
planning had never been properly applied, and, in fact, were made contingent on personal 
preferences of each new minister appointed. Even worse, many of the educated officers in 
force and resource planning had been either dismissed or put in other less relevant positions.
4
  
 
7.3.5.2 Leadership Change and the Credibility of Policy – Commitments  
 
The whole process, which started by the IPAP 2004 - 2006 document and committed 
Georgian side to adopt a new HRM - system for both civilian and military personnel, resulted 
initially in the approval of the HRM - concept in 2006 and the approval of the subsequent 
policies and plans running throughout 2007 and 2008.
5
 The period until 2008 is clearly 
recognized as the most fruitful time for the made progress. The pay by rank system was 
developed as well as some policy implementation plans that were put on hold after 2008.
6
 Yet 
the full implementation to the level of daily routinization of practices never materialized. For 
instance, the Officers Evaluation System (OES), though drafted at concept level, faced 
significant problems in its further introduction down to unit (battalion and company) levels, 
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according to William Lahue.
1
 In general, till 2012 every new minister and his team upheld the 
tradition of a high level authorization and disregarded the well - defined standing procedures 
in various functional areas. 
2
 It must be noted, though, that some signs of internal resistance 
and desire to abolish bad practices were clearly identifiable, as the newly appointed Chief of 
Staff Vladimir Chachibaya (graduated in U.S. War College) was pushing for more western 
standards and promotion of western educated competent cadre.
3
 However he was soon 
replaced by an old soviet - school general, who in turn, was replaced by a young major Giorgi 
Kalandadze, soon promoted to the rank of general. This fact alone raises multiple questions 
about the continuity, consistency and the credibility of personnel management decisions 
within the ministry of defence. This and other instances heavily undermined the commitments 
of Georgian defence leadership made in the framework of NATO – integration. For instance, 
the change of the government in 2012 led to the arrest of the former defence minister Bacho 
Akhalaya and General Giorgi Kalandadze, confronted with charges ―ranging from abuse of 
office to torture‖ and salary supplement approvals at single discretion of the minister without 
any objective justification.
4
  
 
The improvement of the HRM - system was a permanent demand voiced by NATO.
5
 
Georgian side, qonsequently, responded with some initiatives that incorporated a deeper 
involvement from the NATO - side. For instance, in 2009 a Professional Development 
Program (PDP) was launched to train and educate civilian personnel of the MOD, firmly in 
line with ANP - objectives.
6
 Further, the Promotion Board (PB) for military officers was 
established after Irakli Alasania was put in charge of the ministry in 2012.
7
 Before him, the 
PBs though formally created, were in fact, heavily dependent on the approval of Selection 
Boards that in turn was delayed due to ―high risk they posed to the single - handed type rule in 
the ministry‖.8 All these factors repeatedly caused the necessity to restart many policies at 
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functional level after the leadership‘s departure or the dismissal of a responsible individual 
that altogether seriously questioned the efficiency of the institution.
1
 As stressed by Gistav 
Vroemen, the NATI – IS official, the frequent change of defence leadership and staff 
members causes an inherent difficulty to implement the plans and policies adopted, and 
turned the ministry very vulnerable to changes of political landscape (since 2004 minister 
changed eight times).
2
 In fact, the longest serving minister had only two years in office 
―barely sufficient to get fully acquainted with the complex and complicated issues relating to 
defence reform.‖3 Given this, the role of continuous commitment of senior officials to agreed 
policy agenda and the respective transmission of commitments down to lower levels, becomes 
even more critical. As Gustav Vroemen argues: 
 
The best combination is senior and mid-level officials committed. However if the top 
leadership is not interested and is less involved, the role of lower levels increases 
dramatically. I could bring here the example of Minister Akhalaya, who was obviously 
less interested in NATO (supposedly due to other internal priorities), and his deputy 
Kharshiladze, who was overcommitted to implement Georgia’s NATO-agenda and 
kept this fragile balance.
 4
 
 
It seems that the tradition of a ―volatile and potentially disturbing‖ MOD - leadership 
preserved over the entire period relevant to our research with an obviously long record of 
patronaging and making deals through informal personal relations with no reliance on written 
documents.
5
 According to Tamar Karosanidze, a former deputy under the minister Irakli 
Alasania,: ―The most problematic issue was the full dependence of the ministry and people 
within it on the good will of the minister.‖6 Similarly, the NLO - Head William Lahue attested 
in 2014 the Georgian MOD a still existing imbalance between the right of authority and the 
understanding for responsibility: 
 
Top - level officials have to have a very limited ability to interfere and change the 
organizational system, and if yes, then very well defined. Lots of work has to be done 
is this regard, since some elements of a “strong hand”- rule is still visible.7  
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Understandably, the due to persisting obvious wrongdoing on Georgian side the relationship 
to NATO could not remain unaffected, and as pointed by Gustav Vroemen, difficulties 
amounted to the top level as ―it is well known that the chemistry between the Secretary 
General Scheffer and President Saakashvili did not work at all, that naturally, affected 
negatively the whole issue of NATO - Georgian cooperation.‖1 
 
 
7.3.6 Transformation through Socialization: military Training and 
Education, Participation in NATO - Operations  
 
At this point we turn our attention to the intensity of bilateral relations between Georgia and 
its NATO - counterparts in a seemingly less important field of training and education. The 
technical nature of the activities that mostly relate to field exercises and the development of 
doctrines and field manuals leave an impression of less dynamic processes. Yet the deeper 
look into the subject reveals multitude of strong connection lines existing at various levels 
that directly contribute to the establishment of a system, run largely in a western (NATO - 
like) manner. These connections refer to three basic domains: training, education and the 
participation in foreign (NATO, U.S.) missions.  From the very beginning it must be noted 
that the former two, in fact, represent a component element of the latter. And the foreign 
deployment of Georgian troops under NATO/US - command used to be regarded by Georgian 
leadership as key factor enabling high chances of future NATO - membership. As Krisztian 
Meszaros put it: 
 
It is wrong to think that participation in ISAF operation is a ticket to NATO 
membership. Even between U.S. State Department and the Department of Defence 
there was a significant friction and discussion about the Georgian deployment in 
Afghanistan and its implication to membership plans.
2
 
 
Similarly, the former Defence Minister Irakli Alasania admitted in 2013 that Georgian 
leadership had made mistake by thinking that the strong military cooperation would open the 
door of accession.
3
 Hence we will look closer to the intensity of force deployment and 
training to identify, whether the dynamic was corresponding to key political events associated 
with Georgian membership - hopes.  
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As already illuminated in previous chapters, the initial training assistance to Georgian units 
started with U.S. - led GTEP (Georgia Training and Exercise Program) and SSOP 
(Sustainment and Stability Operations Program) programs, propelling soon the GAF to a 
serious player in U.S. led operation in Iraq. As Robert Hamilton, the former head of 
Cooperation Office in Tbilisi, stressed, the Georgian contingent performed full - scale combat 
operations and the control of the entire province with a high level of tactical skill.
1
 The IPP as 
well as the bilateral cooperation plans with individual NATO - countries (predominantly the 
U.S.) allowed Georgia to participate in hundreds of PFP - and joint activities. NATO - 
Georgia Backgrounder provides a vivid picture of continuity of the joint exercises that 
dramatically intensified since 2002, and after the decision to join the ISAF - operation reached 
its peak, with no indication of rapid decline.
2
 Joining ISAF strengthened the existing ties with 
U.S. - side as the major provider of tactical training and equipment. The U.S. Marine Force 
Europe begun to train and equip Georgian units in 2009 on a rotational basis, running almost 
in parallel with multinational PFP - exercises with over 1000 troops from 18 countries hosted 
by Georgia.
3
 The exercises called ―Cooperative Longbow 09‖ and ―Cooperative Lancer 09‖ 
served the basic objective of increasing military interoperability of forces, and continued the 
early tradition of focusing on particular aspect of capability development, similar as in NATO 
- PFP air exercise ―Cooperative Archer‖ in Georgia in 2007.4  
 
7.3.6.1 The high Speed of bilateral Cooperation  
 
The outstanding role of the U.S. involvement in Georgian military and training program is 
undeniable and will be devoted a separate section within this chapter. At this stage we will 
draw an overall picture of the Georgian military education system, which we have partially 
covered in previous chapters while highlighting the interoperability issues and the content of 
foreign assistance. The heavy focus on tactical training of Georgian units found its reflection 
in the first IPAP document 2004, where the NCO - and commissioned officers‘ education and 
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the professional development program were given top priority.
1
 The GTEP and SSOP 
basically embraced this approach and did not go beyond the line of tactical drilling designed 
for foreign operations. It was conducted under the Special Operations Command Europe 
(SOCEUR) and aimed at sustaining standard operating procedures (SOPs) with strong 
emphasis on intensive tactical training (100 days a year) and developing combat capabilities 
consisting of individual skills, marksmanship, squad and platoon tactics, land navigation, 
lifesaver, radio operator etc.
2
 U.S. teams were also involved in training sergeants and 
professional recruits along German counterparts. As for the National Defence Academy, the 
initial four - year officers‘ education program, developed under the Turkish mentorship, was 
dismantled by minister Okruashvili, who preferred a short - term (one year) British - drafted 
program.
3
 The Turkish sponsorship of the Academy before minister‘s decision to abandon it, 
unfolded along the lines of Turkish General Staff Academy, mirroring the steps done in 
Azerbaijan, and additionally covered the deployment of the Georgian peacekeeping platoon in 
Kosovo.
4
 The language training represented another strong pillar of the Academy, with 
English, German and Turkish language courses provided in central facility, the Greek in Poti 
naval base (due to the transfer of missile boat ―La Combattante II‖ and the training of 40 crew 
members), and other language courses on bilateral basis for NCO - category.
5
  
 
Multiple uncoordinated assistance channels, the frequent change of the leadership and the 
respective amendments of educational programs created a certain chaotic environment, in 
which both educational standards and responsibilities seemed to be mixed up. As one 
Georgian artillery officer confessed:  
 
In Soviet times we had a doctrine. Of course it was fiction, but it still gave us 
something to relate to. Now everything is in chaos and no one says anything, because 
then they will be fired.
6
  
 
These words reveal the high degree of internal tensions existing within the GAF, and are 
clearly associated with the period of series of willful decisions made by the minister Irakli 
Okruashvili. The post - Okruashvili period after 2006 was also characterized by an intensive 
works aimed at building new and renovating old training facilities that significantly improved 
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training and educational conditions of the GAF.
1
 This aspect has been partially covered in the 
chapter dealing with interoperability and standards. As for the general NATO - approach to 
defence education and training in Georgia, several programs had been put in place. With the 
support of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies 
Institutes (briefly PFP - consortium) the Defence Education Enhancement Programme 
(DEEP) was developed, being primarily focused on curriculum development for the National 
Defence Academy and able to launch the Command and General Staff School by 2012.
2
 
Similarly, the mountain training center in Sachkhere had been accredited by NATO as a 
Partnership Training and Education Center and offered training courses to militaries of allied 
and partner nations. Additionally, following the Georgian request in 2008 the Professional 
development Program (PDP) was launched in 2009 that provided educational opportunities 
abroad, mobile training teams and policy development advice in a broad variety of areas.
3
  
 
7.3.6.2 Dominance of U.S. – Assistance  
 
It can be said without exaggeration, that the U.S. - involvement in bilateral or NATO - led 
educational and training programs by far outweighed contributions of other nations. The 
GTEP (64 million USD) alone was able to run more than 2000 Georgian servicemen and 270 
members of the mechanized armor company, trained in accordance with US - doctrines, 
subsequently sent to Iraq in 2005 and later in Afghanistan.
4
 The continuation of the U.S. 
efforts was ensured by the follow - up SSOP (Sustainment and Stability Operations Program). 
During the 16 month period and with 60 million USD allocated, it allowed another 2000 
Georgian infantry servicemen, reconnaissance, engineer and signal companies as well as 
general staff command and control elements and operational HQ - staff to complete full 
training.
5
  In 2006 the SSOP was extended for another year and allocated additional 30 
million USD, which made the entire U.S. effort for the period 2002 - 2006 look more than 
impressive, with 154 million USD allocated and more than 5000 Georgian personnel trained.
6
 
These two programs significantly increased the capabilities of the GAF and indeed constituted 
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the core of the national army.
1
 However, it must be also noted, that the turbulent personnel 
change in various echelons of the GAF took heavy toll on the military, as many of GTEP - 
trained servicemen did not continue their contract and left army in 2005.
2
 This fact highlights 
a paradox dominating the Georgian reality that the programs regarded as highly valuable to 
increase the professionalism of GAF and bring Georgia closer to NATO, posed no significant 
obstacle for defence leadership to make counterproductive decisions, especially, with regard 
to personnel management policy, i.e. individuals trained under the mentioned programs.   
 
After the brief Georgia - Russia war in 2008 the U.S. strengthened their approach by 
recognizing the primacy of educational assistance to Georgia. The testimony of the Assistance 
Secretary of Defence, Alexander Vershbow to the Senate Committee in August 2009 
underlines the priority focus on intellectual issues such as training, doctrine, personnel 
management and others as the foundation for the future of the GAF to build on.
3
 Alone the 
year 2011 exposed 63 training, educational and operational activities, and till April 2012 their 
number reached 23, apart from 13 Georgian requests that resulted in U.S. - transfers of 
equipment for modernization of training facilities.
4
 Altough the financial aspect of assistance 
had been reviewed in earlier sections of the paper, the U.S. congressional reports we refer to 
here, also illustrate the heavy emphasis on training and education support, by providing key 
financial figures that allow us to comprehend the size and importance of the assistance for 
Georgia and the U.S.. So, for instance, from 1992 throughout 2010 the overall military aid to 
Georgia accounted for nearly 896 million USD (three times more than for Armenia and two 
times more than for Azerbaijan), and the overall financial aid reached nearly 3.4 billion USD 
by 2014 (two times more than in Armenia, four times more than for Azerbaijan) with 
dramatic increase of financial support in 2008 (895.670.000 USD) and 2009 (423.870.00 
USD) clearly to be attributed to the post war - recovery efforts.
5
 Under the particular U.S. 
Peace and Security Assistance program the cumulative aid to Georgia accounted 542.3 
million USD (three times more than for Armenia and Azerbaijan). The Georgian side tried to 
avoid the duplication of support objectives and therefore preferred to work with FMF and 
IMET programs instead of WIF (Warsaw Initiative Fund) that similarly were aimed at 
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building institutions, policy, doctrines, curricula development, and personnel training.
1
 By 
2012 about 294 Georgian military students completed their respective courses under the U.S. - 
financial aid at cost of about 12 million USD (almost six times more than provided to 
Armenia or Azerbaijan).
2
  
 
7.3.6.3 Meeting NATO in HQ and the Field: Sociological Effects of Identity Formation   
 
The sources that present the financial size as well as material and personal extent of American 
assistance to Georgia tell nothing else but the heavy strategic effort of the U.S. and NATO to 
form a military of a partner nation that would mirror western spirit and standards based on 
common functions and procedures. The GTEP and SSOP were very instrumental to build a 
core of the GAF run along U.S. model.
3
  The ever intensified participation of Georgian units 
in U.S. and NATO - missions significantly increased the Georgian exposure to western 
military influence, especially in operational context. So for instance, in 1999 a company and a 
platoon were deployed under the German and Turkish unit commands in Kosovo.
4
 Since 2003 
Georgia gradually bolstered its presence in operation Iraqi Freedom from 69 to 850 in 2005 
and ultimately to some 2000 servicemen in 2008 that made Georgia largest non NATO -
contributor.
5
 Similarly, the initial 50 peacekeepers sent to Afghanistan were reinforced to 925 
men by mid 2010 and the additional 749 troops sent in October 2012 made the total number 
of the deployed contingent close to 1600, turning Georgia again to a biggest non - NATO 
contributor.
6
 The operational environment, which put Georgian servicemen in a close daily 
contact with U.S. and NATO - contingents, played a role of the cementing substance that 
glued together the tactical skills obtained during the pre - deployment with NATO/U.S. 
military planning and the general behavioral rules confronted with in Afghanistan. Thus, it is 
less surprising that foreign deployments significantly increased interoperability of the GAF, 
and the access to planning and working facilities within the Allied Command Operations 
(ACO) further nurtured the acceptance of higher planning standards of western militaries.
7
 
President Mikhail Saakashvili himself declared in 2010 during the meeting with MOD and 
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Joint Staff officials that the participation in ISAF in fact was a huge military school for 
Georgian units.
1
 The operational practice alos suggests that the U.S. combat commanders in 
Iraq often preferred to operate with Georgian units rather than with other coalition partners 
due to the absence of any caveats and the high level of tactical skills during actual combat 
operations.
2
 Certainly, all this had to be, at least partially, attributed to a significant 
improvement of the national training and educational capacity that met NATO - standards. As 
Gustav Vroemen admits, the area of military education and training clearly exposed a major 
progress, especially in doctrine developments, language courses and military school 
curricula.
3
 He is supported by the deputy Chief of General Staff, General Vladimir 
Chachibaya, who provided a startling insight of the ongoing processes on the ground: 
 
Even the single instance of doctrine development is a clear evidence of the mentioned 
NATO-behavioral impact on national representatives. Not only the whole body of 
Field Manuals (FMs) has been introduced or amended to western/NATO standards, 
but the new (totally different from Russian-soviet) meaning and the core idea of 
doctrine has been adopted, followed by a sweeping effect of military terminological 
innovations, Georgian army never experienced before. Eventually it led to a radical 
change in various military and combat procedures, where old Russian terms and 
standards do not apply or have no sense any longer.
4
  
 
The U.S. effort to support the transformation of the GAF, in fact, is openly formulated as the 
bilateral security collaboration aimed among others at reorganizing the Georgian military, so 
that they can operate with the U.S. and NATO forces and share western values.
5
 Georgian 
side similarly stresses the importance of value - community. As early as 2006 the ISAB report 
attests a high degree of dedication to Georgian officials in various positions that drive the 
reform process, however, with the need to strengthen their ability with ―an understanding of 
best modern practice in their particular fields.‖6 The Georgian Prime Minister Irakli 
Gharibashvili also shared this view and while responding to the U.S. State Secretary John 
Cerry in 2014 declared that the U.S. is considered by Georgia as the foremost partner and 
those two nations ―are united first and foremost by shared values.‖7 The intensive 
communication unfolding via various official military and non - military channels make the 
socializing effects comprehensive (see Tables 18. and 19. below). As argued by Gustav 
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Vroemen, a NATO – IS official, recommendations and advices shared on different levels help 
Georgian partners ―to device the logic and understanding that we all share at HQ and are 
critical in defining objectives, we all want to achieve.‖1 The objective is nothing else as 
―bringing Georgia closer to NATO-membership and to the family of western civilized 
nations.‖2 This view is broadly shared by NATO – as well as national representatives we have 
interviewed, as they all strongly believe that those people, who interact with NATO -
counterparts and take part in various training or educational courses have major effect in 
changing policies, adopting common practices and language so familiar to NATO - members. 
For the purpose of visualization the frequency and the thematic area of bilateral contacts are 
presented by figures provided by the Georgian defence ministry (see below).
 3
 
 
Table 18. Frequency and the Levels of NATO - GEO Meeting at NATO HQ  
 
 
Table 19. NATO - Course/Event Attendance 
 
Field Of  
Activity 
Year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Assistance programs and courses 
provided/supported by NATO  
162 192 207 225 134 150 152 
NATO-Functional Events partner-nation 
(MOD) has participated in* 
144 164 133 155 41 68 135 
Number of NATO-led military training and 
exercises participated in  
2 3 2 3 1 3 1 
Number of personnel attended NATO-
courses and retained in positions  
24 59 42 103 66 45 58 
 
*- Events partner-nation has participated may include various issue based meetings (conferences, seminars, workshops etc.) 
 
Apart from direct links to NATO HQ and staff (IS), the Georgian side took advantage of other 
formats that allowed Georgian decision - makers to broaden their search for political support. 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly is the foremost forum, where such efforts are being made and 
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via parliamentary representatives of member - states the spectrum of contacts, i.e. the chances 
for forming a pro - Georgian stance are higher. Georgian officials frequently stressed key role 
of NATO - PA in supporting Georgian aspiration and strengthening the cooperation with 
NATO.
1
 Typically, before any important decision made by NATO (as in case of Bucharest 
Summit) Georgian side tried to secure strong support of the Assembly and usually got it with 
even stronger notion of solidarity as in case of the establishment of the Georgia - NATO 
Interparliamentary Council (GNIC).
2
 Even more, Tbilisi managed to invite the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC), the highest decision - making body of the Alliance to have sessions in 
September 2008, November 2011 and June 2013.
3
 Yet despite all wide - ranging activities and 
the seemingly deep dedication of Georgian leadership to NATO - membership some 
observers were less optimistic and predicted that ―Georgian officials are unlikely to carry out 
complicated and painful reforms without external pressure and support (…) less likely, that 
reforms will be carries out thoroughly and in accordance with NATO and EU - standards.‖4 
One such example can be brought in, as the NATO - IS rejected overoptimistic timetable of 
the SDR - Implementation Plan, and in course of series of working meetings made the 
Georgian side by November 2012 agree to a more realistic option.
5
 The Georgian delegation 
was confronted to a similar logic, as it was forced to change its position to the draft of the Pay 
by Rank System by increasing the margins of expected costs for transitioning to a new 
system. These examples, according to Gustav Vroemen exemplify the relevance of the 
International Staff in certain issues, but it also proved to be very instrumental in addressing 
issues that Georgian delegation considered as very problematic. For instance the long standing 
problem of acquisition of western equipment was given a separate status in the PARP 
assessment document that brought it to the upfront of political discussion and ultimately 
caused allies to review their positions and look for assistance options.
6
  The reviewed 
examples, once again, illustrate the critical importance of healthy communication lines 
between national representatives and NATO - officials that are instrumental in explaining 
both a particular nation‘s concern as well as common NATO - interest.  
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7.4 Concluding Findings  
 
Georgia is obviously not the best example of a Weberian state, which is characterized by the 
prevalence of rational thinking over the instincts of the moment and the dominance of 
bureaucratic neutrality over increased ―superexecutivism.‖1 Modernization is the key feature 
of Georgia‘s transformation efforts. It replaces the essence of transformation by modernizing 
the external features of the national governmental structure, and avoids the need for deep - 
reaching democratic institutional reforms that challenge the position of the nation‘s power 
authorities. This modernization pattern makes the preservation of bad practices - such as 
informal decision making, fluid roles, and leadership‘s elitist behavior - still possible. As Till 
Bruckner aptly illustrates in the vivid example of the government action to construct camp - 
villages for refugees, the key feature of Georgian political decision - making is the informal 
nature of the procedures adopted by a close knit group of functionaries, who leave no trail of 
official records.
2
 It is astounding how little prominence is assigned to formal procedures and 
norms within the entire process of political decision - making. We share Bruckner‘s 
conclusion on the inherent contradiction in the Georgian government‘s reality between having 
a well - prepared plan and the existing mode of action.
3
 Understandably, having an actual 
planning capacity would require clearly established formal procedures that are accepted and 
followed by all participants within a given institution and between governmental institutions.  
 
Evaluating Georgia‘s performance in the political ―basket‖ of activities, following 
conclusions can be made. Georgian officials constantly kept a high degree of political 
adherence to the strategic objective of NATO - membership throughout the research period. 
The relationship to the Alliance was always given the strategic importance and emphasized 
not only in strong public and official statements addressed to the foreign audience, but not 
less for the internal agenda consumption. From the very first steps of defence reforms, 
Georgia quickly introduced the civilian element of the ministry of defence as key structural 
body that firmly established strong control over the General Staff and military, and often, 
even undermined their authority. However, the parliamentary control of defence activities, 
plans and budgetary appropriations remained poor and till 2012 exposed no serious sign of 
improvement. Hence, the diplomatic adherence, civilian control of the military and the 
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parliamentary control must be given statuses as ―strong‖, ―strong― and ―no progress‖.   As the 
U.S. Congressional Report puts it with a lethal clarity: 
 
Many previously unrecognized or neglected deficiencies in the various required 
capacities of the Georgian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence (came to light). In 
practically all areas, defence institutions, strategies, doctrines, and professional 
military education were found to be seriously lacking.
1
 
 
This horrifying conclusion made by the strongest and most committed partner of Georgia 
must be approached with some caution. Issue based areas of defence transformation, defined 
in our study as ―functional areas‖, reveal mixed picture of both energetic actions and the wide 
- spectrum approach to ensure reform - comprehensiveness, as well as the frequent revision of 
agreed objectives and subsequent setbacks. As Duncan Hiscock seem right to claim that, the 
nature of Georgian defence - reform actions was predestined by the domestic perception of 
the narrow window of opportunity and the small group of individuals involved in all relevant 
decisions made, that effectively caused the sketchy content of actions prepared in hurry, 
unclear roles assigned to institutions and the frequent practice of taking short - cuts by 
ignoring international ―best practices‖.2 The swift legal amendments made it possible to 
introduce a western - like ministerial structure and the General Staff along the clear division 
of responsibilities among them. The subsequent adoption of the Law on Defence Planning 
ensured a clear hierarchy of the strategic level documents, their missions and shaped the 
fundamental structure of the national defence planning system. Yet the weakness of the 
parliament to initiate legal amendments to control and audit defence related activities, leaves 
the overall positive evaluation stuck ―partial +‖. Similar effects, though with much more 
negative touch of ambiguity, we observed in the domain of defence policy and planning. 
Though the overall impression is that formally a coherent body of policy and planning system 
is provided and all relevant documents are drafted and updated with some regularity, the 
frequent revision and the total disregard of policy objectives and planned actions render the 
existing formal framework as a hollow construct, with no effects on their practical 
implementation, thus receiving the status of ―partial‖ evaluation.  
 
Similar assessment can be made with regard to the field of human resource management, 
where respective policies had been long developed and staff members educated, however, few 
signs of policy implementation have been detected. In fact, the entire problem of policy -
                                                 
1
 Nichol, ―Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,‖ 45. 
2
 Hiscock, ―Impatient Reformers and Reignited Conflicts,‖ 134–135. 
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deficiencies and setbacks are directly linked to the volatile behavioral tradition of MOD -
leadership, with some exceptions over the entire period of research. We don‘t agree to Robert 
Hamilton‘s statement that Georgia lacked a modern military bureaucracy with deficits ranging 
from strategic planning to the procedures of ―handling classified material.‖1 Contrary to that, 
the entire period o research reveals the constant capacity of the national defence bureaucracy 
to produce policies, concepts and norms largely meeting all western (NATO) requirements. 
Continuous educational assistance from NATO - members, ensured ever growing quality of 
the personnel. Yet the dominance and authoritarian style of management exercised by MOD -
leadership, effectively disturbed and ignored the continuity of policy developments and their 
coherent implementation. The example of the Georgian SDR, which was thoroughly 
developed, but revised multiple times to the level of a complete irrelevance, is a vivid proof of 
our claim. Similarly, the control of defence budgetary spending was largely placed outside the 
institutional mechanisms under the exclusive right of view individuals that have believed to 
drive reforms, but were risking the collapse of the existing institutional foundation once 
leaving the scene.
2
 With little, non - binding and sporadic efforts, to improve defence 
transparency by strengthening ties to civil society and other stakeholders,  the Georgian MOD 
is still far from reaching its high transparency objectives that remain fully contingent on the 
individual good - will of each new defence minister.  
 
Contrary to ―no progress‖ in defence budget and transparency, we detected a significantly 
strong progress in areas relevant to the issue of a narrow military combat interoperability and 
standards. Whether the overall structure of the GAF and units, or the application of western 
operating procedures and use of equipment, Georgian army revealed a high speed of 
transformation and fairly strong ability to internalize NATO/U.S.- standards regarded as vital 
for joint operations, training and exercises with allied forces. The extensive foreign financial, 
material and educational support over the entire period of 2004 – 2012 significantly 
contributed to this progress, thus allowing us to assign evaluation status ―strong‖ to GAF‘s 
performance in interoperability and participation NATO - led operations. The latter belongs to 
the ideational sphere of NATO - influence, where the most socialization effects unfold.  
Obviously, the operational environment during combat deployments poses the most potent 
framework, where the influence of NATO - procedures, both planning and combat operating 
are brought to the extremes. Thus, it was less surprising that the evidence collected in areas of 
                                                 
1
 Hamilton, ―Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,‖ 1. 
2
 Hiscock, ―Impatient Reformers and Reignited Conflicts,‖ 135–136. 
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foreign assistance, training and education, suggested a growing progress (―partial+‖) in 
performance, yet not to the level typical for participation in NATO - led operations that, in 
fact, incorporated the large part of training and field exercises during pre - deployment 
phases.  
 
Table 20. NATO - Influence in Georgia: Results 
 
 
The overall picture of Georgian defence transformation (Table 20.) renders a mixed feeling. It 
makes clear that the most troubled sector is the functional one with poor progress shown. 
Additionally, it suggest that the deficiencies in implementation of functional policies and 
especially the low level of defence (budget/public) transparency are directly tied to the 
inability of the national parliament to perform its control and supervisory functions. This 
linkage makes the following claim plausible, that the gap between the enthusiastic political 
declarations and poor implementation has to be attributed to the interests of domestic political 
agenda that were strong enough to obstruct Georgia‘s international commitments and to cause 
a certain deviation from the objectives agreed with NATO.  The most success is achieved in 
the political representation of the defence and security concerns abroad, as well as within the 
military domain of interoperability. These results seem also logical, since the strong rhetorical 
action in international negotiations as well as the massive involvement in military operations 
of the Alliance, leaved a solid impression of national credibility without compromising the 
actual objectives pursued in the domestic political agenda.  Along the evaluation model 
generated, we are also able to offer a completed schematic picture of the interplay of 
incentives, gains/pay offs and national preferences (see Figure 8. below), we suggested in the 
earlier chapter of the paper that dealt with the concept of conditionality and compliance.  
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Figure 8. Georgia: Interplay of Incentives, Preferences and Pay-Offs  
 
Georgia 
Incentives/Relative 
Gains  
Domestic  
Factors/Preferences 
External Factors Negative Pay Offs 
 
 Strong bilateral 
(U.S. others) 
relations and 
assistance  
 
 Practical benefits 
of force-
interoperability 
(limited to 
military-technical 
aspect) 
 
 Support of 
defence reforms 
 
 Valuable NATO 
expertise in 
various policy 
fields of defence 
 
 Enhanced 
institutional 
capacity 
 
 Western-minded 
personnel 
 
 Strategic 
bargaining with 
Russia  
 
 Democratically 
run military 
 
 PfP-information 
share 
 
Territorial integrity 
 
Security  
 
Economic prosperity  
 
Effective control of power 
 
Weak democratic system 
 
Strong personal ties between 
key officials 
 
Weak public control  
 
 
 
 
NATO-membership not 
guaranteed   
 
Tiredness of NATO 
enlargement  
 
No bilateral military 
assistance treaty with the 
U.S. 
 
Russian military 
presence in breakaway 
regions 
 
Armenia – member of 
the CSTO, i.e. military 
ally of Russia 
 
 No increased 
security guaranteed 
 
 No major military 
equipment 
 
 Russia‘s 
continuing threat 
 
 Defence priorities 
transparent to 
potential enemies 
 
 Dependence on 
public support for 
defence spending 
priorities 
 Balance / Imbalance 
of Incentives and Negative Pay Offs 
 
Though negative pay offs outweigh the positive ones on 
the whole, the selective or limited acceptance of some 
positive pay offs that do not cause any serious negative 
consequences (pay offs) had been be agreed upon.  
 
 
Behavioral Result under Limited Conditionality 
 
 Positive Effect Negative Effect 
 
- non Compliance - 
 
Compliance   
Partial 
Compliance 
 
 
The Benefits of cooperation relate foremost to bilateral (U.S. dominated) cooperation and the 
practical military domain such as participation in NATO - led operations, training and 
exercises, where valuable skills, procedures and equipment is transferred to Georgia. This 
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view is strongly accepted by Bruce Bach, a former but most experienced NATO - IS official 
on Georgia issues (with decades of service), who highlights an important point of the Alliance 
behavior: 
 
I would say that the military dimension has been more productive, merely because of 
the progress possible through PARP, operations in ISAF and exercises which do not 
require all Allies to be convinced of the benefit.
1
 
 
In other areas however, Georgia faced various challenges and tried to show better picture as it 
was in reality. As argued by William Lahue, a head of NATO Office in Georgia: 
 
There were instances in Georgia in the past, where Georgian authorities tried to show 
better picture than it was in reality. The reason was simple – the structure of existing 
power-relationship at various levels of Georgian government and the ministry was put 
under serious risk and caused therefore significant resistance.
2
  
 
He also concludes that last years of President Saakashvili‘s rule showed no signs of 
continuous defence transformation. Here he is fully supported by the former deputy defence 
minister Nikoloz Vashakidze, who stresses key role the defence ministers and their 
preferences have played in avoiding the real - life implementation of made promises.3 The 
limited effects of relative gains that by and large can‘t outbalance the imperatives of domestic 
and international agenda, is very indicative of the hollow nature of conditionality imposed 
over Georgia. Conversely, the heavy focus on rhetorical action, chosen by the Georgian 
government surved the purpose political pressure and not least of masking the actual 
compliance - failure in several defence related policy areas. The ISAB report in 2006 was 
pressing for democratic standards, compatibility, legality and sustainability as key 
measurement criteria for success in defence transformation.4 As it seems, only compatibility 
and legality matched the existing expectations, and contrary to early reiteration made by 
Georgian side, sustainability, predictability and continuity of reforms were least recognizable 
features of the entire process, ultimately compromising the political will and the ability of 
decisive implementation at practical level.   
                                                 
1
 Interview with Bruce Bach, a former member of NATO IS (Defence Policy and Planning Division), Brussels. 
2
 Interview with the Head of NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Georgia William Lahue, NATO Liaison Office, 
Tbilisi. 
3
 Interview with the former Deputy Defence Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze, Tbilisi. 
4
 Johnson, Smith, and Werner, ―ISAB REPORT 2006,‖ 5. 
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Chapter VIII: Comparative Summary 
 
This chapter sums up the results of the single - case analyses and correlates them in an attempt 
to identify the divergence or, in contrary, a convergence of results according to sectors 
reviewed. While reviewing each case in depth, we already performed a significant part of 
comparison, that of result identification. Yet bringing them in a coherent comparative 
structure turns the study to a truly cross - case analysis, and allows to generate a much more 
comprehensive picture of research results. Thus it also makes it possible to identify tendencies 
within each sector that enable a better provision of explanations and underlying causes.   
 
 
8.1 The Evidence of a Counterintuitive Paradox 
 
Once single evaluation tables are put together (see the Table 21. below), the impression of a 
paradox, startling similarities in results and general tendencies in both cases cannot be 
avoided (see the table below).  
 
Table 21. NATO-Influence: A Cross - Case Comparison, Georgia and Armenia 
 
NATO-Influence 
(indicator-areas) 
Georgia 
status of commitments/compliance 
strong / partial /  
partial + / 
no progress 
Armenia 
status of commitments/compliance 
strong / partial /  
partial + / 
no progress 
Political (aggregated) Positive Progress Some Positive Progress 
 Diplomatic/Rhetorical Adherence strong partial + 
 Parliamentary Control no progress no progress 
 Civil. Control of the MOD strong partial + 
Functional (aggregated) Partial Progress Little Progress 
 Normative (legal) partial + partial 
 Standards - Interoperability strong partial 
 Defence Planning partial partial 
 Defence Budget-Transparency no progress no progress 
 Human Resources partial partial 
Ideational (aggregated) Strong Positive 
Progress 
Positive Progress 
 Training and Education partial + partial 
 NATO-led Ops strong   partial+ 
 Foreign Assistance partial + partial 
 Status of NATO Influence/National Compliance 
Aggregated Result Strong signs of positive influence in 
Political and Ideational Dimension 
with partially positive effects in 
Functional (Policy) areas of 
defence 
Some positive influence on Political 
and Ideational Dimension with little 
effects in Functional (Policy) areas 
of defence 
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Contrary to expectations (since Georgia eagerly wants to become a NATO - member, and 
Armenia not), the performance of defence institutions in both countries shows a great 
similarity in overall dynamics and, most importantly, the identical achievements in several 
key sectors across the areas (political, functional, ideational) of NATO - influence.  
 
Within the political area of influence, both countries had done little to comply with the basic 
requirement of parliamentary control. Though Georgia‘s political engagement with the 
Alliance and respective political commitments showed by far greater intensity and scale, the 
comparison of evaluation - values, in fact, tell us that the difference between the national 
performances in the diplomatic - rhetorical adherence and the establishment of the civilian 
control over armed forces are not that significant (Armenia scoring just one level lower). In 
both sectors Armenia managed to uphold a progressively positive dynamics, falling short of 
being assessed as ―strong‖ due to obvious limitations put on its strategic political objectives 
related to NATO, as contrary to Georgia‘s open desire to join the Alliance. This observation 
speaks in favor of the following conclusion: 
 
A greater scale of political commitments does not guarantee per se the higher degree 
of implementation effort, i.e. compliance. Conversely, the growing convergence of 
compliance - results achieved by “high” and “low” ambitioned actors indicate the 
irrelevance of the commitment degree, as the only factor responsible for positive 
performance.     
 
Contrary to the general expectation that the more promise and commitment made, the more 
results will be achieved, Georgia rendered an outcome that falls not far from the result 
achieved by another nation that did not pursue the same strategic objective and did not 
embrace the same scale of commitments. Despite the existing limits of strategic choices, 
Armenia still accepted the opportunity of intensified cooperation with NATO and showed 
clear signs of positive development between 2004 and 2012.   
 
The most problematic area that revealed serious challenges and setbacks for NATO to exert 
influence and initiate significant change is the functional area of defence. It is, in fact, an area 
where the adoption of various functional policies common to NATO - countries takes place 
while transforming defence. Similar to the political dimension of NATO - influence, we 
observe a significant convergence of performance - results between Armenia and Georgia that 
are assigned identical values in the sectors of defence planning, budgetary transparency and 
human resources. Only within the sectors of legal/normative influence and the application of 
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NATO - standards/Interoperability did Georgia show better results (―partial+‖, and ―strong‖) 
than Armenia, which still received a positive (―partial‖) evaluation. Whereas Georgia‘s 
advantage in legal and interoperability issues can be easily explained and verified, as they 
relate to the formal, representative side of the external commitments made (laws adopted and 
NATO - operations participated), the obvious deficits in other key sectors have to be 
explained predominantly by internal, domestic causes as they mostly relate to the 
requirements of policy - internalization within the defence institutions. The western model of 
defence policy and planning had been formally adopted both in Armenia and Georgia, and 
key elements (drafting strategic documents, the SDR and interagency mode of work) of the 
authority division within the defence planning process between the respective MOD - and GS 
departments had been also approved. Nonetheless, a number of challenges associated with the 
proper implementation and utilization of policy and planning procedures, legal amendments, 
timely update of strategic documents and serious delays of agreed objectives (with NATO) 
cannot be overseen, that altogether point towards the inherent internal difficulties (intentional, 
organizational or capacity based) to master new policies and procedures.  
 
In fact, Armenia was less sophisticated in applying proper (western) defence policy and 
planning procedures than Georgia, yet more steady and coherent in the implementing phase. 
In the Georgian case the frequent disregard of formally approved mechanisms and the change 
of plans already approved, rendered many policy reform initiatives as ineffective as in 
Armenia, with considerable gaps (―no progress‖) in the budgetary planning and transparency 
in both case -countries. A similar observation can be made with regard to the progress 
achieved in human resource management. Georgia was much more advanced in formally 
adopting new HR - concepts and policies; however, with the frequent change of the MOD - 
leadership and the subsequent chain - effect of the policy - revision and personnel - 
reshuffling, the overall results (―partial‖) reveal no progress - difference to the case of 
Armenia. Understandably, the larger scale of the Georgian involvement in NATO - led 
operations and the extent of the U.S. - assistance to the Georgian armed forces and the 
ministry of defence (see the Table 22. below), created conditions, in which Georgian 
representatives (military and civilian) were much more exposed to the professional influence 
of NATO - counterparts than in the Armenian case.  
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Table 22.  U.S. Security Funds Budgeted FY 1992-2008
1
  
(In millions of USD, defence related highlighted)  
  
Key security and defence related US-assistance programs ARMENIA GEORGIA 
Law Enforcement 18.86 48.125 
Non-proliferation of WMD & Disarmament 6.55 10.41 
Foreign Military Financing -FMF 30.236 113.87 
International Military Exchange and Training - IMET 4.692 10.409 
Peacekeeping Operations 0 15.54 
Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) 3.68 12.84 
Humanitarian Demining 4.45 12.67 
Sec. 1206: Counter-Terrorism & Train & Equip 0.0 11.447 
 
As the table above exemplifies, the priority given to the assistance to Georgian military 
outweighs the resources devoted to Armenia by almost three times. Thus, it was not surprising 
that the overall evaluation of the Georgian performance within the ideational area of influence 
delivered better (more progress) results in all three sectors. The Armenian participation in 
NATO - led operations is explicitly limited to the peacekeeping brigade and the ability of its 
units to undergo joint training/exercises and perform combat operations with NATO (U.S.) - 
forces. The fears of the reduced combat readiness of units in case of the large restructuring, 
i.e. changing of ―ways of doing business‖ while facing Azerbaijani enemy units on frontline, 
leaves the overwhelming majority of the armed forces unaffected by a large spectrum of new 
doctrines. Consequently, the strength of the professional influence and the socialization 
effects on Armenian military and civil servants are strongly conditioned within the margins of 
the peacekeeping brigade and by the context of foreign strategic deployments.  
 
Contrary to that, the Georgian military embraced the largest possible extent of exposure to 
foreign (especially U.S.) assistance and mentorship, with all branches and services of the 
military and ministry of defence undergoing intensive educational as well operational 
dimensions of the socialization processes. Yet despite the comprehensive approach chosen, 
the Georgian defence authorities still faced certain difficulties in utilizing foreign assistance 
and adopting the western model of military education system. This eventually had to be 
attributed to a general problem of the frequent leadership change, personnel reshuffling and 
delays in policy - implementation. Throughout the study sufficient evidence has been 
collected to establish a direct link between the strength of ideational influence, professional 
socialization and the degree of political aspirations, i.e. strategic objectives of cooperation 
with NATO. As in the case of the political area of influence, the limitation of strategic 
national objectives, i.e. intentions of Armenia (approval of the merely cooperative framework 
                                                 
1
 Nichol, ―Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,‖ 41. 
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with NATO due to CSTO - membership) serves as the defining factor of the modest results 
and the low intensity of ideational influence, exerted by the Alliance.  
 
8.2 So what with our Hypotheses? 
 
The paradox of findings we observe in our study runs against our hypothetical assumption, 
that the prevalence of external political objectives (incl. international commitments) over the 
internal political agenda supports the increased application of NATO - shared norms, values 
and practices by national institutions. The case of Georgia, where the NATO - membership 
had been raised to the top strategic objective, and the scale of external commitments was 
incomparably larger than in Armenia, showed clearly the weakness of this pre - formulated 
hypothetical linkage. Even though the overall results of evaluating NATO - influence in 
Georgia show some better progress (predominantly in sectors of the political and ideational 
influence), the key areas of the institutional performance requiring new policy adoption and 
internalization on routine basis showed the same shortfalls and challenges resulting in similar 
―progress scores‖ as in Armenia. This finding necessitates a further explanation of the 
strength of the ―hidden‖ domestic political agenda in relation to defence institutions. 
Furthermore, a more cautious approach to the overall importance of foreign commitments 
must be adopted, since they might be formal and hollow, and, in fact, serve predominantly the 
declarative objective of masking and legitimizing the actual domestic behavior. As identified 
by some observers, there is a significant imbalance between the optimistic statements of 
South Caucasus countries‘ official representatives, especially of Georgian politicians 
concerning the progress of achieving NATO - standards and the actual conditions of the 
military on the ground.
1
 
 
8.2.1 Adoption of Norms and Practices - not always not every where  
 
The evidence collected supports also the general conclusion that both countries granted more 
attention to practical benefits of the military cooperation than the political domain of NATO - 
requirements. Even in the case of Georgia, where the political leadership unconditionally 
accepted a much stronger formulated requirement of the democratic governance of defence, 
                                                 
1
 Malek, Shalamanov, and Labarre, ―NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on 
Different Tracks,‖ 49. 
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the practice, in fact, revealed a much heavier focus on the force - interoperability for NATO – 
operations, leaving the process of the democratic transformation of national defence 
institutions to the will of local authorities. This observation refutes the second hypothesis 
we‘ve made in our theoretical part of the study, which assumes that ―cooperation mechanisms 
existing between NATO, Georgia and Armenia support the adoption of norms and practices of 
democratic control of armed forces, consequently, contributing to the increased level of 
institutional accountability rather than to the objective of military effectiveness.‖ As we have 
seen, this assumption especially relevant to Georgia proved to be groundless. The institutional 
accountability of defence, evaluated across all areas of NATO - influence by the progress 
achieved in democratic control of armed forces, defence planning and transparency, rendered 
a least optimistic picture. Contrary to that, the most cooperation work (bi - and multilateral) 
and progress was easily to detect in the adoption of practical military standards and the 
improved combat interoperability. The benefits of cooperation relate foremost to the practical 
military domain such as participation in NATO - led operations and valuable expertise, 
predominantly provided by member - states and less by Alliance as organization. As the U.S. 
2014 Budget Estimates make reference to U.S. Secretary of Defence Panetta‘s speech in June 
2012 ―building the capacity of defense ministries and other institutions, which have not been a 
main focus of our efforts, must become more prominent,‖ and the focus must be sharpened 
from partner‘s tactical interoperability to the increased ministerial and joint staff institutional 
capability by promoting democratic values and reforms and increasing transparency in 
governance.
1
 The democratic requirements, key to NATO, are acknowledged but less 
implemented as institutional pillars of defence reform falling behind the imperative of 
enhancing fighting capabilities of armed forces. Consequently, it can be indicative either for 
the formal (hollow) nature of democratic requirements towards the country, or the inability of 
the Alliance to provide added value of the enhanced cooperation and the subsequent 
compliance in this respect. In line with this conclusion the Armenian first deputy minister 
Davit Tonoyan pointed towards the declining relevance of the PFP as a whole (close to 
ceasing its existence) and the increased role of the bilateral cooperation with NATO - 
countries (especially with U.S.) to Armenia, which is a strong evidence of benefit - based 
behavior. Furthermore, it makes it also plausible that the issue of general transformation of 
defence in accordance with NATO - standards is heavily dependent on the convergence of 
                                                 
1
 ―Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates‖ (Defence Security Cooperation Agency, April 2013), 501–502, available 
at 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdf/01_Operation_a
nd_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/DSCA_OP-5.pdf. 
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both political agendas, that of NATO and of a partner - country, according to Armenian 
defence advisor Mher Israelyan.
1
 He goes on to stress that once the national political interests 
and other factors come together, the NATO – requirements, though important, still can be 
neglected.  
 
8.2.2 The Comparison – an additional Argument for the Interest based 
State Behavior?  
 
The deficits in compliance, i.e. implementation and routiniziation of NATO - standards on 
institutional policies and procedures, have mainly to be attributed to different objectives of 
conflicting agendas, internal and external. As the tables of gains and negative pay - offs 
reveal, the option of full compliance does not provide results comparable with the domestic 
preferences (interests), and, in fact, has little effect in reducing the expected negative pay - 
offs of cooperation. If the modest evaluation of the progress achieved, i.e. influence exerted 
by NATO in Armenia was from the very beginning assumed, the analogous result of interplay 
between the gains, incentives and negative pay offs generated in case of Georgia, provides a 
powerful explanation for the national behavior resulting in a merely partial compliance due to 
the obvious imbalance between the gains and negative pay - offs, clearly in favor of the latter. 
The heavy weight of negative consequences caused by the option of full compliance in both 
case - countries in no way could be outbalanced by calculated positive pay - offs. 
Respectively, it is understandable, why such actions had been taken in Armenia and Georgia 
that selectively aimed at achieving only those pay - offs that could not seriously damage much 
bigger (domestic) interests and objectives. The made conclusion largely validates Joseph 
Grieco‘s view of limitations in international cooperation according to the concept of Amended 
Prisone’s Dilemmas. 
 
We also agree with Richard Giragosyan‘s claim that governance in Armenia is characterized 
by the dominance of strong individuals over strong institutions.
2
 As in case of Georgia an 
impression cannot be avoided about the existence of a significant gap between the formal 
structures and the mechanisms in place to regulate the processes and reality, i.e. actual routine 
way of doing business. The conflict in the Karabakh region indeed is a dominating factor, 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Mr. Mher Israelyan, Defence Advisor at Armenian Mission to NATO, Brussels. 
2
 Giragosian, Shiriyev, and Kakachia, ―Security Perceptions: The Views from Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia,‖ 
197. 
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keeping the focus of the overall defence transformation process very limited and upholding 
the existing informal linkages off record. According to Bruce Bach, the ongoing conflict 
makes Armenia‘s desire to transform the defence very limited, concentrating only on minor 
areas.
1
 Together with the fear of losing monopoly over defence and security by power -
holders it makes the access of a wider public to relevant information very difficult and 
weakens the monitoring function of societal and non - governmental organizations 
significantly.
2
 From that angle the intensive use of language containing much of the 
―democratic principles‖ relevant to defence transformation can be merely explained as an 
attempt to provide a picture of the ―democratic – responsible state‖ and ―positive state-
identity‖, as rightly pointed by Michela Telatin.3 Armenia serves here as a telling example of 
that, the readiness to share the same language and enter certain commitments pertaining to 
institutional transformation does not guarantee their successive implementation. As stressed 
by Defence Advisor Mher Israelyan: ―Existing commitments are by no way political or legal 
obligations, but rather a national will to achieve certain objectives and gain international 
support.‖ This statement provides a clear picture of the national perception of external 
commitments that are legally not binding and serve largely the objective of international 
legitimization.  
 
Similar observations can be made in the case of Georgia. The reasons have to be found in ―too 
much concentration on the political and declarative decision - making, without meticulous 
work in practice,‖ as put by the former deputy defence minister Tamar Karosanidze.4 The 
impression of the formal implementation, i.e. masking of non - compliance indeed seems to 
be a featuring element of Georgia‘s behavior. As argued by another former deputy minister 
Nikoloz Vashakidze, some areas of defence reform activities carried the essence of the formal 
implementation before and after his service - period to avoid the necessity of the real - life 
action. Yet he also stresses the dominating role of defence ministers, their personalities, 
interests and preferences in strengthening or limiting such behavior.
5
 In fact, as argued by 
William Lahue, the Head of the NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Tbilisi, last years before 
2012 the process of defence transformation was simply stuck.
6
 Key sectors (parliamentary 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Bruce Bach, a former member of NATO IS (Defence Policy and Planning Division), Brussels. 
2
 Avagyan and Hiscock, ―Security Sector Reform in Armenia,‖ 41, 36. 
3
 Telatin, ―The Development-Security Nexus and Security Sector Reform,‖ 100. 
4
 Interview with Deputy Defence Minister Tamar Karosanidze, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Tbilisi. 
5
 Interview with the former Deputy Defence Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze, Tbilisi. 
6
 Interview with the Head of NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Georgia William Lahue, NATO Liaison Office, 
Tbilisi. 
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control, defence planning, budgetary transparency and personnel management), where 
Armenia and Georgia show similar values (―no progress‖ or ―partial‖) of national 
performance, directly represent the major mechanisms of power control: political, financial 
and human. Thus, we can conclude with great certainty that in both countries the major 
interest of holding the strong grip of control on the mentioned mechanisms impeded the swift 
transformation of defence and therefore rendered partial or minimal effects of NATO - 
influence. Conclusions drawn from both cases confirm our early formulated hypothesis, 
which argued that the ―participation in NATO - institutional frameworks predominantly 
serves the purpose of legitimization of domestic actions and does not lead to imminent 
implementation.” Indeed, both countries showed enough evidence to agree with that. 
 
For additional explanation of the overall weakness of the Alliance to ensure Georgia‘s 
compliance, as well as the unwillingness of the national authorities at ministerial and 
government level to speed up the reform process, we suggest following: NATO was 
exclusively perceived by Georgian officials as an organization for collective defence. Thus, 
security considerations lay at core of Georgia‘s cost - benefit analysis and respective 
behavior. Since the US - Georgia Strategic Partnership Charter did not provide defence 
guarantees either; it seems not surprising that the Alliance‘s approach to Georgia was 
determined by the balance of interests, as rightly put by Ahto Lobjakas.
1
 Much of the 
evidence speaks in favor of the predominance of security considerations in both case - 
countries while making decisions on defence transformation or the cooperative approach to 
NATO. Our observations strengthen some authors‘ claim that deficits in security 
arrangements and insecurity from external military pressures are one of the major underlying 
factors for national non - or partial compliance.
2
 Consequently, we hold the hypothesis that 
―international power relations and security interests by far determine the speed and depth of 
defence transformation as the political outcome of institutional compliance‖ as valid.  
                                                 
1
 Lobjakas, ―NATO Lacks the Stomach for South Caucasus Fight,‖ 4. 
2
 Cornell, ―NATO‘s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security,‖ 128; Socor, ―NATO Prospects in the South 
Caucasus,‖ 3–4. 
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Chapter IX: Conclusion  
 
All the factors mentioned above are clear examples of the flawed theoretical assumption that 
the policy of conditionality will work once formal attributes and conditions for national 
compliance are established. As Stephen Krasner puts it, this account is wrong, since it fails to 
take into account the incentives for local leaders to impede better governance and does not 
explain explicitly the particular methods of the external contribution to local governance due 
to its rhetorical commitments to local ownership.
1
 This claim is valid for both cases. Though 
formally less attributable to Georgia, it, in fact, exposes clear evidence of an existing gap 
between the formal claims of compliance by imitating the patterns of NATO countries and the 
actual mode of governing. Even if the capacity is the result of foreign assistance or training, it 
is far from clear, why this capacity would be dedicated to developing better practices of 
governance rather than to ―self - serving behavior.‖2 The formal adherence to norms and 
codes of conduct does not result in their automatic implementation in real life, and might even 
serve the purpose of masking the actual behavior (violation of the norm), as in the case of 
many countries joining universal treaties. This particular aspect would require an additional 
analysis of the incentives and expected costs for a national government as a whole, and the 
government officials in particular.  
 
The major question, formulated at the beginning our research endeavor was whether NATO - 
policy of conditionality had the ability to induce or enforce a policy change of a respective 
defence institution. As we‘ve been able to see, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
balance of gains and negative pay - offs in the cases of Georgia and Armenia does not speak 
in favor of the former. Both countries had little motives and incentives to go beyond the 
minimum of domestic performance, since the rewards provided by NATO were indeed 
minimal, and due to the absence of any serious punishment mechanism from NATO – side, 
the minimum of compliance seemed to secure the rewards any way. At this point Alexandra 
Gheciu‘s claim, that there is a high likelhood to secure expected benefits with a minimum of 
domestic adaptation, seems very plausible and strongly confirmed.
3
 Georgia simply failed on 
many instances to provide better results due to various political (internal) and personality - 
                                                 
1
 Krasner, ―International Support for State-Building: Flawed Consensus,‖ 66. 
2
 Ibid., 70. 
3
 Gheciu, ―Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?,‖ 980. 
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related reasons, and Armenia, arguably, did not regard it as necessary to accelerate the speed 
of performance.  
 
The argument, that the more NATO is strategically interested in a country, the less the 
candidates are placed under the scrutiny of conditionality, proves to be largely true for both 
countries, especially for Armenia. However, some unique features and nuances of the 
particular approach adopted towards Georgia should not be put off table. The logic of the 
stated assumption implies the opposite - that the lack of strategic interest in Georgia would 
cause higher degree of procedural scrutiny and the chance of sanctions. The evidence, 
however, speaks only to the strong political reflection of conditionality, which is the 
postponement of procedural guarantees of membership (the Membership Action Plan - MAP). 
On the other hand, the long - lasting deficits in key functional (policy) areas of defence reveal 
also clear deficits in the sanctioning mechanism of the Alliance, as well as a good awareness 
and understanding of this incapacity by national authorities in Armenia and Georgia.  
 
With respect to how national policies are shaped towards the Alliance and what factors seem 
to play decisive role, the relevance of NATO as a regime must be touched upon again. In line 
with Stephen Krasner claim, NATO very well falls under the category of an international 
regime, which typically for all regimes exposes low evidence of punishing the bad behavior of 
its members and partner - nations. To a great extent this can be attributed to the inability of 
NATO – as organization to act independently from its member – states, especially the larger 
ones. The Alliance does not possess the quality of an independent agent to ensure compliance 
via sanctions or the threat of punishment. Its design, organizational structure and the 
mechanism of decision – making ensure a strong dependence on member – states and the 
preponderance of bilateral cooperation tracks. Thus, both Armenia and Georgia have pursued 
their interests in a very strategic, rational and calculative way to ensure and maximize benefits 
from the established cooperation mechanisms.     
 
The adoption of new norms and practices offered by the Alliance via standards and policies 
had, in fact, little to do with the effectiveness of a particular cooperation mechanism, but 
rather with the strong commitment and will of national authorities to implement those norms 
and practices independently from external pressures. Given the low chance of sanctions from 
the NATO – side, the argument of ―self – or interest driven‖ compliance becomes even 
stronger if not the only plausible one.  This fact explains the selective approach of national 
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authorities (especially in Armenia) to adopt NATO – standards that are continuously reviewed 
as means of matching or enhancing particular national or institutional interests, and are in no 
way regarded as ―universal goods‖, even if their positive effects are formally acknowledged. 
Nonetheless, we see growing effects of professional socialization and ideational change, 
induced via multiple linkages and contacts that ensure steady application of mentioned 
policies, norms and standards. The speed of western norms‘ internalization should not serve 
as an indicator for socialization impact in Armenia, not to speak about much ―NATO – 
minded‖ Georgia. In contrary, we see in the retrospective a significant change of ―mindset‖ of 
defence representatives. Although limited and channeled to the areas of practical needs, the 
cooperation mechanisms are still powerful enough to present the advantage, i.e. superiority of 
the western model – thinking and to ensure its recognition not only at the low tactical level of 
field training and exercise, but at the strategic level of policy and doctrine development. All 
our respondents, national and NATO – affiliated, agree with this claim, and more 
interestingly, share the same basic understanding of key NATO - messages, terms and 
benefits, as well as the limitations of cooperation process. Our observation allows us to 
conclude, that there is a significant convergence of views and arguments between national 
(Armenian, Georgian) and  NATO representatives, which at least at mid – to high level of 
representation attests to a well advanced level of socialization and the started process of the 
successful identity change. Thus, the sobering results of defence transformation have little to 
do with this aspect of cooperation and must be explained exclusively in the domain of 
domestic political structure and interests.    
    
NATO is clear in its strategic messaging about the requirements for aspirant members. 
Georgia has failed to apprehend these messages: to address the identity issues more seriously, 
to declare its policy priorities in response, and to internalize and routinize democratic 
institutional norms and standards. In the case of Armenia such messages were less formulated 
and often omitted in practice. Both case - countries adjusted their respective policies 
according to the existing cooperation and conditionality pattern in response to external 
pressures.
1
 The results of this policy adjustment can also be seen in the mode of action the 
national authorities followed while negotiating with NATO officials. Out of five modes of 
behavior, two can be identified as most relevant in the Georgian case while applying Frank 
                                                 
1
 Michael Tierney, review of Lisa L. Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International 
Cooperation, in The Journal of Politics 64:3 (August 2002): 949. 
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Schimmelfennig‘s model of negotiation behavior: those of rhetoric and strategic action.1 
While pursuing strategic objectives of national security and territorial integrity, the Georgian 
government has relied intensively on rhetoric and superb bargaining to present the impression 
of compliance in order to increase its chance of acceptance by NATO members and/or to 
speed up the membership process through the imposition of political necessity. In contrary to 
this, Armenia did not require the adoption of such approach and remained pretty consequent 
in its limited acceptance of NATO‘s transformative influence.  
 
Our findings would generally conform to Stephen Krasner‘s appeal for a greater authorization 
of external actors by granting more power of control, especially in the case of Georgia due to 
its formal desire for membership and full compliance. This would imply stricter rules of 
conditionality, better control mechanisms of commitment implementation, as well as better 
mechanisms for providing higher transparency and public control of policy formulation and 
implementation in particular. In turn, Armenia would require a radical change of strategic 
objectives towards NATO to be propelled onto a higher level of cooperation. In order to be 
successful, the concept of conditionality and compliance must heavily rely on a clear 
identification of ―sticks‖ and ―carrots,‖ along with clear timeframes and credible 
measurement procedures, to avoid the risk of formal compliance that masks the actual 
behavior. The reward would clearly be the prospect of membership. The reward and incentive 
must provide higher pay - offs than the costs of domestic compliance (policy - 
internalization). Since it was not the case in both countries, compliance did not fully take 
place fully, resulting in a weak influence (conditionality) exerted by the Alliance, which 
clearly validates our major hypothesis. Conversely, the Alliance found it increasingly difficult 
to accept an aspirant - country as a member with significant deficits in common identity, 
which is based on the shared values of liberal democracy and the common norms of policy 
formulation/implementation. Since the timeframes for future membership were not defined 
and the existing mechanisms of conditionality do not account for the successful 
implementation of national commitments, the mechanisms of Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), a clear membership prospect as carrot and stick at the same time, seem to be the only 
viable tool that offers better prospects of successful transformation and a greater capacity to 
ensure Georgia‘s compliance with the Alliance‘s norms and procedures. As for Armenia the 
context of the strategic re – orientation (abandoning its alliance with Russia) plays a major 
role for creating general conditions for the enhanced national compliance.     
                                                 
1
 Schimmelfennig, ―NATO‘s Enlargement to the East.‖ 
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Annexes 
 
A.1 U.S. military Assistance Programs and Funding 2004 - 2012   
(Aggregated data sources in thousands of USD) 
 
Account  
FY2004
1
 FY2005
2
 FY2006
3
 FY2007
4
 FY2008
5
 FY2009
6
 FY2010
7
 FY2011
8
 FY2012
9
 
FMF 
 
 
12.000.000 
 
 
11.900.000 
 
11.880.000 
 
9.700.000 
 
9.000.000 
 
11.500.000 
 
16.000.000 
 
15.968.000 
 
14.400.000 
IMET 1.230.000 
 
1.410.000 
 
1.410.000 
 
(1.275.00 
expended) 
 
1.160.000 
 
(0.520.000 
expended) 
0.800.000 1.430.000 
 
1.806.000 
 
1.895.000 1.879.000 
FSA 71.701.000 
 
86.000.000 
 
67.780.000 
 
58.000.000 
 
 52.000.000 - 
estimate, no 
data on 
budgeting  
---- ---- ---- 
Stab. Ops  
& SSR 
---- ---- ---- 21.710.000 
 
15.961.000 – 
estimate, no 
data on 
budgeting 
15.200.000 – 
estimate, no 
data on 
budgeting 
---- ---- ---- 
NADR / Hum. 
Demining 
1.500.000 3.000.000 2.520.000 
 
(3.137.000 - 
expended) 
1.750.000 0.700.000 ---- NADR 
1.300.000 
 
 
 
No further 
detailed data 
NADR 
 2.575.000 
 
 
 
No further 
detailed data 
NADR 
  2.025.000 
 
 
 
No further  
detailed data 
NADR– Sm. Arm 
.Destruct. 
---- ---- ---- 5.115.000 5.570.000 
 
(4.290.000-
expended) 
5.260.000 
PK-Ops 3.000.000 
 
8.000.000 ----   -----  
In Stab. Ops  
 
In Stab. Ops 
---- ---- ---- 
Warsaw 
Initiative 
1.130.000 0.730.000 0.670.000 ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- 
SOF Train & 
Equip 
---- ---- ---- ---- 11.450.000 
 
---- ---- ---- ---- 
DOD Destr. & 
Dismantl. 
---- ---- ---- 34.650.000 66.670.000 
(52.980.000- 
expended) 
71.610.000 
(75.010.000-
expended) 
---- ---- ---- 
 
                                                 
1
 ―Country Assessments and Performance Measures - Georgia,‖ January 2005; ―FY 2004 - 2006 Europe and 
Eurasia,‖ 385. 
2
 ―FY 2005 Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Georgia,‖ U.S. Department of State, accessed 
June 24, 2014, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/65319.pdf; ―FY 2005 - 2007 Europe and 
Eurasia,‖ 409–410. 
3
 ―FY 2006 Funds Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Georgia,‖ U.S. Department of State, accessed 
June 24, 2014, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/93537.pdf; ―FY 2008 Congressional Budget 
Justification FOREIGN OPERATIONS‖ (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Office of U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Resources, 2007), 409, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84462.pdf. 
4
 ―FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,‖ Request by Region - Europe and 
Eurasia (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, February 29, 
2008), 34, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/101440.pdf; ―FY 2007 FSA Funds 
Budgeted for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia,‖ 2, 7. 
5
 ―FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,‖ 34; ―FY 2008 FSA Funds Budgeted for 
U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia,‖ 3, 15. 
6
 ―FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,‖ 34; ―FY 2009 AEECA Funds Budgeted 
for U.S. Government Assistance to Eurasia,‖ 3, 14–15. 
7
 ―FY 2010 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia,‖ Fact Sheet (Office of the Coordinator of 
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, United States Department of State, April 2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/167515.pdf. 
8
 ―FY 2011 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia,‖ Fact Sheet (Office of the Coordinator of 
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, United States Department of State, April 2012), available at 
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/191920.htm. 
9
 ―FY 2012 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Georgia.‖ 
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